In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Ryan Lee Hoyt.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0340

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Ryan Lee Hoyt.

Filed August 31, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-19-603

Daniel P. Repka, Repka Law, L LC, South St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Ryan Lee
Hoyt)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Annsara Lovejoy Elasky, Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Henne pin County Human
Services)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith, Tracy
M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order committing him to the Minnesota
Security Hospital for an indefinite period as mentally ill and dangerous, arguing that the
court should have committed him to a less-restrictive institution and program.
FACTS
In May 2019, appellant Ryan Hoyt assaulted his father and caused an injury that
required six stitches. At the time of the assault, he was on provisional release from a prior

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civil commitment as mentally ill. Subsequently, a representative of the Hennepin County
Department of Human Services and Public Health Department (respondent) petitioned the
district court to civilly commit Hoyt as men tally ill and dangerous (MI&D) to the
Minnesota Security Hospital (MSH). On September 30, following a hearing which
included 57 exhibits, the testimony of two court -appointed examiners, and Hoyt’s own
testimony; the district court granted the petition and issued an order initially committing
Hoyt as MI&D.
Pursuant to applicable statutory provisions, within 60 days of the initial
commitment, D r. Martin Lloyd of MSH filed a report with the district court which
contained the results of Hoyt’s evaluation and his prognosis. Dr. Lloyd also testified at the
hearing following the filing of the 60-day report. The court ordered Hoyt’s indeterminate
commitment at MSH following the hearing. Hoyt appealed, arguing that his commitment
must be reversed because there were less -restrictive alternatives available, that the
respondent failed to meet its burden, and that the district court erred in not selecting them
for commitment.
D E C I S I O N
Civil commitments are governed by statute, and “[o] n appeal, this court is limited
to an examination of the trial court’s compliance with the statute, and the commitment must
be justified by findings based upon evidence at the hearing .” In re Knops , 536 N.W.2d
616, 620 (Minn. 1995); accord Minn. Stat. § 253B.18 (2018) (outlining review and
procedure for commitment of mentally ill and dangerous persons). We will not set aside
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, “ and due regard shall be given to the

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opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness.” Knops, 536 N.W.2d
at 620. “Where the findings of fact rest almost entirely on expert testimony, the trial court’s
evaluation of credibility is of particular significance. ” Id. However, where the question
presented to the reviewing court is wh ether the facts found satisfy the mandates of the
commitment statutes, as the parties agree is the case here, the issue is a legal one we review
de novo. In re Civil Commitment of Stone, 711 N.W.2d 831, 836 (Minn. App. 2006).
If after the first hearing o n a petition for commitment the district court concludes
that the individual at issue is MI&D,
[the court] shall [initially] commit the person to a secure
treatment facility or to a treatment facility willing to accept the
patient under commitment. The court shall commit the patient
to a secure treatment facility unless the patient establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment
program is available that is consistent with the patient ’s
treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a). After the initial commitment, if all procedural
requirements are satisfied, the district court makes “a final determination as to whether the
person should remain committed as a person who is mentally i ll and dangerous to the
public.” Id., subd. 2(a). In addition to dismissing the commitment altogether, the district
court may deem the person either mentally ill or mentally ill and dangerous. Id., subd. 2-
3. Hoyt does not challenge the district court’s determination that he is MI&D, so we turn
to those procedural requirements.
When making the final determination, if the district court finds “ that the patient
continues to be a person who is mentally ill and dangerous . . . the court shall order
commitment of the proposed patient for an indeterminate period of time ,” at which point

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subdivisions 4a-15 of section 253B.18 govern any further discharges, transfers, or changes
in commitment. Id., subd. 3. Hoyt cites In re Schauer for part of his argument t hat his
commitment must be reversed because a less -restrictive alternative to indefinite
commitment at MSH existed. 450 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. App. 1990). In Schauer, the
appellant similarly argued that the district cour t erred because it did not order the least-
restrictive commitment appropriate under the circumstances. Id. at 197. However, as Hoyt
concedes, the appellant’s argument in Schauer was based on a provision in the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Commitment that no longer exists. Id. at 198. That provision was Minn. R.
Civ. Commit. 12.06, and it mandated that when a person is committed indefinitely as
MI&D, as opposed to initially committed as such, the proponent of the commitment was
required to show by clear and c onvincing evidence that no less -restrictive alternative
commitment that serves the needs of the patient and community under the particular
circumstances exists. Id. at 197-98.
Despite rule 12.06 no longer being in effect, Hoyt argues that an existing provision
of the rules of civil commitment—rule 23(e)—applies here. Rule 23(e) states that (1) when
making the final determination on commitment, the district court must consider “all
competent evidence relevant to” the question of the patient’ s continued need for
commitment and (2) the propon ent of continued/indeterminate commitment bears the
burden of demonstrating, with clear and convincing evidence, that the requirements for
commitment in section 253B remain satisfied. Minn. Spec. R. Civ. Commit. & Treat. Act
23(e). Hoyt asserts that this rule, in tandem with subdivision 1(a) section 253B, compels

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the district court and respondent to address less-restrictive alternatives, and he asserts there
was competent and relevant evidence that there were less-restrictive alternatives available.
Hoyt seems to be referring to subdivision 1(a) of section 253B.18, which states that,
during the initial hearing, the court must commit an MI&D person to a secure facility unless
that person “establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a less re strictive treatment
program is available that is consistent with the patient ’s treatment needs and the
requirements of public safety .” Minn. Stat. § 253 B.18, subd. 1(a). Hoyt argues that the
district court was presented with evidence of less-restrictive alternatives in the report and
testimony from Dr. Lloyd. D r. Lloyd listed the services Hoyt would need from
commitment and indicated that MSH had the capacity to provide them, but noted several
times in his submissions that MSH also provided services and a level of security that were
greater than necessary in Hoyt’s particular case. D r. Lloyd opined that there were “any
number of group facilities throughout Minnesota” that had the capacity to provide the
necessary services and lacked some of the unnecessa ry ones. Hoyt points to the fact that
Dr. Lloyd’s statements were uncontested at the hearing, that he made them repeatedly, and
that no other witnesses were calle d to testify on the issue. He argues that respondent
therefore failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that all statutory requirements remain
satisfied under rule 23(e).
We disagree with Hoyt’s reading of the statute and rule. The statute clearly places
the burden of showi ng the availability of a lesser -restrictive alternative on the propose d
patient, and the record shows that Hoyt did not attempt to make such a showing before the
district court. Nevertheless, Hoyt suggests that this burden is on respondent because rule

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23(e) indicates that respondent bears the burden of demonstrating “the s tatutory
requirements for commitment . . . [are] met,” and that because the “less restrictive
alternative” provision is in the statute, the proponent bears the burden of demonstrating
that there are no such alternatives. Here too, we disagree with Hoyt’s reading. Not only
would such a reading blatantly contradict the clear language in subdivision 1(a) that the
burden of showing a less -restrictive alternative by clear and convincing evidence falls on
the patient, but that provision is not a “statutory requ irement for commitment” —it is a
showing the patient may attempt to make to change or improve the terms of the
commitment in the event the proponent does meet its burden of showing that the statutory
requirements for commitment are met. Furthermore, while we need not and therefore do
not answer the question here, we observe that even if Hoyt were correct with respect to the
operation of the law and relative burdens, it is unlikely that Dr. Lloyd’s mere opinion that
there exists less -restrictive alternative facilities—without any further specificity —would
be sufficient to satisfy the showing required by subdivision 1(a).
Affirmed.