State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0348

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Benjamin Bobo, III,
Appellant.

Filed June 1, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-14445

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for first-degree aggravated
robbery, appellant argues that an accomp lice’s trial testimony was not sufficiently
corroborated and that the district court abus ed its discretion in denying his motion for a

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downward dispositional departur e based on his particular am enability to probation. We
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ap pellant Benjamin Bobo with one count
of first-degree aggravated robbery in violat ion of Minnesota Statut es section 609.245,
subdivision 1 (2016). The case proceeded to trial, and the state introduced testimony from
several witnesses, including the victim, a po lice officer, and an accomplice. The jury
returned a guilty verdict. At sentencing, Bobo requ ested a downward dispositional
departure based on his particular amenability to probation. Th e district court denied the
motion. Bobo appeals both the conviction and the sentence. Given the issues raised, we
first summarize the evidence presented at trial and then address the arguments made at the
sentencing hearing.
A. Evidence Presented at Trial
The victim of the robbery, M.C., testified that in 2018, she shared a house with her
boyfriend, K.M. M.C. explained that K.M. bred and sold reptiles and feeder insects from
the house. K.M. also conducted a second business venture out of the house: selling
marijuana. M.C. testified that on June 25, 2018, the acco mplice, Douglas Anderson, and
another man that she did not know unexpectedly came to the house. M.C. had known
Anderson for three or four years because he was friends with K.M. M.C. saw Anderson a
handful of times each month and considered him a friend. Because it was common to have
unplanned visitors, M.C. let Anderson and the other man into the house. In her trial
testimony, M.C. described the other man as an African-American man with “shorter dreads

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. . . to the tips of his ears.” She observed th at he was taller than Anderson and noticed a
tattoo on his neck.
M.C. turned away from the men, took a few steps forward, and heard the clicking
of a gun. She turned around to see that the second man was pointing a gun at her head, and
he threatened to shoot her if she did not do as he said. Anderson we nt downstairs to the
basement to find the marijuana. When Anderson did not retrieve the marijuana right away,
the second man took M. C. to the basement at gunpoint. M.C. gave the two men a bag
containing marijuana. The second man co mmanded that she sit down on the ground and
not move. M.C. complied with the command, and the two men left the house, but not
before stealing M.C.’s purse and $800 in cash that she intende d to use to pay rent. M.C.
called 911 and police were dispatched to M.C.’s house. M.C. testified that she provided a
physical description of the second man to the authorities when she reported the robbery.
A few days later, Sergeant Jeffrey Waite in terviewed M.C. At trial, M.C. testified
that she gave Waite a physical description of the second man. She testified that she told
Waite that the second man was a lighter-skinned, African-American male with tattoos, who
was taller than Anderson, but around the same age as Anderson. After this interview, M.C.
stopped returning Waite’s phone calls and di d not respond to his requests for her to
participate in a photo lineup. In October 20 19, approximately one ye ar and four months
after the June 25, 2018 offense, M.C. agreed to participate in a photo lineup after receiving
a trial subpoena. M.C. testif ied that when she met with Wa ite, she viewed a series of
photographs, each in its own folder. M.C. explained to the jury that she thought the second
man from the robbery could be one of two men pictured in the photos that she viewed. The

4
district court admitted Exhibit 4, which contains the six phot os that M.C. viewed as well
as a form that M.C. filled out stating that she could not specifically or conclusively identify
any of the men in the photos as the second man. M.C. reviewed Exhibit 4 while testifying
at trial and explained that the person pictured in “Photo No. 2” resembled the second man
in two primary respects: the person pictured had a tattoo on his n eck that matches the
placement of the tattoo on the second man’s n eck. According to M. C., the man in Photo
No. 2 also had a skin tone that resembled the second man’s skin tone. M.C. also testified
that the man pictured in Photo No. 3 had eyes that looked like what she remembered of the
second man. On cross-examination, counse l for Bobo confronted M.C. with various
discrepancies that existed from one descripti on to the next. For example, M.C. did not
mention the second man’s neck tattoo during th e 911 call. In addition, although she had
described the second man as having “shorter dreads,” M.C. agreed with counsel for Bobo
that in the second interview a few days after the robbery, she described the second man as
having “medium dreads.”
Anderson also testified at trial, but before he did so, the district court provided the
jury with the model instru ction regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony.
Anderson explained that he on ly knew Bobo as “Goldy,” but that they have known each
other for roughly eight years. Anderson tes tified that he and K.M. would see each other
multiple times a week for many years. Anders on also explained that he would regularly
purchase marijuana from K.M. for personal use. On June 25, 2018, Anderson was with
Bobo at a residence on Emerson Avenue, in Minneapolis. Anderson testified that Bobo
wanted to purchase marijuan a, and Anderson mentioned th at K.M. could sell him the

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marijuana. Anderson then dr ove Bobo to K.M.’s and M.C.’s house so that Bobo could
purchase one ounce of marijuana. Anderson testified that after M.C. let Bobo and him into
the house, he began conversing with M.C. about K.M. who was in the hospital at that time.
While they talked about K.M., Anderson wa s surprised by the sou nd of Bobo cocking a
firearm. According to Anders on, Bobo then ordered Anderson to go get the marijuana.
Anderson went into the baseme nt but pretended that he coul d not find any marijuana.
Eventually, Bobo came downstairs with M.C. at gunpoint. M.C. retrieved a bag containing
marijuana and gave it to Bobo. Bobo and Anderson went back upstairs, and Bobo grabbed
M.C.’s purse before he ran out of the house. Anderson left the house with Bobo, got back
in his car, and drove Bobo ba ck to the residence on Emers on. On cross-examination,
Anderson testified that on June 25, 2018, Bobo had braids, not dreadlocks, that hung down
to his shoulders.
The state also introduced the testimony of Waite, a detective in the robbery division
of the Minneapolis Police Department who inve stigated the robbery. Waite testified that
after reviewing the police report from June 25, 2018, he contacted M.C. and took her
statement. Waite testified that M.C. descri bed the second man as taller than Anderson,
with medium dreads, a dark complexion, and tattoos. Waite also interviewed Anderson.
Waite testified that Anderson knew the seco nd man as Goldy. Based on the address
information that Anderson prov ided for Goldy, Waite obtai ned a picture of the person
Anderson knew as Goldy. Waite confirme d with Anderson that the person who had
committed the robbery was Bobo. Just before trial was to begin in October 2019, Waite
met with M.C. and conducted a photo lineup. Waite explained the process to the jury and

6
testified that while M.C. could not definitiv ely identify the second man, she did pull out
two of the six photos. Waite fu rther testified that M.C. told him that the man pictured in
Photo No. 2 had a tattoo that was similar to the second man and had “the same, exact skin
tone.” Waite then told the jury that the man pictured in Photo No. 2 was Bobo. The jury
considered the evidence presented and returned a guilty verdict.
B. Arguments Made at Sentencing
The presentence investigation (PSI) re port recommended that Bobo receive a
presumptive 48-month prison sentence. Bobo moved for a downward dispositional
departure, arguing that he was particularly amenable to probation. In his sentencing
memorandum, Bobo argued that the following indicated his need for chemical dependency
treatment: the report submitted by the dispositional adviser at the public defender’s office,
the chemical dependency assessment report, and the fact that his attorney moved to
determine his competency at th e initial appearance. In add ition to a need for chemical
dependency treatment, Bobo argued that he was particularly amenable to probation because
of his most recent work history, a favorable report from child protective services about his
parenting abilities, and his suppo rt network of friends and fa mily. At the sentencing
hearing, Bobo presented the te stimony of his boss, who desc ribed Bobo as a valued and
reliable employee as well as a dedicated fathe r. Bobo’s mother and friend also testified
relating to Bobo’s character and parenting abilities. The state opposed the departure
motion, asking for imposition of the presumptiv e sentence. Specifically, the state argued
that Bobo had not take n responsibility for the offense and described the offense as a
particularly “horrendous” crime. The district court agreed with the state, describing the

7
offense as a “horrendous crime” and emphasiz ing the risk to public safety that Bobo
presented given the seriousness of the offense. The district court sentenced Bobo to 48
months in prison.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of Evidence Corroborating Anderson’s Testimony
Bobo argues that the evidence presented did not sufficiently corroborate Anderson’s
testimony.1 We are not convinced. Because the evidence presente d included multiple
descriptions that fit Bobo’s physical appear ance, and because these descriptions exclude
large portions of the general po pulation, we conclude that the state presented sufficient
corroborating evidence linking Bobo to the offense.
Minnesota Statutes section 634.04 (2020) prohibits convictions based solely on the
testimony of an accomplice: “A conviction cannot be had upon th e testimony of an
accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the
defendant of the commission of the offense . . . .” Corroborating evidence is not sufficient
if it “merely shows the commiss ion of the offense or the ci rcumstances thereof.” Minn.
Stat. § 634.034. Instead, the corroborating evidence must also “link or connect the
defendant to the crime.” State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 1980). While the
corroborating evidence “need not establish a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt, it

1 On appeal, Bobo does not identify any e rror regarding the admission of M.C.’s trial
testimony regarding Exhibit 4. Nor does Bobo challenge the suggestiveness of the
identification process in this case.

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must point to [the] defendant’s guilt in some substantial way.” State v. Johnson , 616
N.W.2d 720, 727 (Minn. 2000); State v. Her , 668 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. App. 2003),
review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2003). In addition, the jury must at least be able to “fairly
infer[]” the defendant’s involvement in the crime from the corroborating evidence. Adams,
295 N.W.2d at 533.
When considering whether th e record included evidence sufficient to corroborate
accomplice testimony, appellate courts consid er whether the corrobo rating evidence is
“weighty enough to restore confidence in th e truth of the accomplice’s testimony.” State
v. Clark , 755 N.W.2d 241, 253 (Minn. 2008) ( quotation omitted). Importantly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[i] dentification testimony need not be positive
and certain; it is enough for a witness to testify that it is his opinion, belief, impression, or
judgment that the defendant is the person he saw commit the crime.” State v. Harris, 405
N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn. 1987) (quotations omitted) (concluding that a witness’s statement
that the witness was only “kin d of sure, pretty sure” that Harris was involved sufficiently
corroborated the accomplice’s testimony to affirm the conviction). This court must view
the sufficiency of corroboratin g evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
resolving all conflicting evidence in favor of the jury’s verdict. State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d
257, 264 (Minn. 2019).
During the trial in this case, the state asked M.C. to describe the physical appearance
of the person who pointed a gun at her during the robbery. In addition to this testimony,
M.C. and Waite testified regarding three prior occasions in wh ich M.C. provided
descriptions of this man: when M.C. reported the robbery to authorities on June 25, 2018;

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when Waite interviewed M.C. a few days after the robbery; and when M.C. participated in
the photo lineup just prior to trial. M.C. described multiple physi cal attributes of the
gunman, describing him as a light-skinned African Ameri can man, who was noticeably
taller than Anderson and around the same age as Anderson, with a tattoo on his neck. Each
of these descriptors—height, race, skin tone, age, and unique tattoo placement—fit Bobo’s
appearance and connect him to the crime. Taken togethe r, these identifying descriptors
exclude a significant enough proportion of the general population to sufficiently
corroborate Anderson’s testimony that Bobo was the gunman involved in the robbery.
Bobo argues that the identifi cation evidence provided by M.C. is too uncertain to
sufficiently corroborate Anderson’s identification of Bobo given vari ous discrepancies in
her descriptions. For example, Bobo emphasizes that M.C. initially stated that the gunman
had “shorter dreads” while Anderson testified that on June 25, 2018, Bobo had braids, not
dreadlocks, that hung down to his shoulders. We are not persuaded that the discrepancies
identified by Bobo required the jury to discou nt or disregard the state’s corroborating
evidence for two reasons. First, Bobo raised each discrepancy through cross-examination
at trial, and we are bound by the well-establ ished caselaw requiring deference to a jury’s
weighing of conflicting evidence. See Smith, 932 N.W.2d at 264 (requiring this court to
resolve all conflicting evidence in favor of the jury’s verdict). Second, M.C.’s testimony
need not be positive or certain, but instead need only point to Bobo’s guilt to a sufficient
degree for the jury to fair ly infer Bobo’s involvement from Anderson’s testimony. See
Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at 727; Harris, 405 N.W.2d at 226, 228; Adams, 295 N.W.2d at 533;
Her, 668 N.W.2d at 927. We conclude that, like the witness in Harris who was only “kind

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of sure, pretty sure” of the identification, M.C.’s testimony is sufficient corroboration of
Anderson’s testimony for the jury to infer Bobo’s involvement despite the discrepancies in
her prior descriptions.
II. Exercise of Sentencing Discretion
Bobo also challenges the denial of his departure motion at sentencing. We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its sent encing discretion when it determined that no
compelling circumstances existed to justify a probationary sentence.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guid elines establish sentences that are presumptively
appropriate. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2017). The district court must
pronounce a presumptive sentence “unless th ere exist identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Id. The guidelines provide a
nonexclusive list of factors that may be used to suppor t a departure. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.3 (Supp. 2017). A district court is not required to grant a departure even if
there are grounds that woul d justify a departure. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668
(Minn. 2006); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3 (p roviding that the factors “may” be used to
depart). It is also well-established that dist rict courts may consid er both offense-related
and offender-related factors wh en deciding whether to gran t a request for dispositional
departure. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) (“For a downward
dispositional departure, a district court may consider both offende r- and offense-related
factors.”); see also, e.g., State v. Allen , 706 N.W.2d 40, 46 (M inn. 2005) (“Upward
dispositional departures under the guidelines may be based on either offender- or offense-
related aggravating factors.”); State v. Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1995) (stating

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that “offense-related aggravating factors may be used to support not only such a
dispositional departure but, alte rnatively, an upward dura tional departure” (emphasis
omitted)). Only in a “rare case” will an appellate court reverse a district court’s refusal to
depart. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). We review a district court’s denial
of dispositional departure requests for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d
303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014).
In this case, Bobo argued for a downward dispositional departure based on particular
amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(7). For a departure to be warranted on th is basis, the defendant must
be particularly amenable to probatio n—meaning that “the de fendant’s amenability to
probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial
and compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d
at 309 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (listing
factors relevant to particular amenability, including age, criminal history, remorse,
cooperation, attitude while in court, and th e support of friends or family). Bobo argued
that he was particularly amenable to pr obation because of his need for chemical
dependency treatment, his most recent work history, a favorable report from child
protective services about his parenting abilitie s, and his support ne twork of friends and
family. The district court properly weighe d the evidence and arguments in favor of a
probationary sentence, but ultimately conclu ded that these argumen ts did not compel a
departure. The district court described the offense as a “horrendous crime” and emphasized
the risk to public safety th at Bobo presented given the seriousness of the offense. We

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discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reasoni ng or in the imposition of the
presumptive sentence.
Affirmed.