State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0349

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Francisco Meffert,
Appellant.

Filed December 14, 2020
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-18-903

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Steven P. Groschen, David A. Samb, Kohlmeyer Hagen La w Office, Chtd., Mankato,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pr esiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
GAΪTAS, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction of driving after cancellation—inimical to
public safety, appellant Robert Francisco Meffe rt argues that the district court erred in

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finding no seizure where a police officer request ed and took Meffert’s driver’s license to
his squad car for a records check. We conclude that even if Meffert was seized, the officer
had reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a limited investigatory seizure. We affirm.
FACTS
At around midnight on September 28, 201 8, a police officer on patrol duty drove
through a gas station parking lot in Worthington, Minnesota. As he did so, he noticed a
car parked on a side of the building where customers do not generally park. He saw a
person in the driver’s seat of the car. That person had a hood pulled over his head and was
slouched down, but appeared to be awake. Th e officer found this suspicious and parked
across the street from the gas station to monitor the person.
After ten minutes, the individual in the car had not moved, and the officer drove
back into the gas station parking lot. The officer did not activate the squad car’s emergency
lights or spotlight, and he parked well behind the parked car in a way that did not block it.
After parking his squad car, the officer approached the parked car on foot, where he spoke
with the sole occupant, later identified as Meffert, through the front passenger-side
window.
The officer asked Meffert if he was okay and if he was waiting for someone,
explaining that he noticed Meffert had been there for a while. Meffert responded that the
exhaust on his car was broken and that he need ed to get it fixed. Th e officer replied that
this was okay; he just wanted to make sure that Meffert was not “staking out the place or
something like that.” He then asked Meffert if he had any identification, explaining that
he wanted to “cover his bases” in case the gas station calle d about Meffert sitting in the

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parking lot. The two continued to converse as Meffert handed over his driver’s license.
The officer then asked Meffert if he had been drinking, noting that his eyes looked very
red and bloodshot. Meffert repl ied that he had not, and th e officer asked him to “hang
tight” while he checked his driver’s license in the squad car.
When the officer ch ecked Meffert’s driver’s license , he learned that it had been
canceled as inimical to public safety. He went back to speak with Meffert again, inquiring
further about the exhaust problem. The office r then asked Meffert whether he had been
driving, and Meffert replied that he had not. When the officer asked who drove the car to
the gas station, Meffert replied “an imaginary person.” Meffert then admitted to driving.
The officer arrested Meffert for driving with a canceled license.
The state charged Meffert with driving afte r cancellation—inimical to public safety,
Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2018). Meffert moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that
the police officer had seized him in violation of the Minnesota Constitution by requesting
and taking his driver’s license without a reas onable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. After a contested omnibus hearing, the district court denied the suppression
motion, concluding that there had been no seizure. Meffert then had a stipulated-facts court
trial to preserve the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress for appellate review.
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Meffert guilty and sentenced
him to 365 days in jail, with 361 days stayed and credit for four days of time served.
This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress evidence,
an appellate court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo.
State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011). When the facts are not in dispute,
whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred is reviewed de novo. State v. Burbach,
706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005).
The Minnesota Constitution, like the Unite d States Constitution, protects “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers , and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; accord U.S. Const. amend.
IV. A seizure occurs “when [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d
779, 781 (Minn. 1993) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879
n.16 (1968)); see also State v. Harris , 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999); State v. Cripps,
533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). To determine whether a person has been seized under
the Minnesota Constitution, we apply the Mendenhall-Royer standard. Harris, 590
N.W.2d at 98; see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Under that
standard, “a person has been seized if in vi ew of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have belie ved that he or she was neither free to
disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.” Cripps, 533 N.W.2d at
391; see also E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 780.

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If a seizure occurs and is unreasonable, then all evidence obtained as a result of the
seizure must be suppressed. Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 99. Generally, warrantless searches
and seizures are per se unreasonable. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 33 (Minn. 2016). But
a police officer may initiate a li mited, investigatory stop with out a warrant if the officer
has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d
128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880). The parties agree,
and the record supports, that any seizure in this case was a limited, investigatory stop
subject to this standard.
Meffert argues that the po lice officer seized him bot h when he asked whether
Meffert had any identification and when he took Meffert’s identification to the squad car.
He contends that the seizure was unconstitu tional because the officer did not have the
necessary reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain him to check his driver’s license.
The state responds that Meffert was ne ver seized within the meaning of the
Minnesota Constitution and that, even if he was, the seizure was not unconstitutional
because the officer’s observations of Meffert provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for
a limited, investigatory stop.
We agree with the state that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to
request and check Meffert’s driver’s license. Thus, we need not deci de whether or when
Meffert was seized during the encounter with the officer.
As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether this court should analyze the
reasonableness of the alleged seizure because the district court determined that no seizure
occurred and it did not reach the question of reas onableness. The state urges us to affirm

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the district court’s suppression decision on the alternative ground of reasonableness, while
Meffert requests that we reverse the district court’s ruling on whether a seizure occurred
and remand to the district court to decide whether the seizure was justified.
Although questions that a district court did not decide are generally not amenable to
appellate review, this rule is not “ironclad.” Putz v. Putz , 645 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn.
2002); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11 (sta ting that “[o]n appeal from a judgment,
the court may review any order or ruling of the district cour t or any other matter, as the
interests of justice require”). A well-establis hed exception allows an appellate court to
consider an issue when that issue is plainly decisive of the entire controversy and the lack
of a district court ruling causes no possible advantage or disadvantage to either party.
Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357, 363 n.6 (Minn. 2007). Moreover, “[a] respondent can
raise alternative arguments on appeal in defense of the underlying decision when there are
sufficient facts in the record for the appellate court to consider the alternative theories,
there is legal support for the arguments, and the alternative grounds would not expand the
relief previously granted.” State v. Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003).
The reasonableness question is plainly dispositive of the controversy, as only
unreasonable searches and seizures are unconstitutional. See Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The
issue was raised and argued in the district court, and both parties fully briefed it on appeal.
And the facts appear to be largely undisput ed; the suppression hearing was brief and the
evidence straightforward. At the suppression hearing, the o fficer testified about why he
found Meffert’s conduct suspicious, and he included that information in his police report,
which was entered as evidence. We accordingly see no possible advantage or disadvantage

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to either party if we consider the issue without a remand, and we elect to do so in the interest
of judicial efficiency. See, e.g. , State v. Faber , 343 N.W.2d 659, 660 (Minn. 1984)
(addressing a question then properly before it in the interest of judicial economy).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on spec ific, articulable facts that allow the
officer to be able to articulate . . . that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43
(quotations omitted). “[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires
more than an unartic ulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake , 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.
2008) (quotations omitted). Courts consider the totality of the circumstances when
determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846,
852 (Minn. 1998). In doing so, they “acknow ledge that trained law enforcement officers
are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of
an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
The officer testified that his suspicions were aroused when he noticed Meffert
parked on the side of a gas station, where cu stomers do not generally park, late at night.
Meffert was slouched down in the vehicle with a hood pulled over his head, but he did not
appear to be sleeping. Th e officer observed Meffert for about ten minutes and, when
Meffert remained in this position, the officer went to speak with him. As he was speaking
with Meffert, the officer noted that Meffert’s eyes looked red and bl oodshot as if he had
been drinking. These specific facts articulated by the officer show that he had an objective
basis for requesting and scanning Meffert’s driver’s license, and that he was not acting on
a mere hunch. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43; Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393. In other

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words, the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. We therefore
conclude that any seizure of Meffert did not violate his rights under the Minnesota
Constitution.
Affirmed.