State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0357

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ronny Ray Oleson,
Appellant.

Filed January 11, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Renville County District Court
File No. 65-CR-19-210

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Torgelson, Renville County Attorney, Olivia, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abuse d its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure from the presumptive sentence under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Ronny Ray Oleson with eight counts of criminal sexual
conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.344, subd. 1(c), .345, subd. 1(c) (2012), alleging
generally that Oleson used force or coercion to accomplish multiple acts of sexual contact
with, and penetration of, his stepdaughter (the victim) between June 2013 and April 2014.
Oleson pleaded guilty in October 2019 to one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (penetration accomplished by force or
coercion), and the district court set the matter on for sentencing.
Corrections conducted a presentence investigation (PSI) and reported the following
circumstances. At the time of the PSI , Oleson was 60 years old. Oleson maintained
minimal contacts with his family, and his wife had recently informed him she would be
filing for divorce. Oleson’s criminal history included a July 2019 conviction for second -
degree criminal sexual conduct based on Oleson’s sexual contact with a child. As part of
that proceeding, Oleson had completed a psychosexual evaluation rec ommending that
Oleson complete in -patient sex -offender treatment. After conducting a follow -up
assessment, a psychologist determined that Oleson was eligible for in -patient treatment,

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reporting that Oleson’s offense history and presentation suggested that he would benefit
from therapy and would pose a minimal risk to public safety.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines established a presumptive 62 -month prison
commitment with a durational range of 53 to 74 months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B
(Supp. 2013). Corrections recommended that the district court impose the presumptive
62-month sentence. Oleson moved for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that
he was particularly amenable to probation and treatment in a probationary setting. The
state, meanwhile, moved for an upward departure, but the district court denied the request.
He emphasized that he was remorseful and motivated to seek treatment and rehabilitation.
The parties appeared for a hearing on the departure motion and sentencing . The
victim’s stepmother testified that Oleson controlled the victim, groomed her, manipulated
her, and isolated her. The victim’s father testified that Oleson’s crime hurt the victim and
their family and that they all faced a long road of recovery due to Oleson’s s elfishness.
The victim’s mother (Oleson’s wife at the time) testified that she was divorcing Oleson.
The victim testified, describing Oleson’s criminal sexual conduct and how he had betrayed
her trust. She recalled how her fear of Oleson kept her from t elling others about his
conduct, how she felt isolated and depressed, and how she had contemplated suicide. She
also testified that Oleson lied when she revealed what he had done to her.
Oleson also testified, informing the district court that he was sorry for what he had
done. He claimed he was willing to complete treatment and any other programming the
district court might order, and he assured the district court that he was willing to comply
with any and all probationary conditions.

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The district court denied Oleson’s motion, reasoning that he failed to demonstrate
particular amenability to probation as follows:
I don’t disagree with defense [counsel] and Mr. Oleson that he
is accepted into the treatment program, that he would benefit
from that treatment program and that he wants to go to the
treatment program. I don’t see anything in the record in terms
of Mr. Oleson’s particular amenability however to treatment.
It’s typical that people . . . when faced with a prison sentence
would rather do treatment th[a]n prison and they seek out
treatment options available and they . . . avail themselves of
those options. However, other than that there’ s nothing in the
record and nothing that the Court can point to that . . . I would
be able to find a substantial and compelling reason to show that
you’re particular[ly] amenable to treatment. You’re certainly
amenable, but . . . there’s no factor that the C ourt can find or
has heard that would allow me to determine that you’re
particularly amenable. This is a long -term issue, long -term
incidents. The fact that you want to better yourself and
determine why . . . this happened and [make sure] it never
[happens] again is certainly . . . amenable and something that
we want all these defendants to do, but at this point I would
deny the motion to depart downward due to the fact that there’s
no substantial and compelling reasons to find that Mr. Oleson
is particularly amenable to probation.
The district court adjudicated the conviction and sentenced Oleson to 74 months in prison,
the highest duration within the presumptive range. The district court explained its decision
to impose the 74-month sentence as follows:
From what I’ve . . . heard here today from the devastating
nature of the acts[,] from the particular vulnerability of the
victim, of the [e]ffects that the acts have had on the victim, the
family and the community[,] I don’t believe there [is] any
question that Mr. Oleson should receive[ ] [a] top of the box
disposition in this matter.
This appeal follows.

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DECISION
Oleson challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a downward
dispositional departure from the presumptive sente nce under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines, arguing that the district court failed to consider mitigating circumstances and
erroneously concluded that nothing in the record demonstrated Oleson’s particular
amenability to probation. We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). We will reverse a district
court’s refusal to depart only in “rare” cases. State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn.
1981).
The Minnesota Sentenc ing Guidelines establish presumptively appropriate
sentences and the district court “must pronounce a sentence within the applicable range
unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a
sentence outside the appropri ate range.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2013).
Whether a dispositional departure is appropriate typically depends on a defendant’s
individual characteristics. State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). “[A]
defendant’s particular amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting
will justify departure in the form of a stay of execution of a presumptively executed
sentence.” State v. Trog , 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (emphasis added); see also
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2 .D.3.a.(7) (Supp. 2015) (adding particular amenability to
enumerated list of mitigating reasons supporting departure). The Trog court described
several factors relevant to a defendant’s particular amenability , including age, criminal
record, remorse, coop eration, attitude, and support network. 323 N.W.2d at 31 . A

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defendant’s motivation to reform is also relevant. See State v. Hennessy, 328 N.W.2d 442,
443 (Minn. 1983).
We reject Oleson’s argument that the district court failed to “fully consider . . . the
positive remarks in the psychosexual evaluation update letter ” and his “desire to seek out
both chemical dependency and sex-offender treatment to change his behavior.” The district
court did not disregard those circumstances; it instead explicitly recognized “that [Oleson]
is accepted into the treatment program, that he would benefit from that treatment program,”
and “that he wants to go to the treatment program.” The district court concluded that these
circumstances failed to establish Oleson’s particular amenability by explaining that a
willingness to complete treatment was “typical” of a defendant facing a prison sentence
and that a desire for rehabilitation was something that courts expect of “ all defendants.”
(Emphasis added.) The district cour t’s analysis is consistent with our understanding —
“particular” amenability is that which renders a defendant “exceptional” and “distinguishes
the defendant from most others.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309.
Oleson also argues that the district court “failed to fully consider” the Trog factors.
But, as we have explained, a district court’s failure to explicitly analyze the Trog factors is
not an abuse of discretion so long as the record demonstrates that the district court carefully
considered the reasons offered for and against the departure motion. State v. Pegel , 795
N.W.2d 251, 254-55 (Minn. App. 2011); see also State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925
(Minn. App. 2013) (“ We will affirm the imposition of a presum ptive guidelines sentence
when the record shows that the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and
information presented before making a determination.” (quotation omitted)), review denied

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(Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). We conclude that the district court, h aving reviewed Oleson’s
departure memorandum and the PSI, and having heard both testimony and oral argument,
carefully considered the reasons for and against departure and did not abuse its discretion
by failing to conduct a more explicit analysis.
Oleson argues that “the district court’s finding that it could not find anything in the
record to show that [he] was particularly amenable was error.” But the district court has
the discretion to determine whether circumstances are substantial and compelling so as to
permit departure. See State v. Walker , 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) (“ The
district court considered evidence of factors that could have supported a departure if they
had been substantial or compelling , but concluded that a departure was not warran ted.”
(emphasis added)). Here too, the district court considered factors that might have
supported a departure “if they had been substantial or compelling.” Id. But having
considered Oleson’s primary reasons for a departure, the district court acted wit hin its
discretion by concluding that Oleson demonstrated mere amenability to probation but
failed to demonstrate his particular amenability to probation. This is not one of the “rare”
cases warranting reversal.
Affirmed.