Larry Francis Stevens, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0358

Larry Francis Stevens, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed November 23, 2020
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-CV-19-964

Jay S. Adkins, Godwin Dold, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney Genera l, William Young, Assistant A ttorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pr esiding Judge; Hooten , Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Larry Stevens appeals the district court’s order sustaining the revocation
of his driver’s license after his arrest for im paired driving. Speci fically, Stevens alleges
that a state trooper violated his federal an d state constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures by (1) en tering the deck of his home without first

2
obtaining a search warrant and (2) unlawfully seizing him by knocking on his sliding-glass
door and asking him to step outside. Because the trooper reasonably believed that the deck
facing the driveway was an entrance open to the public, and the trooper did not unlawfully
seize Stevens by knocking on the door and asking him to talk, we conclude that Stevens’s
constitutional rights were not violated. We affirm.
FACTS1
On the night of September 5, 2019, a Minn esota State Patrol Trooper was dispatched
to an accident in Elgin. Di spatch informed the trooper th at a single vehicle had crashed
and the driver was potentially impaired. When the trooper arrived at the scene, he observed
a pickup truck that had been removed fro m a ditch and was now parked in a nearby
driveway. He spoke with a medical technici an who was still on scene. The medical
technician told the trooper th at the driver had walked up the driveway to his house.
According to the medical techni cian, the driver admitted he ha d been at a bar in Elgin.
Preparing for a possible drunk-driving investigation, the trooper asked another officer who
was en route to bring a preliminary-breath-test unit to the house at the top of the driveway.
Then, the trooper walked up the dark driveway to make contact with the driver.
The property had a unique layout. The dr iveway was long and steep, leading to a
two-story house on a hill. On the left side of the house, stairs went up to an unlit door on
the second level. The driveway ended near an attached garage w ith a deck on top. A
darkened door next to the garage appeared to enter the garage. The deck, located directly

1 Our summary of the facts is based on the evidence presented at Stevens’s implied-consent
hearing before the district court.

3
above the garage, was visible from the driveway. It was accessed via a short walkway
alongside the house, which led to a small gate and stairway. On the deck, the house could
be entered from a door and a separate sliding-glass door. That night, the only light on the
property was emanating from the sliding-glass door.
The trooper approached the house from the walkway on the right side, which led to
the deck. He chose this rout e because the “light was on, a nd it just seemed like a natural
way to approach the house.” He could not recall whether the gate leading to the steps was
open or closed.
When the trooper reached th e deck, he could see Stevens through the sliding-glass
door. Stevens was sitting at a table, slumped over. The trooper knocke d on the glass.
Stevens seemed unsteady as he stood up from the table and approached the door. He slid
the door open.
The trooper, who had Stevens’s car keys, told Stevens that he was there to talk about
the crash. Stevens seemed confused at first, denying any crash. The trooper asked Stevens
to step outside to discuss the accident. He requested Stevens’s identification and told him
that he needed to file an accident report. During their interaction, the trooper noticed that
Stevens smelled of alcohol and was slurring his speech. Stevens eventually admitted that
he had been at a bar in Elgin, but he said he could not recall how much he had to drink.
Ultimately, Stevens exited the home and the trooper conducted field sobriety tests, assisted
by other officers who had arrived. Stevens was then arrested for driving while impaired.

4
Following his arrest, the commissioner of public safety revoked Stevens’s driving
privileges under Minn. Stat . §§ 169A.50-.53 (2018). 2 Stevens requested an implied-
consent hearing and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the trooper had violated
his federal and state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
by entering his deck without a s earch warrant and seizing him. The district court held an
evidentiary hearing on St evens’s motion. The trooper and Stevens’s son testified at the
hearing. After the hearing, the district court denied Stevens’s motion to suppress and
sustained the revocation of Stevens’s driving privileges. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
The United States and Minnesota Constituti ons prohibit law enforcement officers
from conducting “unreasonable searches and se izures.” U.S. Const. amend IV; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 10. In a challenge to the constitutionality of a search or seizure, the
government has the burden of establishing that the evidence was lawfully obtained. State
v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. 2018).
The district court concluded that the commi ssioner of public safety satisfied this
burden. First, the court determined that Stevens’s deck was an area open to public use, and
that the trooper entered the deck to perform a valid “knock and talk,” which did not amount
to a search requiring a warrant. Second, the district court held that the trooper had probable
cause to arrest Stevens, and therefore, there was no unlawful seizure.

2 Additionally, the state charge d Stevens with one count of third-degree driving while
impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2018) (refusal), and one count of
fourth-degree driving while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (2018).

5
Stevens challenges the district court’s lega l conclusions. In reviewing a district
court’s order denying a motion to suppress, a ppellate courts review factual findings for
clear error and legal determinations de novo. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn.
2012).
I. The trooper did not perform a search th at required a search warrant when he
entered Stevens’s deck.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions pr ohibit police from entering
constitutionally protected areas without a warran t, with limited exceptions. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 578 (Minn.
2003). This constitutional protection extends to all places where an individual has a
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” See State v. Chute , 908 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Minn.
2018). “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Ame ndment, the home is first among equals.”
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). Given the sanctity of the
home, the constitutional protection against government intrusion also encompasses the area
“immediately surrounding and a ssociated with the home.” Id. (quoting Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984)). This area is often called the
curtilage. Id. An area is considered curtilage for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment if
it “harbors the ‘intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a [person’s] home and the
privacies of life.’” Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S. Ct.
at 1742).
The parties agree that Stev ens’s outdoor deck, which abuts his home, is part of the
curtilage. There is no dispute, therefore, that the deck garnered constitutional protection.

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The next question in evaluating Steven s’s constitutional claim is whether the
trooper’s act of entering the deck—the curtila ge of Stevens’s home—was a search that
required a warrant. A search occurs when law enforcement office rs seek evidence by
invading an individual’s reasonable expecta tion of privacy or by trespassing on private
property. Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 583 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88
S. Ct. 507, 516 (1967) (H arlan J. concurring) and United States v. Jones , 565 U.S. 400,
404-05, 411, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)). Although the home is sacrosanct, not all
intrusions onto the curtilage of the home are constitutionally offensive. The law recognizes
that homeowners typically grant an “implied license” for visitors to approach the home for
ordinary business, such as delivering mail. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.
Even when a visitor is a police officer, an intrusion onto the curtilage may not be a search.
See id. An officer may enter the curtilage of a home without a search warrant so long as
the officer remains within the scope of any implied license and has a legitimate reason to
be there. See Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 586; see also State v. Crea , 233 N.W.2d 736, 739
(Minn. 1975) (“[P]olice may walk on the sidewalk and onto the porch of a house and knock
on the door if they are conducting an investigation and want to question the owner . . . .”).
As an initial matter, the district court found that Stevens’s deck was impliedly open
for public use. In determining whether curtilage is impliedly open, courts should consider
customary social norms. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9, 133 S. Ct. at 1415-16. A door knocker,
for example, implies an invitation or license to approach the door. Id. (citation omitted).
Additionally, courts must consid er the individual features of the property at issue. “The
particular layout and use of a property may show that the hom eowner allows visitors to

7
seek them out from the back door or other locations on the property.” Chute, 908 N.W.2d
at 586 (citing United States v. Shuck, 713 F.3d 563, 568 (10th Cir. 2013)).
We agree with the district court that the deck was implie dly open for public use.
Although there were multiple do ors to Stevens’s house, each accessible in some fashion
from the driveway, none of th ese doors were illuminated as the trooper made his way
toward the house in the dark to make contact with the pickup truck driver. The deck area
was illuminated, however. This was not a deck in the rear of the house. It was atop the
garage, which intersected the driveway. And because it was plainly visible from the
driveway, anyone entering the property could see the deck area. Moreover, the deck
appeared to be a central acce ss point to the home, if not the central access point. The
trooper was certainly under the impression that he was approaching the front door when he
walked to the deck. According to his testimony, this seemed to be the “natural way” to get
to the house. Given the particular layout of Stevens’s house, the district court did not err
in concluding that the deck was impliedly open for public use.
Next, we must consider whether the troope r acted within the scope of the implied
license when he entered the deck and appr oached the sliding-gl ass door. An implied
license to enter the curtilage of a home does not allow unfettered acce ss to the property.
The scope of an implied license is limited. There is a “spatial limitation”—an officer
cannot deviate from the path that a vis itor to a home might reasonably take. See Chute,
908 N.W.2d at 586-87 (citing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10, 133 S. Ct. at 1416). There is a
“purpose limitation”—an officer’s purpose must be limited to what a “private citizen might
do” when visiting the property , such as knocking on the door to make contact with the

8
property owner. Id. at 588. And there is a temporal limitation—an officer can enter the
curtilage only briefly unless invited to stay longer. Id. at 588.
The district court concluded that the troo per engaged in a valid “knock-and-talk,”
noting that he went directly to the illuminated sliding-gl ass door he observed from the
driveway with the sole purpose of investigating the accident. See Chute, 908 N.W.2d at
581 n.1 (stating that a “knock-and-talk”—“a procedure used by law enforcement officers
that involves ‘knocking on the door and seeking to speak to an occupant for the purpose of
gathering evidence’”—is not a search (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 21, 133 S. Ct. at 1423
(Alito, J. dissenting))).
We agree with the district court that the trooper did not exceed the limitations of the
implied license. First, the trooper’s path up the driveway, up the walkway, through the
gate, and onto the deck was w ithin the spatial scope of the implied license. The trooper
went directly to the most obvious place to make contact with the homeowner—a lit area
that appeared to be a primary access point to the house. Likewise, his decision to approach
the illuminated sliding-glass door was within the scope of the license. A visitor hoping to
find the homeowner after dark likely would ha ve selected the door where the light was
coming from, which was just steps from the doorway on the deck.
Second, the trooper complied with the purp ose limitation of the implied license.
The purpose limitation requires police to enter a home’s curtilage only to establish contact
with the homeowner. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. Here, the trooper’s
sole purpose in approaching th e sliding-glass door was to make contact with Stevens,
which he immediately did.

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Finally, the trooper complied with the tem poral limitation of the implied license.
The time spent on Stevens’s pr operty was brief and lasted only as long as necessary to
investigate the accident.
Considering all the circumstances, including the layout of Stevens’s home and the
fact that the trooper entered Stevens’s propert y to investigate an acc ident that had just
occurred near the end of Stevens’s driveway, we agree with the district court that there was
no trespassory search requiring a warrant. The trooper did not violate the federal or state
constitutions in accessing the home via the deck.
II. The trooper did not un lawfully seize Stevens.

Under the Minnesota Constitution, which o ffers more protection than the Fourth
Amendment, a seizure occurs when, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have belie ved that he or she was neither free to
disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.” 3 State v. Harris, 590
N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (quoting State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995));
see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554 (1980). Some of the circumstances suggesting that an individual has been seized
include (1) the presence of mu ltiple officers, (2) the display of a weapon, (3) physical
touching of the individual, (4) the use of language or tone indicating that compliance with

3 In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court held th at a seizure occurs under th e Fourth Amendment when the
police use physical force or a person submits to a police show of authority. Following the
Hodari decision, our supreme court declined to follow this holding, concluding that the
Minnesota Constitution affords more protection than the federal constitution. In re E.D.J.,
502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993).

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the police may be compelled. Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
554-55). Absent any such evidence, “otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of
the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seiz ure of that person.”
Id. at 98 (quotation omitted).
We do not believe that the trooper’s conduct amounted to a seizure. A seizure
occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Cripps, 533 N.W.2d at 391 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 18 68, 1879 n.16 (1968)). The trooper’s act of knocking on the
sliding-glass door and asking Stevens to come outside did not restrain Stevens’s liberty.
Even if the trooper did seize Stevens, however, not every seizure automatically
violates the constitution. Where an officer has probable cause to believe that a driver is
impaired, the officer can lawfully seize and arrest the driver. See State v. Laducer , 676
N.W.2d 693, 697-98 (Minn. App. 2004); Minn. Stat. § 629.34, subd. 1 (2018) (authorizing
a warrantless arrest when an officer has probable cause to believe person arrested
committed a crime). Probable cause to arrest exists when the objective facts are such that
“a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of the circumstances
objectively, would entertain an honest and stro ng suspicion that a specific individual has
committed a crime.” State v. Ortega , 770 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn. 2009) (emphasis
omitted); In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 694-95 (Minn. 1997).
We agree with the district court that the trooper had probable cause to arrest Stevens
for driving while impaired at the outset of their encounter. The trooper knew that a driver
had left the scene of a single-car accident and walked to the home. He was aware that the

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driver had admitted to coming from a bar. The only light emanating from the home was at
the sliding-glass door, where the trooper fo und Stevens. And while the trooper stood
outside the door, he saw that Stevens—who was slumped over a table, and then was
unsteady on his feet—appeared to be impaired . Given these circumstances, the trooper
was entitled to seize Stevens without a warrant. See Heuton v. Comm’r Pub. Safety , 541
N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. App. 1995) (finding that a single-car accident, in conjunction with
a medical professional’s report of an odor of alcohol on the drive r’s breath, provided
probable cause to arrest driver).
The record supports the district court’s factual findings, and the district court
correctly concluded that the trooper did not conduct a search and had probable cause to
arrest Stevens for impaired dr iving. Thus, we affirm the district court’s order denying
Stevens’s motion to suppress and sustaining the revocation of his driver’s license.
Affirmed.