State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0360

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rafeti Alexander de Sala de la Rosa,
Appellant.

Filed February 1, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-6069

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Police arrested appellant after a confidential informant gave officers a picture of a
man and told them that he would arrive at a location within a general timeframe with
cocaine. After the arrest, o fficers discovered cocaine in the back seat of the Uber vehicle

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carrying appellant, and in his home through a later warranted search. Respondent charged
appellant with three controlled-substance crimes. Appellant moved to suppress all
evidence found in the search of the Uber vehicle and his home. The district court denied
his motion. After a trial on stipulated evidence, the district court found appellant guilty of
all charges. In this appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence on the ground that the evidence was the fruit of his unlawful arrest. We agree,
and reverse and remand.
FACTS
Officer Schroeder first met and arrested the confidential informant (CI) in this case
a day before appellant Rafeti Alexander de Sala de la Rosa’s arrest. CI agreed to “work[]
off” CI’s own case by providing information to Officer Schroeder. This was CI’s first time
providing information to law enforcement. The day of CI’s arrest , CI told Officer
Schroeder that within the previous 72 hours CI bought narcotics from a drug dealer near
40th Street and Chicago Avenue in Minneapolis and had witnessed this drug dealer selling
narcotics in the past. CI did not know th e drug dealer’s name or address. The next day,
CI told Officer Schroeder that within a timeframe, this drug dealer would deliver cocaine
to the area of Conga Latin Bistro on Hennepin and Central Avenue in Northeast
Minneapolis. CI provided Officer Schroeder a Facebook profile picture of this drug dealer
and told Officer Schroeder that the drug dealer was a DJ at the Conga Latin Bist ro. The
Facebook picture lacked a full name.
Shortly after Officer Schroeder received this tip, he began conducting surveillance
of the Conga Latin Bistro from a Wells Fargo parking lot located nearby. Within 45

3
minutes, an Uber vehicle (Uber) pulled into the Wells Fargo parking lot. In the Uber,
Officer Schroeder saw two people: a driver and appellant seated in the backseat on the
passenger’s side. The Uber did not commit any traffic violations a s it approached the
parking lot , but Officer Sc hroeder believed that the Facebook picture provided by CI
matched appellant so he radioed other officers.
It is unclear from the record whether the Uber stopped on its own or if officers
stopped the Uber. Nonetheless, a t gun point, officers approached the Uber, pulled both
occupants out of the Uber, arrested them, and placed them in handcuffs. Once in handcuffs,
officers searched both occupants for weapons and placed them in the backseats of squad
cars. Officers then transported both occupants to the police station . Officers did not
question either occupant or confirm any information before or during their stop or arrest.
Only after officers arrested the driver did they learn that he was an Uber driver.
During the search of appellant’s person, officers did not find any contraband. But
officers did find appellant’s Minnesota ID which listed his home address. The Uber driver
confirmed that he picked appellant up from that same address. Officer Schroeder searched
the Uber and discovered a small baggie of cocaine in the map pocket of the rear-passenger
seat. Officers then took the Uber to the police station to search it further. At the precinct,
officers discovered 27.83 grams of cocaine in a hide can1 located on the floor of the Uber
near where appellant sat.

1 A hide can is a can or bottle of soda with a top or bottom that unscrews to expose a void
where narcotics are often hidden.

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Relying on this information and within an hour of appellant’s arrest, Officer
Schroeder applied for a search warrant of appellant’s home. Officers executed the search
warrant and found 13.7 grams of cocaine in appellant’s bedroo m. Respondent State of
Minnesota charged appellant with second -degree possession of a controlled substance,
Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018); third -degree possession of a controlled
substance, Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018); and fi fth-degree possession of a
controlled substance, Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2018). Appellant moved to
suppress all evidence found in the search of the Uber and his home on the ground that the
evidence was fruit of his illegal arrest. The district court denied appellant’s motion to
suppress. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a trial on stipulated
evidence. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. The district court found appellant guilty on
all three charges. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his m otion to suppress evidence
discovered in the search of the Uber and his home, arguing that the evidence was the fruit
of his unlawful arrest. “When facts are not in dispute, as here, we review a pretrial order
on a motion to suppress de novo and determine whether the police articulated an adequate
basis for the search or seizure at issue.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn.
2011) (citing State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 247-48 (Minn. 2007)). “When reviewing
the legality of a seizure or search, an appellate court will not reverse the [district] court’s
findings unless clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d
687, 690 (Minn. 1997). We review de novo whether a search or seizure is justified by

5
reasonable suspicion or by probable cause. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn.
2005).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee an individual’s right to be
free from unreaso nable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art.
I, § 10. A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable
unless the state proves that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Flowers, 734
N.W.2d at 248. Here, officers did not have a warrant to arrest appellant or to search the
Uber in which he rode . For the search and seizure to be constitutional, therefore, they
“must fall within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State
v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn. 1999). The district court held and respondent
argues that two exceptions to the warrant requirement apply to the search of the Uber:
(1) search incident to lawful arrest, and (2) Terry stop.
I. The search -incident-to-lawful-arrest except ion to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement did not authorize officers to search the Uber.

Appellant argues that his arrest was unlawful because it lacked probable cause for
two reasons: the respondent failed to establish (1) the CI’s reliability, and (2) the CI’s basis
of knowledge. Thus, appellant contends that the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception
does not apply. “A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762,
766 (Minn. 2015). Under this exception, “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009). But

6
there must be probable cause to arrest at the time that the search occurs. State v. Cornell,
491 N.W.2d 668, 671-72 (Minn. App. 1992).
“To establish probable cause, the police must show that they reasonably could have
believed that a crime has been committed by the person to be arrested.” State v. Riley, 568
N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. 1997). Courts examine the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the information provided by a confidential informant is enough to
establish probable cause. State v. Ross , 676 N.W.2d 301, 303 -04 (Minn. App. 2004) ,
review denied (Minn. June 15, 2004). “If a case is close, the lack of a warrant may weigh
against finding probable cause.” Id. at 304 (citing State v. Cook , 610 N.W.2d 664, 667
(Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000)). The “credibility and veracity of
the informant” is particularly important. Id. (quoting Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136).
An informant’s tip may establish probable cause if it has sufficient indicia of
reliability. In re Welfare of G.M. , 560 N.W.2d at 690 . Courts consider six factors when
determining the reliability of confidential information:
(1) A first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be established if the police c an corroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.

Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 304.
Only two of the six factors, the third and sixth, are at issue here. In its analysis of
factor three, the district court found that CI’s tip was corroborated because CI “provided

7
information that accurately predicted future activity of [appellant] —he would bring
cocaine to the Latin Conga Bistro at a certain time.” Officer Schroeder testified that CI
told him that appellant would deliver cocaine t o Conga Latin Bistro, and then on cross -
examination, Officer Schroeder clarified that CI stated appellant would deliver cocaine to
the general area. In his application for a search warrant, Officer Schroeder claims that CI
told him appellant would deliver cocaine to a Wells Fargo Bank near Conga Latin Bistro.
Based on Officer Schroeder’s statements, it is nearly impossible to know where CI said
appellant would deliver the cocaine. But it was not until after appellant’s arrest that Officer
Schroeder discovered cocaine in the Uber. The district court erred by considering evidence
obtained after the arrest to establish that there was probable cause for the arrest. Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103, 80 S. Ct. 168, 171 (1959) (stating a defendant’s “arrest is
not justified by what the subsequent search discloses”); State v. Walker, 584 N.W.2d 763,
769 (Minn. 1998) (“The legality of the arrest is determined based on the information the
police took into consideration when making the arrest, not what was uncovered
thereafter.”).
Respondent, however, argues that CI’s tip was sufficiently corroborated under Ross,
because CI provided a detailed prediction of future activity. We disagree. Our review of
Ross supports a finding that CI’s tip was not sufficiently corroborated . In Ross, a
confidential reliable informant (CRI) 2 provided officers information that crack cocaine
would be delivered to a particular address, at a specific time, by a suspect identified as “O,”

2 A CRI is an informant that has previously provided law enforcement with a reliable tip.

8
and provided O’s license plate nu mber. Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 303. Officers conducted a
vehicle registration check which revealed that the license plate was registered to the
defendant. Id. While officers conducted surveillance of the particular address, CRI called
them and stated that the defendant was actually driving a maroon rental car and that he was
wearing a black golf hat and a blue shirt. Id. Police saw the defendant arrive at the
particular address, at the specific time CRI provided, dressed as CRI described, and driving
a maroon rental car. Id. Police detained and handcuffed the defendant, and searched the
trunk of his car. Id.
In Ross, the district court suppressed the evidence finding there was no evidence of
CRI’s reliability. Id. We reversed and concluded that because officers verified CRI’s
information including “the time and place of arrival, the car, the hat, the shirt, and a given
name,” the third factor regarding CRI’s reliability “lean[ed] heavily in favor of finding
probable cause.” Id. at 305. And we noted that the “information predicting future behavior
by [the defendant] . . . was verified by law-enforcement prior to the search.” Id.
Unlike CRI in Ross, CI did not tell Officer Schroeder the specific address appellant
would arrive at, the specific time he would arrive, how he would arrive, what he would be
wearing, or what his name was. The tip CI provided Officer Schroeder contained general
details unlike those in Ross. And the corroboration present here—that appellant arrived in
the general area of his place of work within a general timeframe—is neither specific enough
nor sufficient enough to establish CI’s reliability . It does not link appellant to criminal
activity. See id. at 304 (“An informant’s reliability is not enhanced if the informant merely
gives information that is easily obtained.”); Cook, 610 N.W.2d at 668 (stating innocuous

9
details that lack incriminating aspects cannot establish a link between the CRI and illegal
conduct).
In its analysis of factor six, respondent argues that CI made a statement against
interest when CI admitted to previously purchasing drugs from appellant. While
informants are minimally more reliable if they make a statement against their own interest,
“courts remain reluctant to believe the typical ‘stool pigeon’ who is arrested and who, at
the suggestion of the police, agrees to cooperate and name names in order to curry favor
with the police.” State v. Ward , 580 N.W.2d 67, 71 -72 (Minn. App. 1998). And, “a
statement against interest establishes reliability only when combined with another factor,
such as corroboration or coming forward voluntarily.” Id. at 72. Officer Schroeder
testified that after arresting CI, CI provided information to work off CI’s own criminal
case. Thus, CI is a “stool pigeon” whom courts are reluctant to believe. Id. at 71-72. None
of the other factors of reliabili ty have been established here. After examining the totality
of the circumstances, we conclude that CI’s tip lacked a sufficient indicia of reliability to
establish probable cause for appellant’s arrest under the Ross factors.
Even if there were sufficient indicia of reliability for CI’s tip , “[t]he information
obtained from the [informant] must still show a basis of knowledge.” Cook, 610 N.W.2d
at 668. Respondent argues that the district court properly found that CI had a sufficient
basis of knowledge because CI bought drugs from appellant “within the last 72 hours and
had personally witnessed [a]ppellant sell narcotics to others.” We disagree.
An informant’s basis of knowledge may be established by showing the informant
had firsthand knowledge or “indirectly through self -verifying details t hat allow an

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inference that the information was gained in a reliable way and is not merely based on a
suspect’s general reputation or on a casual rumor circulating in the criminal underworld.”
Id. An informant’s statement that they observed an event firs t-hand “entitles [their] tip to
greater weight than might otherwise be the case.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 2330 (1983). “Assessment of the [informant’s] basis of knowledge involves
consideration of the quantity and qualit y of detail in the [informant’s] report and whether
police independently verified important details of the informant’s report.” Cook, 610
N.W.2d at 668 (citing Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 331 -32, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417
(1990)).
The district court incorrec tly concluded that because CI had bought drugs from
appellant in the previous 72 hours and witnessed appellant sell drugs to others, there was a
sufficient basis of knowledge for CI’s tip. This information does not establish a sufficient
basis of knowledg e for how CI knew that appellant would be in the general area of his
place of employment, within a general time period, with cocaine. As appellant correctly
points out, the record lacks any details about how CI gained firsthand knowledge. The
self-verifying details here—that appellant would arrive at his workplace at a general time—
do not support an inference that CI gained the information in a reliable way that was not
merely based on appellant’s general reputation.
After examining the totality of the ci rcumstances, we conclude that respondent did
not establish CI’s basis of knowledge and probable cause did not support appellant’s arrest.
The district court erred when it found that the search of the Uber was a valid search incident
to lawful arrest.

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II. The Terry stop exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment did not authorize officers to search the Uber.

Respondent contends that the Terry stop exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment permitted the officers to search the Uber appellant occupied. “It is
well settled that in accordance with the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution a police officer may not stop a vehicle without a reasonable basis for doing
so.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d at 691 (quoting Marben v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 198 0)). The Terry exception, however, permits officers to
conduct a limited investigatory stop of a vehicle —a Terry stop—to investigate suspected
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968) . A valid
Terry stop requires that officers have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. Id. The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met when the officer
“observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or
her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390,
393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d at 691).
Here, the district court held that the Terry stop exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment authorized officers’ search of the Uber. But a Terry stop only
authorizes a limited investigatory stop of a vehicle, not a warrantless search of a vehicle.
Here, officers did not conduct any investigation between the time the Uber stopped and
appellant’s arrest . Officer Schroeder agreed that officers “did not confirm any kind of
information with the occupants [of the Uber] prior to their stop and arrest” and instead,

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officers “[p]ulled the m right out of the vehicle.” In short, t he officers skipped the
investigatory part of a Terry stop and went directly to an arrest.3
Because officers did not conduct a limited investigatory stop of the Uber , we
conclude that the district c ourt erred when it determined that the Terry stop exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment authorized officers to search the Uber.
III. The district court erred in failing to suppress evidence.
Having determined that appellant’s warrantless arrest and the later search of the
Uber were not valid under either the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest or Terry exceptions
to the warrant requirement, we turn to whether the district court erred when it fail ed to
suppress the evidence. Appellant argues that evidence discovered throu gh the search of
the Uber is inadmissible as fruit of his unlawful arrest and the district court erred in failing
to suppress the evidence. Appellant also contends that any evide nce found in his home
“when executing the search warrant issued following his unlawful arrest is also fruit of the
officers’ unlawful conduct” and was inadmissible.
A. Evidence discovered through the unlawful search of the Uber must be
suppressed.

Evidence seized as a result of a violation of the Constitution must be suppressed.
State v. Jackson , 742 N.W.2d 163, 177 -78 (Minn. 2007). When officers lack probable

3 A Terry search is “a carefully limited frisk for weapons.” State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d
840, 846 (Minn. 1992) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884). And the purpose
of a Terry search “is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to purs ue
his investigation with out fear of violence.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373,
113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993) (quotation omitted). Thus, Terry did not permit officers to
search the vehicle in any event.

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cause to arrest a defendant but conduct a subsequent search, the search is improper and
violates the Constitution. Walker, 584 N.W.2d at 769.
Here, without probable cause, officers arrested appellant and then searched the Uber
in which he rode. While searching the Uber, officers discovered cocaine in a map pocket
and in a hide can. Because appellant’s arrest lacked probable cause, the later search of the
Uber was improper. The officers’ seizure of evidence discovered in the Uber violated the
Constitution. We conclude the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence
discovered during the unlawful search of the Uber.
B. Evidence discovered during the search of appellant’s home must be
suppressed.

Unlawfully seized evidence cannot “be used to fur nish probable cause” for a
subsequent search warrant. State v. Krech, 399 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Minn. App. 1987), aff’d
on other grounds , 403 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 1987). But i f lawfully obtained information
establishes probable cause for the search warrant, “and, by itself and apart from any tainted
information, would have justified issuance of the search warrant, the evidence seized
pursuant to the warrant is admitted.” State v. Hodges, 287 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. 1979).
We use a two-part test to analyze whether an independent source of information supporting
probable cause for the search warrant “is genuinely independent” of the tainted
information. State v. Lieberg , 553 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Minn. App. 1996). F irst, we must
decide “whether the decision of the issuing magistrate was ‘affected’ by the tainted
information.” Id. at 55. We answer this question by considering whether an affidavit
without the tainted information would establish probable cause. Id. Second, we must

14
determine whether the tainted information “prompted law enforcement officials to seek the
warrant.” Id. When an unlawful search prompted authorities to seek a warrant, the
evidence must be suppressed. Id. at 58.
Here, tainted information in Officer Schroeder’s affidavit affected the decision of
the issuing magistrate. Officer Schroeder’s affidavit contained the following information:
(1) Officer Schroeder received a tip from CI that appellant would deliver a large amount
of cocaine to t he Wells Fargo parking lot, (2) officers surveyed the Wells Fargo parking
lot and saw appellant sitting in the backseat of the Uber, (3) officers found cocaine in the
Uber, (4) officers found about $500 on appellant’s person, (5) officers found appellant’s
Minnesota ID on him and determined his home address, (6) appellant stated he lived at the
address listed on his Minnesota ID, and (7) the Uber driver stated that he picked appellant
up from that address. Removing the tainted information from Officer Schroeder’s affidavit
that officers obtained from appellant’s illegal arrest leaves only two facts: (1) Officer
Schroeder received a tip that appellant would deliver cocaine somewhere around the Wells
Fargo parking lot, and (2) Officer Schroeder saw appellant sitting in the backseat of an
Uber. This information does not establish probable cause to search appellant’s home.
The tainted information prompted Officer Schroeder to seek the warrant. Less than
an hour after arresting appellant, Offic er Schroeder applied for a warrant to search
appellant’s home. Officer Schroeder testified that he drafted the search warrant based on
the information officers learned through appellant’s unlawful arrest.

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We conclude that lawfully obtained information does not establish probable cause
for the search warrant. Thus, the district court erred in admitting evidence discovered
during the search of appellant’s home.
IV. Conclusion
Officers discovered cocaine in the U ber appellant occupied only because of an
unlawful arrest and search . No exception to the warrant requirement applies. Officers
similarly discovered cocaine in appellant’s home only as a result of an invalid search
warrant. Nothing in the rec ord supports a conclusion that lawfully obtained information
supported the search of appellant’s home. We conclude that the district court erred by not
suppressing the evidence discovered as a result of the search of the Uber and appellant’s
home. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.