State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0361

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rarity Shemeire Abdul Lampkin,
Appellant.

Filed July 25, 2022
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-18-2641

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
The general self -defense authorization expressed in Minnesota Statutes section
609.06, subdivision 1(3) (2018), permits a person to use reasonable force to resist “an
offense against the person” even if the offense does not involve an assault or threaten bodily
harm. In a case in which a defendant claims self-defense in resisting a noninjurious offense,
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the district court errs by instructing the jury that the defendant could be justified in using
force only to resist “an assault.”
OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Rarity Lampkin responded to his girlfriend’s attempt to physically prevent him from
leaving their shared apartment building by pulling her from the exit door and causing her
to fall. The jury found Lampkin guilty of domestic assault, rejecting his self-defense claim.
Lampkin appeals from his conviction, arguing that the state failed to prove all the elements
of the assault charge and that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on self-
defense. We hold that the evidence supports the assault elements. But we also hold that the
district court erroneously instructed the jury that Lampkin could use reasonable force to
“resist an assault against the person” because the law of self-defense justifies a person to
use force more broadly to resist any “offense against the person” and the facts could support
Lampkin’s contention that he used reasonable force to resist his girlfriend’s unlawful
attempt to detain him —arguably false imprisonment. We nevertheless affirm Lampkin’s
conviction because the error was not plain in light of caselaw.
FACTS
Rarity Lampkin lived in an Inver Grove Heights apartment with his pregnant
girlfriend, whom we will call Jane for her privacy. Jane was eight months’ pregnant in
October 2018, when the two argued. Lampkin left the apartment but returned the next
morning to collect his safe. Fearing that Lampkin would never return if he left with the
safe, Jane physically prevented him from leaving. The confrontation escalated and Jane’s
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12-year-old daughter dialed 9-1-1 to report, “ My dad is fighting my mom . . . . He came
here to get his safe and then they just started, like, fighting.” Lampkin forced his way out
of their third-floor apartment, and Jane followed him down the stairs to the building’s exit
door.
A surveillance camera captured the struggle on video beginning when the couple
approached the exit door. It depicts Jane physically preventing Lampkin from leaving. It
shows her pulling at him, pushing him, and using her body to block him from getting out
the door with the safe. Jane finally grabbed the door’s crossbar, pulling it to keep the door
closed and latched while she maintained her blocking position between the door and
Lampkin, who was behind her and still struggling to get out.
The video then shows the moment that became the primary focus of the trial.
Lampkin took hold of Jane’s shoulders from behind and p ulled her backwards, wresting
her hands from the crossbar and causing her to fall to the floor. Lampkin picked up the safe
and left the building.
Inver Grove Heights police officers arrived, and paramedics took Jane to the
hospital. She told one officer that “she had been pushed down by her boyfriend.” She told
her physician that Lampkin pushed her down twice, once in the apartment and once at the
door. Neither Jane nor her unborn child suffered significant injury. The state charged
Lampkin with domestic assault under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242,
subdivision 1(2) (2018), which was a felony because he had been previously convicted of
domestic assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2018).
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At trial Jane took “all responsibility for what happened to [her] child’s father.”
Despite her earlier statements that Lampkin pushed her to the floor, she testified that her
fall was an accident. She said that she hit Lampkin first, trying to keep him from leaving,
and that Lampkin did not fight back but was just “trying to . . . run out the door” with the
safe. She told the jury that she was hanging onto the crossbar of the door to keep Lampkin
from opening it when she “just went down.”
The district court instructed the jury on self-defense, defining the term to mean “that
the person used reasonable force . . . to resist an assault against the person . . . .” The jury
rejected Lampkin’s self-defense argument and found him guilty. The district court
convicted Lampkin and sentenced him to 21 months in prison.
Lampkin appeals.
ISSUES
I. Is the evidence sufficient to prove Lampkin’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
II. Did the district court plainly err by incorrectly instructing the jury on self-defense?
ANALYSIS
Lampkin asks us to reverse his assault conviction. He argues first that the state
offered insufficient evidence to prove his guilt. He argues second that the district court
incorrectly instructed the jury on self-defense. For the following reasons, we hold that the
evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt but that the district court erroneously instructed
the jury. The improper instruction was not a plain error, however, and so we will not reverse
Lampkin’s conviction.
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I
We first address Lampkin’s assertion that the state failed to prove his guilt. We
consider claims of insufficient evidence by reviewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the guilty verdict. State v. Hayes, 831 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. 2013). We
review evidence supporting the verdict to decide whether a reasonable jury could conclude
that the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each
element of the offense. State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 353 (Minn. 2012). Lampkin
focuses only on the mental-state element of his domestic-assault conviction. To prove that
Lampkin committed domestic assault, the state had to prove that Lampkin “intentionally
inflict[ed] or attempt[ed] to inflict bodily harm” on Jane. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subd. 1(2). Intent is almost always proved by circumstantial rather than direct evidence.
State v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 2015). And we review circumstantial
evidence in a two-step inquiry: we first identify the circumstances proved, assuming the
jury believed the inculpatory evidence and disbelieved any exculpatory evidence; and
second, we determine whether the rational inferences from those circumstances are
consistent only with guilt. Hayes , 831 N.W.2d at 552–53. The evidence of Lampkin’s
mental state meets that standard.
The evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s finding that Lampkin intended the act
that caused bodily harm. The intent element of the statute requires that the state prove that
Lampkin did not act accidentally or involuntarily. State v. Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826, 830–31
(Minn. 2016); State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309–10 (Minn. 2012). Two witnesses
testified that Jane reported soon after the incident that Lampkin pushed her down. Although
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Lampkin’s argument focuses on the part of the incident captured in the video recording,
the jury also received evidence that Lampkin pushed Jane to the floor inside their
apartment. Jurors observed both Lam pkin and Jane during the trial and were free to draw
inferences of intent from Jane’s daughter’s contemporaneous description of the event in
her emergency call to police, the size and strength disparity between the two, and the fact
that the pregnancy was eight months along. Lampkin does not offer any rational inference
from any evidence showing that he accidentally or involuntarily pushed or pulled Jane to
the floor inside the apartment, or even at the door. Lampkin’s assertion that he acted only
to defend himself and that his level of force was reasonable bears only on his self-defense
argument and is irrelevant to whether the evidence supports all elements of the crime
charged.
We also reject Lampkin’s assertion that the evidence reasonably implies that Jane
consented to being pulled from the door. Jane testified that she fell while “[f]ighting, just
trying to fight for the door to keep from getting the door open.” Rather than consenting,
Jane was resisting Lampkin’s efforts to wrest her from the door.
The state provided sufficient evidence to prove that Lampkin acted volitionally. We
decline to reverse his conviction on this ground.
II
We next address Lampkin’s contention that the district court improperly instructed
the jury on self-defense. The district court has broad discretion in instructing the jury, and
we typically review allegedly improper instructions for an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Shane, 883 N.W.2d 606, 613 (Minn. App. 2016). But Lampkin failed to object to the
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self-defense instruction and therefore forfeited the right to challenge the instructions on
appeal. State v. Cross, 577 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Minn. 1998). We will nevertheless review
the unobjected-to jury instruction, but only to consider whether the instruction constitutes
a plain error. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012). Under a plain-error
review, we may reverse only if we spot an error, determine that the error was plain, and
conclude that the error affected Lampkin’s substantial rights. Id. An error is “plain” when
it is “clear” or “obvious.” Id. at 807. And an error affects substantial rights if it was
prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741
(Minn. 1998). Under our plain-error review, e ven if Lampkin could establish that a plain
error occurred, we have discretion to correct the error only if it seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 740; Pulczinski v.
State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022). Lampkin’s self-defense jury-instruction
challenge clears only the first hurdle of our plain-error review by identifying an error.
A. Self-Defense Instruction with an Assault or Bodily-Harm Element Was
Erroneous

Lampkin sought to convince the jury that he used reasonable force in self-defense
under Minnesota Statutes section 609.06, subdivision 1(3) (2018). Under that subdivision,
a person is justified in using reasonable force when he “reasonably believes” that he is
“resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person.” The district court did
not instruct the jury to consider broadly whether Lampkin was resisting “an offense”
against himself, but narrowly whether he was resisting “an assault” against himself. He
argues on appeal that, because Jane’s conduct arguably constituted false imprisonment or
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attempted false imprisonment by her physically preventing him from leaving the building,
she was engaging in “an offense” that he was justified in resisting with force. The state
defends the district court’s instruction by maintaining that, because the alleged false
imprisonment did not threaten to cause Lampkin bodily harm, and threatened bodily harm
is always an element of self-defense, the instruction correctly stated the law. The state is
correct that false imprisonment does not include any bodily-harm component either in the
statute or as implied by the evidence presented in this case. See Minn. Stat. § 609.255,
subd. 2 (2018) (defining false imprisonment as “intentionally confin[ing] or
restrain[ing] . . . any other person without the person’s consent”). But Lampkin has the
better argument because, for the reasons that follow, self-defense is not limited to resisting
an offense that threatens bodily harm.
1. Plain Language of Subdivision 1(3) Undermines State’s Position
The unambiguous statute on its face does not limit justified self-defense to resisting
only assault or other offenses that result in bodily harm, as the state maintains. It instead
permits a person to forcefully resist “an offense against the person” with no express
requirement that the resisted offense involve bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3).
The language of the subdivision by itself is therefore enough for us to reject the state’s
position. But there is more.
2. Subdivision 1(3) in Context Undermines State’s Position
The subdivision’s context corroborates our understanding. The context of
section 609.06, subdivision 1(3), informs us that the legislature was mindful of the concept
of bodily harm when it enacted section 609.06 and that the omission of bodily harm as a
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prerequisite was therefore intentional. While subdivision 1(3) allows for the use of
reasonable force to resist “an offense against the person” without mentioning bodily harm
of any degree and without defining the triggering offense at any particular level, the next
section of the statute, section 609.065, expressly relates to section 609.06 and identifies the
two types of personal offenses that would justify intentionally using deadly force during
an act of self-defense— the first type being “an offense which the actor reasonably believes
exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death,” and the second being “the
commission of a felony in the actor’ s place of abode.” Minn. Stat. § 609.065 (2018). So
we see that one of these two parallel and interdependent sections refers only to a generic
“offense against the person” without mentioning harm and without specifying whether the
predicate offense must be a felony or misdemeanor. And in contrast, the other refers
specifically to a personal offense that risks great bodily harm or is an in-home felony. This
difference confirms our conclusion that the legislature deliberately omitted a harm
prerequisite from section 609.06, subdivision 1(3).
3. Related History of Self-Defense Statute Undermines State’s Position
We find additional support for our understanding in the legislature’s placement of
the false-imprisonment statute in the category of crimes. Statutory law has long recognized
a distinction—rooted in the common law—between crimes “against the person” and other
types of offenses. The supreme court in 1925 documented this, for example, as it reviewed
a conviction of carrying concealed weapons with intent to cause harm, relying in part on
“the fact that the [concealed weapons] statute is a part of the chapter dealing with crimes
against public safety— not of the chapter dealing with crimes against the person .” State v.
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Simon, 203 N.W. 989, 989 (Minn. 1925). And in the same law that the legislature enacted
to codify the right to use self-defense to resist offenses against the person, it also directed
that the crime of false imprisonment be placed in the statutory category of “Crimes Against
the Person.” 1963 Minn. Laws ch. 753, art. 1, § 609.255, at 1202–03; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02 1963 cmt. by Maynard P irsig (West 2018) (“The terms ‘offense’ and ‘criminal
offense’ are occasionally used in the new Criminal Code. They are used in the same sense
as the term ‘crime.’”). Relevant here, the legislature did so knowing that the crime of false
imprisonment involves only confinement against the victim’s will with no element of
bodily harm or even threat of bodily harm. 1963 Minn. Laws ch. 753, at 1, § 609.255, at
1203. If the legislature meant for an offense “against the person” in section 609.06 to
include only offenses that involved bodily harm, it would not have also placed the non-
bodily-harm offense of false imprisonment in the crimes “against the person” category.
Early supreme court caselaw on the self-defense statute puts it in its historical
context and illuminates its meaning by emphasizing its relationship to common-law self-
defense. Construing the term “an offense” in section 609.06 for the first time in 1967 as
“part of the [then-] new Criminal Code,” the supreme court recognized that “the statute
states the present Minnesota law” of self-defense as developed in the common law. State
v. Johnson, 152 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. 1967). This is significant to our analysis because
the supreme court then observed that, under the common law, a person could use deadly
force in self-defense to resist not only an act of potential “great bodily harm” but also
“some felony” without any express harm qualifier. Id. Two years later, the supreme court
repeated the connection between the common law and the two statutory self-defense
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provisions in State v. Boyce, 170 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. 1969). The Boyce court cited both
sections 609.06 and 609.065 in the context of articulating the common-law self -defense
elements, again including “some felony” without any harm qualifier as one of the predicate
bases for using deadly force to defend oneself. Boyce, 170 N.W.2d at 112. In other words,
under the common law, a defendant could use even deadly force to resist not only an
offense that involved the risk of bodily harm but also to resist “some felony” offense that
did not.
Although the concept of using deadly force to thwart nondangerous felonies may be
unanimously unconscionable and unreasonable today, it was not yet so in 1963 when the
legislature enacted sections 609.06 and 609.065. As Justice Stevens observed, “Under the
common law capital punishment was mandatory for all felonies, and even through the last
century it was mandatory for large categories of offenses.” Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 483 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In fact, it was not until 1985—
more than 20 years after Minnesota codified the elements of self-defense—that the United
States Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner finally held unconstitutional state statutes
authorizing the killing of unarmed fleeing felons who posed no risk of harm to anyone.
471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). It was in the period that states were moving away from harsh
common-law consequences that the Minnesota legislature refined the elements of self-
defense statutorily. The 1963 text, which continues unchanged today, shows that the
legislature refined the common-law elements in two ways. First, while it continued to
permit intentionally lethal force to resist great bodily harm, it no longer authorized lethal
force against all felonies—only those personal-offense felonies that occur in one’s home.
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Minn. Stat. § 609.065. And second, it both expanded and contracted the type of conduct
that justifies the nonlethal use of force, allowing reasonable force to resist even nonfelony
offenses but limiting it to offenses “against the person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06. While our
holding rests on the statutory language in its plain terms, this historical context readily
supports it.
4. Supreme Court Dictum Undermines State’s Position
We also see support for our holding in the supreme court’s response to a self-defense
argument involving sexual groping. Taking the state’s interpretation of subdivision 1(3) to
its logical conclusion, a person has no right to use reasonable force to resist the personal
offense of nonconsensual sexual contact unless the groping also happens to involve that
person’s physical pain or injury. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subd. 7 (2018) (defining bodily
harm), 609.341, subd. 11 (2018) (defining sexual contact without bodily-harm element).
The state’s notion is not only intuitively untenable, the supreme court implicitly rejected it
in a case involving similar conduct but a different, now-repealed, criminal statute. In State
v. Morgan, a convicted murder defendant claimed that the district court improperly failed
to give a self-defense instruction, alleging that, before he killed the victim, the victim had
fondled the defendant’s genitals and caused him to believe that force was necessary to resist
the felony of sodomy. 296 N.W.2d 397, 402–03 (Minn. 1980). The supreme court rejected
the argument on grounds immaterial here. Id. Most relevant, it did not base its holding on
the idea that self-defense is available to resist only those personal offenses that involve
bodily harm. And equally instructive, it construed the same language of subdivision 1(3)
that we are discussing and stated that self-defense requires only an “actual and honest belief
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of the slayer that he was in imminent danger of some felony and that it was neces sary to
take the action he did.” Id. at 402 (emphasis added). By correlating “an offense against the
person” in subdivision 1(3) with “some felony” in which the victim’s alleged conduct did
not involve any bodily harm, the supreme court implied the same understanding that we
state expressly today.
5. State v. Soukup Limited by Context
It is true, as the state emphasizes, that our discussion of the self-defense statute in
State v. Soukup appears on the surface to suggest a bodily-harm element. 656 N.W.2d 424,
429 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 2003). In Soukup, we said that an
“offense against the person” is “an offense of a physical nature, carrying the potential to
cause bodily harm.” Id. The state infers from this statement that an “offense against the
person” is essentially synonymous with an “assault against a person” and that,
consequently, the non -assaultive offense of false imprisonment is not an offense that
triggers the right to use force in self-defense. But Soukup should not be construed as having
introduced a bodily-harm requirement into the defense because it is never our prerogative
to add words to a statute. See Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012). Our
holding today clarifies rather than conflicts with Soukup, because “a court’s expressions
that go beyond the facts before the court are dicta and are deemed to be merely the
individual views of the author of the opinion and not binding in subsequent cases.” Dahlin
v. Kroening, 784 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 796
N.W.2d 503 (Minn. 2011). For the following reasons, we read Soukup as confined to
circumstances that we do not face.
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In Soukup we did not analyze or purport to decide today’s issue. We were deciding
only whether a defendant could rely on self-defense to prevail against a charge of disorderly
conduct when the nature of the disorderly conduct included the potential for physical harm,
akin to assault. Soukup, 656 N.W.2d at 429. And the bodily-harm element was properly
incorporated in that case because, like most self-defense situations, the specific harm that
naturally results from the alleged predicate offense was indeed physical, bodily harm. See
id. at 429–30. (“Here, [the alleged attacker] undeniably started the fight by grabbing the
back of appellant’s coat, and plainly committed an offense against appellant’s person—
namely, assault.”). We therefore emphasize that our broad statement in Soukup applies to
those circumstances like the one we addressed in that case (and in most cases), in which
the personal offense on which the defendant bases his self-defense claim is an offense that
threatens bodily harm. It does not apply to cases in which the predicate offense against the
person involves a harm other than physical pain or injury.
Unlike Soukup, in this rare case the offense on which the self-defense theory
arguably rests— false imprisonment—involves no risk of physical pain or injury. This
distinguishes this case not only from Soukup but also from the long line of self-defense
cases that involve an alleged act of potential bodily harm. Other than Morgan, discussed
above and decided on other grounds, this is the first time the circumstances squarely present
the issue. In every precedential opinion where a Minnesota appellate court has referenced
a threat-of- bodily-harm prerequisite to the use of nonlethal force in self-defense under
section 609.06 subdivision 1(3), the predicate alleged offense has always involved potential
bodily harm. See State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Minn. 2017) (victim said, “I’m
15
going to kill that [woman]”); State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 256 (Minn. 2014) (victim
tried to punch defendant); State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 623–24 (Minn. 2006) (victim
kicked and shot defendant); State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 396 (Minn. 2001) (victim
hit defendant); State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Minn. 1997) (victim punched
defendant); State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Minn. 1983) (victim kicked defendant
in the head); State v. Carlson, 268 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. 1978) (victim police officer
pushed defendant’s friend); State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 535–36 (Minn. 1978) (victim
fired shots); State v. Love, 173 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Minn. 1970) (victim hit defendant with
umbrella); State v. Baker, 160 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Minn. 1968) (victim punched and kicked
defendant); State v. Norlander, 152 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Minn. 1967) (victim grabbed and
kicked defendant); State v. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Minn. App. 2017) (victim tried
to hit and strangle defendant); Soukup, 656 N.W.2d at 427 (victim in fistfight with
defendant); State v. Andrasko, 454 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. App. 1990) (victim brandished
baseball bat), rev. denied (Minn. June 25, 1990); State v. Witucki, 420 N.W.2d 217, 219
(Minn. App. 1988) (victim raised his fist and threatened punch), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 15, 1988); State v. McKissic, 415 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. App. 1987) (victim tried
to punch defendant); State v. Buchmann, 380 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Minn. App. 1986) (victim
shoved defendant’s head into a truck); State v. Oden, 385 N.W.2d 420, 421 (Minn. App.
1986) (victim engaged in large fight); State v. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d 357, 357– 58 (Minn.
App. 1986) (victim shoved defendant); State v. Pita-Iglesia, 393 N.W.2d 524, 525 (Minn.
App. 1986) (victim beat up defendant), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1986); State v. Pacholl,
361 N.W.2d 463, 464 (Minn. App. 1985) (victim fighting); State v. Smith, 374 N.W.2d
16
520, 522 (Minn. App. 1985) (victim punched defendant), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 26,
1985); State v. Soine, 348 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Minn. App. 1984) (victim broke bottle and
threatened defendant), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 12, 1984). Neither Soukup nor the
extensive caselaw applying self-defense in nonlethal, bodily-harm cases conflicts with our
holding.
6. Erroneous Instruction Here
Based on our holding that section 609.06, subdivision 1(3), permits a person to use
reasonable force to resist a personal offense that does not involve or threaten bodily harm,
we conclude that the district court’s instruction to the jury in this case constituted error.
“[W]hen instructing on self-defense, courts must use analytic precision.” State v. Hare,
575 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). The instructions also should not
mislead the jury or misstate the law. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 14–15 (Minn. 2015).
The district court’s reference only to an “assault against the person” erroneously
understated the statutory allowance for self- defense to resist any “offense against the
person” and imprecisely described the circumstances of the alleged offenses that arguably
justified Lampkin’s use of force.
Although Lampkin did not request an instruction that directed the jury to decide
generally whether his conduct was a reasonable use of force to resist “an offense against
[his] person” or to decide specifically whether his conduct was a reasonable use of force to
resist the offense of false imprisonment, both his rationale for the self-defense instruction
and his argument to the jury implicated those bases for the instruction. In arguing to the
district court why he was entitled to the self-defense instruction, Lampkin maintained,
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“There was evidence that she assaulted him and that she was attempting to prevent him
from leaving the building, and that he was acting in self- defense.” (Emphasis added.)
Likewise in arguing to the jury why it should find that the state failed to disprove that he
was acting in self-defense, Lampkin did not mention “assault” or any concern about bodily
harm, arguing only, “And if you see what she’s doing at the time that this is going on, she’s
holding the door shut so he can’t leave.” By instructing the jury to consider whether
Lampkin was acting in self-defense only to resist “an assault,” the district court failed to
frame the issue as expressed by the statute or to tailor it to fit the evidence and argume nt
to the jury. This was error.
We are not persuaded otherwise by the fact that, at one point during the row,
Lampkin made it out the door momentarily but reentered quickly to retrieve the safe while
continuing to resist Jane’s attempts to keep him inside. The self-defense statute does not
expressly or implicitly withhold the defense from those who resist an offense while also
attempting to retain their personal property. And the statute separately authorizes the use
of reasonable force “by any person in la wful possession of . . . personal property . . . in
resisting . . . [the] unlawful interference with such property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06,
subd. 1(4). Lampkin’s brief exit did not disqualify him from the right to use self-defense
to resist an offense against his person.
B. Error in Framing of Self-Defense Instruction Was Not Plain
In this case of first impression, we hold the district court’s error in instructing the
jury was not plain. An error is plain if it is so clear or obvious at the time of the appeal that
“the trial court should be able to recognize and correct the error without the parties’ help.”
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State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 286 (Minn. 2014). The district court’s error was its failure
to include false imprisonment as a predicate self-defense offense and its focusing the jury
instead only on assault. But this error occurred because the district court failed to adopt an
approach that, before today, had not been clarified in caselaw interpreting and applying
Minnesota Statutes section 609.06, subdivision 1(3). In a somewhat similar circumstance
we said, “[T]his is a case of first impression. Even if the district court erred in giving the
requested instruction, the error was not plain.” State v. Sam, 904 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn.
App. 2017). It is true that we have rested our holding on the subdivision’s plain language.
But in doing so we have found it necessary to wade through and distinguish a sizable pool
of judicial opinions that, on a surface reading, imply a standard of self-defense that
universally includes a bodily-harm element. It takes considerable sifting to recognize that
this standard does not always fit. Indeed, caselaw so commonly restated the bodily-harm
element without the qualification for other types of offenses against the person that the jury
instruction guide relied on by district judges and practitioners recommended the
unqualified vernacular. See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.13 (2021). Without
prompting by a careful and thorough trial attorney, we do not presume that a district judge
would have looked beyond such a frequently repeated maxim in the caselaw. Because the
error was not plain, we do not take our plain-error review further.
DECISION
The evidence is sufficient to prove that Lampkin had the requisite intent to support
the assault conviction. Although the district court erroneously described the predicate
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offense for which Lampkin claimed self-defense, the error was not plain, and the
unobjected-to erroneous instruction therefore does not support reversal.
Affirmed.