State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0373

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ishmel Barry McReynolds,
Appellant.

Filed February 22, 2021
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-25678

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public D efender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant argues that he must
be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not accurate. Because we conclude
that the record establishes that appellant’s plea was accurate, we affirm his conviction.

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FACTS
The state charged appellant Ishmel Barry McReynolds with one co unt of stalking
under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5 (Supp. 2019 ). According to the complaint,
McReynolds and the victim had previously been in a relationship and had a child together.
In February 2015, an order for protection was issued that prohibited McReynolds from
having contact with the victim, her home, or her workplace. The order was effective for
50 years. Another court order prevented McReynolds from being present at their child’s
school. The complaint alleged a series of incidents of threate ning behavior from
McReynolds, including McReynolds placing threatening notes on the victim’s car, tracking
the victim’s car with a GPS device, driving past the victim’s house, and making threatening
statements to the victim at their child’s school.
McReynolds pleaded guilty. In laying a factual basis for his plea, McReynolds
admitted that there was one order for protection that prohibited him from having contact
with the victim and another order that prohibited him from being within 100 feet of the
victim’s home. He admitted that in November 2016, he had contact with the victim at his
child’s school and that he told the victim “you better shut it down, you better shut it down
or we’ll end up on the news.” He also admitted that on two days in late O ctober 2019, he
attempted to stop his child’s school bus within 100 feet of the victim’s home.1 McReynolds
agreed that the victim “could have felt threatened or stalked or significantly bothered” or

1 The state orally amended the complaint during the plea hearing to incorporate these two
incidents, which were not described in the complaint.

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“terrorized” or “fear[ed] bodily harm” based on his cond uct in the three incidents he
described. The district court later sentenced McReynolds to a stay of imposition.
McReynolds appeals, arguing that he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
because it is not accurate.
DECISION
A defendant must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea if “withdrawal is necessary
to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice
exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To
be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.
An appellate court reviews the validity of a plea de novo. Id.
“The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more
serious offense than that fo r which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to
trial. To be accurate, a plea must be established on a proper factual basis.” Id. (citations
omitted). An adequate factual basis “must establish sufficient facts on the record to support
a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desire s to plead
guilty.” Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 2008). “Still, a defendant may not
withdraw his plea simply because the court failed to elicit proper responses if the record
contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
A person is guilty of stalking if the person “engages in stalking with respect to a
single victim . . . which the actor knows or has reason to know would cause the victim
under the circumstances to feel terrorized or to fear bodily harm and which does cause this
reaction on the part of the victim.” Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a). “‘Stalking’ means

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two or more acts within a five -year period that violate or at tempt to violate” a number of
Minnesota statutes, incl uding the violation of domestic -abuse orders for protection,
harassment restraining orders, and violations of domestic-abuse no-contact orders. Minn.
Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(b). McReynolds concedes that his plea was sufficient to establish
that he committed two or more acts enumerated in the stalking statute and that his acts were
directed at a specific person. He contends that his plea was not accurate because it does
not establish (1) that he knew or had reason to know that his conduct would terrorize the
victim or cause her to fear bodily harm and (2) that the victim actually felt terrorized or
feared bodily harm. We address each challenged element in turn.
I. The record establishes that McReynolds had reason to know that his conduct
would terrorize the victim or cause her to fear bodily harm.

McReynolds first argues that his plea was not sufficient to establish that he knew or
had reason to know that his conduct would cause the victim to feel terrorized or fear bodily
harm. To “know” means that “the actor believes that the specified fact exists.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 9(2) (2018). To determine whether an actor had “reason to know” requires
a consideration of “the existing conditions and the context” of the act. See In re Welfare
of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 850 (Minn. 2019).
In this context, to “terrorize” means “to cause extreme fear by use of violence or
threats.” State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn. 2009). The threat need not be express.
Id. at 75. In contrast, “harassment” —another offense defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.749
(Supp. 2019) —requires a showing that the defendant engaged in conduct that caused a
victim to “feel frightened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated.” See id.; see also Minn.

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Stat. § 609.749, subd. 1. Thus, the supreme court has concluded that to feel terrorized
means “something more than feeling ‘frightened, threatened, oppressed, perse cuted, or
intimidated.’” Franks, 765 N.W.2d at 74. When considering whether a defendant knew
or had reason to know that his conduct would cause the victim this extreme fear, it is
“proper to view a defendant’s words and acts in the context of the defendant’s relationship
with the victim.” Id. at 75.
The parties disagree over whether McReynolds expressly admitted at the plea
hearing that he had reason to know that his conduct would cause the victim to feel terrorized
or fear bodily harm. The parties also disagree over whether we may look to allegations in
the complaint regarding incidents that McReynolds did not admit to in considering the
accuracy of his plea. Cf. Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588-89 (Minn. 2012) ((“[T]he
plea petition and colloquy may be supplemented by other evidence to establish the factual
basis for the plea.”) ; State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983) (indicating that a
defendant who has pleaded guilty “in effect, judicially admitted the allegat ions contained
in the complaint”); Rosendahl v. State, __ N.W.2d __, __, 2021 WL 416699, at *1 (Minn.
App. Feb. 8, 2021) (holding that “[i]n determining the accuracy of a guilty plea, the
reviewing court does not consider allegations contained in the complaint unless the
truthfulness and accuracy of the allegations have been expressly admitted to by the
defendant”).2 For the purposes of our analysis in this opinion, we assume that McReynolds
did not expressly admit this element and do not consider allegations in the complaint about

2 We note that we released Rosendahl after the parties submitted their briefs for our
consideration.

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the specific incidents that McReynolds did not testify to at the plea hearing. We still
conclude that the record establishes that McReynolds had reason to know that his conduct
would cause the victim to feel terrorized.
Put generally, McReynolds argues that he did not admit to conduct that was
sufficiently egregious to allow an inference that he should have known that his conduct
would cause the victim to feel terrorized. He asserts that “it is unreasonable to infer th at
[he] knew or had reason to know that attempting contact with his daughter —which was
not prohibited by the OFP —would cause [the victim ] to feel extreme fear resulting from
violence or threats or to fear bodily harm.”
To illustrate his argument, McReynolds cites several cases involving s talking
convictions with particularly egregious underlying conduct. See, e.g., Franks, 765 N.W.2d
at 76 (underlying conduct for stalking conviction was writing vaguely threatening letters,
but defendant had previously threatened to kill victim while dragg ing her around house
looking for shotgun) ; State v. Mullen , 577 N.W.2d 505, 506 (Minn. 1998) ( underlying
conduct included the defendant breaking victim’s window and threatening to kill her); State
v. Stillday , 646 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2002) (underly ing conduct included
evidence that defendant punched victim in the face several times and caused the victim to
lose consciousness); State v. Barnslater , 786 N.W.2d 646, 648 -49 (Minn. App. 2010)
(underlying conduct included multiple acts of violence against victim). But none of these
cases establish that it is unreasonable to infer the requi site mental state based on less -
egregious conduct.

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Instead, the stalking statute requires proof that the defendant had “ reason to know
would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel terrorized.” Minn. Stat. § 609.749,
subd. 5(a) (emphasis added). Thus, a complete analysis requires consideration of both the
defendant’s conduct and “the existing conditions and the context” of the act, including the
defendant’s re lationship with the victim . See A.J.B. , 929 N.W.2d at 850 ; Franks, 765
N.W.2d at 75. McReynolds attempts to minimize the context of his relationship with the
victim, asserting that he had no prior convictions for domestic assault against the victim
and a criminal-history score of only one point. But McReynolds acknowledged that there
were multiple orders preventing him from having contact with the victim and being near
her home. There was also an order that prevented McReynolds from going to their child’s
school, which is where one of the incidents he admitted to occurred. The orders color the
context of McReynolds’s relationship with the victim , and we consider them when
determining whether McReynolds should have known whether his conduct would cause
the victim to feel terrorized or fear bodily harm.
We conclude that the record sufficiently establishes that McReynolds should have
known that his conduct would cause the victim to feel terrorized. McReynolds was subject
to multiple orders that prevented him from having contact with the victim, being near her
home, or being at their child’s school.3 Nevertheless, in November 2016, McReynolds

3 While McReynolds did not acknowledge the existence of the order preventing him from
being at the child’s school at the plea hearing, McReynolds himself introduced the order,
issued in August 2016, to support a pretrial motion to exclude evidence. Because there is
evidence in the record to support the existence of the order, which McReynolds himself
submitted, we conclude that it is appropriate to consider that the order existed. Cf.

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went to the school. At the school, McReynolds had contact with the victim and told her
that, “You bette r shut it down. You better shut it down or we will end up on the news .”
(Emphasis added.) McReynolds’s statement is a direct threat that if the victim did not
“shut it down,” he would do something “newsworthy” to her. Considering the incident in
the larger conte xt of his relationship with the victim, we conclude that this record
sufficiently establishes that McReynolds should have known that this conduct would cause
the victim to feel extreme fear.
The record also establishes that McReynolds should have known tha t his conduct
would cause the victim to feel terrorized as a result of the October 2019 incidents.
McReynolds admitted that, pursuant to a court order, he was not permitted to be within 100
feet of the victim’s residence. Despite that order, McReynolds—twice—brazenly violated
the order by attempting to stop his (and the victim’s) child’s school bus within 100 feet of
the victim’s residence. This conduct, again, must be viewed in context. That context
includes the November 2016 incident at the school, wh ere McReynolds also violated
multiple court orders and made a direct threat to the victim. Moreover, by 2019, the victim
had obtained an extension of the order for protection that originally issued in 2015. 4 A

Rosendahl, __ N.W.2d at __, 2021 WL 416699 , at *4 (observing that a revi ewing court
may consider record evidence when determining the accuracy of the defendant’s plea).
4 We also observe that McReynolds did not expressly admit that the 2015 order for
protection was extended for 50 years. Nevertheless, we conclude that Rosendahl does not
prohibit consideration of that fact. In Rosendahl, we concluded that it was improper to
consider allegations in the complaint regarding whether the appellant threatened the victim
with a knife because the appellant never acknowledged that allegation, and in fact arguably
denied it. See Rosendahl, __ N.W.2d at __, 2021 WL 416699 , at *4 ; see also Nelson v.
State, 880 N.W.2d 852, (Minn. 2016) (noting that the factual basis of a plea is inaccurate
when “the defendant makes statements that negat e an essential element of the charged

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district court may only extend an order for protection for 50 years if it finds that “the
respondent has violated a prior or existing order for protection on two or more occasions,”
or “the petitioner has had two or more orders for protection against the same respondent.”
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, sub d. 6a(c) (2020). We again conclude that McReynolds should
have known that his threatening conduct—his repeated disdain for court orders protecting
the victim—would cause the victim to feel extreme fear, and therefore terrorized.
II. The record establishes that the victim actually felt terrorized by McReynolds’s
conduct.

McReynolds next argues that his plea is not accurate because the record does not
establish that the victim actually felt terrorized by his conduct. We are not persuaded.
McReynolds expressly admitted at the plea hearing that the victim could have felt
terrorized by his conduct. His behavior and statements, in the context of his relationship
with the victim, along with his concession that his conduct could cause the victim to feel
terrorized, allow us to infer that the victim felt terrorized by his conduct.
First, we again consider the existence of multiple court orders preventing
McReynolds from having contact with the victim, being near the victim’s home, and being
at their child’s school. One of those orders was an order for protection that was extended
for 50 years. We can infer from the fact that the victim sought and obtained a 50 -year

crime” (quotation omitted)). McReynolds, on the other hand, admitted that the 2015 order
for protection existed. Thus, he expressly acknowledged and admitted to the order for
protection referenced in the complaint. Cf. id. at *5. Moreover, neither McReynolds nor
his attorney disputed the fact that the order for protection was extended for 50 years when,
later in the plea hearing, the prosecutor discussed that fact with the district court . Under
these circumstances, we conclude that it is appropriate to consider this fact in determining
the accuracy of McReynolds’s plea.

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extension to the order for protection that she was fearful of McReynolds based on his
conduct.
McReynolds also admitted at the plea hearing that he made a direct threat to the
victim—that the two would “end up on the news” if the victim did not “shut it down.” He
admitted that he made the statement in person, in violation of an order for protection. Then,
in 2019, after the order for protection had been extended for 50 years, McReynolds twice
attempted to stop his and the victim’s child’s school bus within just 100 feet of her house.
We can infer, based on the context of the relationship, McReynolds’ s repeated disregard
for orders protecting the victim, and McReynolds’s statements and conduct, that the victim
actually felt terrorized by McReynolds’s admitted conduct.
Because we conclude that the record establishes all elements of the offense, we
conclude that McReynolds’s plea is accurate, and therefore valid. Consequently, there is
no basis to allow McReynolds to withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.