State of Minnesota,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-0375

Court of Appeals Anderson, J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: December 15, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Cordale Irby,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant Ramsey County
Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Jessica Merz
Godes, Assistant State Public Defenders, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The statute that prohibits wrongfully obtaining public assistance, Minn. Stat.
§ 256.98, subd. 1 (2012), requires proof that a defendant acted with the “intent to defeat
the purposes of” any one or more of the listed public assistance programs.
2. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
2
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
This appeal requires us to interpret the language of the statute that prohibits
wrongfully obtaining public assistance, Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1 (2012). Respondent
State of Minnesota discovered multiple false statements in applications for public
assistance submitted by appellant Cordale Irby. A jury then found Irby guilty of violating
section 256.98, subdivision 1(1), by obtaining public assistance to which he was not
entitled through willfully false statements . The court of appeals affirmed his conviction.
Irby now claims that the language of the statute requires the State to prove that he intended
to defeat the purposes of all the public assistance programs listed within the statute.
The statute prohibits certain acts or omissions committed with the “intent to defeat
the purposes of” a list of nine separate public assistance programs. Minn. Stat. § 256.98
(2012). We conclude that when viewed as a whole, the plain language of the statute does
not require a defendant to act with an “intent to defeat the purposes of” every listed
program. We also conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Irby
acted with the intent to defeat the purposes of two of the listed programs. Consequently,
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
The relevant facts are not disputed. Between 2012 and 2017, Irby app lied for and
received over $65,000 in public assistance through the Ramsey County Community Health
Services Division . Irby received Medical A ssistance, as well as funds through the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the Minnesota Family Investment
3
Program (MFIP). In applying for this assistance, Irby repeatedly claimed that he had
neither income nor assets. He claimed his only expense was rent. To show the amount of
rent he paid, Irby submitted paperwork purportedly completed and signed by his landlord,
“Tom Bates.”
But the State discovered that during the time he was receiving aid, Irby had earned
nearly $55,000 gambling at three separate casinos. Further investigation revealed that Irby
had accounts at three separate banks. While Irby was receiving public aid, bank records
show over $70,000 in deposits for these accounts . Irby also owned twelve cars . Rather
than paying rent, Irby had executed a contract for deed to buy his home. After making
monthly payments that sometimes exceeded $5000, Irby owned the home outright by July
2015. Irby never disclosed any of these assets in his applications for public assistance.
And Irby’s alleged landlord “Tom Bates” did not exist.
Based on this information, t he State charged Irby with violating Minnesota’s
wrongfully obtaining assistance statute, Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1(1) .1 The statute

1 Irby was convicted of violating the 2012 version of the statute. The applicable
portion of the statute was amended in 2015 and 2019, and now reads as follows:
[W]ith intent to defeat the purposes of sections 145.891 to 145.897, the MFIP
program formerly codified in sections 256.031 to 256.0361, the AFDC
program formerly codified in sections 256.72 to 256.871, chapter 256B,
256D, 256I, 256J, 256 K, or 256L, child care assistance programs, and
emergency assistance programs under section 256D.06.
Minn. Stat. § 256.98 , subd. 1 (2020) (emphasis added). This language remains
substantially the same as the 2012 version, and our analysis in this case of the 2012 version
of the statute applies with equal force to the current version of the statute. Subdivision 1(1)
was further amended in 2021 to change the word “vouchers” to “food benefits.” Act of
May 25, 2021, ch. 30, art. 3, § 43, 2021 Minn. Laws 1, 6 9. This likewise does not affect
our analysis in this case.
4
prohibits several acts or omissions, including obtaining public assistance to which a person
is not entitled by means of a willfully false statement, committed with the “intent to defeat
the purposes of sections 145.891 to 145.897, [2] the MFIP program formerly codified in
sections 256.031 to 256.0361,[3] the AFDC program formerly codified in sections 256.72
to 256.871, [4] chapters 256B, 256D, 256J, 256K, or 256L,[5] and child care assistance
programs.” Id. (emphasis added). Irby testified in his own defense. He claimed that he
did not mean to defraud the State and was unaware of any mistakes in his applications.
Irby claimed that the false statements in his applications had been put there by someone
else. But Irby testified that he could not remember who had completed the paperwork and
had no explanation for how the same false statements had been included in multiple
applications. The jury found Irby guilty. The district court stayed execution of a 366-day
prison sentence and imposed 5 years of supervised probation. The court also ordered Irby
to pay $74,173 in restitution.

2 Sections 145.891–.897 codify the “Maternal and Child Nutrition Act of 1975.”

3 The MFIP codified in sections 256.031–.0361 was repealed in 1998 and 1999. Act
of Apr. 21, 1998, ch. 47, art. 6, § 118, 1998 Minn. Laws 1989, 2234; Act of May 13, 1999,
ch. 159 § 154, 1999 Minn. Laws 763, 869. MFIP is now codified in chapter 256J. Minn.
Stat. § 256J.01 (2020).

4 The AFDC program was repealed in 1997. Act of Apr. 30, 1997, ch. 85, art. 1, § 74,
1997 Minn. Laws 499, 586.

5 These chapters address medical assistance for needy persons, economic assistance
and food support, the current MFIP, services for homeless families and youth, and the
Minnesotacare program.
5
Irby appealed his conviction. He argued that the State presented insufficient
evidence to support his conviction . Specifically, Irby argued that the statute required the
State to prove that , when he wrongfully obtained assistance , he acted with the “intent to
defeat the purposes of” every one of the listed programs. The court of appeals rejected
Irby’s argument and affirmed his conviction.6 State v. Irby , 957 N.W.2d 111, 11 7–19
(Minn. App. 2021). We granted review.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Irby renews his argument that the State presented insufficient evidence
to sustain his conviction. Irby first argues that, because the statute he was convicted of
violating contains a list of programs joined with the word “and,” the State must prove that
he acted with the intent to defeat the purpose of each and every program 7 set out in that
list. Irby next argues that because the State presented no evidence that he intended to defeat
the purposes of, for example, the Maternal and Child Nutrition Act of 1975, the evidence
is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We consider each argument in turn.

6 Although Irby raised arguments related to the jury instructions and the district
court’s restitution order, those arguments are not before us. See Irby, 957 N.W.2d at 123.

7 Throughout his briefing, Irby argued that the State must prove intent to defeat “all”
programs listed in section 256.98. At oral argument, Irby proffered a more limited claim.
There, he argued that the statute requires proof of intent to defeat a set of programs: sections
145.891 to 145.897, the former MFIP, AFDC, childcare assistance, and at least one of
chapters 256B, 256D, 256J, 256K, or 256L. In either case, Irby advanced a more restrictive
reading than the State, which argued that the statute requires proof of intent to defeat any
one of the listed programs.
6
I.
We first must interpret the language of the statute that Irby was convicted of
violating. A sufficiency -of-the-evidence challenge based on a statutory interpretation
argument is a legal question , which we review de novo. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d
914, 920 (Minn. 2019) . “The object of all interpretation a nd construction of laws is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). Our
first step is to examine “the text, structure, and punctuation” of the statute. State v. Khalil,
956 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Minn. 2021). In examining the text, structure, and punctuation of
the statute, “words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according
to their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08, subd. 1 (2020). But no single
grammatical rule controls this analysis. See Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d at 921–22. Rather, we
must “construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give effect to all of its
provisions.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015); see also State v. Gaiovnik,
794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011) (“[W]e do not examine diff erent provisions [of a
statute] in isolation.”). If possible, “no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed
superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp ., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384
(Minn. 1999).
We use the principles discussed above when a ssessing the reasonableness of a
party’s proposed interpretation of the language in question. For example, in State v.
Strobel, we concluded that the interpretation proposed by the State was unreasonable
because when the sentencing guideline provision was read as a whole, the State’s
interpretation failed to give effect to one paragraph of a statutory provision. 932 N.W.2d
7
303, 309 (Minn. 2019) (explaining that “[u] nder the State’s interpretation, paragraph b
would do no work”). On the other hand, in State v. Mikell we concluded that, when read
in the context of the statute as a whole, the language in question supported two reasonable
interpretations. 960 N.W.2d 230, 241 (Minn. 2021).
When the language of a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation
it is ambiguous, in which case we try to resolve the ambiguity using the canons of
construction. Id. But “when the language of a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable
interpretation, it is unambiguous and we must apply its plain meaning.” State v. Culver,
941 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2020). In such case s, “ ‘statutory construction is neither
necessary nor permitt ed.’ ” Lapenotiere v. State, 916 N.W.2d 351, 357 (Minn. 2018)
(quoting State v. Kelbel, 648 N.W.2d 690, 701 (Minn. 2002)).
In accordance with the principles discussed above, our analysis begins with the
language of the statutory provision in question, which reads:
A person who commits any of the following acts or omissions with intent to
defeat the purpos es of sections 145.891 to 145.897, the MFIP program
formerly codified in sections 256.031 to 256.0361, the AFDC program
formerly codified in sections 256.72 to 256.871, chapter 256B, 256D, 256J,
256K, or 256L, and child care assistance programs, is guilty of theft . . .
(1) obtains or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets any
person to obtain by means of a willfully false statement or
representation, by intentional concealment of any material fact,
or by impersonation or other fraudulent device, assistance or
the continued receipt of assistance, to include child care
assistance or food benefits produced according to sections
145.891 to 145.897 and MinnesotaCare services according
to sections 256.9365 , 256.94, and 256L.01 to 256L.15, to
which the person is no t entitled or assistance greater than that
to which the person is entitled;
8
(2) knowingly aids or abets in buying or in any way
disposing of the property of a recipient or applicant of
assistance without the consent of the county agency; or
(3) obtains or attempts to obtain, alone or in collusion
with others, the receipt of payments to which the individual is
not entitled as a provider of subsidized child care, or by
furnishing or concurring in a willfully false claim for child care
assistance.

Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1 (emphasis added).
The arguments of the parties focus on the word “and” in the first paragraph of Minn.
Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1 ( identifying acts or omissions “done with intent to defeat the
purposes of s ections 145.891 to 145.897 . . . and child care assistance programs ”). Irby
argues for a “joint” reading, while the State argues for a “several” reading. 8 We
acknowledge that “and” is most frequently used in the joint sense. For example, in
Reimringer v. Ander son, we held that “unlawfully and in bad faith” unambiguously
constituted two elements—“unlawfully” and “in bad faith”—as the list was joined with the
word “and” and the two elements “require[d] different evidentiary proof.” 960 N.W.2d
684, 688 (Minn. 2021).9 Under a joint reading, the word “and” in the first paragraph of the
statute would require defendants to act with an “intent to defeat the purposes of” at least

8 When “and” requires the occurrence of all items in a list, it may be described as
joint, inclusive, or conjunctive; likewise, when “and” requires the occurrence of only one
or more items in a list, it may be described as several, exclusive, or disjunctive. For clarity
we use “joint” and “several” throughout our opinion.

9 See also Back v. State , 902 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Minn. 2017) (interpreting “and” as
conjunctive); State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433, 444 (Minn. 2014) (same), superseded by
statute, Act of May 13, 2014, ch. 242, § 3, 2014 Minn. Laws 804, 804 (codified as amended
at Minn. Stat. § 609.375 (2020)); Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11,
662 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Minn. 2003) (same).
9
five of the nine programs: The Maternal and Child Nutrition Act; the pre -1997 MFIP; the
AFDC program; “child care assistance programs”; and at least one of “ chapters 258B,
256D, 256J, 256K, or 256L.” Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1.
But in limited circumstances, “and” can be read in a several , that is, disjunctive,
sense based on context and the specific way the word is used. Maytag Co. v. Comm’r of
Taxation, 17 N.W.2d 37 , 39 (Minn. 1944); Eberle v. Miller , 212 N.W. 190, 191 (Minn.
1927), overruled in part on other grounds by Johnson v. Iverson , 222 N.W. 508 (Minn.
1928); see also Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 56 (3d ed. 2011)
(acknowledging that courts “recognize that and in a given context means or”). These
occasions are rare, and we presume that “and” is used in the joint sense unless the specific
context of a statute unambiguously proves otherwise. If this were one of those rare
occasions, as the State argues, the “and” would require a defendant to act with the “intent
to defeat the purposes of” one or more of the listed programs.
Because we must consider the proposed interpretations in the context of the statute
as a whole , we do not limit our analysis to a single word . Minnesota Statutes § 256.98
prohibits three distinct types of conduct, described in subdivision 1(1)–(3), when done with
the requisite intent.10 The charges against Irby allege that he obtained public assistance in

10 Irby was convicted under subdivision 1( 1). But the required intent that Irby
challenges applies equally to paragraphs (1) through (3) in subdivision 1 . The statute
requires the defendant to commit an act or omission with the “intent to defeat the purposes
of sections 145.891 to 145.897, the MFIP program formerly codified in sections 256.031
to 256.0361, the AFDC program formerly codified in sections 256.72 to 256.871, chapters
256B, 256D, 256J, 256K, or 256L, and child care assistance programs.” Minn. Stat.
§ 256.98, subd 1.
10
a fraudulent manner in violation of subdivision 1(1) of Minn. Stat. § 256.98. Subdivision
1(2) prohibits aiding and abetting a recipient of, or applicant for, public assistance in
disposing of property without the consent of the county. Subdivision 1(3) prohibits a
subsidized childcare provider from “obtain[ing]. . . payments to which the individual is
not entitled as a provider of subsidized child care.” See, e.g., Kind Heart Daycare, Inc. v.
Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 905 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2017) (describing charges brought against
a subsidized childcare provider for violating Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1(3) , by falsely
billing for services). Yet when a subsidized childcare provider obtains payments to which
he or she is not entitled, the provider cannot do so with the intent to defeat the purpose of,
for example, the Maternal and Child Nutrition Act. That Act provides food aid directly to
needy individuals—there is no way for a childcare provider to apply for or obtain this aid.11
Irby’s proposed interpretation of the statutory language would effectively read subdivision
1(3) out of existence because subsidized childcare providers could never have the intent
required. Because I rby’s proposed interpretation fails to give effect to all the statute’s
provisions, it is unreasonable. See Strobel, 932 N.W.2d at 309; Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683.

11 One also cannot commit an act or omission with an intent to defeat the purposes of
the former MFIP and the AFDC program—which are among the listed programs—because
those program s have not existed for more than two decades. The former MFIP was
repealed in 1998 and 1999. Act of Apr. 21, 1998, ch. 407, art. 6, § 118, 1998 Minn. Laws
1989, 2234; Act of May 13, 1999, ch. 159 § 154, 1999 Minn. Laws 763, 869. It was
replaced by a newer program, also c alled MFIP, codified in chapter 256J. Minn. Stat.
§ 256J.01 (2020). The AFDC program was repealed in 1997. Act of Apr. 30, 1997, ch.
85, § 74, 1997 Minn. Laws 586; Greene v. Comm’r of Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs ., 755
N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn. 2008) (explain ing that a federal block grant program replaced
AFDC).
11
By contrast, the interpretation proposed by the State gives effect to all provisions of the
wrongfully obtaining assistance statute.
For all the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the only reasonable
interpretation of the statutory language is that it requires proof that a defendant acted with
the “intent to defeat the purposes of” any one or more of the public assistance programs
listed in Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1.12
II.
Having determined the proper interpretation of section 256.98, subdivision 1, we
now “conduct ‘a painstaking analysis of the record’ ” to ensure that the evidence supports
the verdict. State v. Powers, 962 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2021) (quoting State v. Webb,
440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989) ). In doing so, we view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict. Id.
Irby argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that he intended to defeat
the programs for which he applied. Intent is a state of mind; it is frequently proven with
circumstantial evidence. State v. McInnis , 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn. 2021); Reed v.

12 Irby argues that interpreting Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1, in a several sense would
require us to hold the plain language of the statute to be absurd and rewrite it. Irby claims
that this would be a violation of his due process rights. But our analysis relies on the whole-
statute canon of interpretation discussed in Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683 , not the absurdity
principle discussed in State v. Ortega-Rodriguez, 920 N.W.2d 642, 646–47 (Minn. 2018).
Because the language of the statute is unambiguous, consideration of extrinsic sources is
neither necessary nor permitted. Lapenotiere, 916 N.W.2d at 357. Moreover, because our
interpretation does not expand narrow or precise language, we need not address Irby’s due
process argument. In any event, Irby did not raise this issue until after we granted review,
thereby forfeiting any due process arguments. See State v. Ali , 895 N.W.2d 237, 246
(Minn. 2017) (holding that a constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal to our
court is forfeited).
12
State, 925 N.W.2d 11, 20 n.5 (Minn. 2019). To prove intent, it is permissible for the jury
to “infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.” State
v. Cooper , 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997) . Under the two-step circumstantial
evidence test, we must identify the circumstances proved and then determine whether the
circumstances proved, as a whole, are “ ‘consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt. ’ ” McInnis, 962 N.W.2d at 891 (quoting State v.
Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2018)).
The circumstances proved show that Irby received aid under two of the programs
listed in section 256.98: Medical Assistance under chapter 256B and the MFIP under
chapter 256J. In applying for these benefits, Irby made false statements about his income
and his assets. To support his applications, Irby submitted paperwork allegedly completed
by a person who did not exist. Irby’s false statements were broad and found in multiple
places in each application that he filed . Irby repeated these falsities on separate
applications submitted over the course of more than 5 years.
These circumstances are consistent with guilt and in consistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt . Although Irby testified that his false statements were
inadvertent and he was not trying to deceive the State, “a defendant’s statements as to his
intentions are not binding on the jury if his acts demonstrated a contrary intent.” Cooper,
561 N.W.2d at 179. Irby made numerous false statements in his applications , and these
statements were specific, untrue, and repeated to the point that it is not rational to believe
that they were inadvertent. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Irby acted with an intent to defeat the purposes of
13
the aid programs for which he applied, and it is inconsistent with any rational hypothes is
other than guilt.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.