State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0376

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Heather Anne Anderson-Larscheid,
Appellant.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-18-1119

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John L. Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presid ing Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from an order revoki ng appellant’s probation and executing a
previously stayed prison sentence, appellant argues that the district court abused its

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discretion because it did not find, and the record did not show, that the need for confinement
outweighed the policies favoring pr obation. Because the record reveals that the district
court carefully applied Austin and Modtland in revoking probation, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Heather Anne Anderson-Larsche id entered a guilty pl ea to first-degree
sale of methamphetamine, in vi olation of Minn. Stat . § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2016). The
district court accepted her plea and convicted her of that offense. At sentencing, the district
court granted appellant’s request for a downward dispositional departure finding appellant
to be “particularly amenable to probation” and “particularly amenable to treatment.” The
district court sentenced appellant to serve 65 months in prison, stayed execution of the
sentence for fifteen years, and placed appellant on probation. As a condition of probation
appellant was required to enroll in and complete and follow all the rules and regulations of
the Rice County Treatment Court.
The department of correc tions subsequently filed a probation-violation report
alleging that appellant had been discharged from treatment court. The report indicated that
appellant had been terminated from the Rice County Treatment Court after being
discharged from treatment at the Pathways residential program. The report concluded that
while appellant had some success in othe r treatment settings, she had “exhausted the
resources available in the co mmunity” due to her “[inability] to comply with basic rules
and expectations.”
Based on the above, the district court f ound appellant to have intentionally and
inexcusably violated the terms of her proba tion and that the need for her confinement

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outweighed the policies favoring probation. The district court revoked appellant’s
probation and committed her to prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Whether a district court has made the fi ndings required to revoke probation is a
question of law we review de novo. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005);
State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn.
2016). “A district court has ‘broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence
to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.’”
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 605 (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50). Thus, “like all
exercises of judicial discretion,” the decision to revoke probation “requires ‘conscientious
judgment, not arbitrary action.’” State v. Cottew , 746 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. 2008)
(quoting Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 222-23, 53 S. Ct. 154, 156 (1932)). When
revoking probation, a district court must: (1 ) specify the conduct or conditions that the
probationer violated, (2) find the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and (3) find that
the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d
at 250.
Appellant challenges the district c ourt’s findings only as to the third Austin factor,
arguing that “the record did not show, and the di strict court did not find, that the need for
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.” Pursuant to this factor, district
courts “must balance ‘the probationer’s intere st in freedom and the state’s interest in
insuring [the probationer’s] rehabilitation and the public safety,’ and base their decisions
‘on sound judgment and no t just their will.’” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quoting

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Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250-51). In making this de termination, district courts should refer
to whether “(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public,” “(ii) the offender is in need
of correctional treatment which can most effe ctively be provided if [the offender] is
confined,” or (iii) not revoking probation “would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation.” Id. (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251).
The ultimate question this court must answer is not whether the district court simply
recited the correct factors in coming to its conclusion. Indeed, mere recitation of the three
Austin factors cannot satisfy the re quirements for revocation. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at
608 (“[C]ourts should not assume they have satisfied Austin by reciting the three
factors . . . .”). Rather, the question is whether the district court examined proper
considerations, compared those considerations to a “thorough, fact-specific record[],” and
thereby properly concluded that revocation was appropriate. Id. We conclude the district
court examined the proper considerations found in the record and that its decision to revoke
probation was not an abuse of discretion.
In concluding that the third Austin factor was met, the district court stated:
Whether or not the Court believes that [treatment in the community]
can meet [appellant’s] needs—and it may meet her needs—that doesn’t
address the third factor, th e need for revocation to sh ow the severity of the
violation. The Court is persuaded by the State that the sentence to treatment
court was a dispositional—a downward dispositional depa rture that was
based upon [appellant’s] particular am enability to treatment, and she has
shown and by finding that she has violat ed probation, the Court has found
that she is no longer particularly am enable to probation. The Court is
persuaded that the behaviors and actions while at Pathways that resulted in
[appellant] leaving against medical advice to not be discharged . . . show that
she’s not particularly amenable to probation, and, therefore, the violation of
being discharged from treatment court is so severe that revocation is
necessary in order to . . . not unduly depreciate the severity of it.

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(emphasis added). Though the district court did not specifically recite the language of the
third Austin factor—that “the need for confin ement outweighs th e policies favoring
probation”—that is not the critical question here. What is critical is that the district court
specifically found that not revoking probation “would unduly depreciate the seriousness of
the violation,” referring to one of three sub-factors courts “should refer to” in deciding the
third Austin factor. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251.
Though the district court did not specify which “behaviors and actions while at
Pathways” it was referring to, we need not “scour the record” to make that determination.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608 (“[I]t is not the role of appellate courts to scour the record
to determine if sufficient evidence exists to support the district court’s revocation.”). The
district court’s oral findings were presented shortly after the district court heard from the
probation agent regarding appellant’s conti nuing criminal and dishonest thinking, her
history of attendance issues, her continued su bstance abuse, and other concerns with her
lack of compliance while in treatment. It is clear that these were the facts upon which the
district court’s decision was made. Furthermore, the district court explicitly considered the
option of continued treatment in the community, it applied its “broad discretion” to
determine that such an arrangement would not be appropriate given appellant’s severe
violation and history of noncompliance. Id. at 605 (quotation omitted). Thus, the district
court made sufficient findings to satisfy the third Austin factor.
Finally, appellant objects to the district court’s reference to appellant allegedly
“leaving [Pathways] against medical advice. ” It is undisputed that appellant was

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discharged from treatment. The district court made reference to appellant’s discharge as it
carefully considered the third Austin factor. The district court stated: “The Court is
persuaded that the behaviors a nd actions while [in treatment] that resulted in [appellant]
leaving against medical advice to not be discha rged . . . show that she’s not particularly
amenable to probation . . . .” Though the district court referenced the allegation that
appellant discharged herself, the district court’s reasoning clearly focused on appellant’s
“behaviors and actions,” the severity of those behaviors and actions, and how they “show
that [appellant is] not particularly amenable to probation . . . .” The district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that revocation of probation was appropriate.
Affirmed.