State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0379

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ashaunti Quantay Prowell,
Appellant.

Filed September 12, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-1303

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middle brook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Following his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, appellant argues that
he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was unintelligent and therefore
manifestly unjust. We agree, and reverse and remand.
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FACTS
In January 2019, police officers from the Golden Valley Police Department
responded to the scene of a single-vehicle crash and identified appellant Ashaunti Quantay
Prowell as the driver. While speaking with appellant, an officer saw a firearm on the
driver’s-side floor. The officer also detected a strong odor of alcohol and noticed that
appellant was slurring his words. The officer searched the vehicle and found pills that
field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Respondent State of Minnesota charged
appellant with unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of a controlled substance, two
counts of impaired driving, and giving false information to a police officer.
Appellant was at first represented by a public defender , but later dismissed his
public defender and hire d private counsel. In October 2019, appellant pleaded guilty to
unlawful possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. In exchange for his plea, the state
dismissed the remaining counts and dismissed another pending case. The parties also
agreed to recommend a 60 -month prison sentence. The district court accepted the plea
agreement and imposed sentence. In September 2020, appellant petitioned for
postconviction relief. Appellant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
and that his plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent. The district court denied
appellant’s petition, and this appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his request to withdraw his guilty
plea. We review a denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State,
925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). We review the “ [district] court’s legal determinations
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de novo, and its factual findings for clear error.” Brown v. State , 895 N.W.2d 612, 617
(Minn. 2017) (citations omitted). “A [district] court abuses its discretion when its decision
is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record or
exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d
2, 9 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
A c riminal defendant do es not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010) . That said, a district court must allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any time if it is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is
not valid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997) . “If a plea fails to meet
any one of these requirements, it is invalid.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn.
2007). “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 94. We review the validity of a plea de novo. Id.
Appellant argues his guilty plea was not intelligent. The intelligence requirement
ensures that the defendant understands the state’s charges against him, the rights he is
waiving, and the consequences of his plea. Id. at 96. Here, a ppellant claims his plea was
unintelligent because he did not understand the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. 1
Appellant claims his attorney misadvised him that he could enter a guilty plea and still

1 Appellant asserts additional bases for reversing the denial of his postconviction petition
and claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel . Because we conclude that
appellant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it is unintelligent, we decline to
address these other arguments.
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preserve his right to challenge the state’s evidence for the first time on appeal. Generally,
“[a] guilty plea by a counseled defendant has traditionally operated . . . as a waiver of all
non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d
875, 878 (Minn. 1986). This includes the right to challenge the admissibility of the state’s
evidence. Korman v. State, 262 N.W.2d 161, 161 (Minn. 1977); see also State v. Goebel,
654 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating general rule requiring that issues be first
litigated in district court).
Appellant claims his attorney affirmatively misadvised him about the effect a guilty
plea would have on a challenge to the state’s evidence. We agree. During appellant’s plea
colloquy, he waived his rights to contest probable cause for the charge and the admissibilit y
of the state’s evidence, including the firearm. But appellant’s plea petition shows he was
pleading guilty with the understanding that he could challenge the state’s evidence on
appeal. On the plea petition, appellant acknowledged his right to a pretrial hearing to
“determine whether or not the evidence the prosecution has could be used against me ” and
placed an “X” next to the statement, “I specifically do not now waive my right to have such
a pre-trial hearing.” And at the postconviction hearing, appellant testified he went into the
plea hearing understan ding that he was preserving the suppression issue for appeal. The
district court acknowledged in its postconviction order that when appellant appeared for
the plea hearing,
he thought he was appearing for a motion hearing challenging
the officer’s entry into his car. He was surprised that the case
was set for trial. [Appellant] then asked [attorney] if the
suppression issue had been waived. According to [appellant],
[attorney] told him that the issue had not been waived but
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instead [attorney] had missed the filing deadline to file a
motion to suppress. [Attorney] then told [appellant] that the
Court was not going to continue the trial date so his options
were to plead guilty or go to trial. [Attorney] also told
[appellant] that [he] could pursue the suppression issue on
appeal.
Based on our de novo review, we conclude that appellant’s attorney affirmatively
misadvised appellant that he could challenge the suppression issue on appeal, even though
appellant pleaded guilty and did not challenge that issue in district court. The district court
therefore abused its discretion, and a ppellant’s guilty plea was unintelligent.2 Because the
guilty plea is invalid , we reverse and remand with instructions to permit appellant to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Reversed and remanded.

2 Appellant also claims his plea was inaccurate and involuntary. Based on our
determination that appellant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was
unintelligent, we need not address the remaining factors. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94
(noting that a plea that does not satisfy all three requirements is constitutionally invalid ).