In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. A. M. and M. A. C., Parents.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 853 N.W.2d 127 not in our corpus
- 907 N.W.2d 241 not in our corpus
- In Re Dependency of Klugman 97 N.W.2d 425
- In re the Welfare of J.R.B. 805 N.W.2d 895
- Ekman v. Miller 812 N.W.2d 892
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0395
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
M. A. M. and M. A. C., Parents.
Filed August 17, 2020
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge
Grant County District Court
File No. 26-JV-19-341
Matthew P. Franzese, Wheaton, Minnesota (for appellants)
Justin Anderson, Grant County Attorney, Marquelle L. Theis -Pflipsen, Assistant County
Attorney, Elbow Lake, Minnesota (for respondent Grant County S ocial Services)
Dawn Krump, Tintah, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
Appellants mother and father (collectively, parents) appeal the termination of their
parental rights to son and daughter. The district court applied a statutory presumption of
palpable unfitness b ecause a court in the State of Washington previously terminated
parents’ rights to two other children. On appeal, p arents argue that the district court
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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(1) erroneously concluded that parents failed to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness
and (2) abused its discretion by finding that termination of parental rights was in the best
interests of son and daughter. We affirm.
FACTS
Because a presumption of palpable unfitness arises from events and proceedings
occurring in the State of Washington, we begin by describing the Washington proceedings,
which involved two children not at issue in the instant proceedings. We then turn to th e
Minnesota proceedings.
Washington Proceedings
Parents’ first two children were born in 2010 and 2011 and lived with parents in the
State of Washington. From 2014 through 2016, the local social services agency received
reports that the children were ne glected, unbathed, and living in unsafe and unsanitary
conditions. On February 16, 2016, the State of Washington removed those two children
from parents’ care. At the time, p arents were homeless, and mother was unabl e to find
employment. On March 31, 2016, a Washington court found the children to be
“dependent,” meaning that the children were abandoned, abused, neglected, or ha d no
parent or custodian capable of adequately cari ng for them. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 13.34.030(6) (2018).
The Washington court ordered —and the Washington Department of Children
Youth and Families (the department) offered —drug and alcohol assessments, random
urinalysis tests, and psychological evaluations for e ach parent, as well as a mental-health
evaluation for mother. Mother provided two urine samples, both positive for THC, but did
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not avail herself of any other services. Father did not participate in any services. The
assigned social worker repeatedly attempted to call or meet with parents to help them
participate in services. On December 30, 2016, the caseworker found parents at a public
location and attempted to persuade parents to engage in services, but mother refused.
In July 2017, parents moved to Minnesota. Mother told the department she needed
funding for drug and alcohol services in Minnesota. The caseworker informed mother of
the necessary steps to obtain funding and indicated that the State of Washington could pay
if the State of Minnesota declined funding. The department did not make any referrals ,
however, because the caseworker understood that parents still had not attempted to seek
funding from the State of Minnesota. Thereafter, the caseworker attempted to maintain
contact with parents but had great difficulty reaching them.
In 2018, the Washington court held a three-day termination of parental rights (TPR)
trial. On November 26, 2018, the Washington court terminated the parental rights of
mother and father as to the two children. At the time , those children lived with mother’s
brother, two years had elapsed since parents last saw the children in person, and phone
visits with parents had also ceased. The Washington court found that the parents had not
corrected identified deficiencies and wer e currently unfit to parent the children. The
Washington court also found that parents had effectively abandoned the children by
discontinuing in-person and phone visits. The Washington court found that continuatio n
of the parent -child relationship “clea rly diminishe[d]” each child’s prospect for early
integration into a stable and permanent home and that termination of parental rights was in
the best interests of each child.
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Minnesota Proceedings
The proceedings at issue here involve son and daughter, who were each born after
parents moved to Minnesota. Son was born in July 2017, and daughter was born in
September 2019. On December 3, 2019, respondent Grant County Social S ervices (the
county) received a report that father was a predatory offender, bas ed on an incident that
occurred when father was 13. On December 4, 2019, a county social worker had contact
with the family at their home. She observed that every time son tried to engage with father,
son “would end up running away from his dad screaming.” The social worker witnessed
son take cigarettes out of a carton and drag around a bag of garbage . The social worker
alerted parents to each of these events because parents did not notice son’s behavior. The
social worker also observed that father was swaying and slurring his words, and she was
concerned that he was under the influence of a substance.
On December 10, 2019, the c ounty petitioned to terminate parental rights, and son
and daughter were removed from parents’ home on an emergency basis. Once in the
county’s care, son and daughter were taken to a doctor. Assessments revealed that
daughter, who was still an infant, suffered from severe neck and head issues that required
physical therapy and a cranial helmet. Son te sted in the first percentile for speech and
cognition, requiring speech and occupational therapy. The assessor determined that son
would require long-term developmental services.
When son and daughter entered the county’s care, the social worker observe d
behaviors in son that were unusual for a two -year old. For example, “[t]he first week in
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placement he was trying to grab pens and put them in his eyes.” The social worker testified
that these behaviors gradually improved while son was in the county’s c are.
Also w hile son and daughter were in the county’s care , parents participated in
supervised visits. Mother attended a total of eight visits, and father attended six. Four of
the visits were supervised by a contractor retained by the county. The con tractor observed
that mother exhibited a genuine affection for son and daughter, that son and daughter
enjoyed the visits, that mother provided age -appropriate snacks and diapers, and that
mother “did a nice job of managing” son and daughter. The contract or also observed both
mother and father effectively calming son when he threw a tantrum.
On February 7, 2020, the Grant County District Court held a TPR trial. Several
witnesses testified at the hearing. Mother testified that she attempted to obtain a mental-
health evaluation after moving to Minnesota and was told that she needed a referral from
Washington social services, which the department failed to provide. She also claimed that
she tried to set up counseling but was unable to find a counselor wi th whom she felt
comfortable. Father testified that he tried to obtain counseling but did not “feel comfortab le
with some places.” Mother testified that she attempted to set up medical appointments for
daughter, but mother did not present any evidence o f medical appointments. Mother
additionally claimed that daughter did not develop cranial issues until after the county took
daughter into its care. Parents testified that son and daughter were left in father’s care
while mother was at work. Father adm itted that when son woke up in the morning, father
would give son cereal and leave son i n a play area, because father claimed he is not a
morning person.
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Also at the TPR trial, t he social worker testified as to her observations since
December 4, 2019, stating that she would be very concerned about the safety and well -
being of son and daughter if they were returned to parents, especially given the special
needs of son and daughter. The guardian ad litem testified that termination of parental
rights would be in son and daughter’s best interests. The contractor who supervised four
parental visits testified as to her positive observations during the visits but ultimately did
not express an opinion as to whether mother or father were able to parent.
The district court found that mother’s testimony lacked credibility and that mother
ignored son and daughter’s serious medical needs. The district court found father’s
testimony credible but observed that he did not provide any evidence that he is able to care
for son and daughter. The only credited evidence parents presented to rebut the
presumption of palpable unfitness was the testimony of the contractor who supervised their
visitation, but those observations occurred over a total of only a few hours i n a controlled
environment, and the contractor did not express an opinion regarding parental fitness.
Accordingly, the district court found that parents failed to rebut the presumption of
palpable unfitness. The district court further found that terminat ion of parental rights
would be in the best interests of son and daughter to ensure they would receive care
necessary to address their serious developmental issues. Parents appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err by finding parents palpably unfit.
Parents argue that the district court erred as a matter of law by finding that parents
did not rebut the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness. A district court may
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terminate parental rights upon finding that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent-child relationship. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018). A parent is
presumed to be palpably unfit “upon a showing that the parent’s parental rights to one or
more other children were involuntarily terminated.” Id. This presumption “is easily
rebuttable. . . . [A] parent needs to produce only enough evidence to support a finding that
the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the children.” In re Welfare of Child
of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). When reviewing a
parent’s evidence, “a district court must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to
create a genuine issue of fact on the issue of palpable unfitness.” In re Welfare of Child of
J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 245-46 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2018).
We review whether a parent has rebutted the statutory presumption de novo. Id.
Parents argue that they were unable to comply with the Washington case plan
because of their poverty and, therefore, the Minnesota district court lacked a basis to
presume palpable unfitness. “Mere poverty . . . of the parents is seldom, if ever, a sufficient
ground for depriving them of the natural right to the custody of their child or children, to
say nothing of the statutory right.” In re Dependency of Klugman , 97 N.W.2d 425, 430
(Minn. 1959).
The record does not support parents’ contention that poverty was the sole basis for
their noncompliance with the Washington case plan. According to parents’ own testimo ny,
their inability to obtain services was at least in part related to their personal difficulties in
seeking assistance. While we recognize the challenges identified by parents in obtaining
services, the record shows that help was available to parents notwithstanding their poverty
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and that parents chose not to accept the assistance offered to them . The Washington court
found that the department attempted to contact parents numerous times and even sought
parents out in a public location, but mother declined to speak with the social worker and
refused services.
Parents argue that once they moved to Minnesota, the department could have taken
action and “the funding would have come” to enable parents to receive services. But the
Washington court expressly found that parents never completed the instructions to obtain
funding for services in Minnesota. And the record shows that even while parents remained
in the State of Washington—for over one year after the Washington c ourt ordered
services—parents still did not accept services.
Parents also argue that the district court erroneously relied on evidence of their
chemical-dependency issues without finding that those issues affected son and daughter.
But the district cou rt credited testimony from the social worker who observed that father
appeared impaired during the December 4, 2019 home visit and that neither father nor
mother noticed son removing cigarettes from a carton or dragging around a bag of garbage
during that visit. The district court made several other findings relevant to parenting,
including that son exhibited unusual and unsafe behaviors shortly after being in parents’
care, that parents failed to set up necessary medical appointments even though they were
aware that both son and daughter have special needs, and that son was essentially left on
his own while in father’s care.
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In summary, parents do not cite any record evidence that creates a genuine issue of
fact as to the issue of palpable unfitness . W e see no err or by the district court i n
determining that parents failed to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that termination of
parental rights was in the best interests of son and daughter.
Parents also argue that the district court abused its discretion by finding that
termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of son and daughter. “If, after
a hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the
conditions set out in section 260C.301 exist, it may terminate parental rights.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.317, subd. 1 (2018). “[T]he best interests of the child must be the paramount
consideration,” provided that the district court finds palpable unfitness or one of the other
conditions set forth in section 260C.301. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
“[Appellate courts] review a district court’s ultimate determination that termination is in a
child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J. R.B., 805
N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “ The district
court is the exclusive judge of credibility.” Ekman v. Miller, 812 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.
App. 2012).
Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s finding that terminatio n
of parental rights was in the best interest s of son and daughter. The district court found
that son and daughter have serious physical and developmental needs that were
unaddressed while in parents’ care . The district court further found that termination of
parental rights was necessary to ensure those needs are met and that son and daughter have
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a safe home. Parents argue that the district court abused its discretion but cite no legal
authority or record evidence to support their assertion. Parents contend that they obtained
housing one month before the court terminated parental rights and that the evidence did
not show that son and daughter were abused or neglected or did not attend regular medical
appointments. But the district court did not terminate parental rights based on parents’
housing situation and in fact noted that parents’ housing and employment situation had
improved. As to physician visits, we defer to the findings by the district court that mother’s
testimony that she set up medical appointments was not credible and concluding that
mother “had not addressed [son and daughter’s] serious medical needs.” In light of the
significant and unaddressed needs of the children, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that termination of parental rights was in the best i nterests of son
and daughter to ensure they receive the care they need and have a safe and stable home.
Affirmed.