Igor Pavlovich Albantov, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0399

Igor Pavlovich Albantov, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 26, 2020
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-14164

Igor Pavlovich Albantov, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his petition for relief
without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
This is the second appeal in this matter. In April 2017, a jury found appellant Igor
Albantov guilty of possession and sale of a controlled substance in the first degree. The
district court adjudicated both convictions and sentenced Albantov to 110 month s’
imprisonment. Albantov appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the district
court erred by denying his motion to suppress certain evidence discovered following a dog
sniff, that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove his constru ctive possession,
and that he was entitled to resentencing. State v. Albantov , No. A17 -1327, 2018 WL
3214293, at *1 (Minn. App. July 2, 2018), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2018). We
affirmed Albantov’s convictions, concluding that the dog sniff was sup ported by
reasonable suspicion and that sufficient evidence supported his convictions. Id. at *2-4.
But we reversed Albantov’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing
under the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act. Id. at *4; see also State v. Kirby, 899
N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. 2017) . On November 19, 2018, the district court resentenced
Albantov to 85 months in prison.
The factual basis for the convictions is set forth in detail in Albantov. To summarize,
on May 24, 2016, officers s poke with Albantov outside a hotel, observed his nervous
reaction when questioned about selling heroin, subjected his vehicle to a dog sniff which

3
indicated the presence of narcotics, and located nearly 44 grams of heroin within the
vehicle. 2018 WL 324293, at *1. Albantov moved to suppress the evidence against him,
challenging the constitutionality of the stop, dog sniff, and vehicle search.
During an evidentiary hearing immediately before trial , investigating officers
testified that they encountered a man (T.K.) who admitted his intent to purchase heroin
from his friend “Igor,” T.K. provided a descript ion of “Igor” and his vehicle , and officers
observed a man matching Igor’s description and a woman exit the hotel and walk toward a
vehicle matching the description from T.K. Officers questioned Albantov, who claimed
he was at the hotel to visit someone in room 210 , and officers eventually asked Albantov
directly whether he was there to sell heroin. Albantov became nervous and admitted he
was a heroin user. He consented to a search of his person which led to the discovery of a
capsule on Albantov’s keychain that smelled like heroin residue when opened. Police
called for a dog sniff of Al bantov’s vehicle , and the K -9 alerted on the vehicle’s door
seams, indicating the presence of drugs. Police did not administer the Miranda advisory
to Albantov. The district court denied Albantov’s motion to suppress , and the case
proceeded to trial.
The evidence at trial included te stimony from law enforcement about these
encounters, the discovery of a large amount of cash and a vial with heroin residue on
Albantov’s person, as well as the later discovery of a fanny pack containing heroin inside
Albantov’s vehicle. The evidence at t rial also included an account of the K -9 sniff
indicating the presence of narcotics. And the trial testimony further described evidence
found inside room 210, which was registered to someone other than Albantov, including a

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methamphetamine pipe, hypodermi c needles, a case with heroin residue, and Albantov’s
credit card.
Albantov testified in his own defense, claiming that he and three others drove
together to the hotel to party and use drugs. He claimed that he left the hotel room to wait
for T.K. and decided to grab a cigarette from his vehicle when police arrived. He denied
knowing that the fanny pack was inside his vehicle or that it contained heroin. He instead
claimed that the fanny pack belonged to one of the passengers who earlier rode with him.
Following the convictions, sentence, appeal, and resentencing, Albantov petitioned
for postconviction relief in January 2020 , arguing that he did not receive a Miranda
advisory, that the state failed to prove necessary elements, that Albantov’s trial counsel
was ineffective in several respects, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
representing him despite an alleged conflict of interest and for failing to provide him with
transcripts or raise certain issues on appeal. Albantov argued that none of his claims were
time-barred or Knaffla-barred. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2018); State v.
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). He insisted his Miranda argument rested on
newly discovered evidence, that his claims raised novel lega l issues, and that the interests
of justice favored consideration . He also explained that he would have raised the
ineffective-assistance and Miranda issues in a supplemental brief on direct appeal but for
his appellate counsel’s failure to provide him with timely access to trial transcripts.
The postconviction court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. It
concluded that the sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge was barred because it was raised
on direct appeal. It deemed the Miranda and ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims

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barred under Knaffla because they could have been raised on direct appeal. It concluded
that the Knaffla exceptions did not apply because transcripts were available at the time of
the direct appeal, nothi ng prevented Albantov from raising issues through his appellate
counsel, and correspondence to Albantov from his appellate counsel indicated that she had
considered and rejected a potential ineffective -assistance argument. The postconviction
court rejected as meritless the argument that his appellate counsel was ineffective. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Albantov argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by deeming
several claims barred and by rejecting his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim
without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm because his postconviction claims are either
Knaffla-barred without exception or because the petition and record conclusively show he
was entitled to no relief.
We review the denial of a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing for
an abuse of discretion. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 2015). An individual
convicted of a crime may petition for relief from a conviction or sentence. Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 1 (2018). “Unless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief,” the postconviction court must
hold an evidentiary hearing, make findings and conclusions, and either deny the petition or
order appropriate relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). “In determining whether an
evidentiary hearing is required, a postconviction court considers the facts alleged in t he
petition as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen

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v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 424 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “But a court need not
hold an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if t rue, are legally
insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief.” Jackson v. State, 929 N.W.2d 903, 905
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
I. Albantov’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument is Knaffla-barred.
The postconviction court found that Albantov’s sufficiency challenge was
Knaffla-barred because he challenged the sufficiency of the state’s evidence on direct
appeal. Albantov contends he never raised the issue despite having argued in support of
his postconviction petition that “ [t]he State has failed to prove every essential element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt which the petitioner was charged with violating . . . .”
Like the postconviction court, we construe Albantov’s essential-elements argument
as a challenge to the su fficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. “[W]here
direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not
raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (“A petition for
postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds
that could have been raised on direct appeal . . . .”). The Knaffla rule includes all claims
that should have been known at the time of the direct appeal . Zumberge v. State , 937
N.W.2d 406, 411 (Minn. 2019).
On direct appeal, Albantov challenged the sufficiency of the state’s evidence
tending to prove that he possessed heroin. Albantov, 2018 WL 3214293, at *3–4. Although
he advanced a broader argument in his postconviction petition, those arguments could have

7
been raised on direct appeal. The postconviction court correctly deemed the argument to
be Knaffla-barred.
II. Albantov’s Miranda claim is Knaffla-barred.
The postconviction court concluded that Albantov’s Miranda claim was
Knaffla-barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal and because no exception
applied. Albantov argues that his claim was based on newly discovered evidence, that he
raised a novel legal issue, and that the interests of justice warrant consideration of his
petition.
Albantov’s Miranda claim did not arise from newly discovered evidence. A
petitioner filing a timely petition for pos tconviction relief alleging the existence of newly
discovered evidence must establish, in part, that the evidence was unknown to him and his
counsel at the time of trial. See Miles v. State , 840 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Minn. 2013).
Albantov and his trial counsel learned of the alleged violation no later than the evidentiary
hearing that occurred before trial. Albantov therefore could have raised the Miranda issue
on direct appeal.
We also conclude that no exception to the Knaffla bar applies. “For claims that were
not raised on direct appeal, two exceptions to the Knaffla rule exist: (1) a novel legal issue
is presented that was unavailable at the ti me of the direct appeal; or (2) the interests of
justice require review.” Zumberge, 937 N.W.2d at 411–12. Albantov failed to identify
exactly how the legal basis for his claim is novel, instead focusing on the circumstances
supporting his legal theory . The circumstances of the alleged Miranda violation do not
present a novel legal issue justifying an exception to the Knaffla bar. See id. at 411.

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The interests of justice do not support the consideration of Albantov’s petition. The
exception “may be applied when fairness so requires and the petitioner did not deliberately
and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal. ” Ford v. State, 690 N.W.2d 706,
711 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). Albantov contends that his appellate counsel’s
failure to provide him with transcripts prevented him from raising the Miranda issue in his
direct appeal. The postconviction court reasoned that nothing stopped Albantov from
raising the issue through his appellate counsel, who did have transcripts. The
postconviction court failed to recognize that Albantov alleged a violation of his right to
transcripts under the rules of criminal procedure, which in turn precluded him from
preserving issues on direct appeal by filing a supplemental brief . We affirm regardless
because Albantov failed to allege sufficient facts in his petition to support his claim that a
violation of his right to transcripts occurred . See Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(1) (2018)
(“The petition . . . shall contain . . . a statement of the facts and the grounds upon which the
petition is based.”); see also Jackson, 929 N.W.2d at 905.
A defendant has a right to file a supplemental brief. Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02,
subd. 5(13), (17). A defendant also has a right to a transcript of the proceedings , but the
public defender’s office is obligated to send transcripts only if: (1) the defendant requests
a copy, (2) the public defender’s office confers with the defendant , and (3) the defendant
insists on transcript copies after the meeting. Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.0 2, subd. 5(18).
Albantov failed to allege that he requested transcripts before the expiration of the
applicable deadline to file a supplemental brief on direct appeal, or that he conferred with
the public defender’s office, or that he repeated his request . Having failed to meet his

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burden to allege facts sufficient to prove the claimed rule violation, the interests of justice
do not require departing from the Knaffla bar.
III. Albantov’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is Knaffla-barred and
without merit.
Albantov argues that the postconviction court erred by rejecting his ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim without an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that the
grounds supporting Albantov’s claim are Knaffla-barred and without merit.
An ineffective -assistance claim that “can be determined on the basis of the trial
record . . . must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.” Nissalke v. State, 861
N.W.2d 88, 93 (Minn. 2015). When the claim requires the examination of evidence outside
of the record or if the postconviction court must make additional findings, the claim is not
Knaffla-barred. Id. To receive an evidentiary hearing upon an ineffective-assistance claim,
a petitioner must allege facts which, if proven b y a preponderance of the evidence, show
that counsel’s performance “fell below an object ive standard of reasonableness” and that
“but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 93 –94 (quoting Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). We generally decline to review ineffective -
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims based on matters of trial strategy. Sanchez-Diaz v. State,
758 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 2008).
Several of Albantov’s ineffective -assistance claims can be resolved based on the
trial record, including his assertions that trial counsel: (1) made improper statements
regarding automatic juror strikes during voir dire , (2) admitted to throwing a moti on in

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limine together quickly , (3) failed to object to a portion of the prosecutor’s opening
statement, (4) violated the attorney -client privilege , and (5) failed to challenge the
warrantless search of his vehicle. Because these claims of ineffective assistance could have
been decided on the trial record, they are Knaffla-barred. See Nissalke, 861 N.W.2d at 93.
No Knaffla exception applies because i neffective-assistance grounds are not novel,
Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 447–48 (Minn. 2006), and the interests of justice do
not warrant review.
The arguments are also meritless. Albantov failed to allege how his attorney’s
conduct during voir dire fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or affected the
outcome of the proceeding. He faile d to allege any substantive defect with his trial
counsel’s motion in limine and only summarily asserted that counsel “prejudice[d] the
petitioner.” His attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s opening statement was
presumably a matter of trial strategy, see Zumberge, 937 N.W.2d at 413–14, and Albantov
did not allege how his attorney was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor’s
statement that Albantov “reached into the car” was reasonably consistent with the officer’s
testimony that Albantov “opened the driver’s door [and] leaned inside the car a little bit.”
Albantov’s assertion that his trial counsel violated the attorney -client privilege by
“impeaching petitioner’s credibility ” is unsupported by the trial record. And Albantov’s
attorney did challenge the vehicle search by asserting a lack of probable cause under the
applicable motor-vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, which permits police to
search a vehicle without a warrant “if there is probable cause to believe t he search will
result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” State v. Lester , 874 N.W.2d 768, 771

11
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Beyond the Knaffla-bar, t he petition and record
conclusively show that Albantov was entitled to no relief.
Albantov’s other arguments are also without merit. Albantov alleged that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate T.K. as an alternative perpetrator and for
failing to call two of the passengers from Albantov’s vehicle as witnesses who would have
testified that Albantov did not possess or sell drugs. But Albantov specifically alleged that
his counsel “stated that the decision not to investigate [T.K.] was based upon his own
opinion” and that he “did not want” the passengers “to testify on behalf of the petitioner.”
The extent of investigation and which evidence to present were matters of trial strategy not
subject to review for ineffective assistance. See Sanchez-Diaz, 758 N.W.2d at 848.
As for the Miranda issue, whether to file a motion to suppress is generally a matter
of trial strategy. Carridine v. State , 867 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Minn. 2015). Regardless,
Albantov failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a Miranda violation. “Statements
made by a sus pect during a custodial interrogation are admissible only if the police
provided a Miranda warning,” and an interrogation is custodial if a reasonable person
would believe he was in custody to the degree associated with formal arrest. State v.
Sterling, 8 34 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2013) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted) .
Albantov misrepresented the record by claiming that an officer testified he would not have
let Albantov leave, but the officer instead testified that he “ would’ve” let Albantov leave.
(Emphasis added.) The petition contains no facts to support a Miranda violation and
therefore, Albantov failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the issue.

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IV. Albantov’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim is without merit.
Albantov argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by narrowly
construing his ineffective -assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim and by rejecting his
petition without an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred
because Albantov’s claim is without merit.
A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel “must show that his
appellate counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasona bleness and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. ” Arredondo v. State, 754 N.W.2d 566, 571
(Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). Appellate attorneys are “not required to raise all
possible claims on direct appeal, and counsel need not raise a claim if [they] could have
legitimately concluded that it would not prevail.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Several of Albantov’s ineffective-assistance arguments fail for reasons already set
forth herein . Albantov alleged that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
provide him with transcripts, but he failed to allege that he made proper requests during
the relevant time frame and therefore failed to allege a rule violation. See Minn. R. Crim.
P. 28.02, subd. 5(18). He claimed appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
constitutional issues and for failing to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.
But because Albantov’s underlying arguments lack merit, he cannot demonstrate that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issues. See Carridine, 867 N.W.2d
at 494 (“When a petitioner bases his ineffective -assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim on

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appellate counsel’s failure to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he must
first show that trial counsel was ineffective.”).
Albantov also alleged that his appellate counsel represented him despite a claimed
conflict of interest, namely that his appellate counsel was a friend and “co-worker in law”
of his trial counsel. “A lawyer’s performance is deficient if he represents a client despite
having a conflict of interest. ” State v. Paige , 765 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Minn. App. 2009) .
“For conflicts of interest, [p]rejudice is presumed only if the defen dant demonstrates that
counsel actively re presented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affe cted his lawyer’s performance. ” Pearson v. State , 891 N.W.2 d 590, 601
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). To warrant a hearing, Albantov was required to allege
facts in his petition sufficient to demonstrate that there was a “significant risk” that his
appellate counsel’s representation was “materially limited” by her responsibilities to a third
party or by a personal interest. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7.
The allegations set forth in the petition are insufficient to establish a conflict of
interest. Albantov claimed that appellate counsel “did not want to cross th e line with her
friend” by raising an ineffective -assistance claim “because [trial counsel and appellate
counsel] have a loyalty to each other as co-worker[s] in law.” We are aware of no authority
supporting the premise that trial and appellate public def enders owe any loyalty to one
another because they are “co-worker[s] in law.” And the premise contradicts the statutes
requiring the appointment of a public defender on direct appeal or in postconviction
proceedings. See Minn. Stat. §§ 611.14(1)–(2) (affording the conditional right to a public

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defender in district court and on appeal); 590.05 (affording the conditional right to a public
defender in postconviction proceedings) (2018).
Albantov also cited correspondence from his appellate counsel which he claims
establishes that her friendship materially impaired her ability to bring an ineffective -
assistance claim. But the correspondence merely informed Albantov that appellate counsel
could not bring a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on Albantov’s
behalf because “ once someone has been represented on appeal by our office, we cannot
represent them in an additional challenge to their conviction in a postconviction
proceeding.” See Minn. Stat. § 590.05. The correspondence made no m ention of any
friendship or unwillingness to raise an ineffective-assistance claim because of a friendship
or any reason other than office policy.
Albantov failed to allege any additional facts about the nature of any relationship
between his trial and app ellate counsel that could demonstrate a significant risk of
materially limited representation. And, given that the substantive grounds asserted by
Albantov in support of his ineffective -assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are meritless, we
see no basis to conclude that any possible relationship between trial and appellate counsel
could result in a material limitation in representation. We note that the limited allegation
that counsel may be “friends” is insufficient standing alone to give rise to the type of
conflict of interest upon which counsel must act under the rules of professional conduct.
See, e.g., Minn. R. Prof. C onduct 1.7 cmts. 10 (providing examples of personal interests,
including implicating one’s own conduct, potential employer relationships, and personal
business interests), 11 (detailing conflicts based on attorneys being “closely related by

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blood or marriage”). Albantov’s very general allegations, even if true, were insufficient to
warrant relief or an evidentiary hearing. Jackson, 929 N.W.2d at 905.
Accordingly, Albantov’s various grounds for postconviction relief are either
Knaffla-barred or meritless. We see no abuse of discretion by the postconviction court i n
denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.