State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0408

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Ryan Shappell,
Appellant.

Filed February 8, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-19-1459

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Fi rst Assistant Co unty Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction of a felony violation of an
order for protection, appellant challenges his se ntence. He argues that the district court
erred by sentencing him with a criminal-his tory score of seven, which he contends

2
incorrectly included (1) a felony point for a prior felony convicti on that was used to
enhance the current offense to a felony, and (2) a full custody- status point, rather than a
one-half custody-status point, for his supervis ed-release status at the time of the current
offense. We conclude that the Minnesota Se ntencing Guidelines require that appellant
receive a felony point for the prior felony conviction but that the district court erred by
assigning Shappell a full custody-status poin t for his supervised-release status. We
therefore reverse and remand to the district court for resentencing.
FACTS
In July 2019, the State of Minnesota charged appellant Christopher Ryan Shappell
with one count of felony violat ion of an order for protection. The state charged Shappell
with a felony offense because Shappell previously had been convicted of two qualified
domestic-violence-related offenses within ten years of the charged offense—a
misdemeanor violation of an order for protection in 2015, and a felony domestic-assault-
by-strangulation offense in 2015. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, su bd. 14(d)(1) (2018).
Shappell pleaded guilty to the charge.
Because Shappell committed the current o ffense in July 2019, he was sentenced
under the 2018 version of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, which were still in effect
at that time. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2 (2018). A presentence-investigation report
calculated his criminal-history score to be 7.5, consisting of 6.5 felony points and one
custody-status point. The 6.5 felony points included a felony point for Shappell’s 2015
domestic-assault-by-strangulation conviction, which was used to enhance the current
offense to a felony. Shappell’s felony-point total was rounded down to six in accordance

3
with the guidelines. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B. 1.i (requiring an offender’s
felony-point total to be rounded down to the nearest whole number). Shappell was also
assigned a full custody-status point because Shappell committed the current offense while
on supervised release for a 2018 criminal-d amage-to-property conviction. Because
Shappell’s total criminal-history score was se ven and included a custody-status point, his
presumptive sentence was enhanced by three months pursuant to the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines 2.B.2.c. Accordingly, the pres entence-investigation report calculated the
presumptive range of Shappell’s sentence to be 29-39 months.
At the sentencing hearing, Shappell did not dispute his criminal-history score. He
instead moved for a downward dispositional de parture, arguing that he should be placed
on probation. The state argued in favor of a 33-month executed sentence. The district
court denied both requests and imposed an exec uted sentence of 29 months, which is the
low end of the presumptive guidelines range. This appeal follows.
DECISION
This case calls on us to interpret th e Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commiss ion (the Commission) has promulgated the
sentencing guidelines for district courts to use when imposing a sentence after conviction
of a felony offense. State v. Campbell , 814 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2012) (stating that the
sentencing guidelines a pply only to felonies); State v. Williams , 771 N.W.2d 514, 521
(Minn. 2009) (describing the purpose of the sentencing guidelines ). The sentencing
guidelines set forth the procedures that district courts must follow to calculate a defendant’s
criminal-history score. Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 521; see Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.

4
After calculating a criminal-history score in a particular case, a district court uses that score
to determine the defendant’s presumptive sentence. Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 521.
A defendant’s criminal-histo ry score is calculated by allotting “points” in four
categories: prior felonies, custody status at the time of the offense, prior misdemeanors and
gross misdemeanors, and prior juvenile adj udications. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.
Regarding the first category, prior felonies, the guidelines generally instruct district courts
to assign points for each prior felony convic tion, with the number of points for each
conviction dependent on the severity level of the prior felony offense. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.B.1.a-b; see also State v. LaDoucer , 479 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn. 1992)
(discussing the same principle as applied to an earlier vers ion of the guidelines). With
respect to the second category, custody status at the time of the offense, a defendant
generally will receive up to two points if th e defendant was subject to a custody status—
such as probation, parole, or supervised release—at the time he or she committed
the current offense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2; see also State v. Oreskovich ,
915 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. App. 2018) (dis cussing the assignment of custody-status
points under an earlier version of the guidelines).
After allocating points in these four categor ies, the district court combines the total
scores from each category to arrive at a total criminal-history score. Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.B. The district court then uses the defe ndant’s criminal-history score, along with the
severity level of the current offense, to locate the defendant’s presumptive sentencing range
on the appropriate guidelines’ sentencing grid. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.C.1, 4.A (2018);
see also Taylor v. State , 670 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Minn. 2003) (explaining that “[t]he

5
presumptive guidelines sentence is usually located in the cell of the guidelines grid where
the offender’s criminal history score and offense severity level intersect”).
Here, the district court determined that Shappell had a crimin al-history score of
seven and imposed a guidelines sentence of 29 months in prison. Shappell argues that we
must reverse and remand to the district cour t for resentencing because the district court
made two separate errors in calculating his cr iminal-history score. He contends that the
district court erred by assigning (1) a felony point for his prior felony conviction of
domestic-assault-by-strangulation, and (2 ) a full custody-status point for his
supervised-release status at the time of the current offense. Although Shappell did not
object to his criminal-history score at the time of sentencing, he is entitled to challenge his
score for the first time on appeal. See State v. Maurstad , 733 N.W.2d 141, 147
(Minn. 2007) (holding that a sentence based on an incorrect criminal-h istory score is an
illegal sentence that may be “corrected at a ny time”). We address each of Shappell’s
arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not err by assi gning Shappell a felony point for his prior
domestic-assault-by-strangulation conviction.

Shappell contends that the district cour t erred by assigning hi m a felony point for
his prior felony conviction of domestic-assault-by-strangulation because that conviction
was also used to enhance his current offense to a felony. He argues that the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines supports his position.
Where the assignment of criminal-history points turns on an interpretation of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, we review de novo the district court’s determination of

6
an offender’s criminal-history score. State v. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2019).
In interpreting the sentencing gu idelines, an appellate court us es “the same principles as
when interpreting statutes,” including thos e contained in the canons of statutory
construction set forth in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2018). State v. Scovel , 916 N.W.2d 550,
554 (Minn. 2018). “If the language of the [g ]uidelines is plain and unambiguous, it is
presumed to manifest the intent of the Mi nnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission.”
Strobel, 932 N.W.2d at 307 (quotati on omitted). We will “consider other factors to
determine the Commission’s intent only if the la nguage of the [g]uidelines is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We read the sentencing guidelines “as a wh ole and interpret each section in light of
the surrounding sections.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When ther e is an apparent conflict
between two provisions, we first attempt to construe the provisions to give effect to both.”
Scovel, 916 N.W.2d at 555 (quotation omitted). Moreover, we aim to interpret the
guidelines in a way that is consistent with its comments, although the comments are merely
advisory rather than binding. Id.
Shappell was convicted of felony domestic -assault-by-strangulation in 2015. When
charging Shappell for the current offense—viol ation of an order for protection—the state
used Shappell’s felony domestic-assault-by-s trangulation conviction, along with a
misdemeanor conviction for violating an orde r for protection, to enhance the current
offense to a felony. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d )(1) (“A person is guilty of a
felony . . . if the person violat es this subdivision . . . within ten years of the first of two
or more previous qualified domestic viol ence-related offense convictions.”). As

7
recommended by the presentence-investigation report, the district court assigned Shappell
one felony point for the prior domestic-assault-by-strangulation conviction.
Shappell argues that the sentencing guidelin es should not be construed to allow this
prior felony, which was used to enhance the current offense to a felony, to also be included
in the calculation of his crim inal-history score. He fi rst argues that the guidelines
“unambiguously” prohibit a district court from assigning a felony point for a prior
non-driving-while-impaired (DWI) felony offense where that felony has also been used to
enhance the current offense. He maintains that, under the guidelines, a prior felony that is
used to enhance the current offense can only be assigned a felony point if the prior felony
is a DWI offense. Alternativel y, Shappell argues that if this court finds the guidelines to
be ambiguous on this point, we should appl y the same interpretation because doing so
would achieve the Commission’s goal of ensuring fairness in sentencing.
The state counters that the district cour t did not err when it assigned a felony point
for Shappell’s prior domestic-assault-by-strangulation conviction because section 2.B.6 of
the sentencing guidelines “unambiguously” provides that “[p]rior felony offenses used for
enhancement must always be us ed in calculating the offender’s criminal history score.”
The state further argues that the guidelines do not otherwise limit the application of this
language to DWI offenses as urged by Shappell.
To analyze Shappell’s argum ent, and determine whether the guidelines are clear or
ambiguous, we must consider the sentencing guidelines as a whole. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d
at 307. Two sections of the sentencing guidelin es are relevant here. First, section 2.B.1
sets forth the general rule for assigning points for prior felony convictions. It provides that

8
district courts must “[a]ssign a particular weight . . . [to] each felony conviction, provided
that a felony sentence was stay ed or imposed before the current sentencing or a stay of
imposition of sentence was given before the current sentencing.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.B.1 (emphasis added). Section 2.B.1 also provides several exceptions to the general rule
under which certain felony convictions must not be assigned a felony weight—none of
which are applicable here. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1.c-e, g, h. The second relevant
section of the guidelines is s ection 2.B.6, which primarily se ts forth rules governing how
to assign criminal-history points for prior misdemeanor or gross-misdemeanor convictions
that have been used to enhance the current offense to a felony.
Shappell bases his argument solely on the la nguage of section 2.B.6. We therefore
begin by examining the language of that sec tion. In full, section 2.B.6 provides the
following:
6. Felony Enhancement Due to Prior Misdemeanor or Gross
Misdemeanor Convictions.

a. Enhanced Felonies. When the current offense is a
felony solely because the offender has previous convictions for
misdemeanor and gross misdem eanor offenses, the prior
misdemeanor conviction(s) on the targeted misdemeanor list
provided in Minn. Stat. § 299 C.10, subd. 1(e) or gross
misdemeanor conviction(s) u pon which the enhancement is
based may be used in determining custody status, but cannot
be used in calculating the remaining components of the
offender’s criminal history score.

b. Counting Prior Misdemeanors and Gross
Misdemeanors; Future Felony. Except as provide[d] in
paragraph c, misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses
used to enhance the current offense must be used in calculating
the offender’s criminal history score on future offenses that are
not enhanced felonies. Prior felony offenses used for

9
enhancement must always be used in calculating the offender’s
criminal history score.

c. Counting Prior Misdemeanors and Gross
Misdemeanors; Felony Driving While Impaired (DWI). If the
current offense is a felony DWI offense and the offender has a
prior felony DWI offense, the prior felony DWI must be used
in computing the criminal history score. The prior
misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses used to enhance
the first prior felony DWI cannot be used in the offender’s
criminal history. Any ot her misdemeanor or gross
misdemeanor DWI offenses may be included as provided in
section 2.B.3.g.

Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.6 (emphasis added).
The only reasonable interpretation of secti on 2.B.6 is that all felony offenses used
to enhance the current offense to a felo n y m u s t b e i n c l u d e d i n a n o f f e n d e r ’ s
criminal-history score. The language of sections 2.B.6.b and 2. B.6.c supports this
conclusion. As quoted above, se ction 2.B.6.b provides that “[ p]rior felony offenses used
for enhancement must always be used in calculating the offender’s criminal history score.”
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.6.b (emphasis added ). This rule is not qualified by any other
language in section 2.B.6. And, the rule is further reinforced by section 2.B.6.c, which
specifically addresses felony DWI offenses. That section states that “[i]f the current
offense is a felony DWI offense and the offender has a prior felony DWI offense, the prior
felony DWI must be used in computing the criminal history score.” (Emphasis added.)
Although perhaps not immediately apparent from the language of section 2.B.6.c,
this language refers to a situation in which a prior felony DWI conviction is used to enhance
a current DWI offense to a felony. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2) (2018) (providing
that a standard DWI offense must be enhanc ed to a felony where the defendant “has

10
previously been convicted of a felony under this section”). Consequently, section 2.B.6.c
is reasonably interpreted as applying the rule of 2.B.6.b to the context of felony DWI
offenses. In other words, because prio r felonies used for enhancement must always be
included in calculating an offender’s criminal-history score, section 2.B.6.c specifies that
a prior felony DWI used to enhance the current DWI o ffense to a felony must also
be included in calculating an offender’s crim inal-history score. When all parts of
section 2.B.6 are read together, they are reas onably interpreted as requiring prior felony
offenses used for enhancement to always, invariably, and at all times , be included in an
offender’s criminal-history score.
This interpretation is also consistent with the general rule articulated in section 2.B.1
that district courts must assign a particular weight to “each felony conviction” for which a
sentence was stayed or imposed. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1. And, while section 2.B.1
provides several exceptions to this general rule, none of them pertain to felony convictions
used to enhance the current offense. The language of section 2.B.1 therefore requires that
every prior felony offense be counted in an offender’s criminal history, save the convictions
for which it expressly provides an exception.
Shappell asserts a different interpretation of section 2.B.6. In contrast to our reading
of that section, Shappell contends that prior felony offenses used for enhancement are not
included in an offender’s criminal-history score unless the prior felony is a DWI offense.
He argues that because section 2.B.6.c specifies that a prior felony DWI must be included
in an offender’s criminal-his tory score, the necessary imp lication is that prior non-DWI
felony offenses used for enhancement are not to be counted in the crim inal-history score.

11
In particular, Shappell argues that in terpreting the guidelines as requiring all felony
offenses to be included in the criminal-history score wo uld render “superfluous” the
language in section 2.B.6.c that pertains to prior DWI felonies. Moreover, Shappell
attempts to distinguish the language in sec tion 2.B.6.b—which states that prior felonies
used for enhancement must always be included in the cr iminal-history score—by
emphasizing that the title of section 2.B.6.b refers to “future felon[ies].” Based on the title
of section 2.B.6.b, he argues that secti on 2.B.6.b applies only to sentencings for future
offenses, and must not be followed when sentencing for the current offense.
Shappell’s interpretation of section 2. B.6 is unreasonable. First, Shappell’s
argument that the rule in section 2.B.6.b applies only to sentencings for future offenses is
unpersuasive. Foremost, the language of the rule set forth in 2.B.6.b is unqualified: “[p]rior
felony offenses used for enhancement must always be used in calculating the offender’s
criminal history score.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.6.b (emphasis added). This rule uses
the term “always,” which belies its application only to future sentencings. And, the various
subparts of section 2.B.6 contain no express exceptions to that rule. Moreover, as a general
matter, a guideline’s title is not part of the guideline itself and cannot be used to “alter the
plain import of a [guideline’s] explicit la nguage within the sc ope of the title.”
Hyland v. Metro. Airports Comm’n , 538 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. App. 1995); see also
Minn. Stat. § 645.49 (2018).
Second, Shappell’s argument that secti on 2.B.6.c implies that prior non-DWI
felonies are to be treated differently than prior DWI felonies is similarly unpersuasive. As
discussed above, section 2.B.6.c announces a ru le pertaining specifically to felony DWI

12
offenses that is otherwise in accord with the general rule s of sections 2.B.1 and 2.B.6—
just as other prior felonies must generally be included in a defend ant’s criminal-history
score, prior DWI felonies, used to enhance the current offense to a felony DWI offense,
must also be included in the defendant’s criminal-his tory score. In other words, section
2.B.6.c reflects a specific applic ation to DWI offenses of the rules articulated in sections
2.B.1 and 2.B.6.b with regard to prior felonies.
The last two sentences of section 2.B. 6.c support our interpretation. Those
sentences establish that prior misdemeanor and gross-misdemeanor DWIs may be treated
differently than other types of prior misd emeanor and gross-misdemeanor convictions
under certain circumstances. T hus, when read in its entirety, Section 2.B.6.c appears to
reflect that while the rules for prior misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors vary for DWI
offenses, the general rule that prior felonies must be included in a defendant’s
criminal-history score still applies regardless of whether the prior felonies are DWIs.
Shappell, however, argues that “[t]he only interpretation that gives effect to the
entire provision is that non-DWI prior feloni es used to enhance the current non-DWI
offense are not to be in cluded in the person’s criminal history score.” In other words, he
maintains that section 2.B.6 contains an implicit rule that prior felony convictions used to
enhance the current offense are counted in a criminal-history score only where those prior
felonies are DWIs. He argue s that any other interpreta tion would render superfluous
language in section 2.B.6.c regarding counting of prior DW I felonies. We do not find
Shappell’s interpretation to be a reasonable interpretation of th e guidelines as a whole.
Section 2.B.1 sets forth the general rule, section 2.B.6.b applies that general rule

13
unqualifiedly to prior felonies used for enhancement, and section 2.B.6.c reiterates that rule
in the specific context of felony DWI offenses. We can discern no method of analysis that
would permit us to construe se ction 2.B.6.c as establishing an implicit exception to the
general rules set forth explicitly in sections 2.B.1 and 2.B.6.b.
In sum, Shappell’s interpretation of section 2.B.6 is not reasonable. To the contrary,
the language of the sentencing guidelines, considered in its entirety, unambiguously
requires that all prior felony offenses be included in an offender’s criminal-history score,
regardless of whether they are used for enha ncement, provided they would otherwise be
assigned a weight under sectio n 2.B.1. Because we dete rmine that the sentencing
guidelines are plain and unambiguous, we need not consider Shappell’s arguments
regarding the Commission’s intent. See Scovel, 916 N.W.2d at 555. We therefore conclude
that the district court did not err by assi gning Shappell a felony point for his prior
domestic-assault-by-strangulation felony conviction.
II. Shappell is entitled to be resenten ced because the district court erred by
assigning him a full custody-status poin t rather than a one-half point for his
supervised-release status at the time of the current offense.

Shappell also argues that the district court erred by assigning him a full
custody-status point for his supervised-release status at the time of the current offense for
a 2018 felony criminal-damag e-to-property conviction. He contends that under the
common law “amelioration doctrine” he is entitled to the benefit of the 2019 revisions to
the sentencing guidelines which would re quire that he receive only a one-half
custody-status point. We agree.

14
The 2018 sentencing guidelines were in effect when Shappell committed the current
offense in July 2019. Under that version of the guide lines, an offender received a full
custody-status point if the offender committ ed the current offense while on supervised
release for a felony conviction. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1)(iii), a(3). The
Commission revised section 2.B.2.a in the 2019 gu idelines to require that an offender on
supervised release receive only a one-half custody-status point in such circumstances. Id.
(2019). The 2019 revisions took effect on August 1, 2019, while Shappell’s case was
pending in the district court.
The amelioration doctrine provides that ch anges in a law that serve to mitigate
punishment must be applied to offenses committed before the law’s effective date, as long
as no final judgment has been reached and th e legislature has not made a clear statement
of intent to abrogate th e amelioration doctrine. State v. Kirby , 899 N.W.2d 485, 490
(Minn. 2017). Amendments to the sentencing guidelines are treated the same as statutory
amendments for the purposes of the amelioration doctrine. See State v. Robinette ,
944 N.W.2d 242, 248-50 (Minn. App. 2020 ) (applying the amelioration doctrine to a
modification to the sentencing guidelines), review granted in part (Minn. June 30, 2020).
We review the applicability of the amelioration doctrine de novo. See id. at 248-49; see
also Strobel , 932 N.W.2d at 306 (providing that the interpretation of the sentencing
guidelines is subject to de novo review).
Shappell argues that the amelioration doctrine requires this court to reverse his
sentence and remand to the district court to reduce his criminal-history score by one-half
point. The state does not dispute that the amelioration doctrine applies to this case. Instead,

15
the state argues that this error was harmless because even if Shappell’s custody status point
were reduced by one-half point, Shappell’s presumptive sentence range would not change.
Based on our independent review of the law, we agree with the parties that the
amelioration doctrine applies in this case. See State v. Hannuksela , 452 N.W.2d 668,
673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (stating that even if the parties agree on an issue, “it is the
responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with the law”). The
amelioration doctrine applies where: “(1) the Legislature made no statement that clearly
establishes the Legislature’s intent to ab rogate the amelioration doctrine; (2) the
amendment mitigates punishment ; and (3) final judgment has not been entered as of the
date the amendment takes effect.” Kirby, 899 N.W.2d at 490. Here, the first requirement
is met because this court held in State v. Robinette that the legislature did not make a
statement establishing its intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine with respect to the
2019 revisions to Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines section 2.B.2. 944 N.W.2d at 248-51.
While Robinette discussed a different amendment to section 2.B.2.a than is at issue in the
present case, the Commission revised the provisi on at issue here at the same time as the
one discussed in Robinette. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm’n, 2019 Report to the
Legislature (Jan. 11, 2019). Robinette’s holding therefore applies equally in this case.
The amelioration doctrine’s second require ment, mitigation of punishment, is also
met because receiving a one-half custody-status point, as opposed to a full custody-status
point, results in a lower crimin al-history score, which can re sult in a shorter presumptive
sentence. See Kirby , 899 N.W.2d at 495-96 (conclud ing that an amendment to the
sentencing guidelines mitigated punishme nt because it reduced the defendant’s

16
presumptive sentence and “reduced sentences fo r the majority of drug offenders”). And,
the third requirement is met because Shappell’s case was pending in the district court at
the time the 2019 guidelines took effect on August 1, 2019. Consequently, all three
requirements for application of the amelioration doctrine are satisfied and it applies in this
case. Shappell was accordingl y entitled to the benefit of th e 2019 revisions to section
2.B.2.a, and the district court erred by assigning Shappell a full custody-status point for his
supervised-release status, rather than a one-half custody-status point.
The state contends that the district court’ s error was harmless and therefore does not
require reversal because Shappell’s presumptive sentence range would remain the same if
Shappell’s criminal-history score were reduced by one-half custody- status point. We
disagree. The supreme court has unequivocally held that “a sentence based on an incorrect
criminal history score is an illegal sentence . . . correctable at any time.” Maurstad,
733 N.W.2d at 147 (quotation omitted). And we have previously applied that principle and
remanded for resentencing where the appellan t-defendant’s sentence was based on an
incorrect criminal-history score, even though his sentence would still fall within the same
presumptive sentencing guidelines range when calculated with the correct criminal-history
score. State v. Provost , 901 N.W.2d 199, 201-02 (Minn. App. 2017) (concluding that
“Provost’s 48-month sentence, which was within the presumptive guidelines range of 41
to 57 months when calculated with Provost’ s incorrect criminal history score, was also
within the presumptive guidelines range of 37 to 51 months when calculated with his
corrected criminal history score,” but remanding nonetheless because the Maurstad court

17
“at no point . . . indicate[d] that its decision was premised on the fa ct that the corrected
sentence would be outside the presumptive guidelines range”).
Here, applying the 2018 sentencing guidelines, the district court calculated
Shappell’s criminal-history score to be a seven. That score included a full custody-status
point. If the district court had instead applie d the 2019 revision to section 2.B.2.a, and
assigned Shappell only a one-half custody-stat us point, Shappell’s criminal-history score
would have been 6.5.1 Even assuming Shappell’s presumptive sentence remains the same
with a score of 6.5, under Maurstad and Provost, Shappell’s sentence is an illegal sentence
because it was calculated with an incorrect criminal-history score. Accordingly, we must
reverse and remand to the district court to resentence Shappell with a corrected
criminal-history score of 6.5.
In sum, we conclude that the district c ourt erred by assigning Shappell a full-custody
status point, rather than a one-half custody-status point, for his supervised-release status at
the time of the current offense. Because Shappell was sentenced with an incorrect
criminal-history score, we reverse and remand to the district court for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.

1 Under the 2019 guidelines, Shappell’s score would include the same 6.5 felony points as
his 2018 score, rounded down to six in accordance with Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1.i
(2019). And Shappell would also receive a one-h alf custody-status point instead of a full
point due to the 2019 revision to secti on 2.B.2.a. Therefore, Shappell’s final
criminal-history score under the 2019 guidelines’ revisions would total 6.5.
The state incorrectly contends that Shappe ll’s final, revised score would be seven
rather than 6.5 because the state fails to recognize that Shappell’s 6.5 felony points would
still be rounded down to six under Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1.i.