In the Matter of: E. D. M., petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0422

In the Matter of:
E. D. M., petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

S. J. M.,
Respondent,

N. N. N.,
Respondent.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-FA-20-57

Andrew T. Hunstad, Sheridan & Dulas, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

S.J.M., Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Amy J. Rotering, Susan J. Mundahl, Mundahl Law, PLLC, Maple Grove, Minnesota (for
respondent N.N.N.)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his parentage
action. He argues that the district court erred by (1) concluding that the judgment
dissolving respondents’ marriage bars this action, (2) dismissing the action without
addressing his request for genetic testing or the parentage presumption he claims , and
(3) attributing a presumption of parentage based on respondents’ same -sex marriage. We
affirm the district court’s determination that respondents’ marriage gives rise to a parentage
presumption. But because the district court erred by giving preclusive effect to the
dissolution judgment, we reverse the dismissal of this action and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
In January 2020, appellant E.D.M. initiated this action , alleging that he is the
biological father of a child born in February 2014. According to the complaint, the child
was conceived when he had sexual intercourse with the child’s mother, respondent S.J.M.
He and S.J.M. were not married. In November 2013, S.J.M. married another woman,
respondent N.N.N. The child was born during the marriage . N.N.N. did not adopt the
child. In 2016, S.J.M. and N.N.N. ended their marriage. The stipulated dissolution
judgment awards them joint legal and physical custody of the child and directs N.N.N. to
pay child support; E.D.M. was not involved in the dissolution proceeding. The complaint
also alleges that E.D.M. is presumed to be the child’s biological father because he has
received the child into his home and openly held him out as his biological child.

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Along with his complaint, E.D.M. filed a motion asking the district court to order
genetic testing. His supporting affidavit avers that he had sexual intercourse with S.J.M.
“during the period in which the child was conceived.”
Before S.J.M. answered the complaint , responded to the motion , or sought any
relief, the district court dismissed the action. The court reasoned that N.N.N. is the child’s
presumed parent because the child was born during her marriage to S.J.M., and the
parentage action is barred because the dissolution judgment conclusively “established”
N.N.N. as the child’s parent . E.D.M. requested permission to file a motion for
reconsideration. The district court denied the request but added N.N.N. as a party. E.D.M.
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Interpretation of the Minnesota Parentage Act (MPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51-.74
(2018), presents a question of law , which we review de novo. Dorman v. Steffen , 666
N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn. App. 2003) . “[T] he goal of all statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. ” Christianson v. Henke , 831
N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). To discern legislative intent, we look
principally to the language of the statute itself. Id. We apply the plain and ordinary
meaning of undefined terms, but we are mindful of context. In re J.M.M., 937 N.W .2d
743, 747 (Minn. 2020).
I. The dissolution judgment does not bar this parentage action.

Under the MPA, a man is rebuttably presumed to be a child’s “ biological father”
under various circumstances , including that which E.D.M. claims —that he receives the

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minor child “into his home and openly holds out the child as his biological child .” Minn.
Stat. § 257.55, subds. 1, 2. Paternity “may be established” in one of only two ways. Minn.
Stat. § 257.54(b). One way is to execute a recognition of parentage, bu t that option is
available only if the biological mother joins in the recognition. Minn. Stat. §§ 257.54(b),
.75, subd. 1 (2018). The other way is through a parentage action. Minn. Stat. § 257.54(b)
(citing Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51-.74). A man alleging that he is a child’s father may bring a
parentage action “at any time.” Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 2(1).
A parentage action “may be joined with” a dissolution action. Minn. Stat. § 257.59,
subd. 1. When that occurs, any man presumed or alleged to be the child’s father must be
joined as a party.1 Minn. Stat. § 257.60. But when the actions are not joined, a dissolution
judgment does not determine parentage and does not preclude a subsequent parentage
action by some one who was not a party to the dissolutio n. See Dorman, 666 N.W.2d at
410-11 (observing that dissolution decree contained findings that husband was not child’s
biological father but “ did not declare the non-existence of [his] parent -child relationship
with [child]”); Markert v. Behm, 394 N.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding
that dissolution jud gment recognizing joint child barred mother, on the ground o f
res judicata, from bringing a subsequent claim that former husband was not the father but
would not preclude a third party, if he has standing, from bringing a separate paternity
action).

1 The child also must be joined as a party to a parentage action if a man seeks to establish
paternity but the mother denies his claim. Minn. Stat. § 257.60.

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N.N.N. and S.J.M.’s dissolution judgment awarded them joint legal and physical
custody of the child born during the marriage ; it did not establish parentage. Even if the
judgment could be given pre clusive effect as against N.N.N., it does not bar a parentage
action by a nonparty who alleges that he is the child’s father. Accordingly, the district
court erred by concluding that the dissolution judgment bars E.D.M.’s parentage action.2
We reverse th e dismissal and remand for further proceedings , including a determination
whether E.D.M. is entitled to an order for genetic testing under Minn. Stat. § 257.62,
subd. 1. See Frieson v. Pahkala, 653 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that the
statute “requires” the district court to order testing “ if requested by an alleged father who
states sufficient facts to establish the possibility of paternity”).
II. The district court did not err by attributing a parentage presumption to N.N.N.
based on her marriage to S.J.M.

The MPA establishes three circumstances in which “[a] man is presumed to be the
biological father of a child ” based on marriage. Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1 (a)-(c).
Among the m, a man is presumed to be the father when “he and the chi ld’s biological
mother are or have been married to each other and the child [was] born during the
marriage.” Id., subd. 1(a).

2 E.D.M. also faults the district court for noting that he and S.J.M. never married or
attempted to marry, emphasizing that “[t]he parent and child relationship may exist
regardless of the marital status of the parents.” Minn. Stat. § 257.53. It is unclear why the
court noted the absence of an actual or attempted marriage because E.D.M. does not claim
a marriage-based paternity presumption. But any error is harmless because the court did
not rely on the absence of a marriage -based presumption in dismissing this action. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored).

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E.D.M. argues that the district court erred by applying this presumption to N.N.N.
He does not dispute that provisions of the MP A that refer to fathers may be applied to
mothers. But he asserts that Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(a), does not apply to N.N.N.
because she undisputedly is not the child’s biological parent. We are not persuaded.
E.D.M. is correct that Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1 (a), refers to “biological”
parentage. Standing alone, it does not apply to same-sex spouses because they cannot have
a child who is the biological product of both parents. But as the district court observed,
this provision does not stan d alone. In 2013, when the legislature legalized same -sex
marriage, it expressly addressed marriage-based parentage presumptions:
When necessary to implement the rights and
responsibilities of spouses or parents in a civil marriage
between persons of the same sex under the laws of this state,
including those that establish parentage presumptions based on
a civil marriag e, gender -specific terminology . . . must be
construed in a neutral manner to refer to a person of either
gender.

2013 Minn. Laws ch. 74, § 6 (now codified at Minn. Stat. § 517.201, subd. 2 (2018)).
E.D.M. has not identified, and we do not discern, any way to construe marriage-based
parentage presumptions gender-neutrally, as Minn. Stat. § 517.201, subd. 2, instructs,
without treating someone as a presumed parent who undisputedly has no biological
connection to the child.
Instead, E.D.M. argues that it is not “practicable” to treat a woman with no
biological connection to a child as the child’s mother, citing Minn. Stat. § 257.71. This
argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, h is reliance on Minn. Stat. § 257.71 is
misplaced. That statute provides that, in “ an action to determine the existence or

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nonexistence of a mother and child relationship,” the provisions of the MPA applicable to
“the father and child relationship” apply “[i]nsofar as practicable.” Minn. Stat. § 257.71.
Because this is not an action to determine maternity or non-maternity, it does not apply.
Second, interpreting Minn. Stat. § 517.201, subd. 2, as indicating the legislature’s
intent to prioritize marriage over biology is consistent with the long -standing principle,
enshrined in the MPA, that biology is not dispositive of parentage. See County of Dakota
v. Blackwell, 809 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. App. 2011) (“A legal adjudication of paternity
is not controlled by biology. ”). The clearest illustration of this principle is in Minn. Stat.
§ 257.56, subds. 1-2, which provides that w hen a man “donated” his genetic material for
artificial insemination of a married woman, her husband is “treated in law as if he were the
biological father” of the resulting child and the donor “ is treated in law as if he were not
the biological father.” But even when an alleged father did not donate his genetic material
but testing confirms a biological link between him and a child, that link “does not preclude
the adjudication of another man as the legal father” if the other man’s conflicting claim of
parentage is founded on “weightier considerations of policy and logic .” Minn. Stat.
§§ 257.55, subd. 2, .62, subd. 5(c); see also Blackwell, 809 N.W.2d at 229 (recognizing
that action to establish parentage of man with proven biological link to child should include
as a party the man who was married to mother at child’s birth a nd raised child for seven
years, to determine whose presumption prevails).
In sum, the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 517.201, subd. 2, and the MPA as a
whole persuade us to neutrally construe the parentage presumption in Minn. Stat. § 257.55,
subd. 1(a), to read, “A [person] is presumed to be the [parent] of a child if . . . [the person]

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and the child’s biological mother are or have been married to each other and the child is
born during the marriage [.]” So construed, the presumption applies to N.N.N., and the
district court correctly determined that she is the child’s presumed parent.
But this presumption is not conclusive and, like the dissolution judgment, does not
prevent E.D.M. from pursuing an action to establish his parentage . See Minn. Stat.
§ 257.55, subd. 2 (providing that parentage presumptions can be rebutted); In re Welfare
of C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Minn. App. 1994) (stating that parentage presumptions
are “not conclusive”). To the extent the district court concluded otherwise, it erred. On
remand, the district court should determine whether E.D.M. is also entitled to a parentage
presumption, whether any presumption in favor of E.D.M. conflicts with N.N.N.’s
parentage presumption, and, if so, which presumption prevails. See Minn. Stat. § 257.55,
subd. 2 (requiring court to assess competing presumptions based on considerations of
“policy and logic ”); In re Welfare of C. F. N. , 923 N.W.2d 325, 332 (Minn. App. 2018)
(explaining that resolving conflicting presumptions requires examination of “the particular
facts of the case,” including the child’s best interests) , review denied (Minn. Mar. 19,
2019).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.