State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0424

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Edward Nixon,
Appellant.

Filed February 22, 2021
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-75

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea M. Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant appeals after he was convicted of second-degree burglary, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4) (2018), fo r breaking into the Ha Tien Super Market
on May 9, 2018. He argues th at: (1) police lacked probable cause to seize his vehicle,
which was later searched pursuant to a search warrant; and (2) the district court erroneously
admitted evidence of another bu rglary, also committed on Ma y 9, 2018, without proving
by clear and convincing evidence that appella nt committed the unrelated burglary. We
affirm.
FACTS
In May 2018, the St. Paul police department (SPPD) wa s investigating a string of
commercial burglaries. There was a departme nt-wide “stop-and-ID” alert (the alert)
concerning the burglaries. The alert containe d pictures of the suspect and the suspect’s
vehicle captured by video cameras. It also contained a brief description of the burglaries:
“[S]uspect has burglarized the HA TIEN MARKET . . . and Augustines . . . and possibly
other businesses.” The alert described the su spect’s vehicle as “a 2001 to 2 006 White
Chevrolet Impala with a distinctive rear spoiler.” Officers were instructed to “create [their]
own [probable cause] for a stop and ID” and to contact Sergeant M.S. if the vehicle was
spotted and the suspect was identified.
Due to the nature of the in vestigation, officers were aware of several similarities
among all of the burglaries. A ll were in the same general area of St. Paul; similar tools
were used to gain entry; a distinctive greenish-yellow bag was used by the burglar(s); and

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unique red and black gloves were worn. In addition to the alert, the SPPD regularly
informed its officers of developments in the investigation.
The Ha Tien Super Market Burglary
The Ha Tien Super Market , located at 1959 Suburban Avenue in St. Paul, has a
surveillance video system inside the store that recorded the May 9 burglary, as well as a
surveillance video system outside that recorded the suspect, the suspect’s accomplice, and
the vehicle they used.
The surveillance footage insi de of the market depicts the outer glass door being
broken at approximately 2:11 a.m., with a hammer or other tool, and a male entering
through the broken outer glass door. The inner glass door was then broken with the same
tool. The district court summarized the surveillance footage as depicting a male who was
“medium built, wearing a black baseball cap w ithout a logo, a white surgical mask, blue
jeans, a black hooded sweatshirt or jacket, distinctive red and black gloves, and black boots
or shoes.” The male was carrying a “greenish-yellow bag with black straps.” He attempted
to steal cash from an inner office, but was unable to gain access because the locks had been
changed.
The surveillance footage outside of the market showed a “white vehicle with black
lines across it” arrive in the parking lot of the Ha Tien Su per Market. A male left the
vehicle and headed toward the direction of the market “with the greenish-yellow bag with
black straps in his hand” and then returned and put the greenish-yellow bag in the trunk of
the vehicle.

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Seizure of Appellant’s Vehicle
On May 25, 2018, Officer M.T. of the SPPD was on patrol in the area of the
commercial burglaries. According to his police report, as detailed by the district court in
its findings and order after a stipulated-evide nce trial, Officer M.T. was looking for a
vehicle described as a “white 2001 to 2006 Ch evrolet Impala sedan with black rub strip,
trunk lid spoiler, and silver wheels or hub caps. ” Officer M.T. was informed that this
vehicle was connected to the burglaries; he was also told that the burglaries were
perpetrated by “a Black male, with a medium build, short or no hair, wearing a surgical
mask, black baseball cap, black hooded . . . sweatshirt or j acket, and distinctive red and
black gloves.” At approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer M.T. saw a vehicle pass in front of him
that matched the description of the vehicle in the alert and the other information provided
by the SPPD. He followed the vehicle, ran a license plate check, and learned that the owner
of the vehicle was appellant Daniel Edward Nixon.
Officer M.T. stopped the vehicle. As he approached it, he noticed the windows had
an illegal tint “not in compliance with Minnesota traffic laws.” He identified the driver as
being Daniel Edward Nixon. There was a front-seat passenger in the car. Because the
vehicle’s windows were so dark, Officer M. T . w a n t e d t o e n s u r e t h e r e w e r e n o o t h e r
occupants in the vehicle, and he asked the driver to roll down the back window. According
to the district court order, Officer M.T. “saw in plain view on the rear seat: black baseball
hats, [and] a pair of unique work gloves that were red, black, and gray with yellow writing
on the strap.” While speaking to appellant, O fficer M.T. observed that appellant was a

5
“Black male, had short to no hair and medium build, was wearing a black hooded jacket or
sweatshirt.” A second SPPD officer was called to the scene to assist.
Believing the driver to be the burgla ry suspect, and the passenger to be the
accomplice, Officer M.T. asked them to step out of the vehicle. The passenger was
identified as J.N., appellant’s brother. When J.N. got out of the car, Officer M.T. “saw two
handheld two-way walkie-talkies on the passenge r seat in plain view.” Appellant was
placed in Officer M.T.’s squad car. During this time, Officer M.T. and the second officer
reviewed the information provided by the SPPD, compared the red and black work gloves
to the photo provided, and “agreed they were a match.”
Sergeant M.S. instructed the officers to take appellant to the police station to be
photographed and identified. The Impala wa s seized and towed to the impound lot in a
secured garage and, after obtaining a search warrant issued by a judge who found probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contained ev idence of crime, law enforcement searched
the Impala.1 Sergeant M.S. seized th e following items from the vehicle: black baseball
caps, two-way radios, a yellow sling-shot, and a pair of distinctive red and black Hardy
brand mechanic’s style gloves. The followi ng items were seized from the trunk: bolt
cutters, an orange extension cord, a reciproc ating saw, and a yellowish-green bag with
black straps. Inside the bag, officers foun d a hammer, pry bar, and several reciprocating
saw blades. The gloves and radios were take n to the Bureau of Cr iminal Apprehension

1 Appellant does not challenge the search warra nt. He challenges only the seizure of the
vehicle which resulted in the search.

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(BCA) for analysis. A DNA sample was take n from appellant pursuant to a warrant and
was also delivered to the BCA. The DNA profile on the gloves matched appellant’s DNA.
Appellant was charged with this May 9 burglary at Ha Tien, and was charged with
multiple other burglaries in other files.
Appellant moved the district court to suppress evidence gathered from the search of
the Impala after it was seized. The district court denied the motion, finding that police had
a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant’s vehicle and ample probable cause to
seize and later search the vehicle pursuant to a valid search warrant.
During the same hearing, the district cour t addressed the state’s intention to admit
at trial other-crimes evidence from the simi lar burglaries being pr osecuted. Appellant
challenged the introduction of evidence of the other burglaries. The district court found
that there was clear and conv incing evidence of appellant’s involvement in the other
burglaries, but limited the admission in each case to one other incident of burglary. The
district court permitted the state to presen t evidence in this case concerning an Arby’s
burglary, which was committed on the same night as the Ha Tien Super Market burglary.
Appellant waived his jury-trial rights, an d this case proceeded to trial based on
stipulated evidence. Appellant was found guilty of second-degree burglary and sentenced
to 90 months’ imprisonment.
This appeal followed.

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DECISION
I. Motion to Suppress
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence recovered from the Impala because police lacked probable cause to seize the
vehicle. “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppre ss evidence, we may
independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court
erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90,
98 (Minn. 1999). Appellate courts review a district court’s factual findings for clear error
and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).
The United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A
search or seizure without a warrant is per se unreasonable. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d
218, 222 (Minn. 1992). But if police have probable cause to search a vehicle, it is
“constitutionally permissible” to impound the vehicle and search it later after a warrant is
obtained. State v. Jankowski, 281 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. 1979).
“Probable cause exists when there are facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant
a reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” State v.
Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 7 71 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitte d). “Probable cause is an
objective inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances in each case.” Id. “[T]he
totality of the circumstances includes reasonable inferences that police officers draw from
facts, based on their training and experien ce, because police officers may interpret
circumstances differently than untrained persons.” Id. “Therefore, an appellate court must

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give due weight to reasonable inferences drawn by police officers and to a district court’s
finding that the officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
Appellant argues that “[b]ecause the police did not observe evidence or proceeds of
a burglary, the information they had did not amount to probable cause to believe” that
appellant and his brother were the burglary suspects. This argument is unpersuasive.
Appellant’s argument appears to ignore that the Impala itself was a major factor in the
probable-cause determination. The record reflects that, at the time of the seizure, St. Paul
police were investigating several commercial burglaries that appeared to be connected. To
assist in the investigation, an alert was distri buted to all officers. The alert identified the
vehicle involved in all of the burglaries. In light of this information, Officer M.T. stopped
a vehicle that matched the description. Office r M.T. testified that when he first saw the
Impala, he “immediately thought, that’s the vehicle,” and claimed that the match was such
that he was “95 percent confident” that the vehicle he stopped was the Impala depicted in
the alert.
After stopping the vehicle, Officer M.T. observed that the vehicle was occupied by
two males matching the description of the burgl ars who were sought. The fact that the
Impala was occupied by two people was consistent with the alert, too. The alert contained
two pictures of an alleged bur glar, which showed a Black male with short hair. The fact
that the Impala was occupied by two Black males with shorter hair further supported the
officer’s suspicions because it was consistent with information in the alert.

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Moreover, after asking the driver to ro ll down the back window, Officer M.T.
observed a black baseball cap and distinctive black and red gloves in the Impala. The
gloves and hat were consistent with the gloves and hat worn by the burglar pictured in the
alert. And when the Impala was stopped, appellant was wearing a black “hoody or a
jacket,” which was also consistent with the attire worn by the burglar depicted in the alert.
Finally, another officer arrived at the scene and that officer also concluded that the
individuals in the Impala matched the desc ription of the suspects connected to the
burglaries. The entirety of the officers’ obs ervations amply provided probable cause to
believe that the Impala contained evidence of crime and that the occupants of the vehicle
were the persons who were sought in connection with the string of burglaries in the general
area of St. Paul where the vehicle had been stopped.
A search warrant was issued after a judge found probable cause to believe that there
was relevant evidence inside the vehicle. Only after obtaining th e search warrant did
Sergeant M.S. search the Impala.
The seizure of the Impala and subsequent search of it pursuant to a warrant were
supported by probable cause. Accordingly, th e district court did not err when it denied
appellant’s motion to suppress.
II. Admission of Other-Crimes Evidence
The admissibility of evidence of other crimes or acts is governed by Minn. R. Evid.
404(b).
A district court’s decision to ad mit [other-crimes] evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discre tion. A defendant who claims
the trial court erred in admitti ng evidence bears the burden of

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showing an error occurred and an y resulting prejudice. If an
appellate court determines that the district court erroneously
admitted [other-crimes] evid ence, the court must then
determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
verdict.

State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261-62 (Minn. 2016) (citations omitted).
To be admissible, there must be clear and convincing evidence that appellant
participated in the other crimes or bad acts and that the probative value of the incidents is
not outweighed by the potential for unfair prej udice. Minn. R. Evid . 404(b). Here, the
district court made a detailed oral ruling admitting the evidence of the Arby’s burglary and
stated the correct legal standard in its ruling.
The district court later issued a more-detailed written order explaining why evidence
of the Arby’s burglary was admissible at th e trial concerning the May 9 Ha Tien Super
Market burglary. “Because of the significan t similarities in modus operandi and identity
between the Ha Tien Market and Arby’s incidents, the evidence supports the two burglaries
were perpetrated by the same male, who later tu rned out to be [appellant].” The district
court found, and the record supports, that appellant was found guilty of the Arby’s burglary
in a court trial completed before this stipulat ed-evidence trial. Accordingly, appellant’s
identity as the person who burgled the Arby’s was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The district court applied the correct lega l standard in determining that the other-
crimes evidence was admissible, and the record supports the district court’s factual findings
in arriving at that determination. Furt her, the district court limited the other-crimes
evidence at trial to one prior crime. This reasoned decision was favorable to appellant and

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avoided the possibility of unfair prejudice by th e use of excessive other-crimes evidence.
The district court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of the Arby’s burglary
and evidence that the Arby’s burglar and the Ha Tien Market burglar appeared from video
recordings to be the same person using the same car, where appellant’s guilt in the Arby’s
burglary had been proved before this stipulated-evidence trial.
In sum, appellant’s conviction resu lts from evidence ob tained after the
constitutionally permitted seizure of his Impala, the warranted search of the car, and error-
free proceedings in the district court.
Affirmed.