R e s p o n d e n t ,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-0425

Court of Appeals Chutich, J.
Dissenting, Thissen, J.
Dissenting in part, Anderson, J.
State of Minnesota,

R e s p o n d e n t ,

vs. Filed: October 13, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Larry Dale Taylor,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay Coun ty Attorney, Jacob P. Fauc hald, Assistant Clay County
Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota, for respondent.

Luke T. Heck and Drew J. Hushka, Vogel Law Firm, Fargo, North Dakota, for appellant.

_______________________

S Y L L A B U S
A deputy sheriff’s expansio n of a traffic stop by one question was supported by
reasonable, articulable suspic ion of other criminal activity when the totality of the
circumstances, and the rational inferences to be drawn from them, made him suspect that
appellant may have been driving while impaired.
Affirmed.
2
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether a de puty sheriff had reasonable, articulable
suspicion during a traffic stop to believe that appellant Larry Dale Taylor may have been
driving while impaired when the deputy learned that Taylor’s license had been canceled as
inimical to public safety and the deputy saw an open case of beer with missing cans in the
backseat of Taylor’s truck. Taylor challenges his convictions for first-degree driving while
impaired (DWI) and possessing an opened bottle or receptacle containing an alcoholic
beverage. He argues that the district c ourt erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence because the de puty impermissibly expanded the sc ope of the unde rlying traffic
stop by asking Taylor if he ha d consumed any beer from the open case in his truck. A
divided panel of the court of appeals held that the officer lawfully expanded the scope of
the stop, and therefore concluded that the dist rict court properly denied the motion to
suppress. Because we conclude that the circumstances known to the deputy, and the
legitimate inferences to be drawn from them, ra ised a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
other criminal activity sufficien t to expand the scope of the traffic stop, we affirm the
decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ta ylor with (1) first-degree DWI for
driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5)
(2020); (2) first-degree DWI for driving while under the influence of alcohol, Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1); (3) driving after cancellation-inimical to public safety, Minn. Stat.
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§ 171.24, subd. 5 (2020); and (4) driving with an open bottle containing an alcoholic
beverage, Minn. Stat. § 1 69A.35, subd. 3 (2020). Taylor was charged with first-degree
DWI because he committed the current offense w ithin 10 years of the first of three prior
DWI convictions. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2020). Taylor filed a motion to
suppress, arguing, in part, that the arresting deputy sheriff improperly expanded the scope
of the traffic stop by asking him if he had recently consumed alcohol. A contested omnibus
hearing was held, at which the deputy sheriff was the sole witness.
The deputy sheriff testified that on February 17, 2019, at about 7:15 p.m., he noticed
a truck driving in Clay County without a front license plate and a back license plate covered
in snow even though it had not snowed for some time. The deputy pulled the truck over
and dusted off the back license plate. He noticed that the registration sticker read “2017”;
when he ran the license plate number through the database, he learned that the vehicle had
not been registered since then.
The deputy then approached Taylor, who was the driver of the truck and sole
occupant. He asked Taylor for identificati on, which Taylor claime d not to have. The
deputy noticed a case of beer in the backseat of the truc k, with the flap open, that was
missing some cans. It was, as the deputy te stified, an “extremely cold” and “unbearable”
night; so cold, in fact, that even in his brief interaction with Taylor, he was losing dexterity
in his fingers. The deputy escorted Taylor to his squad car and ran the truck’s registration
through the database. In so doing, he learne d that Taylor’s license had been canceled as
inimical to public safety, which, in his expe rience, often means that a driver is a “repeat
offender” for driving while impa ired. The deputy asked Tayl or if he knew his driver’s
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license was canceled as inimical to public safety; Taylor conf irmed that he was aware of
this status. Based on the license status and the open case of beer, the deputy asked Taylor
if he had consumed any of the beer, to which Taylor replied that he had drunk two cans.
Later, Taylor admitted to having drunk si x cans. After the tr uck was eventually
impounded, the deputy found two empty cans of beer near the passenger seat.
Driving with a license canceled as inimical to public safety, the deputy testified, is
a gross misdemeanor, for which he decided to arrest Taylor. Because of the extreme cold,
he explained that it would have been irresponsible to have Taylor complete field sobriety
tests on the road, both because it would be quite uncomfortable and because the test results
might be skewed. He brought Taylor to jail, where Taylor agreed to complete the field
sobriety testing. Based on his performan ce, the deputy concluded that Taylor was
impaired. A preliminary breath test revealed that Taylor had an alcohol concentration of
0.09, and a later DataMaster breath test reveal ed an alcohol concentration of 0.12. Both
tests were administered within 2 hours of the stop.
After the omnibus hearing, t he district court denied Taylor’s motion to suppress the
statements and the results of the field sobriety and breath tests. The court concluded that
the deputy expanded the scope of the traffic stop to investigate a possible driving while
impaired violation when he asked Taylor if he had been drinking. The court further
concluded that “[u]nder the totality of th e circumstances,” the deputy “had reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the scope of the stop based on the open
case of beer and [Taylor’s] license status.”
5
Taylor then waived his right to a jury tria l and other trial rights and stipulated to the
prosecution’s evidence in a cour t trial, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain
review of the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress. The district court found
Taylor not guilty of first-degree DWI based on driving while unde r the influence, but
convicted him of the other th ree counts: (1) first-degree DWI based on driving with an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as measured within 2 hours of the time of driving;
(2) driving after his license was cancelled as inimical to public safety; and (3) having an
open bottle in his vehicle. The district c ourt sentenced Taylor to a stayed, 42-month
sentence for first-degree DWI and placed him on probation.
In an unpublished decision, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed Taylor’s
convictions. The court of appeals reasoned that the combination of both the open case of
beer within reach of the driver and the canceled license amounted to reasonable, articulable
suspicion. State v. Taylor, No. A20-0425, 2020 WL 7491283, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 21,
2020). The court emphasized that the deputy’s training and experience as an officer caused
him to believe that drivers whose licenses have been canceled as inimical to public safety
are often repeat offenders for driving while impaired. Id. It concluded that this knowledge,
in combination with the open case of beer within Taylor’s reach, gave the officer more than
a “mere hunch” that Taylor may ha ve been driving while impaired. Id. The court of
appeals rejected Taylor’s argument that th e deputy could not ha ve had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of driv ing while impaired when he did not observe any physical
indicia of intoxication. Id. at *4.
6
The dissent concluded that “[w]ithout the presence of any indicia of intoxication,
the license status together with the observati on of a legally-located open case of beer did
not provide a reasonable basis to believe the driver was intoxicated.” Id. at *6 (Slieter, J.,
dissenting). The dissenting judge reco gnized that an officer may have a reasonable
suspicion that a driver is intoxicated even without obser ving the tell-tale signs of
intoxication but concluded that the totality of the circumstances here allowed the deputy to
form only a “hunch.” Id.
We granted Taylor’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
The question before us today is whether the deputy lawfully expanded the scope of
the traffic stop to investigate whether Taylor was driving while impaired. Taylor does not
contest the facts, but merely whether the expa nsion of the scope of the stop was lawful.
Accordingly, the issue is “purely a legal dete rmination on given facts,” which we review
de novo. Berge v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. Warrantless searches and
seizures are generally unreasonable. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016). A
law enforcement officer may, however, “consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct
a brief, investigatory stop” of a motor vehi cle when “the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390,
393 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
7
Reasonable suspicion must be “particul arized” and based on “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In determining whether the
reasonable suspicion standard is met, we consider the totality of the circumstances. State
v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Min n. 2007). We have emphasized that an analysis of
reasonable suspicion is a “ ‘common-sense’ ” and “ ‘nontechnical’ ” approach that
considers “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life”; this standard is “ ‘not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d
378, 382 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996)).
Under this standard, trained police officers may “draw inferences and deductions that might
well elude an untrained person.” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487 (cita tion omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicio n requires more than a mere “hunch” but
“is considerably less than pr oof of wrongdoing by a preponder ance of the evidence, and
obviously less than is necessa ry for probable cause.” Navarette v. California , 572 U.S.
393, 397 (2014) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the Minnesota Constitution, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop
[must be] tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose
of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). Generally, if evidence is seized in
violation of the constitution, it must be suppressed. See State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836,
842 (Minn. 2011).
8
Applying these precedents, we analyze the stop and the ensuing actions of the
deputy. First, the deputy pulled Taylor over because his truck was missing a front license
plate and the back plate was covered with snow. See Minn. Stat. § 169.79, subds. 6–7
(2020) (requiring motor vehicles including pickup trucks to ha ve front and back license
plates that are unobscured). Taylor does not challenge this stop or any of the deputy’s
actions before he aske d Taylor about drinking. 1 When the deputy asked Taylor for his
license, the deputy noticed the case of beer in the back seat directly behind Taylor, saw that
the flap was open, and believed that the ope n case had a few cans missing. He did not,
however, ask Taylor whether he had anything to drink just then. Instead, he asked Taylor
to wait in his squad car while he ran the vehi cle’s registration. Th e deputy then learned
that Taylor’s license was cance led as inimical to public safe ty. Based on the deputy’s
training and experience, such a license cancellation shows that it is likely that Taylor was

1 As the record shows and the dissent recognizes, this case does not involve a
pretextual traffic stop. The appellate record shows that Taylor is white. Taylor did not
claim that the initial stop was pr etextual or challenge the deputy’s decision to search for
Taylor’s license status in the State’s computerized records after learning that the truck did
not have current registrati on tabs and Taylor was unable to produce any form of
identification. Accordingly, while we share the dissent’s concern over racial disparity in
traffic stops, this is not a case of a pretextual traffic stop, and Taylor has never raised the
issue of race or argued that any of the deputy ’s actions were pretext for an underlying
ulterior motive such as racial bias.
In addition, Taylor does not challenge the le gal standard that is used to determine if
an incremental expansion of a traffic stop vi olates the Minnesota Constitution. Taylor
agrees that if there was a reasonable, artic ulable suspicion that he was driving while
impaired, the deputy’s expansion of the stop to ask him if he had drunk any of the beer in
his truck was lawful. See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. Simply put, Taylor has not asked
us to change the law and apply a new standard for evaluating the expansion of a traffic stop
that accounts for racial imbalances in our criminal justice system. Contrary to the dissent’s
claim, we do not lower the bar for the expansi on of traffic stops. Instead, we apply well-
settled law to the specific factual circumstances of this case based on the arguments made.
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a “repeat offender” for driv ing while impaired. On cr oss-examination, the deputy
acknowledged that there are other reasons that a person’s license could be canceled as
inimical to public safety, but he explained, “[o]ff the top of my head I’m not aware of
which.”2
Only then, after the deputy observed the open case of beer with the missing cans
and learned that Taylor was driving with a license canceled as inimical to public safety, a
gross-misdemeanor offense, did he ask Taylor if he had been drinking. This single question
is the expansion of the stop challenged here. Because the question is unrelated to the
original purpose for the stop an d neither party contends that the deputy had or needed to
have probable cause, the inquiry must be justified by the reasonableness standard set forth
in Terry.
The test for reasonableness depends upon “the totality of the circumstances—the
whole picture.” United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). We look closely at
“the facts available to the officer,” and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them
and evaluate whether they establis h sufficient reasonable suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at

2 On cross-examination of the deputy, the following exchange occurred:

Q. Now, there’s other reasons why i ndividuals’ licenses are canceled as
being inimical to public safety other than just DWI convictions, correct?
A. Off the top of my head I’m not aware of which.
Q. So you’re not saying that there ar en’t other reasons, you just aren’t
aware of any other reasons.
A. Correct.

This testimony shows that the deputy did not contend, as the dissent claims, that
drivers whose licenses are canceled an inimical to public safety are always repeat driving
while impaired offenders.
10
21−22. Notably, we need not determine whether either the open case of beer with some
missing cans in the truck or the canceled licen se status would be sufficient by itself. We
focus only on whether the combination of the objective, particularized facts and any
resulting rational inferences warranted a reasona ble, articulable suspicion that justified
expansion of the stop.
A.
Taylor focuses on each fact separately an d claims that, even if considered in
combination, they do not add up to reasonable, articulable suspicion. First, he contends
that it was lawful for him to possess the open case of beer in his truck. Borrowing language
from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. Georgia,3 448 U.S. 438, 441
(1980), Taylor cautions that “a very large category of pres umably innocent travelers []
would be subject to virtually random expanded seizures if” we determine the expanded
seizure was justified based on “as little foundatio n as there was in this case.” He claims,
and the dissent emphasizes, that many drivers lawfully tran sport sealed containers of
alcohol in their vehicles, and so to conclude that this fact creates reasonable suspicion to
investigate possible impaired driving wo uld subject many Minnesota motorists to

3 Reid involved a stop of two airline passengers in an airport who law enforcement
identified as suspicious because they had no luggage besides matching shoulder bags, and
walked a few paces apart, with one looking back at the other a few times as they left the
terminal. 448 U.S. at 439. The passengers then met outside the airport, where a DEA agent
approached and asked to see thei r airline tickets before reques ting that they return to the
terminal for a search of their persons and shoulder bags. Id. The Supreme Court held that
the agent’s observations about how appellants were walking through the airport, without
more, were insufficient to justify the stop. Id. at 441. The Court reasoned that if it accepted
the agent’s justification here, then large swaths of the population would be subject to nearly
random seizures simply for walking through an airport. Id.
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impermissible discretionary intrusions on their liberty. Our holding today, however, does
not cast such a wide net. We need not determine whether an open case of beer inside of a
truck establishes reasonable, articulable susp icion, and our holding s hould not be read to
suggest that this fact itself does.
Moreover, as Taylor conceded at oral ar gument, even lawful activity can serve as
the basis for reasonable suspicion. See State v. Johnson , 444 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn.
1989) (stating that “innocent activity might justify the suspicion of criminal activity”). We
emphasize that on the specific facts here, although lawful, it is relevant to the determination
of reasonable suspicion that the case of beer was open, it was within arm’s reach of the
driver, and cans were missing from the case. Because the case was open and cans were
missing, someone had likely drunk the missing beer. Drivers can also easily discard cans
and bottles of beer from car windows, and, he re, the deputy testified that he saw the open
case “behind the driver’s spot.”
B.
We next evaluate the impact of the fact, known to the deputy, that Taylor’s license
was canceled as inimical to public safety. Minnesota law requires the Commissioner of
Public Safety to cancel a license as inimical to public safety when a person is convicted of
DWI and has two or more “qualified prior impaired driving incidents.” 4 Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.54, subd. 1(5)–(7) (2020) (requi ring cancellation under section 171.04,

4 A “qualified prior impaired driving in cident” is a “prior impaired driving”
conviction, which includes DWI convictions and substance-related criminal vehicular
operation convictions, and “prior impaired driv ing-related losses of license.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.03, subds. 20, 22 (2020).
12
subdivision 10, when the qualifying prior DWI incidents exist); see Minn. Stat. § 171.04,
subd. 1(10) (2020) (referring to the Commissioner having “good cause to believe that the
operation of a motor vehicle” by the person “w ould be inimical to public safety”).
Consequently, a person with a significant history of repeatedly driving while impaired will
have their license canceled as in imical to public safety. In State v. Busse , we explained
that “the offense of driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety implicates the
necessarily greater concern regarding a person who has repeatedly (by statute, at least three
times) violated Minnesota’s driving under the influence laws, and yet continues to drive.”
644 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Minn. 2002). The cancellation of a license for this reason shows that
the person’s dangerous driving co nduct is so pervasiv e as to make the driver a threat to
public safety.
The deputy testified that based on his training and experience, licenses are often
canceled as inimical to public safety because a driver has multiple DWI convictions.5 See
State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502–03 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that when determining

5 The dissent claims any infe rence that Taylor had a record of repeat DWI convictions
is “supposition proffered by the State after the fact” because the deputy did not testify that
he inferred Taylor had such a record. This claim ignores the deputy’s testimony described
above. More importantly, the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion is an “objective
test” and is not based on the subj ective beliefs of the officer. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at
368 (addressing the State’s argument that officer safety concerns made the expansion of a
traffic stop reasonable, even though the officer “articulated no specific safety concerns
during his testimony” because the “reasona bleness test is an objective test”); State v.
Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227, 230–31 (Minn. 2014) (stating that “the legality of a pat search”
under Terry “depends on an objective ex amination of the totality of the circumstances,”
rather than “the actual, subjective beliefs of the officer” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Hardy , 577 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. 1998)
(“The reasonableness of the officer’s actions is an objective inquiry; it does not depend on
the officer’s subjective frame of mind.”).
13
if a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity exists, we give “deference . . . to
officers regarding inferences and deductions made based on th eir training”). Our review
of Minnesota law supports the deputy’s testimo ny. Not only does Minnesota law require
the Commissioner to cancel a lice nse as inimical to public safety when a person has
repeatedly driven while impaired, see Minn. Stat. § 169A.54, subd. 1(5)–(7), but also a
review of reinstatement cases reveals that the vast majority of cancellations as inimical to
public safety involve repeated DWI convictions.6 It was reasonable for the deputy to infer
that a person whose license has been canceled as inimical to public safety has a history of
multiple alcohol-related driving incidents. Given the deputy’s tr aining and experience
interacting with drivers whose licenses have been canceled as inimical to public safety, this
fact may be given evidentiary weight in evaluating reasonable inferences.7

6 See, e.g., Igo v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 615 N.W.2d 358, 360–61 (Minn. App. 2000)
(explaining that conditioning reinstatement on total abstinence from alcohol is reasonable
in a case where a driver’s license has been canceled as inimical to public safety and stating
appellant had several DWI offenses), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 2000); Lamusga v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 536 N.W.2d 644, 649 (M inn. App. 1995) (same), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 27, 1995); Thorson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 519 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn.
App. 1994) (same); Wangen v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 437 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn. App.
1989) (explaining in a case where the appellant sought reinstatement of his license that the
appellant had his license canceled as inimical to public safety after several DWI offenses),
rev. denied (Minn. May 12, 1989); Askildon v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 403 N.W.2d 674,
678 (Minn. App. 1987) (explaining that co nditioning reinstatement on total abstinence
from alcohol is reasonable in a case where a driver’s license has been canceled as inimical
to public safety and stating ap pellant had several DWI offenses), rev. denied (Minn.
May 28, 1987).

7 The dissent dismisses the deputy’s tes timony about his training and experience with
drivers whose licenses have been canceled as inimical to public safety because there is no
evidence that the deputy has “reviewed any in formation about the percentage of inimical
to public safety cancellations that are due to multiple impaired driv ing violations.” The

14
The dissent contends that it is unreasonable to infer that a person whose license has
been canceled as inimical to public safety has a history of repeatedly driving while
impaired because the Commissioner may cancel a license as inimical to public safety for
reasons other than a history of impaired driving. 8 See Minn. Stat. § 171.04, subd. 1(10)
(2020);9 Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 524–25 (Minn. App. 2013)
(upholding cancellation based upon a pattern of driving very sl owly on the sh oulder of a

dissent cites no case that requires such statistic al evidence before a court may rely on an
officer’s inferences, based on their training and experience, when determining if a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity exists. That lack of precedence is not
surprising, considering that requiring such ev idence is inconsistent with the concept of
reasonable, articulable suspicion. See Lee, 585 N.W.2d at 382 (explaining that an analysis
of reasonable suspicion is a “common-sense, no ntechnical” approach that considers “the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life,” and thus is “not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules” (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695)).

8 The dissent further claims that we cannot rely on the de puty’s training and
experience because his understanding of the law regarding the cancellation of a license as
inimical to public safety wa s wrong. The dissent claims that the deputy believed that a
person whose license is canceled as inimical to public safety is always a repeat, driving
while impaired offender. The record does not support this claim. The deputy testified that
based on his training and experience, a person’s license is canceled as inimical to public
safety because they have a history of repeatedly driving while impaired. He acknowledged,
however, that there were other reasons why a pe rson could have their license canceled as
inimical to public safety but he was unable to identify any other reasons “off of the top of
[his] head.”

9   A person is not entitled to a driver’s licen se if the Commissioner “has good cause
to believe that the operation of a motor vehi cle on the highways by the person would be
inimical to public safety or welfare[.] ” Minn. Stat. § 171.04, subd. 1(10). The
Commissioner, in turn, is authorized to cancel a person’s license if “the person, at the time
of the cancellation, would not have been entitled to receive a license under section 171.04.”
Minn. Stat. § 171.14(a) (2020).
15
road).10 That a driver’s license is not always canceled as inimical to public safety because
of a history of impaired driving incidents “does not negate the re asonableness of [the
deputy’s] inference. Such is the case with all reasonable inferences.” Kansas v. Glover,
__ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020) (holding investigative stop was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment).
Further, Taylor’s reliance on, and the dissent’s analogy to, State v. Henning ,
666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003), is not persuasive. In Henning, we announced that stops on
the basis of special series registration plates, issued when other plates are impounded when
the vehicle operator was driving while impaired, alone are unconstitutional. Id. at 385.
Specifically, we found that reasonable suspicion must be based on the actual driver of the
vehicle, and the driver of a car with the special series plates is not necessarily the one who
was required to have the special plates placed on the vehicle. Id. This situation is
distinguishable from the canceled license at issue here because the canceled driver’s license
was Taylor’s license alone. Consequently, some level of indivi dualized suspicion is
present for licenses canceled as inimical to public safety. The dissent’s analogy to Henning
understates the importance of individualized suspicion in the analysis.

10 The court of appeals’ decision in Constans, 835 N.W.2d 518, is the only appellate
case we have found, and that Taylor and the dissent have cited, in which the Commissioner
canceled a license as inimical to public safety for a reason ot her than a history of driving
while impaired. When cons idered in light of Minnesota law that requires the
Commissioner to cancel a license as inimical to public safety when a person has a history
of driving while impaired and our review of relevant cases involving licenses canceled as
inimical to public safety, Constans is properly viewed as a factually atypical case that
reasonably would not have been at the top of the deputy’s mind when testifying.
16
In this case, Taylor’s license canceled as inimical to public sa fety, in conjunction
with the open case of beer in his truck, its placement in th e truck, and the missing cans,
clear the low hurdle of reasonable suspicion. Accord Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 385–86
(stating that while special series plates may not provide the sole ju stification for a stop,
“special series plates may be a factor for law enforcement to consider and would provide
a basis for closer scrutiny of [a] vehicle[]”). The combinati on of these facts establishes
more than a “unarticulated hunch” that Taylor was driving while impaired. See Davis,
732 N.W.2d. at 182 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, they
provide a “ ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting’ ” that Taylor was driving
while impaired. State v. Poehler , 935 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 2019) (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
C.
Taylor next claims that Holtz v. Commissioner of Public Safety , 340 N.W.2d 363
(Minn. App. 1983), requires an officer to observe at least one objective indicia of
impairment for reasonable suspicion to exist, which was lacking here. While Taylor’s
reliance on Holtz is misplaced for a number of reasons, this assertion misstates the holding
of the case. 11 See Holtz , 340 N.W.2d at 365 (holding the officer complied with the

11 Holtz involved a civil license revocation under the imp lied consent law, which
requires a higher standard of proof of whether the person was driving while impaired before
the police may ask the person to take a test to determine if the person is impaired. Holtz,
340 N.W.2d at 365. At the time, the standard of proof required under the implied consent
law was “reasonable and probable grounds to believe,” the driver was driving while
impaired, id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2( a) (1982)), which we have held was
synonymous with “probable cause,” State v. Harris, 202 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Minn. 1972).

17
requirements of the applicable implied consent law when he asked the appellant to take a
chemical test for the presence of alcohol after observing several physical signs of
intoxication). Further, in State v. Lee , we said that “[t]he cour t of appeals’ requirement
that the officer observe at least one of the commonly known physical indicia of intoxication
is inconsistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court a nd of this court both
with respect to probable cause and . . . the lesser reasonable suspicion standard.”
585 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1998).
Taylor insists that the facts of Lee are wholly distinguishable from this case and that
Lee represents a narrow carve out in an exceptional situation, rather than an iteration of the
general rule. We do not agree.
In Lee, officers arrived at the scene of a motorcycle crash where the driver, Lee, was
severely injured, and his passenger admitted th at she had been drinking and that they had
been coming home from a party. Lee, 585 N.W.2d at 379. The passenger claimed she did
not know whether Lee was drinking, and the o fficers were unable to ask him at the scene
because of his injuries. Id. at 380. Officers noticed that there were no skid marks at the
steep curve where the mo torcycle crashed, which implied th at the driver had not tried to
brake. Id. While Lee was being transported to the hospital by ambulance, an officer asked
him to consent to a blood draw to measure his alcohol concentration. Id. Lee refused to
consent; the officer nonetheless required the ambulance technician to draw his blood. Id.

As stated above, reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard for law enforcement to meet,
Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843, and therefore, Holtz is distinguishable.
18
We upheld the involuntary blood draw as constitutional, explicitly stating that no
physical indicia of intoxication are required for the higher probable cause standard. Id. at
382. We reasoned that “ ‘ingestion of alcohol in amounts less than those needed to cause
gross outward symptoms of intoxication can have a substantial adverse effect on a driver’s
judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Speak, 339 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn. 1983)). Thus, Lee
unequivocally stands for the proposition that no bright line rule re quires an officer to
observe one of the physical indicia of intoxication to establish either probable cause or the
lower standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion that is at issue here.12
No one silver bullet exists to determin e reasonable, articulable suspicion of
intoxication; we have repeatedly emphasized that we evaluate each case on a totality of the
circumstances and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those particular facts.
See, e.g., Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182. Although we consider the lack of physical indicia of
impairment as one circumstance within the totality of the circumstances analysis, for the
reasons stated above, we do not find this absence—although unusual—to outweigh the
other factors contributing to the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion that Taylor
was driving while impaired. The totality of the circumstances here, even without outward
signs of intoxication, weighs in favor of the conclusion that reasonable, articulable
suspicion existed to expand the stop.

12 While the dissent agrees with our interpretation of Lee, it claims Lee “is a much
different case” because the facts in Lee “strongly suggested the motorcyclist had been
drinking and driving.” But even if we agreed with the dissent that the evidence in this case
is weaker than in Lee, that assessment would not change our holding today. Lee involved
the probable cause standard, see 585 N.W.2d at 382, which the dissent concedes is a higher
hurdle to clear than reasonable suspicion.
19
In sum, we reiterate that the bar for reasonable suspicion is low. See Diede ,
795 N.W.2d at 843 (“[T]he reasonable-suspici on standard is not high.”). Applying this
standard to the totality of the circumstances here, we conclude that the State presented
sufficient articulable facts, and inferences that could be drawn from those facts, to establish
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Taylor was driving while impaired. The deputy’s
observation of the open case of beer, its location within arm’s reach of the driver, and the
missing cans, combined with hi s knowledge that Taylor’s lic ense had been canceled as
inimical to public safety and his past experience with such drivers, establish that the deputy
had sufficient reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the valid traffic stop by one
question. Consequently, the district court properly denied Taylor’s motion to suppress
evidence that was obtained after the deputy e xpanded the scope of the underlying traffic
stop.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
D-1
D I S S E N T
THISSEN, Justice (dissenting).
The court’s holding today permits respondent State of Minnesota to intrude on the
privacy of any driver who ha s previous convictions for dr iving while impaired to ask
whether the driver has been drinking simply because the driver has an open case of beer in
his back seat (a perfectly lega l act), even when there is no indication that the driver has
consumed alcohol. In so holding, the co urt places too little value on the right of
Minnesotans to be free from unreasonable State intrusion into their lives; a right enshrined
in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution an d Article I, Section 10, of
the Minnesota Constitution.
Worse yet, in this case, the deputy who asked the question about alcohol
consumption had no knowledge that the driver had previous convictions for driving while
impaired. Rather, based on his misinterpret ation or misundersta nding of the law, the
deputy conjectured that the driver had such previous convictions because the driver’s
license had been revoked as inimical to public safety. While we do not set a high bar for a
police officer’s reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of a traffic stop, s ee State v.
Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008), that bar is not nonexistent. And because
the court today sets that bar too low, I respectfully dissent.
A.
Appellant Larry Dale Taylor sought to suppress evidence obtained after a deputy
sheriff expanded a traffic stop. Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the State. U.S. Const. amend.
D-2
IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Searches and seizures conducted without warrants are
presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Lugo , 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016). But
when a police officer “has a reasonable, artic ulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot,” the officer may perform a limited inves tigatory traffic stop without a warrant or
probable cause. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S.
119, 123 (2000)). “Reasonable suspicion must be ‘based on specific, articulable facts’ that
allow the officer to ‘be able to articulate . . . that he or she had a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.’ ” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d
836, 842–43 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995)).
In other words, the police officer must have “more than a mere hunch” that the suspect has
done something illegal. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
We use a totality of the circumstances an alysis when assessing whether a police
officer had a reasonable suspicion, looking at all facts surrounding the traffic stop. Lugo,
887 N.W.2d at 487. “Our task is not to de cide whether [a] particul ar officer’s suspicion
was genuine[;] . . . rather, we examine whether the suspicion was objectively reasonable”
based on the facts available to the police officer and any rational inferences the officer may
have derived from those facts. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 2000) (emphasis
omitted). The State bears the burden of justifying the expansion of a stop. State v. Flowers,
734 N.W.2d 239, 256 (Minn. 2007).
Further, Taylor brings his claim under Article 1, Section 10, of the Minnesota
Constitution. “Decisions of the United Stat es Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth
Amendment are of ‘persuasive, although not compelling, authority’ in interpreting article
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I, section 10.” State v Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d 353, 361 (Min n. 2004) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In par ticular, under Article I, Section 10, of the
Minnesota Constitution, “the sc ope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be
limited to the justification for the stop.” State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003);
see also State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Minn. 2005). We have stated that
each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified
by one of the following: (1 ) the original legitimate purpose of the stop,
(2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in [the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968)].
Furthermore, the basis for the intrusion must be individualized to the person
toward whom the intrusion is directed.

Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. Absent independent probable cause, when a police officer
expands the scope of a traffic stop beyond the initial justifica tion for the stop, the officer
must have reasonable suspicion of “additional illegal activity.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d
346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
B.
I now turn to the facts of this case. The deputy sheriff originally pulled Taylor over
because his truck was missing a front license plate and the rear plate was obscured by snow.
In other words, the initial ju stification for the stop was the deputy’s reasonable suspicion
that Taylor had violated traffic laws related to the proper displaying of license plates. See,
e.g., Minn. Stat. § 169.79 (2020). As the deputy approached th e vehicle, he observed a
case of beer behind the driver’s seat. The flap of the case was open, and it was missing a
few cans, but the deputy did not observe any open or em pty cans of beer in the vehicle.
D-4
Further, the deputy had observed neither erratic driving by Taylor before the stop nor any
physical indications that Taylor had been drinking.
Taylor had no driver’s license. The deputy instructed Taylor to sit in the back seat
of his squad car while he searched for Taylor’s name in his squad car computer. The search
revealed that Taylor’s license had been canceled as inimical to public safety. The deputy
did not conduct any follow-up to ascertain why Taylor’s license had been canceled. Rather,
the deputy immediately asked Taylor whether he had consumed any of the beers from the
case in his truck. Taylor responded that he had. Taylor was eventually convicted of driving
with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as well as an open container violation.
The State acknowledges that the deputy expanded the scope of the traffic stop by
asking Taylor whether he had consumed alcoho l. The State also concedes that this
expansion was related to neither the original legitimate purpose of the stop nor independent
probable cause. So the question here is, at the time the deputy asked Taylor whether he
had consumed any of the beer from the open case in his truck, did the deputy have a
reasonable suspicion that Tayl or had committed some other illegal activity? I conclude
that the State did not carry its burden of proving both that such objectively reasonable
suspicion existed and that the extension of the stop was sufficiently limited in scope. See
Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 252.
The only suspected illegal ac tivity that could have just ified the deputy’s question
about the beer was Taylor possibly driving while impaired. The question was unnecessary
to support arresting Taylor fo r driving without a valid drive r’s license. After the deputy
determined that Taylor’s license was canceled as inimical to pub lic safety, he had a
D-5
sufficient basis to arrest Taylor fo r driving without a valid license. See Minn. Stat.
§ 171.24, subd. 5 (2020). Further, standing al one, Taylor’s consumption of alcohol (e.g.,
while not driving) is not illegal.1 And the record discloses that, at the time the deputy made
the inquiry about alcohol consumption, the de puty had no informa tion to suspect that
Taylor had an open container of alcohol in the vehicle or that he had been drinking a beer
while driving. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.35, subds. 2– 3 (2020). Accordin gly, I examine
whether the totality of the circumstances leading up to and surr ounding the deputy’s
question support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Taylor was driving while
impaired. See Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487.
The State relies on the combination of two facts to support the district court’s finding
that the deputy had reasonable suspicion that Taylor was driving wh ile impaired: (1) the
deputy’s observation of the open case of beer behind the driver’s seat, and (2) the deputy’s
inference that Taylor had a prior record of driving while impaired; an inference based solely
on his knowledge that Taylor’s driver’s license had been can celed as inimical to public
safety.

1 A person who has had his license canceled as inimical to public safety typically
must abstain from any alcohol consumption to have his license reinstated. See Minn. R.
7503.1600, .1700, subp. 4, .1725, subp. 4 (2019). But violating this requirement on its own
triggers no criminal penalties. It merely jeopardizes the person’s ability to have his license
reinstated. See Minn. R. 7503.1700, subp. 5, .1725, subp. 5. Of course, the commissioner
may impose a no-alcohol restriction on a license and a person who violates such a condition
is subject to criminal charges under Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(f)(1) (2020).
D-6
1.
I first turn to the deputy’s knowledge that Taylor’s driver’s license was canceled as
inimical to public safety. Th e only relevance of Taylor’s li cense status to the deputy’s
question about Taylor’s consumption of beer was to support a conjecture that Taylor had a
prior record of driving while impaired. It is Taylor’s presumed prior criminal record (not
his license status), combined with the open case of beer, that forms the basis for the State’s
argument that, when the deputy asked abou t the open case of beer, the deputy had a
reasonable suspicion that Taylor was driving while impaired.
It is undisputed that the deputy had no direct knowledge that Taylor had prior
driving while impaired violations when he asked Taylor whether he had consumed any
beer from the open case. Accordingly, the State’s case turns on whether the inference that
Taylor had prior driving while impaired violati ons based on his drive r’s license status is
reasonable and permissible. I now turn to that inquiry.
The record shows that the deputy knew only that Taylor’s driver’s license had been
canceled as inimical to public safety. The record is clear that the deputy did not know why
Taylor’s license was canceled. Indeed, the deputy never even testified that he assumed that
Taylor had a record of driving while impaired because of Taylor’s license status.2 That is
a supposition proffered by the State after the fact.

2 The deputy testified that he asked Ta ylor the question about the beer—thereby
expanding the scope of the traffic stop—based only on his observation of the open case of
beer. The deputy mentioned no other reason. Specifically, the deputy never stated that his
question was also prompted by Taylor’s driver’s license be ing canceled as inimical to
public safety. The court notes the deputy’s testimony that a license is often canceled as

D-7
Further, as the court notes, a person may ha ve his driver’s license canceled as
inimical to public safety for reasons entirely unrelated to alcohol-related driving violations.
See Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 835 N.W.2d 518, 524–25 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013)
(holding that the Commissioner of Public Safety could cancel a license as inimical to public
safety because the driver had a history of driving too slowly on state highways); Minn.
Stat. § 171.04, subd. 1(10) (2020) (authorizing the Commissioner of Public Safety to cancel
a person’s license as inimical to public safety when the Commissioner has “good cause to
believe that the operation of a motor vehicle on highways by the person would be inimical
to public safety or welfare”). Consequently , the mere fact that a person’s license was
revoked as inimical to public safety does not support an inference that the person has prior
alcohol-related driving violations. Cf. State v. Henning , 666 N.W.2d 379, 382, 385–86
(Minn. 2003) (holding that it was not reasonable for police officers to “automatically infer”
that a driver was in violation of the law when the vehicle had special series plates because
the previous plates were impounded due to a driving while impaired violation).
The State and the court suggest that becau se a history of alcohol-related driving
violations is one reason for can celing a person’s driver’s lice nse as inimical to public
safety, the deputy reasonably inferred that Ta ylor was driving under the influence on the

inimical to public safety because a driver has multiple DWI convictions. But that testimony
was not given as a reason for expanding the stop to ask whether Taylor had consumed beer.
The deputy cited Taylor’s canceled license status as only partial support for his decision to
ask Taylor to submit to field sobriety tests after his arrest and transport to the Clay County
jail. And both the State and this court agree that, on its own, observing the case of beer
with a flap open is not enough to support a finding of reasonable suspicion to expand a
stop.
D-8
night in question. That inference is not something a reasonable and prudent layperson
would make. Instead, to make that leap, the State and the court must rely—and exclusively
do rely—on the deputy’s experience. See Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 353 (relying on a police
officer’s training and experience when a ssessing whether the officer had a reasonable
suspicion to expand the scope of a traffic stop). The de puty testified that he had
encountered other drivers who had licenses cancel ed as inimical to pu blic safety and that
it was his “understanding” that such driver s are “repeat offenders for driving while
impaired.” Indeed, when pressed, the deputy continued to testify that he was not aware of
reasons other than multiple driving while im paired violations for which a person could
have his license canceled as inimical to public safety, despite this incorrect understanding.3
The State’s position is flawed. First, “tra ining and experience” is not a talismanic
phrase that provides an automa tic blessing to a police officer’s actions. Rather, the State
must prove why and how the police officer’s particular training and experience is
meaningful to support a reasonable suspicion in a way that would not be apparent to a
layperson in the particular case. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (stating that when considering

3 In response to questioning on cross-exam ination, the deputy admitted that there may
be reasons other than multiple driving while impaired violations for which a person could
have his driver’s license canceled as inimical to public safety, but he was not aware of any.
The testimony quoted by the court plainly shows that the deputy knew of no other reason
for a cancellation as inimical to public safe ty. And, as noted above, the deputy never
testified in any event that, when he expanded the stop, he relied on Taylor’s license being
canceled as inimical to public safety. Further, it is not a meaningful response to say (as the
court does in footnote 5) that we can ignore the deputy’s misunder standing of the law
because it is merely the deputy’s subjective belie f on the ground that the test is objective.
As set forth below, the deputy’s unde rstanding of the law was incorrect and objectively
unreasonable.
D-9
whether a police officer acted with reasonable suspicion, “due weight must be given . . . to
the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience ” (emphasis added)); State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn.
2016) (stating that training and experience are relevant because “police officers may
interpret circumstances differen tly than untrained persons”); State v. Martinson ,
581 N.W.2d 846, 853 (Minn. 1998) (Page, J., dissenting) (“[T]he state must articulate what
it is about the officer’s training and experience , coupled with the fa cts relied on, that
creates a reasonable suspicion of illegal c onduct.” (emphasis added)). Here, the two-
question discussion during the suppression hearing concerning the deputy’s experience is
not enough to show that the deputy’s experi ence was sufficient to reasonably support the
speculative leap from an inimical to public safety cancellation to a record of driving while
impaired.
There is no evidence that the deputy had been trai ned on or reviewed any
information about the percentage of inimical to public safety cancellations that are due to
multiple impaired driving violations. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record whatsoever
that the deputy’s speculation is true.4 Further, there was no evidence adduced concerning

4 I agree that there is no case where we have required the State to introduce statistical
or other evidence to support the factual accuracy of a police officer’s reason for expanding
a stop. But in a case like the one before us, where the reason offered (after the fact) by the
State to justify the expansion of a stop is ba sed solely on a bare (and incorrect) assertion
by a police officer, the lack of any objective support for the assertion is certainly relevant
to our assessment of whether the State carried its burden to prove reasonable suspicion in
light of the totality of the circumstances. Th e court’s reliance on the fact that most of the
handful of cases involving cancellation as inimi cal to public safety that have reached
Minnesota appellate courts are for repeat dr iving under the influence violations is not

D-10
the extent of the deputy’s experience or how many drivers the deputy had encountered
whose licenses were canceled as inimical to public safety prior to questioning Taylor.
Accordingly, we have no solid basis upon which to do our job and assess whether the
deputy’s inferences were reasonable. The court just accepts the deputy’s assertion at face
value. Consequently, the court decides today that an inference based solely on an isolated
experience of a particular pol ice officer that may not be consistent with reality is
reasonable. The court turns what we have lo ng held to be an objective standard into a
subjective one in which a police officer can simply justify a stop based on his belief, even
if that belief may be entirely inconsistent with the objective reality.5
That brings me to the second flaw in the State’s position. The deputy’s
understanding of the law regarding the cancella tion of a driver’s license as inimical to
public safety was wrong. We have held that a police officer’s mistaken interpretation of a
statute may not form the particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity

compelling since the overwhelming majority of cancellations as inimical to public safety
cases never reach an appellate court.

5 The principle articulated by the Suprem e Court of the United States, that it is
impermissible to tie a police offi cer’s length of service to the validity of a traffic stop, is
inapposite. See, e.g., Kansas v. Glover, __ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2020). First,
as noted, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the scope of the Fourth Amendment are
merely persuasive when we are interpreti ng Section 1, Article 10, of the Minnesota
Constitution. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 361. More importa ntly, my point is not that the
deputy’s inference was impermissible because he had been employed as a deputy for less
than 1 year at the time he stopped Taylor, but rather that there is too little in the record
about the basis for the deputy’s inference to support a c onclusion that the cancellation of
Taylor’s license as inimical to public safety meant that Taylor had a record of driving under
the influence was reasonable. That is an en tirely proper inquiry; indeed, the inquiry we
must undertake under the federal and state constitutions.
D-11
necessary to justify a traffic stop. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004);
see also George , 557 N.W.2d at 579 (holding that the stop of a motorcyclist based on a
state trooper’s mistaken understanding that the headlight configuration on the motorcycle
was illegal was not reasonabl e because “[t]here was no objective basis in the law for the
trooper to reasonably suspect that George was operating his motorcycle in violation of th[e]
law” (emphasis added)). As pr eviously noted, the power of the Commissioner of Public
Safety to cancel a person’s license as inimical to public safety is not limited to repeat
driving while impaired offenders. Accordingly, there was no objective basis for the deputy
here to believe that Taylor had a history of alcohol-related driving violations based solely
on the fact that his license was canceled as inimical to public safety.
In sum, the deputy had no reasonable basi s for believing that Taylor had a prior
record of driving while impa ired, had no knowledge of whet her Taylor had a criminal
record, and did not know why Taylor’s license had been canceled as inimical to public
safety. And the deputy’s understanding that dr ivers with licenses canceled as inimical to
public safety are always re peat driving while impaired offenders was based on both
unspecified experience and incorrect. To the extent the deputy speculated that Taylor had
a history of driving while impaired based on Taylor’s license status (and it bears repeating
that the deputy never testified that he, in fact, ever made such a speculative leap), any such
speculation can be charact erized as nothing more than a hunch. Accordingly, one of the
two reasons the State relies on to support its position that the deputy had a reasonable
suspicion that Taylor was driv ing while impaired is invalid. The State is left with the
deputy’s observation that there was an open case of beer behind the driver’s seat in Taylor’s
D-12
vehicle—a fact, the State concedes is insufficient on its own to justify the expansion of the
stop.
2.
Even if we concluded that the deputy had a reasonable basis to infer that Taylor had
a record of alcohol-related driving violatio ns, his expansion of the stop still was not
justified. I have found no precedent to support the conclusi on that Taylor’s record of
driving while impaired on its own is enough to support the expansion of the stop. Cf. State
v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d 35,
41 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “a criminal reco rd, even a ‘long’ one, is best used as
‘corroborative information’ and not as the so le basis for probable cause”)). Indeed, it
would be a surprising conclusion that the constitution allows police officers to stop a person
on a suspicion that the person is impaired solely because he has a prior driving-under-the-
influence conviction without any other partic ularized and objectiv e basis for such a
suspicion. That would dramatically expand the power of police officers to stop Minnesota
drivers. Consequently, both the State and th e court stress that Taylor’s common, lawful
activity of transporting an open , partially full case of beer in a truck weighs strongly in
favor of a finding that the deputy acted with reasonable suspicion.
The State properly concedes that the trans portation of an open ca se of beer, even
one that is partially full, in a vehicle is a lawful activity. Indeed, people across Minnesota
transport partially full cases of beer every day, whether traveling to a party or paying back
a friend for help with a recent move or some other wholly legal reason. The record here
discloses no evidence that most , many, or even a few Minnesotans lawfully transporting
D-13
beer on a regular basis actually consume any of the beer that they are transporting while
driving. It is simply not a reasonable leap from an observation of an open case of beer in
the back seat of a vehicle to the conclusion that the person is driving while impaired.
It is true that even observing a lawful activity can serve as the basis for a reasonable,
articulable suspicion to conduct or expand the scope of a traffic stop. Britton, 604 N.W.2d
at 89 (“It is . . . true that wholly lawful co nduct might justify the su spicion that criminal
activity is afoot.”); see also Martinson, 581 N.W.2d at 852 (concluding that multiple lawful
acts, when viewed together, supported a findi ng of a reasonable suspicion sufficient for
police officers to conduct an investigatory stop in an air port terminal). But under the
reasonable suspicion standard, such lawful activ ity must consist of “s pecific, articulable
facts” to support a police officer’s “particular ized and objective basis” that a person is
breaking the law. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842–43 (citati on omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In other wo rds, something about the la wful activity must raise a
reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in illegal activity.
Unlike some lawful activities we have held could serve as a basis for a reasonable
suspicion, the act of transporting an open case of beer is not inherently suspicious—there
certainly is no evidence in the record that it is. See, e.g., Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86 (police
officer testified that a vehicle with a br oken window was a common indicator that the
vehicle was stolen); Martinson, 581 N.W.2d at 851 (police officers noted that the suspect
was acting in a manner “consistent with that of other drug couriers they had arrested”).
Accordingly, we should exercise caution when considering the State’s argument that such
a common, nonsuspicious, and lawful activity could function, even in part, as the basis for
D-14
a reasonable suspicion in this case. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (holding
that police officers “could not, as a matter of law, have reasonably suspected the petitioner
of criminal activity on the basis of . . . circumstances [that] describe a very large category
of presumably innocent travel ers”). The location of the case of beer in Taylor’s truck—
directly behind the driver’s seat, a location not conducive to access while driving—further
strengthens the need for caution here.
The default rule is that police officers should not intrude into the lives and privacy
of Minnesotans who are objectively engaged in lawful behavior. The court, however,
opens the door for any police officer to do just that to thousands of Minnesotans.
Unfortunately, it is neither rare, nor unlawful, nor suspicious for a person to have multiple
prior driving while impaired convictions. Sim ilarly, it is neither rare, nor unlawful, nor
suspicious for a person to drive with unopened beer cans in the back seat. And people in
both of those categories drive every day without consuming alcohol. Therefore, I conclude
that it is not reasonable for a police officer to suspect that a person with a prior record of
driving while impaired is currently driving while impaired based solely on the existence of
a mostly full case of beer with its flap open behind the driver’s seat—a perfectly lawful
activity. That is particularly true when, as here, there were no physical or other indicia of
impairment whatsoever. It is to that issue that I now turn.
3.
In considering the totality of the circumstances here, it is also important that the
deputy observed no erratic dr iving nor physical indicia of impairment before expanding
the stop.
D-15
Physical indicia of impairment are not a prerequisite to a reasonable suspicion that
a suspect has driven under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382
(Minn. 1998) (concluding that a police officer need not observe any phy sical indicia of
impairment to have probable cause or reasona ble suspicion of driving while impaired).
Nevertheless, many cases involving driving while impaired or other alcohol-related driving
violations understandably cont ain evidence of such indicia, such as an odor of alcohol,
slurred speech, or bloodshot or glassy eyes. See, e.g., State v. Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729,
732 (Minn. 2019); Burbach , 706 N.W.2d at 486; Kennedy v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
No. A15-1279, 2016 WL 3222850, at *1 (Minn. App. June 13, 2016); Flynn v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, No. A06-1136, 2007 WL 1747008, at *1 (Minn. App. June 19, 2007); State v.
Rogus, Nos. A05-1490, A05-1840, 2006 WL 2347802, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 15, 2006);
State v. Lopez , 631 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25,
2001). Consequently, when the reco rd reflects no physical indicia of impairment at all
prior to the expansion of the traffic stop, as here, such an absence should factor in our
totality of the circumstances analysis.
The court acknowledges that this absence of physical indicia is “unusual” in a case
where a police officer suspects a person is dr iving while impaired. The court, however,
dismisses that absence of physical indicia of alcohol use based on the deputy’s conjecture
that Taylor had a history of driving while im paired—a conjecture based on the deputy’s
misunderstanding of Minnesota law on cancellations as inimical to public safety—coupled
with the observation of Taylor’s legal activity of driving with a case of beer with an open
flap behind the driver’s seat. The court dismi sses the absence of open ed cans of beer on
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the further speculation unsupported in the record that Taylor tossed them out the window.
The court’s cherry-picking of certain facts, and its dismissiveness of the lack of any
indication of alcohol use or evidence of e rratic driving as a factor which should be
considered, fails to take seriously our totality of the circumstances analysis. Importantly,
it also ignores that the State bears the burden of proving that a reasonable suspicion existed.
The court strongly credits the weak reasons of the deputy while ignoring the common-
sense inference that a person driving under the influence would generally exhibit some
signs of impairment, either through his mann er of driving and/or common physical signs
of intoxication.
The court relies heavily on State v. Lee, where we found probable cause that a nearly
unconscious motorcyclist was driving under the influence even though the record did not
demonstrate that the police officers investigating a crash observed any physical indicia of
impairment. But Lee is a much different case and serves as a useful factual counterexample
to this case.
In Lee, we held that a police officer had probable cause to order a warrantless blood
draw from a motorcyclist following a single-vehicle crash despite no evidence of physical
indicia of impairment. 585 N.W.2d at 383. Significantly, unlike this case, the motorcyclist
could not respond to the police officer’s ques tions because he was severely injured and
“incoherent.” Id. at 380. On the other hand, ther e was evidence of aberrant driving
behavior commonly associated with impaired driving. Skid marks off the road suggested
that the motorcyclist had failed to turn to follow the curve of the road and had not applied
the brakes before the crash. Id. Further, at the scene, the passenger on the motorcycle
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admitted that she and the motorcyclist had come from a party where drinking had occurred
and admitted that she had been drinking. Id. at 379. Given these facts, the police officer
suspected that the motorcyclist, like the passenger, had also been drinking, and requested
that medical personnel remove a sample of th e motorcyclist’s blood wi thout his consent.
Id. at 380. Following the blood draw, which rev ealed elevated alcohol levels, the
motorcyclist was charged with various alcohol-related driving offenses. Id. We reviewed
the district court’s order suppressing the bl ood test evidence, holding that, given the
circumstances surrounding the scene of the crash, the police officer had probable cause to
order the blood draw.6 Id. at 381–83. In short, while the record in Lee did not recite any
observations by the police officer of physical indicia of impairment by the motorcyclist,
the objective facts surrounding the incident ve ry strongly suggested that the motorcyclist
had been drinking and driving. In this case, in contrast, there was no evidence of erratic
driving behavior or admissions of alcohol consumption by others in the vehicle. Rather,
as discussed above, the supporting facts and inferences the State argues formed a basis for
reasonable suspicion are comparatively weak. 7 Consequently, the lack of any physical

6 Although Lee involved an issue of probable cause, a higher hurdle for law
enforcement to meet than reasonable suspicion, see id. at 382, the factual similarities and
differences still serve as a useful comparison to this case.

7 State v. Rogus provides another useful contrast to the facts of this case. Nos. A05-
1490, A05-1840, 2006 WL 2347802, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 15, 2006). There, a police
officer pulled over a driver for driving 70 mi les per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Id.
When approaching the vehicle, he noticed beer cans in the back seat and smelled alcohol
on the driver. Id. The police officer then checked the driver’s license and discovered that
the driver had a restricted license barring him from any alcohol use, even when not driving.
Id. The police officer then retu rned to the driver’s vehicle and expanded the scope of the

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indicia of impairment in the record prior to the deputy expanding the scope of the traffic
stop tips the scales even further against the State here when considering the totality of the
circumstances.
C.
As should be clear by now, I do not believe that the expa nsion of the stop in this
case is allowed under our current standard for stop expansions. I also believe that it is
important to be transparent about my full thought process concerning the conclusion that
the court reaches in this case. I believe that our decision t oday is also wrong because it
creates too much space for future pretextual and potentially racially motivated stops and
will contribute to Minnesota’s racial disparitie s in who is stopped and who is searched
following a minor traffic stop.
The court is correct that there is no suggestion in this case that the deputy’s decision
to stop Taylor for a missing front license plate and a snow-covered back license plate was
a pretext for further criminal investigation. The record al so discloses that Taylor was
white. Those facts, however, do not mean that we can or should ignore how this decision
may affect whether future pretextual or potentially racially motivated stops or expansions

traffic stop by asking whether the driver had consumed any alcohol recently. Id. The court
of appeals correctly held that the police officer had a reasona ble suspicion to expand the
scope of the traffic stop by inquiring about the driver’s alcohol use. Id. at *2.
In Rogus, the police officer observed beer cans in the rear of the vehicle, smelled
alcohol on the driver, and had actual knowledge that the dr iver had a history of alcohol-
related driving violations due to his restricted license status. This stands in contrast to the
deputy in this case, who obse rved no physical indicia of im pairment and had no actual
knowledge of whether Taylor had a history of alcohol-related driving violations. In other
words, the poli ce officer in Rogus had more than a mere hunch that the driver had been
drinking based on the totality of the circumstances, unlike the deputy here.
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of stops are conducted and whether those stops or expansions will be upheld. The rule we
adopt in cases like this where there are no racial overtones and no assertions of pretext sets
the threshold for the constitutionality of all future stops and expa nsions of stops. The
standard for what constitutes reasonable suspicion will not vary in cases where there is no
pretext or where pretext exists, at least under current law. It is not enough to say that the
parties did not ask us to apply a standard other than reasonable suspicion because, by
deciding the case, we are defining that standard.
Each decision we reach in individual cases on what constitutes a reasonable
suspicion for a stop or the expansion of a stop impacts the behavior of other state actors in
the criminal justice system. It affects how police officers do their jobs, including the extent
to which officers use stops for minor traffic violations as a tool to justify a broader police
investigation. It affects wh ether prosecutors will continue to charge felonies when the
evidence is the product of an initial stop for a minor traffic violation. Of course, it affects
how district courts will review challenges to traffic stops or expansions of stops. Our
decision today about what constitutes a reasonabl e suspicion to expand a search helps set
the background rule that drives the behavior of all those other actors. Consequently, the
rule we adopt in cases like this directly impacts the liberty interests of all Minnesotans and
the structural fairness, and perceived fairness, of our criminal justice system.
The evidence is abundant th at the police practice of using stops for minor traffic
violations as a tool to justify broader investigations is widespread and common. For several
decades, police officers have been trained in how to turn stops for minor traffic violations
into investigations for other potential criminal behavior and they are encouraged to adopt
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the practice. See, e.g., Brett A. Lacey, An Examination of the Evolution of Racially Biased
Pretextual Investigatory Stops a nd their Legitimacy in Policing 37–69 (Mar. 22, 2017)
(M.S. thesis, Illinois State University) (Proqu est) (providing hist ory of police officer
training to expand routine stops as an in vestigatory tool); Michelle Alexander, The New
Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 70 (2012) (describing how
police officers are trained in how to expand stops for minor violations into broader criminal
investigations); Charles Remsberg, Tactics for Criminal Pa trol: Vehicle Stops, Drug
Discovery & Officer Survival (1995); Lt. Kirk Simone , Kansas Highway Patrol, Epic
Operation Pipeline, Passenger Vehicle Drug Interdiction Manual, Kansas Highway Patrol
(unpublished). As a leading po lice officer trainer stated, “the core concept of Criminal
Patrol [is] that vehicle stops are golden opportunities for unique field investigations which,
with the right volume of contacts, the ri ght knowledge and creativity, and the right
approach, can lead to major felony arrests.” Remsberg, Tactics for Criminal Patrol, supra,
at 25 (emphasis omitted). And as long as the limits we establish for such police tactics are
sufficiently rigorous and protect ive of Minnesota’s individual constitutional rights, such
police behavior may legitimately help keep us safe. But therein lies the rub—whether our
standard is sufficiently rigorous and protective.
In 1997, we noted “our seri ous concerns related to the ‘pretext problem . . . .’ ”
George, 557 N.W.2d at 579. We explained:
We note first that very few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance
without violating some traffic regulation. Second is our concern that police,
who have enormous discretion in enforcing traffic laws, may take advantage
of their right to stop motorists for routine traffic violations in order to target
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members of groups identified by factors that are totally impermissible as a
basis for law enforcement activity.

Id. at 579–80 (citations omitted) (internal quot ation marks omitted). The same concerns
are reflected in our holdings that the Minnesota Constitution demands more justification
for the expansion of traffic st ops than that required under th e United States Constitution.
See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 361; Fort, 660 N.W.2d at 418–19; see generally State v.
Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 136 (Minn. 2002) (notin g that Article I, Section 10, of the
Minnesota Constitution “impos es a reasonableness limitati on on both the duration and
scope of a ‘Terry detention’ ” in the context of a traffic stop).
Those same structural issues continue to plague us today. The racial disparities in
Minnesota’s criminal justice system are well documented. For instance, in 2018, people
in Minnesota age 15 and older w ho were Black were an estimated six percent of the total
state population, yet they comprised 27 percent of the population of individuals convicted
of felony offenses, and 36 perc ent of the prison population. Demographic Impact
Statement for House File 2013-1CE , Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
(May 12, 2020) (providing current demograp hic information in Table 3). Similar
disparities in felony convictions and impris onment exist for American Indians in
Minnesota. Id.
There are of course many reasons for such disparities. But one likely reason is that
police expand stops of black individuals a nd individuals of othe r racial and ethnic
subgroups more and disproportionately often. For instance, a national recent study found:
After stopping a driver, officers may se arch both driver and vehicle . . . .
Aggregating across all states for which we have search data, white drivers
D-22
are searched in 2.0% of stops, compared to 3.5% of stops for black motorists
and 3.8% for Hispanic motorists. Across jurisdiction, . . . black and Hispanic
motorists are consistently searched at higher rates than white drivers. After
controlling for stop location, date and time, and driver age and gender—via
logistic regression, as above—we find that black and Hispanic drivers have
approximately twice the odds of being searched relative to white drivers . . . .

Emma Pierson, et al., A Large-scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across
the United States 6 (June 18, 2017);8 see also Mary F. Moriarty, Opinion, Traffic Stops as
Criminal Investigations: Pretext Stop s Should be Disallowed in Minnesota , Minnpost,
June 6, 2019 (noting that 54.8 percent of the drivers stopped by the Minneapolis police in
2018 were black, although the black population in Minneapolis is 18.8 percent of the total
population, and that nearly three-quarters of equipment stops that resulted in searches
involved black Minnesotans).9 Moreover, even if the disproportionate number of traffic
stops and searches does not cause more convictions, those disproportionate numbers are
problematic as infringements on the dignity of entire classes of Minnesotans and the related
distrust between those communities and the po lice that such disproportionate adverse
treatment sows. See generally Charles R. Epp, et al., Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define
Race and Citizenship 2–4 (2014).
In the face of such information, we cannot ignore the broader impact that our  
reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence has on poli ce practices that use traffic stops as an

8 In a follow-up study, the authors analyzed the data using different controls and still
found evidence of racial bias in searches fo llowing traffic stops. Emma Pierson, et al., A
Large-Scale Analysis of Ra cial Disparities in Police St ops Across the United States ,
Nature, July 2020, at 736.

9 To its credit, in 2019, the Minneapolis Police Department was the only police
department in Minnesota to provide such extensive demographic data.
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excuse to conduct broader investigations, and the disproportionate effect those practices
have on black Minnesotans, American Indian Minnesotans, and other communities of
color. This is true both for cases wher e there is no observed traffic violation 10 and cases
where a traffic stop for a minor traffic violati on is expanded into a la rger investigation.
Certainly, I believe that most police officers in our state are motivated by an interest in
keeping their fellow Minnesotans safe and they work hard and risk their lives to do so. But
the practical impact of, and practical incentives created by, our decisions that set an
extremely low, nearly-anything -goes bar for what constitutes a reasonable suspicion to
justify a traffic stop and the expansion of a tr affic stop is that pretextual stops are both
easier and deemed more acceptable. See Remsberg, Tactics for Criminal Patrol, supra, at
63 (training police officers to push the edge of established legal limits when appropriate).
Those decisions also create the space for police officers, some of whom may have racially
biased beliefs and others who (like most of us11) carry implicit or unconscious racial biases
into their jobs, to treat members of certai n racial groups differently than others. See
George, 557 N.W.2d at 579–80.

10 See, e.g., State v . Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Mi nn. 1989) (approving stop
where police officer observed no traffic violation but where driver turned off highway after
looking trooper in eye and then reentered highway a short time later); see also State v.
Holmes, No. A20-0899, 2021 WL 1846851, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 10, 2021)
(approving stop in early morning hours where, although no traffic violation was observed,
car passed police vehicle and U-turned ), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2021).

11 State v. Lufkins , 963 N.W.2d 205, 214 n.6 (Minn. 2021) (noting the significant
research on the topic of unconscious bias in directing the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure to study Minnesota’s standards for racial
challenges to peremptory strikes).
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Without question, the easy, nearly unlimite d ability accepted by the court in this
case to expand traffic stops for minor violations into broader searches and investigations
may result in the discovery of more criminal activity, although that may not deter crime or
make our communities any safer, see generally John MacDonald, et al., The Effects of
Local Police Surges on Crime and Arrests in New York City , PLOS ONE 11, no. 6 (June
2016). But crime prevention is not our sole concern, especially where Minnesotans’ liberty
is at stake. What constitutes reasonable police intrusion under our state and federal
constitutions is ultimately a balancing of differ ent values we hold as a society, including
the interest of the public in crime prevention and detection and intere st of individuals in
privacy and security relative to the scope of the intrusion. See 4 Wayne LaFave, Search
and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment , § 9.1(d) at 362– 63 (4th ed. 2020)
(discussing balancing of societal interests in determining reasonableness).12
The important societal interest in eliminating racial injustice in our criminal justice
system should be part of the mix of societ al values in assessing what is a reasonable
intrusion. Twenty years ago, our court was issued a challenge:
Unless and until the justices of the Mi nnesota Supreme Court elevate their
concern for racial equality in the courtroom above concerns for finality,
judicial economy, and crime prevention, Minnesotans will c ontinue to read
in the papers about racial injustices in our court system, and persons of color

12 The Supreme Court conclude d a quarter-century ago that pretextual stops by police
officers are constitutional because the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
does not allow inquiry into the officer’s subjective motivations for a stop. United States v.
Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). This case does not present an opportun ity to revisit that
principle as a matter of state constitutional law. But that principle does not mean that we
should ignore the objective ra cial disparities in traffic stops described above when
conducting the balancing of societal values underlying the constitutional standard we set
for reasonable suspicion. 
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in Minnesota will continue to feel th e imposition of racism in the legal
system. Judicial economy, crime prevention, and protection of the adversary
system are important values. In the context of the history of racial injustice
in the court system, however, they op erate to perpetuate and encourage
unequal treatment of persons of color. The baseline for our justice system
must be that all people, including pe rsons of color, resident aliens, new
citizens, and those with difficulty spea king English, receive equal justice
under the law.

William E. Martin & Peter N. Thompson, Judicial Toleration of Racial Bias in the
Minnesota Justice System, 25 Hamline L. Rev. 235, 239–40 (2002). The authors identified
traffic stops as an area of law ripe for improvement. Id. at 249–53. Our standard for
establishing a reasonable suspicion to justif y a stop or expanded search—including the
standard we adopt today—should account for the systemic racial imbalances and inequities
that we observe in this corner of our criminal justice system and our societal interest in
treating all Minnesotans the same when it come s to fundamental liberty interests like the
right to be free of unreasonable searches. While the court’s decision in this case does not
reject the adoption of such an idea in a future case, it also does not take those considerations
into account.
D.
Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that the State
has not met its burden to establish that the deputy acted with reasonable suspicion when
asking Taylor whether he had consumed any beers out of the op en case in his truck. The
deputy’s reliance on the presence of the case of beer as well as Taylor’s canceled license
status, even when considered together, do not amount to a reasonable, objective suspicion
that Taylor was breaking the law at the time the deputy e xpanded the traffic stop. And
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even assuming those two facts together came close to supporting reasonable suspicion, the
lack of any observed physical indicia of impairment weighs against such a finding. If the
facts of this case are enough for reasonable suspicion, it is frankly hard to imagine what is
not enough.
While the State need not prove much to clear the low bar for reasonable suspicion,
it must still prove that a police officer had a “particularized and objective basis” to expand
the scope of a traffic stop beyo nd its initial justification. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Stat e failed to do so here, and
Taylor suffered an unreasonable seizure in vi olation of his rights under the United States
and Minnesota Constitutions. I would therefore reverse Taylor’s convictions based on the
district court’s failure to suppress the ev idence that was gather ed after the deputy
unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop.
For the reasons stated abov e, I respectfully dissent.

ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting in part).
I join in parts A through B-3 and D of Justice Thissen’s dissent.