State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0432

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey Raymond Greenbush,
Appellant.

Filed November 23, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Worke, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-18-14973

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistan t County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution
in favor of his ex-wife for costs she incurred for (1) their adult daughter, (2) their sons who

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were not victims of the crimes of conviction, (3) out-of-net work therapy, and (4) a home
security system. Appellant also challenges the manner in which restitution is to be
reimbursed. We affirm the district court’s award, except for the restitution awarded on
behalf of the sons; on that issue, we reve rse and remand for correction of the restitution
amount awarded.
FACTS
Appellant Jeffrey Raymond Gr eenbush was married to L.G.; they had four children,
two daughters (daughter 1 and daughter 2) and two sons (son 1 and son 2).
In late 2016, Greenbush was arrested fo r domestic assault against L.G. L.G.
obtained an order for protection (OFP) that prohibited Greenbush from having contact with
L.G. and returning to the family home. Greenbush was convicted of violating the OFP in
April 2017, June 2017, and Au gust 2017. Greenbush was al so convicted of violating a
related harassment restraining order in November 2017.
In January 2018, an investigation began after son 1 reported that Greenbush was a
“child abuser.” Son 1, age ten at the time, reported that Greenbus h had been hitting him
with closed fists and kicking him all over his body since he was around five years old.
Daughter 1, age 20 at the time, reported that Greenbush began abusing her when she
was around six years old, and that there were “hundreds of incidents.” Daughter 1 reported
that the most recent incident occurred when she was 17 or 18 years old when Greenbush
found out that she had a boyfriend. Gree nbush threw her down the stairs and then
attempted “to stomp on her head.” Daughter 1 reported that when she was 15 years old,
Greenbush began sexually abusing her.

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Daughter 2, age 17 at the time, recalle d Greenbush’s abuse against her beginning
when she was seven years old. She reporte d that the worst incident occurred when
Greenbush found out that she knew that daughter 1 had a boyfriend. Daughter 2 reported
that Greenbush “punched . . . and slapped her on the face with such force that she fell
across the room and blacked out.”
In August 2018, Greenbush was charged w ith two counts of criminal sexual conduct
committed against daughter 1 and three coun ts of malicious punishment of a child
committed against his daughters and son 1. The state later added three counts to the
complaint: two counts of first-degree assault and one count of malicious punishment of a
child.
In May 2019, Greenbush pleaded guilty to two counts in the amended complaint.
He pleaded guilty to first-degree assault, admitting that in 2016 he kicked daughter 1 in the
face, causing permanent damage to her teeth. Greenbush also pleaded guilty to malicious
punishment of a child, admitting that in 2015, he slapped a nd punched daughter 2 in the
face and head, knocking her uncons cious. All remaining counts were dismissed. The
district court sentenced Green bush to 114 months in prison for the first-degree assault
conviction and a concurrent 105 months in prison for the malicious-punishment-of-a-child
conviction.
In August 2019, L.G. filed an affidavit requesting restitution for a camera security
system for $581.93, a doo r-and-window security system for $794.53, counseling for
$2,475, and psychological counseling and testing for $1,294.04. The district court ordered
Greenbush to pay L.G. $5,145.50 in restitution. Greenbush requested a hearing.

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At the restitution hearing, L. G. testified that she had a s ecurity system installed to
feel more secure after Greenbush “was out of jail a few times,” and had “let himself in [the
family] house.” L.G. requested to be reimbursed for the amount she spent on the children’s
counseling that started in 20 19. On cross-examination, L.G. explained that she has
insurance that covers talk th erapy, and that she did not re quest to be reimbursed for the
deductible. A psychologist submitted letters with L.G.’s restitution request recommending
that the children receive neurofeedback thera py. She testified that the providers covered
under her plan do “not provide the [neurofeedback] therapy that [her] kids need.”
At the end of the hearing, th e district court stated that “the costs are definitely all
related to the abuse [Greenbush ] inflicted.” The district c ourt ordered that the $5,145.50
in restitution be deducted from the sum that L.G. owed Greenbush under the terms of their
judgment and decree. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Greenbush challenges the district court’s restitution order. “The district court has
broad discretion to award restitu tion, and the district court’ s order will not be reversed
absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted). “A court abuses its di scretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is agains t logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State,
792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
In imposing a sentence for a felony conv iction, a district court may include the
payment of restitution to compensate “the victim or the victim’s family.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.10, subds. 1(a)(5), 2(a)(1 ) (2018). “A victim of a cr ime has the right to receive

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restitution as part of the disposition of a cr iminal charge . . . if the offender is
convicted . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2018).
The term “victim” means “a natural person who incurs loss or harm as a result of a
crime.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.01(b) (2018). The term “includes the family members,
guardian, or custodian of a minor, incompet ent, incapacitated, or deceased person.” Id.
The supreme court has interpreted the term “vic tim,” in the restitutio n context, to mean
“the direct victim of the crime.” State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 25 (Minn. 2004). A district
court abuses its discretion by awarding restitution to a person who does not meet the legal
definition of a victim. State v. Esler, 553 N.W.2d 61, 65 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 15, 1996). Whether a person seeking restitution fits within the statutory
definition is a question of law, wh ich this court reviews de novo. See In re Welfare of
M.R.H., 716 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Min n. App. 2006) (noting that application of restitution
statutes to particular claim is a question of law), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).
“A request for restitution may include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses
resulting from the crime, including medical and therapy costs, [and] replacement of wages
and services . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). Such loss must be a direct result of
the specific conduct for which the defendant was convicted. State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d
103, 105 (Minn. App. 1999). “[W]hether a particular item of restitution fits within the
statutory definition is a question of law and is fully reviewable by the appellate court.”
State v. Thole, 614 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. App. 2000).

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Adult victim
Greenbush first argues that because daughter 1 is now an adult, she, rather than L.G.,
should have requested restitution for her therapy. Greenbush claims that the district court
erred by awarding restitution to L.G. because L.G. is not a victim. The state counters that
daughter 1 did not have any economic loss beca use L.G. paid for therapy for daughter 1.
We agree with the state.
First, there is no dispute that daughter 1 is a victim under the statute. And Greenbush
does not suggest that daughter 1 does not need therapy. Second, although the term “victim”
in the restitution context has a narrow definition, in some circumstances it means a family
member who has suffered an eco nomic loss as a direct result of the offender’s conduct.
For example, in State v. O’Brien , the parents of a bride-to-be were considered victims
entitled to restitution after the offender pleade d guilty to perjury regarding the annulment
of a prior marriage. 459 N.W.2d 131, 132, 135 (Minn. App. 1990). While O’Brien was
decided before the narrow definition in Jones was released in 2004, this court relied on
O’Brien in 2006, stating that “[a] parent of a victim is consid ered a victim for restitution
purposes if she suffers economic harm directly resulting from the crime.” M.R.H., 716
N.W.2d at 351.
Under these circumstances, when the ne ed for therapy is uncontested and the
victim’s mother paid for the therapy costs, the mother suffe red an economic loss directly
resulting from the crime. The district c ourt appropriately exercised its discretion by
ordering Greenbush to pay L.G. the amount she spent on therapy for daughter 1.

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Sons’ therapy
Greenbush argues that the district court also erred by awarding L.G. restitution
“for the cost of therapy for her two sons, as neither of them are victims of [his]
offenses.” Based on Jones, Greenbush is correct that hi s sons are not victims of the
offenses of conviction—the victim s are Greenbush’s daughters. See 678 N.W.2d at 25
(stating that in restitution context “victim” means “the direct victim of the crime”). Thus,
the district court erred by awarding restitution for the sons’ therapy.
Out-of-network provider
Greenbush argues that even if he must pay for therapy costs, he should not be
ordered to pay for “out-of-network therapy costs, when [his] offenses did not directly cause
a need for therapy prov ided by an out- of-network provider [and] in-network therapy is
available.”
A request for restitution ma y include “any out- of-pocket losses resulting from the
crime, including medical and therapy costs.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). The
statute does not require the victim to seek particular therapy. Nor does it require a victim
to ease the cost imposed on the offender. L.G. testified that her insurance covers talk
therapy but for a deductible, which she paid and did not request restitution. L.G. testified
that the neurofeedback therapy was necessary for her children. She provided letters from
the children’s psychologist recommending this tr eatment. And L.G. did not suggest that
there was an in-network provider offering the neurofeedback therapy. Instead, she testified
that the providers covered under her plan do “not provide the [neurofeedback] therapy that
[her] kids need.” The district court believe d L.G., and this court generally defers to a

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district court’s evaluation of witness credibility. See State v. Olson, 884 N.W.2d 906, 911
(Minn. App. 2016), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2016).
Because there is nothing in the statute suggesting that a victim must secure therapy
that is covered by her insuranc e, and the district court belie ved that L.G. chose the most
appropriate therapy for her children, the dist rict court did not err by concluding that the
neurofeedback therapy for the daughters was a recoverable item of restitution.
Security system
Greenbush next argues that he should not have to pay restitution for the security
system because the offenses were committed in 2015 and 2016 when he lived in the home,
and the offenses did not involve a “burglary or breaking and entering.” Greenbush asserts
that the “link between the cr imes and the security system is too attenuated to be
compensable [because] [t ]hey were separated by long sp ans of time [and] attenuated in
relationship.”
The parties recognize that the issue of whether a security system is an item
recoverable as restitution has no t been addressed in a precedential opinion in Minnesota.
But this court has determined that, in some cases, a security system is a recoverable item
of restitution. In State v. Mentzos , the offender was convicted of terroristic threats for
conduct against his ex-girl friend. No. C8-93-2577, 1994 WL 425172, *1 (Minn. App.
Aug. 16, 1994), review denied (Minn. Sept. 16, 1994). Because of his actions, the victim’s
family bought a security system and hired security personnel. Id. The offender was
required to pay restitution to the family for the cost of security personnel. Id. This court
stated that “[t]he purpose of making terroristic threats is to cause the victim to fear for his

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or her safety. Thus, we hold th at reasonable expenditures made by a victim to ensure his
or her safety are a ‘result’ of the terroristic threats within the meaning of the statute.” Id.
at *3. Thus, the costs for secu rity to ensure a victim’s safety have been recovered as an
item of restitution.
Here, the offenses—first-degree assault and malicious punishment of a child—
occurred in 2015 and 2016 when Greenbush liv ed in the home. In late 2016, Greenbush
was arrested for domestic assault against L. G., and she obtained an OFP prohibiting him
from returning to the family home. Greenbush did not abide by the OFP and was convicted
of violating it three times in 2017. L.G. ha d the camera security system installed in 2017
because Greenbush “was out of jail a few times.” L.G. had the door-and-window security
system installed after Greenbush had “let himself into [the family] house” “quite a few
times.” Thus, following the offense dates, the family did not feel safe because Greenbush
continually returned to the ho me even after being convicted of violating the OFP. The
district court appropriately determined that th e security system is an out-of-pocket loss
resulting from the crimes and is an item of restitution.
Manner of reimbursement
Finally, Greenbush challenges the manner in which restitution is to be reimbursed.
At the restitution hearing, the district court stated that because Greenbush was in prison, it
was unlikely that L.G. would “ever see a dime.” The district court then invited the parties
to propose ideas as to how L.G. could collect the restitution. Greenbush’s attorney stated:
“It is my knowledge there is a divorce proceeding [and] I understand there’s proceeds from
that.” The prosecutor explained that, as part of the divorce decree, L.G. owed Greenbush

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for equity in the home. The district court stated: “I ca n enter an order in the dissolution
file . . . that’d probably be the easiest way to handle it, to simply deduct that from what
[L.G.] owe[s] him.” Greenbush never challenged the manner of reimbursement in district
court; thus, the issue is forfeited on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn.
2014) (declining to consider a restitution argument raised for the first time on appeal).
Accordingly, we affirm the district cour t’s award of restitution to L.G. for therapy
for daughter 1, out-of-network therapy, and the home security syst em. But because the
district court erred in determining that the s ons were victims and that their therapy costs
were items of restitution, we reverse and remand for the district court to deduct this amount
from the restitution award. Finally, becaus e Greenbush failed to raise the manner-of-
reimbursement issue in district court, it is forfeited on appeal.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.