Wade Justin Hoffman, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0433

Wade Justin Hoffman, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed November 2, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CV-19-6255

Rodd A. Tschida, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, William J. Young, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Connolly, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of h is petition to rescind the cancellation of his
driver’s license, arguing that the district court erred by considering respondent’s exhibits

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filed prior to the hearing and by failing to ap ply the correct burden of proof. He also
challenges the decision to cancel his license, arguing that no evidence showed that
appellant violated the abstinence provision on his license so the cancellation was arbitrary
and capricious. Because there was no error in the district court’s application of the law and
we defer to its ability to weigh the evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2015, appellant Wade Justin Hoffman signed a “Last Use Statement”
acknowledging that: (1) he stopped using alcohol on July 11, 2015; (2) he was not allowed
to operate a motor vehicle until he was informed that his driving privilege was reinstated;
(3) his license would “contain a restriction that [he] may not consume any drink or product
containing alcohol or controlled substances at any time”; (4) he was no t allowed to
consume any drink or product containing alcohol “even when not operating or in phys ical
control of a motor vehicle”; and (5) respondent the Commissioner of Public Safety would
“cancel and deny [appellant’s] privilege to drive if there [was] su fficient cause to believe
that, after the abstinence date . . . attested to above [i.e., July 11, 2015, appellant had]
consumed any drink or product containing alcohol or controlled substances.”
On June 22, 2019, shortly after 2:00 a.m., a police officer was driving on patrol. He
saw appellant sitting outside a bar holding a plastic cup that he threw into the travel lane
of the road as the officer passed. The officer wrote a report of his subsequent encounter
with appellant.
In his report, the officer stated that he parked in front of the bar, appellant entered
the bar; he followed a ppellant into the bar, asked appellant to come outside, and told

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appellant that he had been stopped for littering and having intoxicating liquor on a public
sidewalk. The officer asked for appellant’s ID, and appellant said he did not have an ID.
The officer asked for appellant’s name and appellant “was not forthcoming.” Appellant
said he had never had a state ID, then gave his first name as Wade, his last name as
Hoffman, a date of birth, and an address. He would not give his middle name. When the
officer had dispatch run the name, a Wade Hoffman was listed with a different address.
The officer, “[b]ased on [appellant’s] unwillingness to provide his name and stating th at
he had never had contact with the police or a state ID, . . . suspected that he was possibly
not being truthful.” As the officer spoke with appellant, he “observed [appellant] was
slurring his speech and had difficulty holding a conversation. [Appella nt] appeared to be
under the influence of alcohol.” The officer noticed that appellant’s license “would
invalidate with any use of drugs or alcohol” and “believed this was why [appellant] was
not forthcoming with his name.” The officer told appellant he “would issue a verbal
warning for the littering and alcohol in public.” The officer ’s report concluded with a
“Disposition,” which stated that appellant was “warned for open bottle on public street and
littering on a public roadway” and concluded with the directive to “[f]orward this report to
[the] appropriate place for review of license violations and alcohol use.”
In November 2019, appellant was sent a notice that, as of October 31, 2019, his
license had been cancelled as inimical to public safety and that the requirements for
reinstatement were enrolling in an ignition interlock device program and completing an
alcohol/drug rehab ilitation program. Appellant petitioned under Minn. Stat. § 171.19
(2018) for judicial review of the cancellation. Respondent replied to the petition by filing

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an affidavit with four documents: copies of appellant’s driving record, his last use
statement, his notice of cancellation, and the officer’s report of the June 2019 incident.
At the hearing, bot h parties were represented by counsel. 1 The officer did not
appear, and appellant objected to the admission of the officer’s report as hearsay and as a
violation of the confrontation clause. He did not object to the admission of the other
documents. Appellant testified that he had not used alcohol in June 2019 and was then on
medication, which caused the behavior that the officer observed. The district court found
that: (1) no evidence other than appellant’s testimony indicated his medication caused
slurred speech and difficulty in conversing; (2) the officer’s observations gave respondent
sufficient cause to believe appellant had consumed alcohol, and (3) appellant had not met
his burden of showing that respondent acted unreasonably. Appellant’s motion to rescind
the cancellation was denied.
Appellant challenges the denial, arguing that the district court abused its discretion
in admitting and considering the officer’s report and erred in concluding that appellant had
the burden of proof; he also challenges the cancellation of his license, arguing that the
commissioner’s decision to cancel was arbitrary and capricious. 2

1 Appellant is represented by different counsel on appeal.
2 Appellant did not raise either the district court’s alleged abuse of discretion in considering
the officer’s report or the commissioner’s allegedly arbitrar y and capricious decision to
cancel appellant’s license to the district court, so they are arguably not before this court.
See Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). In the interest of completeness,
we nevertheless address them.

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D E C I S I O N
Standard of Review
In reviewing an appeal brought under Minn. Stat. § 171.19, this court “review[s] de
novo the district court’s application of the law and defer[s] to the district court’s credibility
determinations and ability to weigh the evidence.” Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. App. 2013) (citations omitted).
1. Admissibility of the Officer’s Report
Minn. Stat. § 171.19 provides that, at a hearing on license reinstatement,
[t]he commissioner may appear in person, or by agents or
representatives, and may present evidence upon the hearing by
affidavit personally, by agents, or by representatives. The
petitioner may present evidence by affidavit, except that the
petitioner must be present in person at such h earing for the
purpose of cross-examination.

Respondent’s attorney said, “[T]he statute under which [appellant’s p]etition has been
filed, [Minn. Stat. §] 171.19, specifically states that [respondent] may present evidence
upon affidavit . . . and that is what we have done. We filed a n affidavit with our exhibits
[including Officer F.’s report] attached . . . . [T]hey are part of the record, they are a part
of [respondent’s] evidence in this case.”
The district court agreed in its memorandum, noting that “[t]he Commissioner may
present copies of departmental records if they are certified as true copies. Minn. Stat.
§ 171.21. Police reports are admissible, unless a lack of trustworthiness is indicated.
Gardner v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 423 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Minn. App. 1988).”

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The copies of the departmental records are stamped “Certified Copy Same As Original.”
No lack of trustworthiness in Officer F.’s report has been alleged or indicated.
Moreover, Minn. R. Evid. 803(8) includes a mong the exceptions to the hearsay
exclusion, even when the declarant is available to testify:
records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form,
of public offices or agencies , setting forth . . . (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a du ty to report, excluding, however, in criminal
cases and petty misdemeanors matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings except petty misdemeanors and
against the State in criminal cases an d petty misdemeanors,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant
to authority granted by law.

Thus, because this was a civil implied-consent hearing, the officer’s report was not hearsay
and was admissible under the rules of evidence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering Officer F.’s report,
which respondent had provided prior to the hearing.
2. Burden of Proof
Appellant argues that the district court erred in crediting Officer F.’s report over
appellant’s testimony because his testimony was “new evidence” and therefore the district
court should not have deferred to respondent’s decision, which was based on earlier
evidence. For this argument, appellant relies on Madison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 585
N.W.2d 77, 83 (Minn. App. 1998 ) (concluding that “[a]n appeal to the district court for
license reinstatement pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.19 must be tried de novo”), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1998).

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But Madison is distinguishable: in that case, the dist rict court relied on a police
sergeant’s letter saying that the defendant admitted to drinking alcohol rather than on
testimony from the defendant’s physician that the defendant had suffered a diabetic
reaction that could have caused him to confuse “beer” and “root beer.” Madison, 585
N.W.2d at 81-82. Moreover, the district court failed to make any finding as to whether the
defendant had or had not consumed alcohol, and it concluded that the police sergeant’s
letter gave the commissioner sufficient cause t o revoke the license. Id. at 83. This court
reversed and remanded because the district court had not said whether the witnesses’
testimony offered at the hearing was credible or whether the district court’s decision to
uphold the commissioner was based o n testimony or on other evidence. Id.; see also
Gardner, 423 N.W.2 d at 112 (reversing and remanding because the district court had
erroneously believed it could not consider the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing).
Here, the district court reiterated the contents of the officer’s report and noted that
(1) “given the totality of circumstances” appellant appeared under the influence of alcohol;
(2) with the exception of appellant’s testimony, no evidence indicated that his medication
caused slurred speech or difficulty holding conversation; and (3) appellant failed to explain
his evasive actions. Moreover, Madison explicitly stated that its decision “d[id] not affect
the driver’s burden of proving entitlement to license re instatement under M inn. Stat.
§ 171.19.” 585 N.W.2d at 82; see also Plaster v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 490 N.W.2d 904,
906 (Minn. App. 1992) (stating that a petitioner under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 must show that

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the commissioner acted unreasonably in cancelling his license). The district court correctly
noted that appellant had not met that burden.
3. The Commissioner’s Decision
Appellant argues that the commissioner’s decision was reversible as arbitrary and
capricious because the commissioner had no evidence that the prohibition against
consuming alcohol was on appellant’s license when appellant consumed alcohol in 2019.
But appellant agreed in his 2015 last -use statement not to consume alcohol while a
restriction was placed on his license, and he agreed at the 2019 hearing that he may not
consume alcohol and retain his driving privilege.
No evidence was presented that the restr iction had been removed from appellant’s
license before he consumed alcohol in 2019; his driving record clearly shows that the
restriction was imposed in 2015 and does not show that it was ev er removed. Nor does
appellant provide any support for his view that the restriction must appear on a license to
be enforceable.
Affirmed.