Justin Marcus Rosendahl, petitioner, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0439

Justin Marcus Rosendahl, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 8, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Slieter, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-16-2689

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney , Kristen E. Swanson, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
In determining the accuracy of a guilty plea, the reviewing court does not consider
allegations contained in the complaint unl ess the truthfulness and accuracy of the
allegations have been expressly admitted to by the defendant.

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OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order denying postconviction relief, appellant
Justin Marcus Rosendahl argues that the district court erre d in denying his request to
withdraw his guilty pleas to first-degree bu rglary and second-degre e assault because his
guilty pleas were not accurate. We conclude Rosendahl’s plea colloquy established a
sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea to first-degree burglary and we affirm that
conviction. However, Rosendahl’s plea colloquy did not establish a sufficient factual basis
for his guilty plea to second-degr ee assault. We therefore affi rm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.
FACTS
The complaint alleged as follows. Duluth police officers were dispatched to a home
following a reported domestic assault. The victim, C.M.A., told an officer that Rosendahl,
who was her ex-boyfriend, had kicked open a locked door and entered the home.
Rosendahl began hitting her in the face with the back of his hand causing her to fall to the
floor. C.M.A. said Rosendahl at some point grabbed a knife and held it in a threatening
manner.
C.M.A.’s son, who was hiding in his bedr oom at the time, told officers he heard
“slapping” sounds and Rosendahl tell his mother he was “going to shove [the] knife in [her]
forehead” and “kill her.”

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Officers spoke with C.M.A.’s father, P.A., who told officers th at Rosendahl came
to his house after the incident at C.M.A’s home and forced his way inside while holding a
knife. Rosendahl then went to the kitchen, took a beer from the refrigerator, and drank it.
Based on this conduct, the state charged Rosendahl in an amended complaint with
three counts of first-degree burglary, one count of second-degree assault, and one count of
obstructing legal process. Rosendahl pleaded guilty to three counts:
(1) first-degree burglary (possessing a dang erous weapon in P.A.’s home), in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(b) (2014);
(2) first-degree burglary (assaulting C.M. A. after entering her home), in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2014); and
(3) second-degree assault (intending to cause fear in C.M.A. with a dangerous
weapon), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014).
Rosendahl testified to facts in support of his pleas. The district court determined
Rosendahl’s testimony established a sufficient factual basis of his guilt for each count.
Rosendahl subsequently petitioned for postconviction relief to withdraw his guilty
pleas to counts one and three on the ground th at his testimony did not establish a factual
basis for his guilt. The district court denied the petition and Rosendahl appeals.
ISSUE
Did Rosendahl provide a sufficient factual basis for his gu ilty pleas to first-degree
burglary with a dangerous weapon and second-degree assault?

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ANALYSIS
To be constitutionally valid , a guilty plea must be accurate; and whether a
defendant’s plea is accurate is a question appellate courts review de novo. State v. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To be accurate, a plea must be established on a proper
factual basis.” Id. A defendant may be entitled to wit hdraw an inaccurate guilty plea on
the ground that an inaccurate plea is a “manifest injustice.” Id. at 93 (quotation omitted);
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
Establishing a proper factual basis is “typically” accomplis hed “by asking the
defendant to express in his own words what happened.” Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581,
589 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94). “T he defendant’s statement
usually will suggest questions to the court which then, with the assistance of counsel, can
interrogate the defendan t in further detail.” State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.
1983). “The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant from
pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on
his right to trial.” Id. “‘It is well established that befo re a plea of guilty can be accepted,
the [district court] judge must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt
of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.’” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861
(Minn. 2016) (quoting State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1978)). “It is to be
hoped that the [district court] judge, in [a ccepting a plea], will ask the questions with
respect to the factual basis fo r the crime so as to avoid th e rather common inclination of
counsel to elicit these fact s by leading questions.” State v. Hoaglund , 240 N.W.2d 4, 6
(Minn. 1976).

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I. Rosendahl’s guilty plea to first-degree burglary with a dangerous weapon was
accurate.

Rosendahl contends his plea colloquy did not establish the following burglary
element: that he intended to or did commit a crime while in P.A.’s home. The state asserts
the colloquy shows that he committed theft by taking a beer from P.A.’s refrigerator. The
record demonstrates that Rosendahl’s factual basis satisfies this element.
Minnesota statutes section 609.582, subdivision 1(b) provides:
Burglary in the first degree. Whoever enters a
building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or
enters a building without consent and commits a crime while
in the building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits
burglary in the first degree and may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not mo re than 20 years or to payment of a
fine of not more than $35,000, or both, if:
. . . .
(b) the burglar possesses, when entering or at any time
while in the building . . . a dangerous weapon . . . .

(Emphasis added.) Rosendahl admitted to entering P.A.’s home without consent and with
a dangerous weapon. In response to questioning from the prosecutor, Rosendahl testified
that “at that time [he] went in [P.A.’s] hous e and [he] saw the police were coming, [he]
decided to go drink a beer instead of talk[ing] to police.”
“[Whoever] intentionally and without claim of right takes, uses, transfers, conceals
or retains possession of movable property of another without the other’s consent and with
intent to deprive the owner permanently of po ssession of the property” is guilty of theft.
Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(1) (2014). Ro sendahl’s admission that he drank a beer
belonging to P.A. while inside P.A.’s home is sufficient to infer that he intentionally took
movable property without P.A.’s consent, and his drinking it demonstrated his intent to

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permanently deprive him of its possession. See State v. Thompson , 544 N.W.2d 8, 11
(Minn. 1996) (stating intent “is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’s
words or actions in light of all the surround ing circumstances”). As the district court
accurately recognized, there is no minimum property value requirement for misdemeanor
theft in Minnesota. In sum, Rosendahl’s pl ea colloquy demonstrated a sufficient factual
basis to establish his guilt of first-degree burglary.
II. Rosendahl’s guilty plea to second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon
(intending to cause fear in C.M.A) is not accurate.

Rosendahl does not dispute that he posse ssed a dangerous weapon while inside of
C.M.A.’s home. However, Rosendahl argues his plea colloquy did not establish he acted
with the necessary specific inte nt to cause fear in C.M.A. The state appears to concede
that Rosendahl’s testimony alone is insufficient to support his guilty plea but suggests that
we may consider the allegations in the complain t to infer his intent and conclude the plea
is accurate. Because Rosendah l’s plea colloquy did not suppo rt his guilty plea for this
count and we may not consider the contents of the complaint to establish by inference a
factual basis for his plea, the district court must allow Rosendahl to withdraw his plea and
vacate his conviction.
Minnesota statutes section 609.222, subdivision 1 states: “Whoever assaults another
with a dangerous weapon may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than seven years
or to payment of a fine of not more than $14,000, or both.” A “dangerous weapon” is
defined as “any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a weapon
and capable of producing death or great bod ily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6

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(2014). An assault is defined as “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of
immediate bodily harm or death.” Id., subd. 10(1) (2014). An assault-fear offense, which
is what Rosendahl pleaded guilty to, is a specific-intent crime. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d
303, 309 (Minn. 2012). As a specific-inte nt crime, the state was required to prove
Rosendahl intended to cause the victim fear of immediate bodily harm with the knife.
During the colloquy, the prosecutor questioned Rosendahl as follows:
Q: What did you do when you -- what did you do when you
got [to C.M.A.’s house]?
A: I leaned and kicked on the front door and assaulted C.M.A.
in the mouth with the back of my hand.
Q: Fair to say that when you got to the house, [appellant], you
weren’t invited in?
A: Correct.
. . . .
Q: At some point when you were in the house, did you have
possession of a knife?
A: Yes.
Q: Where did you get the knife from, [appellant]?
A: Near the kitchen counter.
Q: And how would you describe your demeanor at the time
you had the knife?
A: Calm actually. I had the knife, I placed it in my pocket.
Q: Is it -- did you possess the knife after you slapped C.M.A.?
A: No -- after, yes.
Q: Okay. At the time that you had the knife, would you agree
that it is reasonable for C.M.A. to have been fearful for her own
life?
A: I imagine she was fearful not of the knife but of myself, yes.
Q: And the fact that you had a knife at the time certainly could
add to that fear?
A: Sure.

Rosendahl did not admit to, and was not asked about, this element of a second-
degree assault crime: whether he acted “with intent to cause fear in [C.M.A.] of immediate
bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1). Rosendahl explained that he hit

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C.M.A. with his hand once and then picked up a knife in the kitchen and put it into his
pocket after hitting her and he believed C.M.A. “was fearful not of the knife but of [him].”
His statements do not establish that he intended to cause he r fear by picking up the knife
nor do they acknowledge the allegations in th e complaint that he th reatened her with the
knife. As stated in Fleck, it matters not what C.M.A. fe lt, for “[t]he intent of the
[defendant], as contrasted with the effect upon the victim, becomes the focal point for
inquiry.” 810 N.W.2d at 308 (quo tation omitted) (alterations in original). Though
Rosendahl’s admission itself fails to satisfy all the crime’s elements, we consider whether
the accuracy of his plea may be inferred.
Even if an element to an offense is not verbalized by the defendant, a district court
may nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted to by the defendant. See Nelson,
880 N.W.2d at 861 (“It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the
[district court] judge must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of
the crime charged can be reas onably inferred.”) (quotation omitted). For example, in
Nelson, the supreme court concluded the district court properly inferred intent for first-
degree premediated murder through the defenda nt’s testimony that he had hurt feelings,
brought a knife to work, and stab bed the victim multiple times. Id. at 860. We note too
that the defendant explicitly acknowledged to the district court during his colloquy his
intent to kill the victim. Id. at 857. Likewise, in Neumann, the supreme court determined
that the defendant’s testimony that he execut ed a robbery with a loaded gun and fired

9
multiple gunshots was sufficient for the district court to infe r the defendant’s intent for
first-degree premeditated murder.1 262 N.W.2d at 430-31.
In contrast to those cases, no statemen t made by Rosendahl during his colloquy
presents an inference that he intended to cause fear in C.M.A. with the knife and there is
no other evidence we may consider to establish such an infere nce. By testifying only to
putting the knife in his pocket after slappi ng C.M.A., Rosendahl admitted no act from
which specific intent for an assault as required by Fleck might be inferred. 810 N.W.2d at
309. Instead, his testimony admits solely to an act of general-intent assault. See id. at
309-10 (contrasting general-intent crime of as sault-harm with speci fic-intent crime of
assault-fear). This is different from those s ituations in which, for example, a defendant
testifies to waving a knife at a victim or admits to multiple stabbings, either of which allows
an inference of specific intent to be found.
The state requests us to consider the c ontents of the complaint to supplement
Rosendahl’s testimony and thereby conclude his guilty plea was accurate. The complaint
states that C.M.A. told offi cers that Rosendahl held the knife at her “in a threatening
manner” and that C.M.A.’s son told officers that he heard Rosendahl threaten to “shove”
the knife into her fore head and threaten to kill her. The state believes this information
would allow us to infer Rosendahl’s intent.

1 The defendant testified during the trial and, following his testimony, pleaded guilty, and
it is this trial testimony that the district court considered in inferring the defendant’s intent
for the purposes of his guilty plea. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d at 430-31.

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A postconviction court may consider record evidence, in addition to a defendant’s
words, in inferring intent. Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 860-61 . However, because Rosendahl
did not expressly testify as to the truthfulne ss and accuracy of thes e allegations of the
complaint during his colloquy, th e allegations are not part of the record and we cannot
consider them in assessing the accuracy of his plea.
In plea-withdrawal cases, Raleigh is often cited—and is cited by the state here—for
the principle that “a defendant may not withdr aw his plea simply because the court failed
to elicit proper responses if the record contains sufficie nt evidence to support the
conviction.” 778 N.W.2d at 94 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Nelson, 250 N.W.2d 816,
817 (Minn. 1976)).2 Though this is indeed an accurate recitation of the legal proposition,
for reasons explained below, it does not alone allow our court to consider the contents of
the complaint because no record was made involving the alle gations in the complaint in
order to supplement Rosendahl’s testimony.
We note that Nelson states that “defendants will not be permitted to plead anew
simply because the court did not elicit the testimony so long as the record contains
sufficient testimony.” 250 N.W.2d at 817 (e mphasis added) (citing State v. Nace , 241
N.W.2d 101, 101 (Minn. 1976)). Unless such evidence is acknowledged by the defendant

2 State v. Goulette is also often cited for this proposition, and is cited by the state here. 258
N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1977). Goulette stated the factual basis for a plea is sufficient if the
judge “reasonably concludes that there is evid ence which would support a jury verdict of
guilty.” Id. at 760. But Goulette explicitly relies on Alford for this principle and is
therefore not helpful for assessing what a court may consider to supplement a “typical” or
“non-Alford” plea. See Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 760 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970)).

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during the plea colloquy, Nelson and Nace do not support the proposition that we may refer
to allegations in a complaint.
Despite this legal framework, Raleigh is typically misconstrued to mean that a
reviewing court may look beyond the defe ndant’s sworn testimony to supplement the
factual basis for the plea. Often, as is here argued by the state, this means looking to the
allegations in the complaint. See Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 252. Ho wever, it is important to
note that Trott states “[t]he court should not accept the plea unless the record supports the
conclusion that the defendant actually committed an offense at least as serious as the crime
to which he is pleading guilty.” 338 N.W.2d at 252-53 (emphasis added).
Looking to “the record” is indeed mandatory in Alford or Norgaard pleas. See
Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-38, 91 S. Ct. at 167-68 (stating defendant may plead guilty based on
factual record while maintaining innocence); State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d
867, 871 (Minn. 1961) (stating defendant ma y plead guilty yet maintain innocence on
account of lack of memory).3 But our review of Raleigh, Nelson, and Nace, together with
Ecker, Trott, and Lussier considered below, compels our conclusion that consideration of
evidence not expressly acknowledged and ad mitted by the defendant during the colloquy
is not proper for a reviewing court to consider in a “typical” plea. See State v. Ecker, 524
N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994).
The supreme court in Ecker—issued after and with multiple references to Trott—
described three ways to obtain a guilty plea. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. It first described

3 We note that even in Alford and Norgaard pleas, a defendant is required to acknowledge
on the record during the plea hearing the evidence that supports guilt.

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a “typical” plea, in which “an adequate factual basis is usually established by questioning
the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in his or her own words the
circumstances surrounding the crime.” Id. We note below that exceptions exist that allow
the consideration of other evidence in a “typ ical” plea if expressl y acknowledged by the
defendant. The supreme court contrasted this “typical” plea with two “unique situations in
which a defendant may plead guilty without unequivocally admitting his or her guilt,”
which are Alford and Norgaard pleas. Id. at 716-17. In an Alford or Norgaard plea, the
supreme court recognized, a court must consider the record as support for the factual basis.
Id. at 716. The Ecker directive is, therefore, that a “typical” plea “usually” involves only
the defendant’s words, as contrasted with an Alford or Norgaard plea. When considering
the Ecker decision, and the bo dy of caselaw both before and after Ecker addressing the
accuracy of a “typical” guilty plea, documents such as a complaint may only be considered
by a reviewing court if the truthfulness and accuracy of the evidence is expressly admitted
to by the defendant.
The state points to Trott, through its citation to Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 588, as
support that the court may consider the co mplaint to supplement Rosendahl’s plea
colloquy. We disagree that Trott and Lussier support this proposition. The supreme court
in Trott stated that the defendant “by his plea of guilty, in e ffect judicially admitted the
allegations contained in the complaint.” 338 N.W.2d at 252. However, the supreme court
recognized in that case that “the [district court] judge carefully interrogated the defendant
about the acts, and the defendant freely admitted” the allegations in the complaint. Id. This
did not happen here. Rosend ahl was not “carefully interroga ted” about his conduct, nor

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did he admit an element necessary to estab lish his guilt. Theref ore, Rosendahl never
“judicially admitted” the allegations in the complaint.
Additionally, during the plea hearing in Lussier, without objection by the defendant,
the court received a grand jury transcript. Hence, the district court did receive “a record”
to support the guilty plea. Moreover, our court has recognized that guilt may be established
through a defendant’s “specific acknowledgeme nt of the truth and accuracy of facts
constituting the essential elements of the crime.” In re Welfare of J.R.R., 648 N.W.2d 739,
743 (Minn. App. 2002). Rosendahl did not expressly acknowledge the truth and accuracy
of the facts of the complaint or of the essen tial intent element of the crime, which further
compels our conclusion that we cannot consider the contents of the complaint.
DECISION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that , in determining the accuracy of a guilty
plea, the reviewing court does not consider allegations in the complaint unless the
truthfulness and accuracy of the allegations have been expressly admitted to by the
defendant. We affirm the district court’s denial of Rosendahl’s petition to withdraw his
guilty plea to first-degree burglary, as his plea colloquy provided a sufficient factual basis
for his guilt. We reverse, however, the distri ct court’s denial of Rosendahl’s petition to
withdraw his guilty plea to seco nd-degree assault because he did not, and was not asked,
to admit the truthfulness and accuracy of th e complaint. We remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.