Scott Thomas LaClair, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0455

Scott Thomas LaClair, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed October 26, 2020
Reversed
Frisch, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-19-5176

Adam Kujawa, Ambrose Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Leah M.P. Hedman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant challenge s the district court’s order sustaining the revocation of his
driver’s license, arguing that he was unlawfully seized when an officer parked in front of

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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appellant’s driveway, entered the curtilage of appellant’s property, and opened the car door
without first knocking or announcing the presence of law enforcement. We reverse.
FACTS
While on normal patrol around midnight on August 31, 2019, Officer Jacob Cree of
the Lino Lakes Police Department noticed a vehicle parked in a residential driveway with
its headlights illuminated. When he again drove by an hour later, the headlights were still
illuminated. Officer Cree parked at the end of th e driveway and activated his squad car’s
spotlight and arrow stick . He walked up the driveway, intending to knock on the front
door.
Officer Cree noticed a puddle in the driveway, which he suspected was urine, and
footprints leading toward the vehicle. He turned and walked toward the vehicle. When he
reached the passenger side of the vehicle , he turned on his flashlight and saw appellant
Scott Thomas LaClair in the driver’s seat and slumped over the console. Officer Cree
observed that LaClair was breathing but thought LaClair’s body should be repositioned to
keep his airway open.
Officer Cree called dispatch and walked over to the driver’s side of the vehicle .
Without first knocking or announcing his presence, Office r Cree opened the driver’s-side
door, startling LaClair awake. When asked why he was sleeping in his car, LaClair
responded that he had “too much to drink” but “got home safe.” Officer Cree administered
field sobriety tests and arrested LaClair on suspicion of driving while impaired.
LaClair contest ed his resulting license revocation. The district court held an
implied-consent hearing and sustained the revocation. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
LaClair argues that Officer Cree unlawfully seized him without constitutional
justification. In pertinent part, LaClair challenges Officer Cree’s initial entry onto the
driveway of the residence . The commissioner argues that Officer Cree was free to enter
the driveway without a warrant because that area is traditionally open to the public . We
review the issue of whether a driver’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated de novo
where the facts are undisputed. See Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918,
920 (Minn. App. 2010).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit law enforcement from
unreasonably seizing an individual. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; State
v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. App. 2005) . Police must have a warrant to enter a
constitutionally protected area, subject to limited exceptions. U.S. Const. amend . IV;
Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; Haase v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 679 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn.
App. 2004). “If police enter a constitutionally protected area without a warrant, that entry
is presumed to be unreasonable, and evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed ” if
no exception applies. Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 747.
These protections extend to the “curtilage,” or the area adjacent to a home. Florida
v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 6, 1 33 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) . The path to the front door ,
however, invites visitors to approach and knock, and an officer may use this implied license
just as any other citizen. Id. at 7, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. The relevant question is whether an
officer’s behavior falls within the scope of the implied license that extends to any member
of the public. See id. (“Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not

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require fine -grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by t he
Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.”). The scope of an implied license is limited in
time and purpose as determined by social norms. See State v. Chute , 908 N.W.2d 578,
586-88 (Minn. 2018) (concluding that officer violated social norms by taki ng a circuitous
route and by lingering too long).1
The implied license to approach a home does not extend through all hours of the
night. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 20, 133 S. Ct. at 1422 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“ Nor, as a
general matter, may a visitor come to the front door in the middle of the night without an
express invitation.”); 569 U.S. at 9 n.3, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 n.3 ( accepting dissent’s view
that “quite rightly” concluded that a nighttime knock would be “a cause for great alarm”
and outside the scope of an implied invitation to approach). A late-night approach does
not fall within the purview of an implied license absent an emergency or some evidence
that the homeowner accepts visitors during those hours. United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d
1151, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2016); People v. Frederick, 895 N.W.2d 541, 546-47 (Mich. 2017)
(discussing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at 1415); see also United States v. Quintero,

1 The commissioner relies on State v. Crea, in which officers entered a curtilage because
they observed a vehicle that had just been seen transporting stolen property. 233 N.W.2d
736, 738 (Minn. 1975). But in Crea, the officers entered the curtilage for the pu rpose of
conducting “legitimate business,” and the court concluded, in part, that the officers had
probable cause to investigate. See id. at 739-40 (concluding that officers had “very strong
probable cause” and acted reasonably when shining flashlight int o window). Moreover,
the supreme court later clarified the standard: an officer’ s implied license to enter a
curtilage is “limited to what ‘ any private citizen might do’ when visiting another’ s
property.” Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 588 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at 1415).
Here, Officer Cree testified that he entered the property merely for the purpose of notifying
the homeowners that their headlights were left on, and the commissioner concedes that this
did not constitute an emergency.

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648 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the time of day is a relevant
circumstance when analyzing whether a consent to search is voluntary).
Here, the district court reasoned that a driveway “is a place that an ordinary visitor
would be expected to go” for the purpose of “notify[ing] the homeowner that his or her
headlights were still on.” The district court did not consider that Officer Cree approached
the home at 1:00 a.m. or conclude that an ordinary visitor would be expected to enter a
driveway at that time to notify a homeowner of illuminated headlights. The record shows,
and the commissioner concedes, that there was no sign of emergency when Officer Cree
entered LaClair’s driveway or approached the residence. LaClair was not visible in his
vehicle. Officer Cree did not testify that anyone else was present. He did not observe any
indication of imminent danger to anyone. There is no evidence that the lights in the home
were illuminated or of any other sign that the occupants of the home would welcome
visitors during sleeping hours. And the circumstances observed by Officer Cree before his
entry onto the property did not give rise to any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Instead, Officer Cree testified that he entered the property only to alert the homeowner of
the potential for a dead car battery, which the commissioner concedes is a non-emergency.
These are not the circumstances where an ordinary citizen would approach a home in the
middle of the night . Accordingly, Officer Cre e entered a constitutionally protected area
without a warrant or an i mplied license , and evidence obtained thereafter must be
suppressed.
Although we need not reach the remaining question s of whether Officer Cre e
unconstitutionally seized LaClair by (1) parking his squad car in a manner that purportedly

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blocked LaClair’s vehicle from exiting the driveway 2 or (2) opening LaClair’s car door
without first knocking or announcing the presence of law enforcement, we note that the
commissioner conceded at oral argument that certain of these actions were not consistent
with “best practices.”
Reversed.

2 The parties dispute whether Office Cree actually blocked LaClair’s vehicle from leaving
the driveway. We need not reach the question of whether the district court clearly erred in
its factual findings given our disposition.