State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0460

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Amy Christine Lukes-Quinn,
Appellant.

Filed February 1, 2021
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-28571

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the revocation of her probation following a conviction of first-
degree driving while impaired (DWI), arguing that the district court abused its discretion

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by admitting hearsay evidence at the probation-revocation hearing and by finding that the
need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Amy Christine Lukes-Quinn pleaded guilty in 2016 to first-degree DWI
under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2014). This was her seventh conviction of an
impaired driving offense, and he r fourth in the past ten years. Lukes-Quinn received a
stayed prison sentence of 42 months, with a conditional-release period of five years , and
was ordered to serve 180 days at the Hennepin County Adult Correctional Facility (ACF).
The conditions of her probation included completing treatment and following all
recommendations, abstaining from alcohol and other controlled substances, and notifying
her probation officer within 72 hours of any contact with law enforcement.
Lukes-Quinn’s probation officer (P.O.) had filed four previous probation-violation
reports primarily related to her failure to abstain from alcohol use and missed drug- and
alcohol- testing dates. Lukes-Quinn admitted to many of the violations and was found in
violation of failing to abstain f rom alcohol in the one proceeding that she contested . In
these proceedings, the court imposed additional time to be spent in local incarceration at
the ACF and chemical-dependency programming.
The current probation-revocation action was initiated in the fall of 2019 following
an October 8 interaction betwee n Lukes -Quinn and law enforcement . The probation-
violation report identified several violations , including the failure to (1) abstain from
alcohol, (2) submit to random testing, and (3) complete treatment . The report also
identified her failure to notify probation within 72 hours of her contact with law

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enforcement on October 8, and her refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT) on
October 18, 2019.
The contact with law enforcement on O ctober 8 was initiated in response to a call
from Lukes-Quinn’s landlord reporting a possible domestic disturbance at Lukes-Quinn’s
apartment. When police arrived, they learned that Lukes-Quinn and her husband had been
at a bar all day. The officer who spoke to Lukes -Quinn told her that it appeared that both
Lukes-Quinn and her husband were intoxicated. This conversation was recorded on the
officer’s body camera and the video was submitted as evidence at the contested probation-
revocation hearing.
The October 18 incident involved officers who were sent to arre st Lukes -Quinn
based on the P.O.’s initi al probation-violation report. The arresting officer noted in the
police report that Lukes-Quinn’s speech was slurred, her eyes were red and the officer
could smell an odor of alcohol coming from her. The report also noted that the officer
asked Lukes-Quinn to take a PBT, but that she declined. After this interaction, the P.O.
submitted an ad dendum to his initial probation -violation report referencing these
interactions.
At the probation -revocation hearing, the state presented testimony from two
witnesses, the officer who conversed with Lukes-Quinn during the October 8 incident and
the P.O. The state presented no testimony from the officer who arrested Lukes-Quinn on
October 18 or any other witness concerning whether Lukes -Quinn appeared to have
consumed alcohol on that date or refused to take the PBT.

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Based on the evidence presented, the district court found that Lukes-Quinn “violated
multiple conditions of her probation, including: failure to inform probation about contacts
with law enforcement, persistent failure to abstain from alcohol, failure to submit to drug
testing, and failure to complete treatment.” The district court also found that the violations
were intentional and inexcusable and that the need for confinement outweighed the policies
favoring probation. The district court thus revoked her probation and ordered the balance
of her sentence to be executed. Lukes-Quinn now appeals this decision.
DECISION
Lukes-Quinn challenges the revocation decision on two grounds —first, that the
district court erred by admitting hearsay evidence concerning the October 18 police
interaction without analyzing whether the evidence was necessary or reliable in violation
of her due-process rights and, second, by finding that the need for confinement outweighed
the policies favoring probation. To revoke probation, a district court must “1) designate
the specific condition or conditions that w ere violated; 2) find that the violation was
intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that the need for confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). The burden of
proof is on the state to establish each element by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.04, subds. 2(1)(c)b, 3(1).
I. The district court did not commit plain error by considering hearsay evidence
from a police report.

We address, first, the claim that the district court erred by allowing the P.O. to testify
concerning statements in the police report from Lukes -Quinn’s October 18 arrest . As

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described above, those statements relate to whether Lukes -Quinn had consumed alcohol
on October 18 and refused to take a PBT. Lukes-Quinn argues that her rights under the
Confrontation C lause were violated because the district court accepted the hearsay
evidence without considering whether it was necessary or reliable.
As a preliminary question, we must determine the proper standard of review. Lukes-
Quinn asserts that we should apply the abuse-of-discretion standard because counsel made
a hearsay objection, and evidentiary rulings typically “rest within the sound discretion of
the district court.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). She argues that her
objection on the grounds of hearsay necessarily included an objection on the grounds of
the Confrontation Clause.
The state claims that the proper standard is plain error, contending that a hearsay
objection is not broad enough to include a constitutional objection under the Confrontation
Clause and that Lukes-Quinn’s assertion of that claim on appeal constitutes unobjected -to
error.
The rules of evidence require objections to state the specific ground of the objection
unless the ground is apparent from the context. Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Counsel for
Lukes-Quinn objected on the ground that the statement was “double -hearsay.” Counsel
did not include any reference to the Confront ation Clause or due process and it is not
apparent from an objection simply stating “double-hearsay” that a constitutional challenge
might be intended. State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2014). Consequently,
the plain-error standard of review is applicable.

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Under the plain -error standard, relief is available only if there is an “(1) error;
(2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. If these three prongs are
met, the appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error to ensure fairness
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998) (footnotes omitted).
With this standard in mind, we turn to the merits of the Confrontation Clause issue.
The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 . In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Supreme Court held that
due process applied to parole-revocation hearings, and that the “right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses” was a minimum requirement of due process. 408 U.S. 471,
488-489, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2603 -2604 (1972). The S upreme Court extended those due -
process rights to probation-revocation hearings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, concluding that the
revocation of probation presented equivalent liberty interests. 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S. Ct.
1756, 1759-60 (1973). However, the court emphasized that a revocation hearing is not
analogous to a criminal prosecution and “the process should be flexible enough to consider
evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an
adversary criminal trial.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S. Ct. at 2604.
This court addressed the constitutionality of hearsay evidence i n probation-
revocation proceedings in the case of State v. Johnson. 679 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. App.
2004). The Johnson case involved a challenge to the district court’s reliance on a hearsay
letter from the defendant’s probation officer stating that Johnson had failed to attend a

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required M.A.D.D. victim -impact program. This court concluded that , so long as “ the
defendant has had ample oppor tunity to present evidence in a probation revocation
proceeding,” reliance on hearsay evidence , such as the letter about failure to attend a
program, does not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id.
The holding in Johnson, however, does no t necessarily end our inquiry. We note
that the hearsay evidence in that case involved, as the opinion notes, a “straightforward”
question—whether Johnson did or did not attend a specific program. Id. at 175. This is
the type of evidence that can be readily challenged by a defendant at the probation -
revocation hearing. The question of whether or not Lukes -Quinn had ingested alcohol on
October 18 i s more complex . The evidence that she had done so dep ends on the
observations of the police officer—that Lukes-Quinn slurred her speech, had red eyes and
smelled of alcohol—and ultimately comes down to the officer’s judgment and credibility.
This could, arguably, be the type of evidence that would implicate the right of
confrontation, even in a probation -revocation setting. We need not resolve this question,
however, because the admission of statements from the October 18 police report does not
constitute a plain error affecting substantial rights that must be addressed to ensure fairness
and the integrity of the judicial proceeding. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740.
Here, the district court detailed, in its order, Lukes-Quinn’s lengthy history of four
prior probation-violation proceedings where sanctions were ordered, along with an
informal restructure where the P.O. attempted to get her “back on track” without a formal
revocation proceeding. The court also identified five dates where Lukes -Quinn failed to
appear for random drug testing within less than four months of the current probation -

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violation report. With regard to the failure to complete treatment, the district court noted
that she failed to attend outpatient treatment required after her last probati on violation,
despite the fact that she had received an updated chemical assessment just six weeks prior
to the current probation -violation report still diagnosing her with “severe alcohol use
disorder.” The district court further pointed out its concern that statements made by Lukes-
Quinn in a recent assessment demonstrate “her refusal to acknowledge the severity of her
alcohol abuse and dependence.” Finally, the court point ed to the October 8 police
interaction and conclude d that the officer involved in this incident “credibly testified
[Lukes-Quinn] had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol” and
that Lukes-Quinn fail ed to inform the P.O. of this contact with police. All of this is
independent of the October 18 incident.
The test for whether “substantial rights” were affected by an alleged error is whether
there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the hearsay “had a significant effect on the verdict.”
Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741 ( quotation omitted). Based on this record, we can deduce no
such reasonable likelihood and conclude that the admission of the hearsay did not constitute
plain error.
II. The record supports the district court’s finding that the need for confinement
outweighed the policies favoring probation.

The second issue raised by Lukes-Quinn is whether there was sufficient evidence in
the record to support the district court’s finding on the third Austin factor, that the need for
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. “The [district] cou rt has broad
discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation . . . .” and we

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review a district court’s findings for a clear abuse of discretion. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at
249-50. The question of whether the district court made t he findings required for
revocation of probation is reviewed de novo as a question of law. State v. Modtland, 695
N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005).
The relevant criteria for assessing the third Austin factor, the need for confinement,
include whether:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.

Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court found all three criteria were applicable in this case and
supported its conclusion with reference to specific facts. First, the district court found that
“confinement [was] necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity” because,
despite having been afforded four previous treatment interventions since 2018, Lukes-
Quinn “persists in alcohol use, placing herself and the public at risk.” The district court
referenced the P.O.’s report that Lukes -Quinn “is a chronic alcoholic and . . . [d]ue to the
lack of cop[]ing skills and awareness, she remains at a high risk of relapse.” On the second
criteria, the district court found that Lukes-Quinn was “in need of correctional treatment”
because she has not been successful at treatment while on probation and because she
expressed resistance to entering another inpatient treatment program. This concerned the
court “given the seriousness of her alcohol use disorder.” The district court thus concluded

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that Lukes-Quinn “needs treatment and confinement ensures that she receives it.” On the
third criteria , the court determined that if probation were not revoked “it would undu ly
depreciate the seriousness of the violation” because Lukes-Quinn was already granted
“multiple opportunities to change her behavior and has not done so.”
Lukes-Quinn challenges these findings on the grounds that she completed four
treatment programs and , at the time of the current violation report, had an intake
appointment scheduled for an outpatient treatment program. Lukes-Quinn also argues that
the court’s interpretation of her expressing resistance to entering inpatient treatment could
just as easily be read as an acknowledgement of the problem, not a refusal to address it.
She further argues that nothing in the record supports the court’s finding that treatment
would be more effective in prison. Lukes-Quinn finally argues that the violations were
mainly technical (i.e., missing urinalysis tests), rather than based on alcohol use.1
These arguments, however, were made to the district court and the district court,
acting within its discretion, was not persuaded. We conclude that the district court ma de
the required findings , those findings are amply supported by the record , and the district
court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.

1 In connection with missed urinalysis testing, the state notes that these were random
testing dates. While Lukes -Quinn submitted evidence of negative test results, these were
largely for dates where she voluntarily appeared for testing. The state argues, persuasively,
that this allowed Lukes -Quinn to be tested on dates of her own choosing when she knew
she had not been drinking, and to avoid the random dates where the results may have been
positive.