In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. N. and J. J. N., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0461

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. N. and J. J. N., Parents.

Filed August 31, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-JV-19-235

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant mother
M.N.)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Taylor J. Mehr, Assistant County Attorney, Center
City, Minnesota (for respondent Chisago County Health & Human Services)

Alfred Alliegro, Alliegro Law Office, Center City, Minnesota (for child J.L.N.)

Charlene Larsen, Cedar, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights,
arguing that the state did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant is the mother of four children who, at present, are ages 5, 8, 9, and 13 (the
children).1 The children have been the subject of a number of child-protection matters in
the past. In 2015, respondent Chisago County Health & Human Services (the county)
received a report that one of the children —who was four years old at the time —followed
her sibling to school in the morning , unbeknownst to mother, and was gone for over two
hours. The county offered mother voluntary services, and she accepted and signed a case
plan. In 2016, following mother’s positive test for methamphetamine and a report that the
children’s father struck one of the children, the court ordered the children out of their
parents’ care and required mother to complete an out -of-home case plan. To date, a total
of ten child -protection reports asserting issues of neglect and abuse of the children had
been filed since 2015.
In June 2019, the county received the report that lead to the instant appeal. 2 The
report alleged that mother’s domestic partner lifted one of the children off the ground by
the child’s neck, and the county initiated a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS)
proceeding. In July 2019, the district court granted the county emergency protective care
over the children. The county removed the children and placed them w ith an aunt and
uncle. In August, mother appeared at an admit/deny hearing where she admitted to the

1 Earlier in these proceedings, the children’s father voluntarily entered into a consent -to-
adopt and therefore is not involved in this appeal.
2 While mother had started living with a new domestic partner, and while that person was
the alleged abuser in the most recent report, his involvement is not pertinent to the issues
presented in this appeal.

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allegations in the county’s petition. The court found the children to be in need of protection
or services and scheduled a disposition hearing.
At the disposition hearing, the district court was presented with case plans for the
children developed by mother’s caseworker.3 The court adopted the case plans, but mother
initially refused to sign them resulting in the county filing the petition to terminate parental
rights (TPR) involved herein. For more than one month following the disposition hearing,
the caseworker attempted to meet with mother to encourage her to sign the plans or to
discuss any additions or suggestions mother might have wanted. The di strict court found
that
[mother] was uncooperative and stated to [the caseworker] that
she had addressed all of her problems in the previous 2016
child protection case and that she did not struggle with
chemical dependency issues and mental health issues.
[Mother] never presented a reasonable basis for her refusal to
sign the case plans nor did she submit her own
recommendations.

Mother did eventually sign the case plans on October 25, 2019 —the day following the
county’s TPR petition.
The case plans identified three concerns with res pect to mother and her parenting :
“(1) a significant history of domestic violence and physical abuse of the children in [her]
home, (2) [her] drug use, and (3) [her] mental health issues.” The district court found that,
under the case plans provided by the county, (1) mother was required to maintain regular

3 There were also case plans for each of the four children pertaining to mother’s new
domestic partner because mother “indicated that [he] would be part of the children’s life if
reunification occurred.”

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communication with the caseworker; (2) mother was required to complete chemical-
dependency and mental -health assessments; (3) mother was required to complete a Rule
25 chemical-dependency assessment, follow all recommendations, and submit to random
and regularly scheduled drug testing; and (4) mother was required to address her mental-
health issues by completing a mental -health assessment, follow all subsequent
recommendations, and work with an adult-mental-health worker.
The county’s TPR petition made three primary allegations in support of termination:
(1) the parents failed to comply with their statutory parental duties under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. (1)(b)(2) (2018); (2) the parents were palpably unfit for the parent-child
relationship under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018); and (3) the county made
reasonable but unfruitful efforts —under the direction of the court —to corr ect the
conditions underlying the out-of-home placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5) (2018).
The permanency trial was held on February 4, 2020. The district court granted the
TPR petition and terminated mother’s parental rights on all three grounds. Mother
appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding —in accordance with Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8 (2018)—that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify her and
the children.
D E C I S I O N
In reviewing TPR orders , this court sets out “to determine whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether those findings are supported by
substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d

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538, 543 (Minn. 2001). “We examine the record to determine whether the evidence is clear
and convincing,” but “[p]arental rights may be terminated onl y for grave and weighty
reasons. . . . [and] the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration.” In re
Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).
To prevail on a petition to terminate parental rights , the county must present clear
and convincing evidence that (1 ) at least one statutory ground for termination exists ;
(2) termination is in the child ren’s best interests; and (3 ) the petitioner made reasonable
efforts to reunite the parent and children. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008). Here, mother’s sole argument is that the district court erred by
concluding that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. We interpret her
argument as challenging the district court’s findings on the subdivision 8 reasonable efforts
because there would be no basis upon which the termination could be upheld were mother
to succeed on her challenge to subdivision 8. 4 See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8
(requiring the district court to make specific findings on the issue of reasonable efforts “[i]n
any proceeding under this section” (emphasis added)); In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d
886, 892 (Minn. 1996) (“[I]t is clear that provision of reasonable efforts must be evaluated
by the court in every case.”).

4 In her br ief, mother does not specify whether she is challenging the district court’s
findings on the reasonable -efforts requirements that are built in to two of the statutory
grounds for termination held to be applicable —failure to comply with statutory parental
duties under subdivision 1(b)(2) and the failure to correct the conditions that led to the out-
of-home placement under subdivision 1(b)(5) —or the stand -alone requirement of
subdivision 8 which applies to all terminations. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2018). Even a
successful challenge to both statutory grounds would leave one ground—palpable unfitness
under subdivision 1(b)(4)—remaining and therefore would not change the result.

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Mother argues that the county made reasonable efforts on two of the concerns
identified in her case plan —mental health and chemical dependency —but that it did not
make any efforts to remedy or mitigate the third: domestic violence in her home.
“Reasonable efforts” means “the exercise of due diligence by the responsible social
services agency to use culturally appropriate a nd available services to meet the needs of
the child and the child’s family.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(f) (2018). The district court, when
investigating whether the petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, “shall
consider whether services to the child and family were: (1) relevant to the safety and
protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally
appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under
the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)(1)-(6) (2018).
In support of its conclusion that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family, the district court found that the county: (1) ensured that the children were well cared
for in their placement with family members; (2) facilitated communication between mother
and the foster parents and other professionals to provide proper services to the children and
mother; (3) tailored a case plan to mother’s particular needs and the unique needs of the
children; (4) provided reasonable supervis ed visitation; (5) helped with “ locating,
arranging, and providing referrals for [mother] to complete her mental health and chemical
use assessments”; and (6) attempted to keep in contact with mother to assist with t he
provision of these services and completion of the goals in her case plan. The district court’s
thorough order, containing 44 pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law, describes
many examples of the services the county attempted to provide and its efforts to encourage

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mother to use them—many of which related to mental health and drug abuse. Nevertheless,
mother argues that none of these were ex plicitly tailored to the TPR petition’s concern
about domestic violence.
We agree with the distric t court’s analysis of the county’s reasonable efforts . Not
only would mental -health and drug -abuse services relate to and help with issues of
domestic violence, but they seem to be the only services at the county’s disposal that could.
Despite obtaining the court-ordered chemical-dependency and mental-health assessments,
mother failed to follow a ny of the recommendations. Addressing the dom estic-violence
issue was an implicitly intended result of the mental-health and addiction services. Indeed,
in mother’s testimony, which the di strict court found credible, she acknowledged that the
trauma of her own domestic abuse significantly affected her mental he alth. She further
admitted that her use of drugs related to her ability to take care of the children.
In fact, the evidence established that mother continued to use methamphetamine as
recently as the day before the TPR trial , and she was held in contempt on the morning of
trial for refusing to submit to a test. Mother ultimately submitted, and the test came back
positive for methamphetamine. Addressing the issues related to mother’s chemical
dependency and mental health were part and parcel with addressing the domestic violence
in her home. Tellingly, mother does not offer or speculate as to any types of services that
would target domestic abuse specifically and therefore should have been provided by th e
county.
Further, the district court’s findings are rife with uncontested instances in which
mother forewent many of the services that were offered to her —even after repeated

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encouragement from the county. In S.E.P., the father of the child at issue rep eatedly
physically abused both the child and the child’s mother. 744 N.W.2d at 382-84. S.E.P.’s
case plan included a goal of “hav[ing] a home and lifestyle free from domestic violence.”
Id. at 383. The petitioner offered S.E.P. a number of resources, such as in-home parenting
education, shared family foster care, an in-home social worker, individual counseling and
group therapy, and frequent meetings with her social worker. Id. at 387. There, like here,
S.E.P.’s mother refused to partake in many of the offered services. Id. 386-87. The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the termination of S.E.P.’s
parental rights, concluding that the county’s provision of mental-health and social services
constituted reasonable efforts to ad dress the problems presented, which included the
domestic violence identified in the case plan. Id.
The district court’s extensive findings, including the findings that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family, are amply supported by the r ecord, and on that
basis we affirm the order terminating mother’s parental rights.
Affirmed.