William Gunder Reppe Jr., Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0464

William Gunder Reppe Jr.,
Appellant,

vs.

Karen Beckers Reppe,
Respondent.

Filed May 17, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bjorkman, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19-FX-07-010085

Merlyn L. Meinerts, Emily B. Peterson, Meinerts Law Office, P.A., Savage, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Susan Thurston, Susan Thurston, P.A., White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to modify spousal maintenance,
arguing that the district court (1) abused its discretion by declining to terminate his
maintenance ob ligation based on respondent’s cohabitation, (2) erred by declining to
impute full -time earnings to respondent , and (3) abused its discretion by awarding
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respondent need-based attorney fees. We affirm the determination of respondent’s income
and the attorney-fee award. But because the court misapplied the cohabitation statute, we
reverse the denial of maintenance modification and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In 2007, the 22-year marriage of appellant-husband William Gunder Reppe Jr. and
respondent-wife Karen Beckers Reppe was dissolved. At the time, husband earned $6,417
in gross monthly income and had monthly expenses of $2,828 , while wife earned gross
monthly income of $2,566 and had monthly expenses of $2,900. Based on their agreement,
husband was ordered to pay wife $1,450 per month in permanent spousal maintenance.
In October 2019, husband moved to terminate or reduce his maintenance obligation
“due to a substantial change in circumstances and [wife’s] cohabitation.” Wife opposed
the motion, requested a cost -of-living adjustment (COLA), and sought attorney fees. In
February 2020, the district court denied husband’s motion, reasoning that although wife
has been cohabiting with her fiancé for at least eight years, husband did not demonstrate
that the “cohabitation gives rise to a substantial change in circumstances rendering the
existing maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair.” The court implemented a
COLA and awarded wife need-based attorney fees. Husband appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court abused its discretion by denying husband’s motion to modify
maintenance without considering the cohabitation factors.

We review a decision whether to modify spousal maintenance for an abuse of
discretion. Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. App. 2019). A district court
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abuses its discretion if the record does not support its factual findings, it misapplies the
law, or its decision “is contrary to logic and the facts on record.” Id.
A party seeking to modify a spousal-maintenance obligation must demonstrate that
a substantial change has occurred in the parties’ circumstances and that the change renders
the existing obliga tion “ unreasonable and unfair. ” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)
(2020). Often, the types of changes that warrant modification are substantial increases or
decreases in the parties’ income or expenses. See id., subd. 2(a), (b) ( 2020). But
maintenance also “may be modified pursuant to section 518A.39, subdivision 2,” based on
an obligee’s cohabitation with another adult. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a) (2020).
The cohabitation statute lists four factors that a district court must consider before reducing,
suspending, reserving, or terminating maintenance based on cohabitation:
(1) whether the obligee would marry the cohabitant but
for the maintenance award;
(2) the economic benefit the obligee derives from the
cohabitation;
(3) the length of the cohabitation and the likely future
duration of the cohabitation; and
(4) the economic impact on the obligee if maintenance
is modified and the cohabitation ends.

Id.
After the district court issued its decision in this matter, we considered the analytical
framework that governs maintenance modification under the cohabitation statute. Sinda v.
Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 177 -80 (Minn. App. 2020). We observed that the cohabitation
statute incorporates the two -part test of Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a), requiring a
showing of substantially changed circumstances and resulting unreasonableness and
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unfairness. Id. at 179. And we mapped that test onto the terms of the cohabitation statute,
holding that (1) when a maintenance obligor demonstrates that the obligee is cohabiting
with another adult, the cohabitation constitutes a substantial change in circumstances; and
(2) that change justifies modifying maintenance “if consideration of the four factors
enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6, indicates that cohabitation makes the existing
maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair.” Id. at 180.
Husband contends the district court committed legal error by failing to apply the
cohabitation statute as Sinda instructs. We agree that the district court, lacking the benefit
of Sinda, did not make all the necessary findings. The court determined that wife is
cohabiting with her fiancé but concluded that the cohabitation was not a substantial change
in circumstances because it did not substantially change wife’s financial circumstances. In
light of that conclusion, it did not address any of the four factors enumerated in the
cohabitation statute. As wife concedes, this was a misapplication of the law.
Generally, when a district court fails to consider necessary factors, the appropriate
remedy is to remand. See, e.g., Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989); Kielley v.
Kielley, 674 N.W.2d 770, 778 (Minn. App. 2004) . We may “treat” necessary factors “as
addressed” only when the factors “are implicit in the findings” that the court actually made.
Prahl v. Prahl , 627 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001) . The decision under review is
not susceptible of the necessary inference. The district court expressly indicated that it was
not addressing the cohabitation factors. And while the court made numerous findings about
the parties’ financial circumstances, none of them indicates that it considered and weighed
all four statutory cohabitation factors.
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The findings come closest to addressing the second factor —the economic benefit
wife “derives from the cohabitation .” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a)(2). The district
court considered wife’s fiancé’s contribution to housing and vehicle costs and found that
“sharing of certain household expenses with [her fiancé] has allowed [wife’s] overall
financial circumstances to approximate the standard of living the parties established during
their marriage.” But it is unclear whether this finding means, as wife suggests, tha t the
court believed wife does not derive any “economic benefit” from cohabiting , or that the
court found the benefit wife derives is insufficient to reduce her need for maintenance.
Findings regarding the other three cohabitation factors—whether wife would marry
her fiancé “ but for the maintenance award ,”1 the length and likely duration of the
cohabitation, and “ the economic impact on [wife] if maintenance is modified and the
cohabitation ends ,” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a)(1), (3) , (4) ,—are almost entirely
absent. The district court found that wife has cohabited for at least eight years but
otherwise made no findings that support an inference that it considered these factors. And
most important, it did not weigh the four factors, explaining how any factors favoring
modification weigh against any factors disfavoring modification.
In short, the district court neither expressly considered the cohabitation factors nor
made findings that support an inference that it considered them. Accordingly, we reverse
the denial of husband’s motion and remand for the district court to address and determine
whether th e four statutory f actors indicate that wife’s cohabitation makes husband’s

1 A maintenance obligation generally terminat es upon the obligee’s remarriage. Minn .
Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3 (2020).
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maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair. On remand, the district court may, in its
discretion, reopen the record.
II. The district court did not err by declining to impute full-time earnings to wife.

We review de novo the application of caselaw regarding imputation of income to a
maintenance obligee. Passolt v. Passolt , 804 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. App. 2011) , review
denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011).
Husband challenges the district court’s determination of wife’s income based on
part-time employment. He appears to argue that the district court committed legal error by
not imputing full-time income to wife because, although she worked part-time at the time
of the dissolution and continues to do so , she is “capabl e of working full -time.” As
authority, he points to our statement that a district court may impute employment income
to a maintenance obligee based on the obligee’s “present earning capacity ” if the court
“makes a finding of the [obligee’s] earning capacity as of the time of the modification
proceeding.” Madden, 923 N.W.2d at 700. We are not persuaded.
As we explained in Madden, an obligee’s current earning capacity is relevant only
if there is a basis for imputing income to the obligee. Id. And a district court may impute
income to a maintenance obligee only if she was obligated to make reasonable efforts to
increase her earnings . Id. A permanent -maintenance obligee gen erally has no such
obligation. Rather, an award of permanent spousal maintenance “implies” that the obligee
“will not become fully self-supporting, and has no obligation to increase his or her earning
capacity.” Id. at 699. A permanent-maintenance obligee must seek to increase her earnings
only if the district court “expressly imposed such an obligation.” Id. at 700.
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The dissolution judgment awarded wife permanent spousal maintenance with no
condition that she increase her employment to full -time or otherwise endeavor to become
self-supporting. Accordingly, the district court did not err by declining to impute full-time
earnings to wife.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awardin g wife need -based
attorney fees.

A district court “shall” award attorney fees if it finds that (1) the fees “are necessary
for the good faith assertion of the party’s rights,” (2) the party from whom fees are sought
has “the means” to pay them, and (3) the party seeking fees “does not have the means to
pay them.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2020). We review attorney-fee awards for an
abuse of discretion. Muschik v. Conner -Muschik, 920 N.W.2d 215, 225 (Minn. App.
2018). A court abuses its discretion “if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by
the record.” Madden, 923 N.W.2d at 696. We review factual findings for clear error.
Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 360 (Minn. App. 2004).
Husband argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that wife lacks the
means to pay attorney fees because she has a monthly budgetary shortfall. But he does not
explain the claimed error, and review of the record reveals ample evidentiary support for
the court’s finding. Wife presented evidence t hat she has monthly expenses of $3,172,
which accounts for her fiancé’s contribution to housing and vehicle expenses. The district
court found wife’s expenses largely reasonable but reduced the amount to $2,919 to
account for paycheck deductions. Wife also presented evidence that her net monthly
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income is $1,359. Between that income and the $1,450 maintenance award, she still falls
short of her expenses by $110.2
On this record, the district court did not clearly err by finding that wife lacks the
means to pay her attorney fees. Based on that finding, and the unchallenged findings that
the fees were necessary for wife to oppose the motion and husband has the abili ty to pay
them, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of need-based attorney
fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

2 Husband also contends the difference between wife’s income and expenses does not
accurately represent her ability to pay attorney fees because it does not account for assets
like the home she owns with her fiancé. But this issue is not properly before us because he
did not present it to the district court and the district court did not address it. See Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate review is limited to issues
presented to and decided by the district court). Moreover, husband identifies no authority
for the proposition that a maintenance obligee should be expected to liquidate assets to pay
attorney fees incurred in responding to a motion to reduce or eliminate maintenance when
the obligor has ample income from which to pay them.