Justin Lee Ironhawk, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0471

Justin Lee Ironhawk, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-2763

Justin Lee Ironhawk, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his
petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing as Knaffla-barred and
without merit because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) advis ing

2
against a jury trial; (2) failing to communicate a plea offer made by respondent State of
Minnesota; and (3) failing to subject the state’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. We
affirm.
FACTS
After waiving his right to a jury trial, the district court found appellant Justin Lee
Ironhawk guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced him to 276 months
in prison. Appellant filed a direct appeal to this court, arguing only that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of his
cell phone. The underlying facts of this case are discussed in our prior opinion in which
we affirmed appellant’s conviction and the supreme court denied review . State v.
Ironhawk, No. A17-1739, 2018 WL 6729841, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Dec. 24, 2018), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for
postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The postconviction
court determined that appellant ’s claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla,
243 N.W.2d 737, 741 ( Minn. 1976), and summarily denied an evidentiary hearing . The
postconviction court also determined that appellant did not e stablish by a fair
preponderance of the evidence facts warranting relief and that his claims fail on the merits.
This appeal follows.

3
D E C I S I O N
I. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are Knaffla-barred.

Appellant first challenges the postconviction court ’s denial of h is request for an
evidentiary hearing and relief , arguing that no direct appeal occurred and that fairness
requires a hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. We disagree.
A postconviction court does not abuse its discretion when it summarily denies a
petition that is Knaffla-barred. Colbert v. State , 870 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 2015).
Minnesota courts do not consider claims for postconviction relief based on facts and issues
which were known at the time of direct appeal and not raised. Doppler v. State , 660
N.W.2d 797, 801 (Minn. 2003). “When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct
appeal or it is Knaffla-barred” unless it requires review of evidence outside the record or
more fact-finding. Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 20 13). A petitioner must
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” facts warranting relief. Erickson v. State, 725
N.W.2d 532, 534 (Minn. 2007). And an appellant must prove why fairness requires review
of claims which were “deliberately and inexcusably” not raised on direct appeal. Greer v.
State, 673 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Minn. 2004).
Appellant initially argues that he only filed an appeal of his evidentiary hearing,
which is not a direct appeal. This appears to b e a misunderstanding of his appeal. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2(1) (a criminal defendant cannot appeal from a pretrial
evidentiary hearing). Appellant filed a direct appeal to this court from his conviction,

4
challenging the district court’s pretri al denial of his motion to suppress . This court
explicitly stated that appellant “direct[ly] appeal[ed] from his conviction for first -degree
criminal sexual conduct.” Ironhawk, WL 6729841, at *1.
Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance when his trial counsel
advised against a jury trial, failed to communicate a plea offer made by the state, and failed
to subject the state’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Each of appellant’s arguments
is based on trial counsel’s conduct at trial . And appellant knew about the conduct at the
time of each complained -of error. Further, appellant’s claims do not require evidence
available outside of the trial record . The record is fully developed on each of appellant’s
arguments, and we nonetheless analyze them below on the merits based on that developed
record. Because appellant’s claims involve trial counsel’s conduct at trial, do not require
evidence outside of the record to determine, and were not raised on dir ect appeal,
appellant’s claims are barred under Knaffla.
For claims not raised on direct appeal, there are two exceptions to the Knaffla rule:
(1) if novel legal issues now exist that were unavailable at the time of direct appeal or
(2) the interests of justice requires review. Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 673
(Minn. 2020). Appellant does not contend that his claims involve a novel legal issue .
Rather, appellant broadly argues that fairness requires an evidentiary hearing because he
did not knowingly reject the state’s plea offer due to trial counsel’s ineffective assistance
by not communicating the state’s plea offer. But the interests of justice are not served by
reviewing claims which are capable of determination from the record, as appellant’s claims
are here, and were deliberately not raised on direct appeal . His underlying ineffective -

5
assistance claim lacks merit, as explained below , and he does not argue excusable delay .
See Griffin v. State , 883 N.W.2d 262 , 286 (Minn. 2016) ( assuming interests -of-justice
exception applied, nevertheless “a viable claim must have substantive merit and must be
asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.” (citation omitted)).
Appellant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that either exception
to the Knaffla bar applies. The postconviction court therefore did not abuse its discretion
by determining that appellant’s claims are Knaffla-barred and that no exception to Knaffla
applies.
Even if we were to consider appellant’s th ree arguments, each fail s on the merits.
We address each claim in turn.
II. Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail on the merits.
Appellant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance based on
counsel’s (1) advice against a jury trial on aggravating factors under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); (2) failure to communicate a plea offer made by the
state; and (3) failure to subject the state’ s case to meaningful adversarial testing . We are
not persuaded.
This court reviews a summary denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion. Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). “A postconviction court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Id. On an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim, an
appellant seeking an evidentiary hearing must “allege facts that, if proven by a fair
preponderance of the evidence,” would prove both that (1) counsel’s representation “fell

6
below an objective standard of reasonableness ” and (2) “there is a reasonable pr obability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068
(1984). There is a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably. Andersen, 830
N.W.2d at 10. If one prong is determinative, this court need not analyze both. Chavez-
Nelson, 948 N.W.2d at 671.
A. Appellant’s trial counsel informed appellant of his right to a jury trial
on the Blakely factors.

Appellant argues that trial counsel only explained in general terms the significance
of waiving a jury trial and findings of an upward-departure under Blakely. Appellant states
that counsel informed him prior to trial that, to give up these rights, appellant had to agree
with counsel when asked about waiver, and appellant subsequently agreed to everything.
We are not persuaded.
Here, counsel extensively communicated appellant’s right to a jury trial on the
record. The process of obtaining these waivers constitute s six pages of trial transcript.
Counsel ensured that appellant understood wh at waiving a jury trial meant, and
communicated to appellant that waiving a jury trial is not a question of trial strategy, but
appellant’s decision whether to waive this right. Appellant replied that he understood and
that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial. Counsel also communicated that, if the
jury found appellant guilty, “the [s]tate is going to seek a sentence that is greater than the
sentencing guidelines.” Appellant replied that he understood. Appellant also stated that
he understood he had the right to a jury determination of those facts justifying an upward

7
departure, and appellant replied that he wanted to waive that right . Trial counsel ’s
representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness in plainly
communicating these waivers on the record.
B. Trial counsel communicated the plea offer to appellant on the record.
Appellant argues that trial counsel “utterly failed to communicate” the state’s plea
offer. He states he “was not aware of the supposed plea offer of 144 months,” and that the
state did not present the offer “in a way that [he] would have known it to be a n offer.”
However, the state made the plea offer directly to appellant on the record.
My offer to [appellant] is to withdraw my Blakely notice and
have him plead guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree and have him serve the bottom of the box, which is 144
months in prison. . . . If he is not willing to take that, then we
can proceed to trial.

Twice on the record, the state clearly articulated its offer to appellant. It further
explained what sentence it sought, what it would be withdrawi ng, and how much time
appellant would actually serve if appellant accepted the state’s offer. The state therefore
explained on the record the possible ramifications of either accepting or declining its offer.
See e.g., State v. Powell, 578 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1998) (finding no ineffective assistance
of counsel when state made verbal statement of its immediately rejected plea offer before
start of trial). The record does not support appellant’s arguments.
After the state offered the plea, appellant’s trial counsel also immediately spoke to
appellant off the record. Appellant asserts that counsel merely told appellant that “[the
state is] done talking now, we can continue on with the trial if that’s okay with you.” But
counsel stated on the record that “[o]ur position remains the same. My client continues to

8
assert his innocence of the charge and therefore would like to exercise his right to trial.”
We conclude that counsel’s assistance did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness with the plea offer clearly communicated on the record to appellant, which
he subsequently rejected on the record.
C. Appellant’s trial counsel did not fail to present evidence or a defense
theory.

Appellant argues that trial counsel failed to : (1) submit evidence of appellant’s
“actual innocence;” (2) call several specified witnesses to his defense ; (3) assert that the
victim threatened appellant by saying she would report to the police that she had been raped
unless he gave her money and drugs ; and (4) put forth a d efense at trial . We are not
persuaded.
Generally, we do not review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim s when the
complained-of conduct is based on trial strategy. Chavez-Nelson, 948 N.W.2d at 671
(citing State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Minn. 2014) ). Trial strategy includes
determining what witnesses to call at trial, Carridine v. State, 867 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Minn.
2015), and selecting what evidence to present to the ju ry, Sanchez-Diaz v. State , 758
N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 2008). We therefore do not review trial counsel’s strategy on
whether to call certain witnesses and whether to present evidence of appellant’s “actual
innocence.”
Belying appellant’s third argument that counsel did not present evidence that the
victim threatened him, the district court’s order recognized appellant’s statement that the

9
victim threatened to report appellant for rape if appellant did not give her both drugs and
money. This argument is not supported by the record.
The postconviction court determined that trial counsel advanced a defense of
consent. The record reflects that counsel called three witnesses at trial. Counsel offered
that the victim and appellant had engaged in similar behavio r in the past, exchanging sex
for drugs. Appellant argued that the victim had consented to each of the acts recorded and
had consented to being recorded on this occasion. He also a rgued that the victim was
conscious and aware of what occurred.
The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that trial
counsel presented evidence and witnesses and offered a clear defense strategy of consent
at trial. Because appellant fails to establish the first Strickland prong, we need not consider
the prejudice prong.
Affirmed.