In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: G. W., Adjudicated Father.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0481

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
G. W., Adjudicated Father.

Filed November 23, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-19-1698

Karla Valusek Strom, Valusek Law P.L.L.C., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant G.W.)

Theresa Reilly Paulson, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent L.H.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Robert Hamilton, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Human Services)

Katie Speckman, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presid ing Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district co urt’s decision to terminate his parental
rights to his son. Father argues that the di strict court erred when it found clear and

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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convincing evidence to support two statutory bases for te rmination. The district court
found, first, that an older ch ild experienced egregious harm while in father’s care; and
second, that father is palpably unfit to be a parent. Father also contends that termination is
not in his son’s best interests. Because the re cord evidence supports the district court’s
findings of fact and the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
These facts summarize the district court’ s written findings following a five-day
bench trial. L.H. is the biological mother of child 1, a 14-year-old daughter, and child 2, a
three-year-old son. Appellant G.W. is child 2’s adjudicated father. G.W. is not the father
of child 1, although child 1 lived with L.H. and G.W. until 2015 when she moved in with
her biological father and stepmother.1
The district court found that, in November 2018, child 1 told her stepmother that
G.W. had “touched her in a se xual manner” and she was “sca red” to be around him.
Child 1’s stepmother testified that they were alone when child 1 made this disclosure and
that child 1 “was aware” stepmother had suffered sexual abuse. Stepmother notified
authorities about child 1’s statements.
The county started an investigation and a sexual-abuse examiner interviewed
child 1. During the interview, child 1 stated that when she was nine-years-old and L.H. was
not home, G.W. removed their clothing, laid on top of her, and touched her “private areas”
with his hand and his “private areas.” Usin g a diagram, child 1 explained that G.W.

1 In 2019, L.H. voluntarily transferred sole legal and physical custody of child 1 to child 1’s
biological father. L.H.’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.

3
squeezed her “boobs,” licked he r vagina, placed his “private part” on her vagina, and
ejaculated.2 During a physical examination, child 1 more specifically described how G.W.
touched her vagina with his ha nd and penis. The examiner made a clinical diagnosis of
sexual abuse.
Following the sexual-abuse examination, respondent Ramsey County Human
Services (the county) sought to establish a sa fety plan that required L.H. and child 2 to
leave G.W.’s home. When L.H. stated that she was unable to leave, the county removed
child 2 from the home. At a later emergency pr otective-care hearing, the county returned
child 2 to the home, and the county and L.H. developed a safety plan that required L.H. to
supervise all interactions between G.W. and child 2.
The county, with some invo lvement by G.W., developed an interim case plan,
including requirements that G.W. complete mental-health and psychosexual evaluations,
and follow all recommendations. 3 G.W. at first refused to comply with th e interim case
plan, but he eventually completed a psychosexual examination in September 2019.
The district court found th e psychosexual examiner c oncluded that G.W. had “a
medium-high risk of future se xual offenses.” During the four-hour examination, G.W.
“spoke loudly at times, yelled profanities and apologized, went on rants, [and] showed high

2 Child 1 also described a second incident in 2017, stating that G. W. offered her twenty
dollars to perform oral sex, and a third incide nt in June 2018, sta ting that G.W. showed
child 1 a message on his phone saying that he wanted to be with her. Child 1 also stated
that G.W. showed her pictures of naked people on his phone.

3 G.W. refused to sign both the initial case plan and a subsequent updated case plan,
although the social worker discussed both case plans with G.W. in person on December 4,
2019. The updated case plan includes a note that G.W. refused to sign it.

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distractibility and was impulsive.” The exam iner confirmed G.W.’s prior diagnosis of
bipolar disorder. The district court found th at G.W.’s schizophrenia diagnosis was “less
clear.” For example, G.W. denied symptoms typical of schizophreni a. But the examiner
ultimately determined that sc hizophrenia was an appropriate diagnosis, given G.W.’s
delusional thinking, lack of impulse control, and bizarre behaviors.
The psychosexual examiner also found that G.W.’s mental health may increase his
risk of engaging in sexually abusive behavi ors because “[a]n increased interest in sex
(hyper-sexuality) is also a common feature of mania/hypomania and increases [G.W’s] risk
for exhibiting abusive or inappropriate sexual behaviors.” The examiner recommended that
G.W. complete outpatient sexual-abuse treatm ent, have no unsupervised contact with
children under the age of 18 (including child 1), abstain from mood-altering substances,
and complete a medical evaluation. The examin er noted that G.W. “appear[ed] to be an
individual with largely untreated serious psychiatric issues,” and stated that G.W.’s access
to child 2 while they lived together was a “high risk environment.” The district court found
that G.W. did not comply with the report’s recommendations and that G.W. testified he
will never attend outpatient or sexual-abuse treatment.
G.W.’s case plan also required that he complete a mental-hea lth assessment and
follow all recommendations. He disclosed his mental-health records, which included a
diagnosis of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. G.W.’s r ecords also show that he was
placed on stayed orders of judicial commitmen t, or was civilly committed, at least five
times, most recently in May 2 017. G.W., however, did not otherwise comply with the
requirement that he complete a mental-health assessment.

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G.W. refused to cooperate with the soci al worker and the guardian ad litem. He
asked the social worker not to contact him, an d refused to meet with the social worker or
allow her to visit the home without a court order. The social worker tried to review the case
plan with G.W. while at the courthouse in December 2019. G.W. stated that he would not
comply and left without signing the updated case plan.
G.W. hampered the social worker’s cont acts with L.H., only allowing meetings
outside the home. The district court found that in January 2020, G.W. asked the social
worker by text message if she had a “lesbian attraction” to L.H., and his message also stated
that “if the social worker want ed to meet with [L.H.], the me eting must take place at the
courthouse.” G.W. allowed the guardian ad litem to visit the home twice. He told the
guardian ad litem that she was not “welcome to come to their home again” after he learned
of the psychosexual-evaluation recommendations.
In October 2019, the county petitioned to terminate G.W.’s parental rights to child 2.
The petition alleged two statutory bases for te rmination: (1) while under G.W.’s care,
child 1 experienced egregious harm of a nature, duration, or chronicity so that a reasonable
person would believe it contrary to child 2’s be st interests to remain in G.W.’s care, and
(2) G.W. was palpably unfit to parent child 2. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd 1(b)(4);
(6) (2018).
The case went to trial. G.W. proceeded pr o se after making a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of his right to counse l; L.H. and the county were represented by
counsel. The district court received testimon y from G.W., child 1, child 1’s father and

6
stepmother, L.H., the psychosexual examiner, the sexual-abuse examiner, the guardian ad
litem, and the social worker.
Child 1 testified about the abuse allegations, but “declined to provide some details.”
G.W. and L.H. both testified that they be lieved child 1 was lying about the sexual-abuse
allegations. L.H. testified that “160 minut es” for the sexual-abuse examination was “not
sufficient to delve into the child’s entire history and un earth other possible reasons for
[c]hild 1’s trauma.” L.H. also testified that the physical and verbal abuse she suffered by
child 1’s biological father, sometimes in child 1’s presen ce, was a source of trauma.
According to the district court, G.W. testified that child 1 “created the story as retribution
after he and [L.H.] refused to buy shoes that [c]hild 1 had requested the night before she
informed [her stepmother] of the sexual abuse.”
The district court found L.H.’s expl anation did not rebut the sexual-abuse
examiner’s conclusion, and that G.W.’s expl anation was not credible. The district court
also found that the sexual-abuse examiner’s testimony was “credible, and [gave] great
weight to her testimony and report.” The district court found child 1 credible, despite “some
minor discrepancies between her testimony in court and the information she provided” at
the sexual-abuse examination. Child 1 “has suffered multiple forms of trauma throughout
her life, including [her] allegations of sexual abuse.” The district court also found that
child 1 has “maintained the same consistent allegations for more than a year at the cost of
alienation from her mother.”
The district court found the psychosexual examiner credible, along with her written
report. The district court specifically considered G.W.’s mental-health history. The district

7
court noted two incidents. In March 2017, L. H. reported that G.W. hit her “numerous
times,” including once when child 2 was in her arms. Then , in May 2017, G.W. became
irritated with a neighbor over shower use that changed the water temperature in G.W.’s
apartment. G.W. asked the neighbor to step outside and fight, and when the neighbor
refused, G.W. damaged the neighbor’s new car because he “felt disrespected.” Child 2 was
in G.W.’s care during the May 2017 incident. Authorities found child 2 in the street while
G.W. was naked and hugging a tree.
G.W. was not taking prescribed medications in May 2017. At the time of the trial,
the district court found that G.W.’s me dical providers recommended medication “to
maintain stable mental health,” but that G.W. refused all medications and gave “multiple
reasons” for his refusal, including staying alert and protecting his family. The district court
found that G.W. has consistently refused to take recommended medications to maintain his
mental health.
During trial, G.W. became agitated and argumentative. The district court found
G.W. made “menacing statements” to others when he was “unhappy with the direction of
the trial.” He commented abou t the county’s counse l: “[s]he’s definitely going down”;
G.W. told L.H.’s counsel: “[y]ou’re chewing me out,” and “[y]ou’re kind of ruining my
mood,” even though L.H.’s counsel tried to elicit favorable testimony. G.W. also testified
that if his parental rights were terminated, someone “would have to pay.”
Child 2 was present during the trial beca use L.H. and G.W. could not obtain
childcare, and while L.H. was testifying, chil d 2 ran up to the w itness stand and became
disruptive. When the district court asked child 2 to sit down, G.W. stated this request was

8
“verbal abuse” of his child. After a recess to arrange for someone to care for child 2, G.W.
did not return and remained absent for the remaining day and a half of the trial. L.H. stated
that she “tried to explain to him the magnitude and importance of him needing to continue,”
but did “not [get] a response.”
In a 21-page written decision following the trial, the district court terminated G.W.’s
parental rights to child 2 on both grounds raised by the petiti on. First, the district court
found that while under the care of G.W., child 1 had suffered egregious harm; and second,
the district court found that G.W. was palpably unfit to parent child 2. The district court
also found that further reasonable efforts by the county would be futile, and it is in child 2’s
best interests to terminate G.W.’s parental rights.
G.W. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A parent’s right to custody of a child “should not be taken from them but for grave
and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of the Child of K.L.W. , 924 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Minn.
App. 2019) (quoting In re Welfare of P.J.K., 369 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn. 1985)), review
denied (Minn. March 8, 2019). Minnesota has long recognized a parent’s fundamental right
to enjoy the custody and companio nship of his or her own child. In re Welfare of
Rosenbloom, 266 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Minn. 1978). Th at right, however, is subject to the
state’s compelling interest in protecting a child from abuse. In re Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d
577, 589 (Minn. App. 2003) review denied (Minn. April 15, 2003).
We therefore presume that a natural parent is fit and suitable to care for his or her
child. In re Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1995). But we also recognize

9
that a district court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds, among other things, that the
county has established a statutory basis for termination by clear and convincing evidence.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2018); In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. ,
744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). A district court’s decision to terminate parental rights
must turn on evidence of “conditions that exist at the time of termination and it must appear
that the conditions giving rise to the te rmination will continue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 2001).
A district court is vested with broad discretion in deciding child-protection cases. In
re Booth , 91 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. 1958). Wh en reviewing a decision to terminate
parental rights, we review the district c ourt’s factual findings for clear error, and “we
review its determination of whether a par ticular statutory basis for involuntarily
terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 9 01 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
“A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Children of T.R.,
750 N.W.2d 656, 660- 61 (Minn. 2008) (quota tion omitted). We will defer to the district
court’s “determinations of witness credibility and the weight to be given to the evidence.”
In re Welfare of Child of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007).
To establish grounds for termination, the county must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) at least one statutory basis for termination has been met, (2) termination
is in the child’s best interest, and (3) the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. Reasonable effort s are not required, however, if they

10
would be futile. See In re Welfare of S.Z. , 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996). Here, the
district court found that any additional efforts by the county would be futile, and G.W. does
not contest that finding. Thus, we analyze the first two requirements for termination, both
of which G.W. challenges in his brief to this court.
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in determining that G.W.
egregiously harmed child 1 and that the nature, dura tion, or chronicity of
G.W.’s conduct is such that termination of G.W.’s parental rights is in child 2’s
best interests.

G.W. argues that the district court erre d in finding that he egregiously harmed
child 1. Parental rights may be terminated if the district court finds “a child has experienced
egregious harm in the parent’s care which is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that
indicates a lack of regard fo r the child’s well-being, such that a reasonable person would
believe it contrary to the best interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6). The pare nt need not have eg regiously harmed the
child in question; rather, the county’s petition may rely on “any child” in the parent’s care.
In re Child of A.S. , 698 N.W.2d 190, 19 7 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 20, 2005). Egregious harm includes conduct toward a child that would establish
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14(10) (2018).
Here, it is undisputed that G.W’s alleged conduct would satisfy the definition of egregious
harm.
The district court relied on the credible testimony of child 1 and the sexual-abuse
examiner, and rejected G.W. and L.H.’s tes timony. The district court determined that
child 1 suffered egregious harm while in G.W.’s care. Thus, this court need only consider

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whether the district court clearly erred in crediting the testimony of child 1 and the
sexual-abuse examiner over G.W. and L.H’s testimony.
First, G.W. contends that the district c ourt erred when it “dis counted the evidence
and testimony that child 1 may have been coached by her stepmother.” We note that G.W.’s
claim that stepmother coached child 1 lacks any support in th e record. The district court
observed that child 1’s statements to th e sexual-abuse examiner differed from her
testimony at trial, such as who removed her clothes. Still, the court found that child 1’s
testimony was “consistent for more than a year,” and “[s]he has not wavered . . . in the key
facts.” We defer to the district court’s finding that child 1 credibly testified about the sexual
abuse. See T.D., 731 N.W.2d at 555.
Second, G.W. argues that the district court did not consider child 1’s prior emotional
disturbances, including self-harm and suic idal ideation, when making its credibility
determination. We disagree. The district c ourt stated that it “believe[d] [c]hild 1 has
suffered multiple forms of trauma throughout her life, including [her] allegations of sexual
abuse.”
Third, G.W. argues that the district court abused its discretion when it relied on the
testimony of the sexual-abuse and psychosexual examiners, arguing that the district court
failed to recognize that they had incomplete information. At the outset, we note that the
district court did not refer to the psychosexual examiner’s testimony or report in its analysis
of egregious harm and referenced it only in the best-interests analysis.
The district court found the sexual-abuse examiner’s testimony credible given her
“20-year career in evaluating children alleging sexual abuse.” The district court noted that

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the examiner “gains no personal benefit in the outcome of this matter” and has training
specific to interviewing childre n alleging sexual abuse. We de fer to the district court’s
“determinations of witness credibility and th e weight to be given to the evidence.” See
T.D., 731 N.W.2d at 555.
In sum, the district court weighed the testimony of child 1 and the sexual-abuse
examiner along with all record evidence, including L.H and G.W.’s testimony that denied
any sexual abuse occurred and cl aimed child 1 was lying. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by determining that child 1 suffered egregious harm while
in G.W.’s care, given child 1’s credible and consistent testimony and the sexual-abuse
examiner’s detailed testimony and diagnosis of sexual abuse.
G.W.’s brief does not contest the district court’s finding that the egregious harm
experienced by child 1 was of a nature, durati on, or chronicity that it would conflict with
child 2’s best interests to be in his care. Generally, issues not argued in briefs are waived
on appeal. In re Adoption of T.A.M. , 791 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing
Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982)).
E v e n i f w e a s s u m e t h a t G . W . h a s n o t w aived the issue, the record supports the
district court’s finding that the egregious ha rm found here was of a nature, duration, or
chronicity so that it would conf lict with child 2’s best intere st to remain in his care. The
district court found that G.W. consistently re fused to take measures to remediate the risk
that he might offend again. On this record, the district court did not err in determining that
the egregious harm was of a nature, duration, or chronicity that it would conflict with the
best interests of child 2 to be in his care.

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Because we conclude that the district cour t did not err in determining that child 1
experienced egregious harm while in the care of G.W., we decline to address G.W.’s
arguments on the district court’s determination that G.W. was palpably unfit to be a party
to the parent-child relationship. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (allowing
termination of parental rights upon satisfaction of “one or more” statutory condition).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that child 2’s best
interests support the termination of G.W.’s parental rights.

A child’s best interests may preclude te rminating parental rights even when a
statutory basis for termination exists. In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Minn. App.
2003). In analyzing the best interests of the child, the court must ba lance three factors:
(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing in terest of the child.
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App.
1992). “[D]etermination of a child’s best inte rests is generally no t susceptible to an
appellate court’s global review of a record, a nd . . . an appellate court’s combing through
the record to determine best interests is inappropriate because it involves credibility
determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009)
(quotations omitted). Thus we review a district court’s best-interests analysis for an abuse
of discretion. K.L.W., 924 N.W.2d at 656.
G.W. contends that the district court erred when it found that termination is in child
2’s best interests. He argues that “the district court abused its discretion by giving too much
weight to certain evidence in the record and not enough weight to other evidence in the

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record.” Specifically, he argues that the court “abused its discretion by relying at all on the
opinion of the guardian ad litem,” because she “d id not do an indepe ndent investigation
and explicitly agreed that in making her decision she relied upon the reports and allegations
of the [county] and their contracted providers.”
To support his position, G.W. cites In re Welfare of D.F.B. , 412 N.W.2d 406, 412
(Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 1987), wh ere this court affirmed
termination because the district court’s findings were supported by record evidence, even
though the guardian ad litem had failed to meet her obliga tions. This court noted in its
opinion that the guardian ad litem’s testimony failed to refer to her qualifications, she never
saw the child, and she met the appellant once. Id.
We see no parallel between the guardian ad litem here and the facts in D.F.B. Here,
the guardian ad litem testified about her qualifications; she visited L.H., G.W., and child 2
in September 2019 when they established a safety plan; and again visited in October 2019
to discuss the psychosexual examination. G.W. then told the guardian ad litem that she was
no longer welcome in the home. Given these circumstances, the guardian ad litem’s limited
access to child 2 is understandable. Nor did the district court rely on the guardian ad litem’s
testimony in making its best-interests determination.
We discern no error in the district court’s best-interests analysis. First, the district
court noted that child 2 and G.W. have an interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship “stemming from their clear love for each other.” G.W. argues that the district
court “gave little to no weight to the testimony and detailed descriptions of the rich home
life that G.W. and [c]hild 2 share.” We disagree. The district court recognized the “loving

15
bond between [G.W.] and [c]hild 2, and that they enjoy significant, positive playtime
together. These benefits for [c]hild 2 are signi ficant.” It also noted that child 2 has an
interest in preserving the relationship, in pa rt because G.W.’s public housing assistance
provides child 2 with stable housing.
The district court also found that child 2 has three competing needs: safety, a stable
environment, and parenting that prioritizes his needs over the parent’s needs. The district
court determined that child 2’s interest in safety competes with G.W.’s “risk of further
sexual abuse [that] was determined to be moderate to high risk.” G.W.’s risk of reoffending
is higher because he refuses prescribed mental-health medications and outpatient treatment,
and G.W. testified that he cannot tell when he will suffer a mental-health episode.
As for child 2’s need for a stable environm ent, the district court found that “[f]or
nearly a year, [c]hild 2 has lived with [G.W.] without incident.” But the district court also
found that L.H.’s continuous supervision of G.W. and child 2 has been necessary to
“maintain a stress-free environment to avoid a ny triggers for [G.W.].” G.W. argues that
the district court gave no weight to evidence that he “has been a large part of maintaining
a stable home environment by regularly a ddressing his mental-health needs and by
adhering to a safety plan with [L.H.]” We di sagree. In fact, the district court determined
that “[p]lacing all responsibility for a stable environment on [L.H.] is not sustainable.”
The district court also determined that child 2 has a competing interest in an
“environment that includes the ability to exercise his opinions, put his own needs first, and
have rational disagreements. [G.W.] is not capable of providing that environment.” The
district court found that G.W.’s refusal to engage in a case plan, refusal to take prescribed

16
medication, and refusal to follow other reco mmendations supports its determination that
G.W. “places his own interests first.” The distri ct court recognized that G.W. has a “right
to refuse medication,” but gave greater weight to child 2’s competing interest in having his
needs prioritized.
The district court did not abuse its disc retion when, after re cognizing the bond
between G.W. and child 2, it de termined that the benefits to child 2 “do not outweigh the
child’s competing interests in safety, stability and prioritizing his basic needs over those of
[G.W.].”
We also see no error in the district c ourt’s careful consideration of child 2’s
competing need for housing. While the public housing assi stance secured by G.W. has
advantages, the district court found that livin g with G.W. also has serious disadvantages
because G.W. “has demonstrated a lack of im pulse control, and a hi story of violence and
irrational behavior when children are present.” The district court did not abuse its discretion
by determining that “[c]hild 2’s current housi ng is not safe or stable.” For all of these
reasons, the district court determined that termination is in child 2’s best interests.
In conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that child 1
suffered egregious harm while in G.W.’s ca re. The egregious harm was of a nature,
duration, or chronicity so that a reasonable person would believe it contrary to child 2’s
interests to be in G.W.’s care. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that termination of G.W.’s parental rights is in child 2’s best interests. We
therefore affirm the district court’s termination of G.W.’s parental rights to child 2.
Affirmed.