State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0482

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Emily Maye Namyst,
Appellant.

Filed March 22, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-8300

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Adrian S. Lafavor-Montez, Colich & Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Conor E. Tobin, Grannis & Hauge, P.A. Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE , Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction for failing to yield to a pedestrian, arguing that
the district court erred in instructing the ju ry, and that the eviden ce was insufficient to
sustain her conviction. We affirm.

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FACTS
On February 1, 2019, around 7:00 p.m., A.P. was driv ing her husband (J.P.) and
their children home. A.P. was driving in St. Louis Park, heading east on Excelsior
Boulevard to turn onto Yosemite Avenue. The Excelsior-Yosemite intersection has two
eastbound lanes and one turn lane onto Yosemite. A.P. was in the right-hand lane. When
A.P. was roughly 300 feet from the turn, she saw a pedestrian , K.C., in the crosswalk on
or by a median separating east and westbound traffic on Excelsior. K.C. was facing south
to cross eastbound traffic. A.P. slowed and came to a complete st op within two to three
seconds. A semi-truck similarly stopped behind A.P.’s vehicle.
K.C. was wearing dark-colored clothing and she had her hood up. K.C. did not
move until A.P.’s vehicle stopped. She then looked to her right before crossing Excelsior
in the crosswalk. K.C. walked at a slow-to-normal pace. As K.C. crossed, she was hit by
the vehicle in the lane next to A.P.’s vehicle. K.C. “fl[ew]” approximately six feet into the
air over the driver’s side of the vehicle and landed in the middle of the intersection several
feet from the crosswalk. J.P. ran to K.C.’s assistance and called 911.
A responding officer immediat ely spoke with the driver of the vehicle, appellant
Emily Maye Namyst, who was “very distraught, devastated, [and] shaking.” She told the
officer that
[s]he was on her way to a friend’ s house. She was talking to
an individual on her cell phone which was in the center console
in a cupholder. . . . [S]he tried to wash the windshield off, turn
on the wipers, there was no fluid or at least it was not coming
out at the time, and as she’s driving in the left lane, she noticed
that the car to her right had either slowed down or stopped, and
then she hit the pedestrian.

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The state charged Namyst with careless driving and failing to yield to a pedestrian
in a crosswalk or at an intersection in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 169.13, subd. 2, .21, subd.
2(a) (2018).
At Namyst’s jury trial, A.P. and J.P. tes tified and recounted the accident similarly.
K.C. testified that she had b een on a bus going home from work and pulled the string for
the bus to stop. Her next memory is being in the hospital and hear ing that she had been
unconscious for ten days because she was injured as a result of a collision with a vehicle.
K.C. suffered extensive injuries, including, “[ b]roken bones in [her] leg. A broken hand,
nerve damage on the right side of [her] body, and a traumatic brain injury.” Officers
testified regarding the “significant damage” to the front driver’s side of Namyst’s vehicle.
Namyst testified that she lived near th e intersection and was aware of the crosswalk
and how it is marked with a sign and white paint on the roadway. Namyst testified that she
noticed the vehicles to her right slowing down. Namyst took her foot off of the accelerator
and scanned the area for something that caused the vehicles to stop, but she did not brake.
She admitted that the vehicles could have stopped for a pedestrian. Namyst testified that
she did not see K.C., but was aware something happened when “[she] made an impact.”
The district court’s instruction to the jury on the failure-to-yield charge provided,
[Namyst] approached a pedestrian who was crossing the
roadway within a marked cr osswalk where traffic signal
controls were not in place. No pedestrian shall suddenly leave
a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of
a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to
yield. The state must prove be yond a reasonable doubt that it
was not impossible for [Namyst] to yield.

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During deliberations, the jury submitted questions, including: (1) “Can the time a
pedestrian is walking in front of a stopped car in the left turn lane be interpreted as a place
of safety?” and (2) “Can a single location be defined simultaneously as both a crosswalk
and a place?” The district court provided the jury with the definition of a “place of safety”
as stated in Brazington v. Plankerton , 82 N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 1957). Over Namyst’s
objection, the district court instructed the jury that “other place of safety” means “safety
zones or safety islands when they have been provided for pedestrians on heavily traveled
streets or highways in the interests of safety.”
The jury found Namyst not guilty of carele ss driving, but guilty of failing to yield
to a pedestrian in a crosswal k. The district court senten ced Namyst to 90 days in the
workhouse, with 85 days stayed for one year and five da ys of sentence to service, and
imposed a fine. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Jury instruction
Namyst first argues that the district cour t erroneously instruct ed the jury on the
definition of “other place of safety.” The district court’s jury instructions are reviewed as
a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law, without
misstating the law. State v. Huber , 877 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 2016). District courts
are afforded “broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the language of jury
instructions.” State v. Smith, 674 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Minn. 2004). Absent an abuse of that
discretion, this court will not reverse a district court’s decision on jury instructions. State
v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007).

5
“The extent to which a district court must explain the law of the case, define the
crime charged, and explain the elements of the offense” depends on the facts and law of
each particular case. State v. Moore , 863 N.W.2d 111, 120 (Minn. App. 2015), review
denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). “[D]etailed definitions of an element of an offense may be
necessary if, without the additional detail, the instructions could mislead the jury or cause
the jury to speculate about what the state must prove to obtain a guilty verdict.” Id.
Namyst was charged with failing to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 169.21, subd. 2(a). Under the statute:
Where traffic-control signals are not in place or in
operation, the driver of a vehicl e shall stop to yield the right-
of-way to a pedestrian crossi ng the roadway within a marked
crosswalk or at an intersection with no marked crosswalk. The
driver must remain stopped until the pedestrian has passed the
lane in which the vehicle is stopped. No pedestrian shall
suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run
into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible
for the driver to yield.

Minn. Stat. § 169.21, subd. 2(a) (emphasis added).
After the jury returned with questions, the district court instructed that “other place
of safety” means “safety zones or safety is lands when they have been provided for
pedestrians on heavily traveled streets or highways in the interests of safety.” See
Brazington, 82 N.W.2d at 623. Namyst claims that the definition of “other place of safety”
from Brazington misled the jury.
In Brazington, a pedestrian saw the defendant’ s car approaching from one block
away, stepped off the curb, and started crossing a street. Id. at 621. While crossing, the
pedestrian saw the defendant’s car getting clos er but was unable to estimate its distance

6
from her; she hesitated slightly , took more steps, and then was struck by the defendant’s
car. Id. at 621-22. The defendant argued that he should have been granted a directed
verdict because the pedestrian was negligent for continuing after she hesitated and saw him
approaching, and her negligence proximately caused the accident. Id. at 622.
The supreme court determined that the pe destrian was not negligent as a matter of
law because she was struck af ter she had taken several step s from the center of the
intersection, indicating that, had the defenda nt complied with Minn. Stat. § 169.21,
subd. 2,1 and yielded the right-of-way, ther e would have been no accident. Id. The
supreme court also stated that the district court was not required to instruct the jury that the
pedestrian was guilty of “suddenly leaving a ‘curb or other place of safety’ into the path of
a closely approaching vehicle,” in part, becaus e the reference “to ‘other place of safety’
obviously was intended to relate to [s]afety zones or [s]afety islands when they have been
provided for pedestrians on heavily traveled streets or highways in the interests of safety.”
Id. at 623. The supreme court concluded that any other construction of the term “would in
effect nullify totally statutes relating to pede strian right-of-way at such intersections and
crosswalks.” Id.
Here, the jury asked, “Can the time a pedestrian is walking in front of a stopped car
in the left turn lane be inte rpreted as a place of safety?” and “Can a single location be
defined simultaneously as both a crosswalk and a place?” The district court instructed the
jury that an “other place of safety” means “safety zones or sa fety islands when they have

1 It is not clear what version of the statute the case is citing, but the case quotes the statute,
and the substantive law is identical to our current statute.

7
been provided for pedestrians on heavily traveled streets or highways.” By explaining that
a “place of safety” includes “safety zones, ” the jury had to de termine whether K.C.
suddenly left a safety zone—the portion of the crosswalk covering the left turn lane—and
walked in front of Namyst’s vehicle withou t giving Namyst enough time to yield. The
district court’s definition was appropriately within its broad discretion.
Namyst argues that Brazington is inapplicable for several reasons. First, she points
out factual distinctions. For example, she claims that the pedestrian in Brazington saw the
vehicle approaching but “[K.C. ] never observed . . . Namyst ’s vehicle.” But we do not
know this because K.C. lost her memory as a result of being hit by Namyst’s vehicle. There
is no evidence as to what K.C. saw.
Namyst also claims that K.C. “only wa ited one second and then walked quickly”
across the turn lane before she was struck. But A.P. testified that she came to a complete
stop approximately two to three seconds after she began slowing down and that K.C. was
in the crosswalk for approximately two seconds before she was struck. She testified that
K.C. walked at a “normal pace.” J.P. testif ied that K.C. did not move until their vehicle
came to a complete stop, and she walked fairly slowly. Based on this evidence, K.C. waited
two to three seconds for A.P. to stop completely before beginning to walk across Excelsior.
She then walked for two seconds before she was struck, and she was not walking quickly.
Namyst also claims that the pedestrian in Brazington continued crossing the street,
but K.C. came to a complete stop before walking. However, there is no evidence that K.C.
stopped walking. The record shows that K.C. was stationary in the crosswalk at or near

8
the median when A.P.’s vehicle approached, but once she began walking, she did not stop
before Namyst hit her. Thus, Namyst has not raised reliable factual distinctions.
Next, Namyst argues that Brazington is inapplicable because it is a civil case and an
older case. But these arguments are disi ngenuous because Namyst’s proposed jury
instructions included the ci vil jury instruction for ne gligence—common law duties of
drivers and pedestrians, 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG 65.10 (2014), and she cited civil
cases from 1950 and 1938. See Becklund v. Daniels, 42 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 1950); Reier v.
Hart, 277 N.W. 405 (Minn. 1938). Brazington is more recent than these cases, and even
though it is a civil case, it interpreted the statute at issue here. See 82 N.W.2d at 621.
Finally, Namyst argues that Brazington is inapplicable becau se an Oregon case
rejected the definition. First, an Oregon case is not precedential. See Mahowald v. Minn.
Gas Co. , 344 N.W.2d 856, 861 (M inn. 1984) (noting that decisions from foreign
jurisdictions are not binding as authority). Additionally, in that case the Oregon Supreme
Court stated that in determining the definition of “other place of safety,” it would look to
the “legislative history of our statute” rath er than looking to a definition from another
jurisdiction. See Plasker v. Fazio, 485 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Or. 1971).
As the state argues, Brazington defines the exact phrase “other place of safety,” as
used in Minn. Stat. § 16 9.21, subd. 2. And as the court stated in Brazington, for a safety
zone (crosswalk) not to be a place of safety “would in effect nullify totally statutes relating
to pedestrian right-of-way at . . . intersections and crosswalks.” See 82 N.W.2d at 623.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in selecting jury instructions.

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Sufficiency of the evidence
Namyst also argues that the evidence wa s insufficient to support her conviction.
When evaluating a claim of in sufficient evidence, this cour t “carefully examine[s] the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Boldman, 813 N.W.2d 102, 106
(Minn. 2012). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and will not
overturn the verdict if the jury could reasonably have found the defe ndant guilty of the
charged offense, consistent w ith the presumption of innoce nce and the state’s burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Bernhardt v. State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn.
2004).
Namyst claims that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because it
showed that K.C. sudd enly left a place of safety. But the district court appropriately
instructed the jury that a safety zone is a place of safety. And the evidence shows that K.C.
only left the safety zone—the crosswalk—when Namyst hit her and K.C. flew into the air
and landed several feet from the crosswalk.
Namyst also claims that A.P. and J.P. told the police that K.C. “walked into the side
of [Namyst’s] car.” But that is a complete mischaracterization of the record, which Namyst
concedes in her reply brief. In fact, J.P. testified that K.C. did not walk into the side of the
vehicle. And an officer testified that Namyst stated that “she hit the pedestrian.”
Additionally, Namyst testified that she saw A.P.’s vehicle and the semi-truck slow
down, but she did not slow down. She also admitted that the vehicles could have stopped

10
for a pedestrian. Moreover, A.P. testified that, although it did not appear that the driver of
the vehicle was speeding, the driver did not slow down or stop for K.C. And J.P. testified
that the vehicle did not appear to attempt to stop. Therefore, th e evidence sufficiently
supports Namyst’s conviction because it shows that she failed to “yield the right-of-way to
a pedestrian crossing the road way within a marked crosswalk,” and it did not show that
K.C. suddenly left a “place of safety” and walked into the path of Namyst’s vehicle making
it impossible for Namyst to yield. See Minn. Stat. § 169.21, subd. 2(a).
Affirmed.