State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0484

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Eugene Walker,
Appellant.

Filed February 16, 2021
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-17-971

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County
Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defend er, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for failing to register as a
predatory offender, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knowingly violated the registration statute. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Following a court trial, appellant Michael Eugene Walker was convicted of three
counts of failing to register as a predatory offender pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd.
5(a) (2016), one count for each place of employment that Walker failed to register . The
facts as found by the district court are as follows. Walker is subject to lifetime predatory-
offender registration following his conviction of criminal sexual conduct in 2002. Since
then, he has updated his predatory -offender registration quarterly or annually, as required
by statute. Part of Walker’s duty to register includes reporting any changes of employment
within five days, which he has done on several occasions.
In 2016, Walker moved to Worthington , Minnesota, in Nobles County. Before
moving, Walker’s former parole officer, with whom Walker kept in contact for assistance
with his predatory-offender-registration requirements, told Walker that he had to report to
the local law-enforcement office in Worthington upon his arrival. Walker, however, failed
to register with the Worthington Police Department and instead registered his information
changes with a Murray County Sheriff’s Office employee (Murray County employee) .
Walker met the Murray County employee through his sister. Murray County is located 30
miles away from Worthington, and the Murray C ounty Sheriff’s Office did not have
jurisdiction over Walker’s Worthington address.
Walker updated his information with the Murray County employee on three separate
occasions in 2016, including submitting his annual compliance form in December 2016.
A section of the annual compliance form required Walker to initial a list of items he had a
duty to register, including “any changes in . . . employment . . . within five days of the

3
change.” (Emphasis omitted.) Walker did not have any contact with the Murray County
employee or register any information regarding his employment with her in 2017.
On August 17, 2017, a detective who monitors predatory offenders went to Walker’s
home to check on him. Walker was not home, but the detective learned from talking with
Walker’s wife that Walker’s employment registration was not current. The following day,
Walker registered his current employment. In a subsequent interview with the detective,
Walker admitted that he had failed to register three employment changes, each lasting more
than five days, from Apri l 2017 to August 2017. Walker admitted that he knew he was
supposed to register his employment changes in Nobles County, but stated it was a “pain
in the rear” and that he was concerned that informatio n would get out into the community
that he was a predatory offender.
Walker testified at trial, but the district court expressly found that his testimony was
not credible. Walker testified that he registered the three jobs in 2017 by going to the
Murray County employee’s office at the Murray County Sheriff’s Department and giving
his updated information to the receptionist, who wrote it down on a form for Walker to
sign. He added that the Murray County employee had encouraged him to continue
registering through her “because she knew how much of a pain in the ass it was to register”
in Worthington. He stated that he either called or texted the Murray County employee to
update his registration information and that he trusted her with the registration pro cess
because she was in law enforcement and because she told him it was okay. He further
testified that he did not learn there was a problem until the detective came to his house. He

4
testified that he did not know that registering with the Murray County employee was not
proper.
The Murray County employee testified that, although she helped Walker register
some information in 2016, Walker did not register any information relating to his
employment changes in 2017. She testified that she had not spoken to Walker since 2016.
The district court found that the state’s witnesses were credible and that Walker was
not credible. The district court found Walker guilty of all three counts, concluding that
Walker “knew he was supposed to register his employers in Worthington and purposefully
chose not to do so.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Walker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions,
arguing that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly violated
the registration statute. We first determine what the appropriate standard of review is and
then apply that standard to the evidence presented.
I. The direct evidence standard of review applies to this case.
Walker argues that this court should apply the circumstantial evidence standard of
review because his state of mind is at issue , and a defendant’s state of mind is generally
proved by circumstantial evidence. See State v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 47 3-74
(Minn. 2010) (indicating that the circumstantial evidence standard of review applies when
a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence) . In contrast, the state argues that the
direct evidence standard applies because, while a criminal defendant’s state of mind is most

5
often proved by circumstantial evidence, this is an example of a rare case where direct
evidence proved Walker’s state of mind. We agree.
Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) ( quotation omitted ). “In contrast, direct evidence is evidence that is based on
personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, “circumstantial evidence always requires an
inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” Id.
Here, the trial record contains direct evidence of Walker’s state of mind —his
statements to the detective and his own trial testimony. This was direct evidence because
it reflected Walker’s state of mind and personal observations, and allowed the district court
to find Walker guilty without having to draw any inferences. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at
599 (defining direct evidence). Therefore, we apply the direct evidence standard of review
to this case. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016) (observing that the direct
evidence standard of review applies when, although there is both circumstantial and direct
evidence of guilt as to a particular element, the disputed element is sufficiently proved by
direct evidence alone)
II. There was sufficient evidence to prove Walker knowingly violated the
predatory-offender statute.

Under the direct evidence standard, this court’s review is limited to a “painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which

6
they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). “We use the same standard
of review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.”
State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
For the district court to convict Walker of the three failure-to-register offenses, the
state had to prove that (1) Walker is a person required to r egister as a predatory offender;
(2) Walker knowingly violated any of the requirements to register; (3) the time period
during which Walker was required to register had not elapsed; and (4) Walker’s acts took
place on specified dates in Nobles County. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1(b), 3-6
(2016). In this case, the state sought to prove that Walker was guilty of knowingly violating
the requirement to register changes in his employment. See id., subd. 4a. Walker only
contests the sufficiency of the second element of the offenses—that he knowingly violated
the predatory-offender statute. We are not persuaded.
A person required to register as a predatory offender who does not have an assigned
corrections agent must register “with the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in
the area of the person’s primary address.” Id., subd. 3(a). Walker essentially argues that
because he thought he was complying with the statute by notifying an employee at the
Murray County Sheriff’s Office of his information and employment changes, he believed
he was complying with the statute and therefore could not have “knowingly” violated it.
While ignorance of the law does not generally excuse criminal liability, “when knowledge
of the law is an element of the offense, mistake of law is a defense because it negates the
existence of a required mental state.” State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017).
Therefore, knowledge of the law at the time of the violation is an element of the offense of

7
knowingly violating the predatory-offender-registration statute. Id. at 604. But Walker’s
statement to the detective constituted direct evidence of his knowledge that he was required
to provide his information to Nobles County law enforcement because it indicated that his
failure to register was because he did not want to go through the trouble of registering in
Worthington and because he did not want people in Worthington to know about his
criminal record.
Furthermore, even if registering with the Murray County employee was complying
with the requirements of the statute, the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict demonstrates that Walker had not registered any of his three employment
changes in 2017 , even in Murray County. The district court concluded, and the record
supports, that “there was no mistake of law in this case,” but rather Walker knew he was
supposed to register his employment in Worthington but did not do so. Giving “due regard
to the presumption of innocence and to the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt,” we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Walker’s
convictions. State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Affirmed.