State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0490

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

D.D.,
Appellant.

Filed March 15, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-JV-15-1803, 27-CR-19-32165

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s revocation of his extended jurisdiction
juvenile (EJJ) status and its subsequent execution of the imposed adult sentence. Appellant
claims that the district court erred in concluding that the need for confinement outweighed
the policies favoring continued probation. Because the distri ct court did not abuse its
discretion in revoking appella nt’s EJJ status and executing the adult prison sentence, we
affirm.
FACTS
In 2015, appellant was charged in a juve nile-delinquency petition with attempted
second-degree murder, in violation of Minn . Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2014), with
reference to Minn. Stat. §§ 609.11, 609.17 (2014), and first-degree assault, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2014). According to the petition, appellant was age 14 and
shot a 17 year old with a firearm several times in the victim’s back and stomach at a metro-
transit station in New Brighton, resulting in serious injuries to the victim’s liver and kidney
and the victim being placed in a medically induced coma.
The Hennepin County district court denied a motion from the st ate to certify the
proceeding for adult prosecution and designated the case as an EJJ and appellant pleaded
guilty to attempted seco nd-degree murder. Pursuant to hi s EJJ status, the district court
sentenced appellant to a stayed adult prison sentence of 153 months and placed appellant
on EJJ probation until his 21st birthday. His probation conditions included remaining law-
abiding, not possessing firearms, and completing programming at the Mesabi Academy.

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Appellant did not complete programming at Mesabi Academy and was discharged.
Upon discharge, a probation- violation proceeding was co mmenced. Appellant admitted
this probation violation, and the district court ordered appe llant placed at the Minnesota
Correctional Facility—Red Wing (Red Wing ). Appellant successfully completed
programming at Red Wing and was then placed in a transition program at the Maple Tree
group home in Maplewood. Following a subsequent probation violation, the district court
again placed appellant at Red Wing.
After appellant completed a relapse program at Red Wing, the district court directed
that appellant reside with his mother and mo ther’s friend in Stearn s County. Following
allegations that appellant “pulled a gun” at the home and hit a person in the head with the
firearm, Stearns County charged appellant by delinquency petition with two counts of
second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of illegal possession of a
firearm. Appellant waived his right to a certif ication hearing, agreed to be charged as an
adult, and pleaded guilty to all three counts.
As a result of pleading guilty to these charges in Stearns County, appellant’s
probation agent filed a probation-violation report in Hennepin County which recommended
revocation of EJJ status and execution of appellant’s adult sentence in the Hennepin County
juvenile file.
A contested EJJ revocation hearing occurred and the district court heard testimony
from appellant, his probation officer, a form er Mesabi Academy employee, and various
juvenile probation and release-program staff. The district court received exhibits detailing
appellant’s past probation violations and placement discharges, his progress and treatment

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plans, the complaint, plea petition, and sentencing order from appellant’s adult charges and
convictions in Stearns County.
Following the revocation hearing, the distri ct court revoked appellant’s EJJ status
on the juvenile file and executed the 153 month adult prison sentence. This appeal follows.
DECISION
A district court “has broad discretion in de termining if there is sufficient evidence
to revoke probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 1980). Absent a clear
abuse of discretion, our court will affirm a probation-revocation and a disposition in a
juvenile-delinquency case. In re Welfare of R.V., 702 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Minn. App. 2005).
“A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of
the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801,
810 (Minn. 2017).
Appellant argues that the district court’s findings regarding the third Austin factor—
that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation—were insufficient
to support its conclusion to revoke probation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. The state
contends that the district c ourt’s findings on this factor we re supported by the record and
justify revocation. Because we agree the district court’s Austin and Modtland findings
were sufficient and supported by the record, the district cour t did not abuse its discretion
in revoking appellant’s probation.
The district court must address three fact ors in determining whether revocation is
appropriate. Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 250. “[T]he court must: 1) designate the specific
condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or

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inexcusable; and 3) find that the need fo r confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation.” Id. This analysis applies to both adult and EJJ status. See State v. B.Y., 659
N.W.2d 763, 768-69 (Minn. 2003). Appellant contests only the third factor.
To satisfy the third Austin factor, the state must esta blish one of the following
subfactors: (1) “confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal
activity by the offender”; (2) “the offender is in need of co rrectional treatment which can
most effectively be provided if he is confined”; or (3) “ it would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d
602, 607 (Minn. 2005). It is not necessary for the distri ct court to find that each factor is
satisfied, but it is required to “create thor ough, fact-specific records setting forth [its]
reasons for revoking probation” and provide “substantive re asons for revocation and the
evidence relied upon.” Id. at 607-08.
The district court detailed the conduct underlying appellant’s adult convictions and
concluded that the third Modtland subfactor—that it would “unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation if probati on is not revoked”—was satisfied. Id. at 607. The
district court reasoned that appellant’s conduct “demonstrate[s] an inability to comply with
his EJJ probation” and that the new law violations, three felonies involving firearms, were
not “technical.” The district court noted th is demonstrates that appellant “cannot be
counted on to avoid anti-social activity.” See Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 251 (stating that
revocation decision requires more than an accumulation of technical violations and instead
“requires a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be
counted on to avoid anti-social activity”) (quotations omitted).

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The district court also considered poten tial mitigating factors but stated that it
“[could not] conclude” that “system failures” explain appellant’s “decision to intentionally
assault [the victims] with a handgun.” The district court noted that appellant spent “almost
two years” at Red Wing after leaving Mesabi Academy, where he received “individual
counseling, primary group se rvices, cognitive skill developm ent, academic/vocational
services, mental health servi ces, and chemical health indivi dual services.” Because the
district court’s determinations were based on the facts of th e record and do not reflect a
legal error, we discern no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.