State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0496

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Isaac Lee Kelley,
Appellant.

Filed March 1, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-8682

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant argues that his drug-possession conviction is invalid because the state
failed to try his case within 180 days after his request for final disposition in violation of
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Appellant also argues that he received ineffective

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assistance of counsel. Because we conc lude that appellant’ s conviction is valid and
counsel’s assistance was not ineffective, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2013, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Isaac Lee Kelley
with fifth-degree drug possession and gross misdemeanor obstruction of legal process. At
the first-appearance hearing, the district court ordered appellant to appear at a future court
hearing. Appellant failed to appear for his hearing and the district court issued a warrant
for his arrest and set bail. In July 2013, Wisconsin authorities arrested appellant and took
him into custody. Over a year later, in October 2014, appellant sent a letter from the
Wisconsin correctional institution to the Hennepin County District Court with a “Motion
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Prosequendum ,” citing the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (the IAD). Appellant acknowledged that he missed his hearing date in
Minnesota, leading the district court to issue a warrant for his arrest. Appellant asked the
district court to impose a sentence concurrent with his Wisconsin sentence.
In January 2015, appellant sent a second letter to the Hennepin County District
Court with a “Motion for Immediate Dispositional Relief and Reli ef Sought,” “Motion to
Appear in Absentia,” “Motion to Utilize Interstate Detainer Act Previously Filed and
Submitted,” and “Motion to Quash Warrant.” Appellant stated that he wanted to resolve
his outstanding criminal case in Minnesota so that he could r eturn to California directly
after his release f rom confinement in Wisconsin. Following his release from custody in
Wisconsin i n September 2015, appellant appeared for a court hearing in Minnesota .
Appellant’s counsel moved to dismiss the case on the gro und that the IAD deadline had

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expired. The district court granted a continuance to allow the parties to provide more
information and set a future hearing date. When appellant failed to appear at his next
scheduled hearing, the district court issued a warrant for his arrest.
Appellant was arrested in Minnesota on the warrant in April 2019. The district court
set a hearing date in June 2019, but appellant failed to appear. Appellant later appeared for
a hearing in August 2019 , and the district court se t a trial date for November 2019.
Appellant failed to appear for the trial and the district court issued a warrant and set bail .
In January 2020, the parties informed the district court that they had settled the case.
Appellant agreed to plead guilty to the drug-possession charge and respondent agreed to
dismiss the remaining charge. Appellant admitted that he was in possession of a controlled
substance in March 2013, and entered a guilty plea. The district court sentenced appellant
to time served and discharged him from probation immediately. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not apply.
Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief under the IAD. The IAD is a compact
among 48 states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia to establish
procedures for resolving one state’s outstanding criminal charges against a prisoner who is
incarcerated in another state. State v. Wells , 638 N.W.2d 4 56, 459 (Minn. App. 2002),
review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2002). The purpose of the IAD is to require prompt
disposition of outstanding charges so that a person incarcerated in one state receives a
speedy trial on those charges. State v. Burks , 631 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Minn. App. 2001).

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Both Minnesota and Wisconsin are parties to this agreement, codified in Minn. Stat.
§ 629.294, subd. 1 (2020), and in Wis. Stat. § 976.05 (2020).
The Minnesota statute provides that a prisoner who has
pending in any other party state any untried indictment,
information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has
been lodged against the prisoner , [ ] shall be brought to trial
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to
the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the
prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of
his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be
made.
Minn. Stat. § 629.294, subd. 1, art. III(a); State v. Kurz, 685 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn. App.
2004), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2004). We apply a de novo standard of review to the
construction and application of the IAD . State v. Dickerson , 777 N.W.2d 529, 531 -32
(Minn. App. 2010) (citing Burks, 631 N.W.2d at 412) , review denied (Minn. Mar. 30,
2010).
Appellant argues that he received notice of a detainer in Minnesota while he was in
custody in Wisconsin , and sent two letter requests to Minnesota in October 2014 and
January 2015 for final disposition of his pending Minnesota case. Appellant argues that
because his case was not resolved within 180 days of these requests, his rights were violated
and the case must be dismissed with prejudice.
We do not agree. The IAD sets forth specific processes and procedures that a
prisoner must follow to seek relief under the IAD. To begin:
The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a
certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the
prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time

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remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good
time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and
any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
Minn. Stat. § 629.294, subd. 1, art. III(a).
This written notice and request for final disposition “shall be given or sent by the
prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of
him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appro priate
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” Id.,
art. III(b). The official who has custody of the prisoner must then “promptly inform [the
prisoner] of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information,
or complaint on which the detainer is based.” Id., art. III(c). The official must also notify
the “appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state
to which the prisoner’s request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being
initiated by the prisoner.” Id., art. III(d). Any request under this section is also “deemed
to be a waiver of extradition.” Id., art. III(e).
Appellant failed to follow the procedural require ments clearly set forth in the IAD.
Appellant sent two letters directly to the Hennepin County District Court. He has not
presented any evidence showing that he sent the proper written notice and request for final
disposition “to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having c ustody
of him,” or “that the official with custody over him notified the county prosecutors of his
request for final disposition.” Id., art. III(b) , (d). Nor did appellant agree to waive
extradition. Id., art. III(e). We have no authority to disregard the plain language of the
statute. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020) (stating that courts must apply statute’ s plain

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meaning if its language is clear and unambiguous); see also State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d
818, 821 (Minn. 2004) (instructing courts to interpret statutory language according to its
plain meaning if it is clear and unambiguous and not resort to other principles of statutory
construction). Because appellant failed to submit a proper request under the IA D, it does
not apply.
We also note that appellant appears to confuse a detainer with a warrant. The
district court did not file or serve a detainer on appellant. The district court issued a warrant
for appellant’s arrest based on his failures to appear for his hearing dates. But a warrant is
distinct from a detainer request. A warrant is a “writ issued directly by a judge to a law -
enforcement officer, especially for the arrest of a person who has been held in contempt,
has been indicted, has disobeyed a subpoena, or has failed to appear for a hearing or trial.”
Burrell v. State , 858 N.W.2d 779, 785 n.2 (Minn. 2015) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary
1819 (10th ed. 2014)). “[A] detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a
prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges
in another jurisdiction.” Dickerson, 777 N.W.2d at 532. And “the protections of the IAD
are not invoked when no detainer is filed.” Id. (citing United States v. Mauro , 436 U.S.
340, 364 n.30, 98 S. Ct. 1834, 1849 n.30 (1978) (“It is only when a party to the IAD does
file a detainer that it becomes bound by the [IAD’s] provisions.”)).
Because appellant disregarded the processes and procedures articulated in the IAD,
it cannot support relief. Appellant is not entitled to reversal of his conviction under the
IAD.

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II. Appellant is not entitled to relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Appellant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. W hen a defendant
raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a direct appeal, we examine the claim
under the two-prong test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2068 (1984). See also State v. Ellis -Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017)
(applying the Strickland test). “Under the Strickland test, [a criminal defendant] must
demonstrate that (1) his counsel’ s performance fell below a n objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have
been different but for counsel’s errors.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
Appellate courts “need not address both the perfo rmance and prejudice prongs if one is
dispositive.” Id.
Appellant has not shown that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. A strong presumption exists that counsel’s representation is
reasonable. King v. State , 562 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1997). Additionally, “[a] n
attorney’s failure to raise meritless claims does not constitute deficient performance and
cannot provide the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Dickerson, 777 N.W.2d at
535 (determining that defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by
declining to assert a meritless claim under the IAD). Because defense counsel’s
performance is not deficient for failing to raise a meritless claim under the IAD, appellant
has not satisfied his burden related to the first Strickland prong. Thus appellant fails to
present a claim for relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.