Catherine Ann Moore, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0512

Catherine Ann Moore, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge*

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-17-13028

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistan t County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant Catherine Ann Moore challeng es the postconviction court’s denial,
without a hearing, of her petiti on to withdraw her guilty plea to the charges of terroristic
threats and domestic assault. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2017, B.D.R. returned home from work at approxima tely 4:30 p.m. to find
multiple bottles of alcohol throug hout the residence he shared with his fiancée, Moore.
According to B.D.R., he tried to convince Moore to go to the hosp ital because she was
bleeding from her rectum. But Moore refused and in the process threatened B.D.R. with a
knife. While making jabbing motions with the knife, Moore struck B.D.R., causing several
small lacerations.
B.D.R. called the police, and stated that Moore was bleeding and that he wanted to
see a doctor. He reported that Moore had been drinking alcohol. Upon their arrival,
deputies noticed that Moore smelled of alcohol and had bloodshot eyes. Moore denied that
she had been drinking and claimed that B.D.R. was trying to take her to the hospital against
her will. Moore also denied the incident with the knife, stating that she was defending
herself. Moore was arrested and was charged with one count of second-degree assault, one
count of terroristic threats, and one count of gross misdemeanor domestic assault.
At the plea hearing, Moor e pleaded guilty to terrorist ic threats and an amended
misdemeanor domestic-assault count. In exchange for Moore’s plea, the state agreed to a
stay of adjudication on the terroristic-threats count, a stay of imposition on the domestic-

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assault count, and a dismissal of the second-degree assault count. The parties also agreed
that the terroristic-threats offense would be sentenced as a gross misdemeanor if a sentence
were ever imposed. The district court accepted Moore’s plea and sentenced her according
to the plea agreement.
Approximately two years la ter, Moore petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking
to withdraw her guilty plea on the ground that her plea was invalid because it lacked an
adequate factual basis. The postconviction court denied her request ed relief and denied
her request for a hearing. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
A. Plea Withdrawal
“We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or
made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn.
2017) (quotation and citation omitted). We will sustain the postconviction court’s
findings if they are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Cuypers v. State, 711
N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. 2006).
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But a court must allow withdrawal if it is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Id. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea
is not valid.” Id. at 94. A constitutionally valid plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent. Id. The defendant bears the burden of showing that his plea was invalid. Id.;

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see also Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). The validity of a guilty plea
is a question of law that we review de novo. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
Moore argues that withdrawal of her guilty plea is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice because her plea was inaccurate and, therefore, invalid. Specifically, Moore
contends that there is an insufficient factua l basis supporting her guilty plea to terroristic
threats because she did not act in reckless di sregard of the risk of causing terror and an
insufficient factual basis supporting her guilty plea to domestic assault because she did not
act with the intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm.
A guilty plea is accurate if it is su pported by a proper factual basis. State v. Theis,
742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007). A proper factual basis exists “if the record contains a
showing that there is credible evidence available which woul d support a jury verdict that
[the] defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to whic h [s]he pled guilty.”
Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016) provides that a person is guilty of terroristic
threats if she “threatens, directly or indirec tly, to commit any crime of violence with the
purpose to terrorize another . . . or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror
or inconvenience.” This court has held that “recklessly making terroristic threats is not a
specific-intent crime.” State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 58 (Minn. App. 2009). Reckless
disregard “means that the defendant, even though not having the specific purpose of
terrorizing another , recklessly risks the danger that th e statements would be taken as
threats by another and that they would cause extreme fear.” Id. at 57 (quotation omitted).
The state does not need to prove that the victim actually experienced extreme fear. Id.

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Moore admitted that she threatened to cut B.D.R.’s throat while holding a knife and
that she intended to cause him fear. She e ngaged in the following exchange with her
attorney at the plea hearing:
Q: . . . You said that you would kill him?
A: I said that if you come closer to me, I will cut your throat.
Q: Okay. And you were holding a knife at that time?
A: I was.
Q: And you understand you are giving up your right to claim
self-defense in this matter?
A: I understand that I am givi ng up that right by making this
plea.
Q: Okay. And also you would agree that you intended him to
be afraid that you would in fact do that?
A: I wanted him to believe that I would do that, yes. I wanted
him to leave me alone.

This record provides an ade quate factual basis to support the accuracy of Moore’s guilty
plea to terroristic threats.
Moore also pleaded guilty to domestic a ssault. A person is guilty of domestic
assault if she “commits an act [against a family or hous ehold member] with the intent to
cause fear in another of immediate bodily ha rm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd.
1 (2016). Assault-fear is a sp ecific-intent crime that requires the state to prove that the
defendant intended to cause a particular result—namely fear of immediate bodily harm or
death. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2012). “‘With intent to’ . . . means
that the actor either has a purpo se to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes
that the act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2016).
With respect to the domestic-assault count, the following exchange between Moore
and her attorney occurred at the plea hearing:

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Q: On that same day and same series of incidents, would you
agree that you intended by your actions to make your fiancé
afraid that he would be harmed?
A: I intended to make him afra id that he would be harmed if
he continued to pursue me, yes.
Q: And you are giving up your right to claim self-defense in
that matter?
A: I am giving up that right.

Moore’s testimony supports a finding that she intended to cause B.D.R. to fear immediate
bodily harm.
We conclude that Moore has not met her burden to show that her pleas were invalid.
To the contrary, the record well supports the factual bases for the pleas. Therefore, Moore
is not entitled to withdraw her pleas.
B. Denial of Evidentiary Hearing
Moore argues that the postconviction cour t abused its discre tion by denying an
evidentiary hearing because her affidavit alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle her to
relief. We review the postconviction court’s decision to grant or deny an evidentiary
hearing for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012).
A postconviction petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is
entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). But a postconviction court
“need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alle ges facts that, if true, are
legally insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief.” Zumberge v. State, 937 N.W.2d
406, 411 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “[A] defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing if her allegations lack factual support and are directly refuted by her own testimony

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in the record. Williams v. State , 760 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 21, 2009).
Here, Moore alleged in a postconviction affidavit that the only reason she pleaded
guilty was because she was afraid she might be hospitalized if she did not plead guilty. But
this allegation is directly refuted by her own testimony at the plea hearing. See id. On this
record, the postconviction cour t properly exercised its di scretion by denying Moore an
evidentiary hearing on the petition.
Affirmed.