City of Shoreview, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0513

City of Shoreview,
Respondent,

vs.

Mohamad Amro, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed March 1, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-19-3568

Joseph A. Kelly, Kevin M. Beck, Kelly & Lemmons, PA, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Ferdinand F. Peters, Benjamin P. Loetscher, Patrick M. Kennedy, Ferdinand F. Peters, Esq.
Law Firm, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant s Spring Lake Park Gardens, LLC and
Mohamad Amro)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The City of Shoreview co mmenced this action to abate a nuisance at Mohamad
Amro’s residence. Amro did not serve a pr oper answer to the summ ons and complaint.
The district court granted the city’s motion for default judgment and later denied Amro’s

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motion to vacate the default judgment. We conc lude that the district court did not err by
entering default judgment because Amro did not serve a valid answer or otherwise respond
to the complaint. We also conclude that th e district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Amro and his family live in a home in the city of Shoreview that is owned by Spring
Lake Park Gardens, LLC (SLPG), a company of which Amro is the registered manager.
In 2018, Amro began performing significant landscaping work, including the construction
of a berm. In 2018 and early 2019, the city and Ramsey County repeatedly informed Amro
that he was not in compliance with various ordinances and codes due to the accumulation
of refuse and debris, outdoor storage of construction material and construction equipment,
outdoor storage of inoperable vehicles, and uncovered excavation. Amro did not resolve
the issues to the city’s satisfaction.
On March 1, 2019, the city sent Amro a le tter stating that he must take action to
resolve the issues on his property by March 15 and that the city council planned to discuss
the matter at an upcoming March 18 meeting. At the meeting, the city council passed a
resolution ordering Amro to abate the nuisance conditions on his property by April 30,
2019. The city sent Amro written notice of the resolution on Marc h 20, 2019. The city
inspected Amro’s property on March 21, 2019, and May 2, 2019, but determined on each
visit that the property still was not in compliance.
On May 15, 2019, the city commenced this action against Amro and SLPG to
enforce the city council’s resolution. In early June 2019, Amro faxed a one-page document

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to an attorney representing the city. The document consists of a photocopy of the first page
of the summons with two handwritten comments and a handwritten date. In the top margin,
in printed letters, is the handwritten comment , “Attention Kevin M. Beck,” who is the
attorney who signed the summons and the comp laint on behalf of th e city. Below the
caption, also in printed letters, is the handw ritten comment, “I’m contesting the charges.”
No signature or printed name of the person responsible for the handwriting appears on the
document.
In early July 2019, the city filed a motion for default judgment. The city sent the
motion papers to Amro via U.S. Mail. The district court he ld a hearing on the motion in
mid-July. Neither Amro nor SLPG appeared at the hearing. The district court granted the
city’s motion. The district court’s order states that Amro and SLPG must abate the
nuisance on the property by July 23, 2019; that the city could enter the property and abate
the nuisance after that date if Amro and SLPG fail to do so; a nd that if the city needs to
perform abatement work, “it may assess the costs of said abat ement to the property taxes
of the Property.” The district court administrator entered judgment on July 25, 2019, and
the notice of judgment indicates that a copy was sent to Amro and SLPG. On July 30 and
31, 2019, the city entered Amro’s property and abated the nuisance.
In mid-August 2019, with the assistance of counsel, Amro and SLPG filed a motion
to vacate the default judgment. The city opposed the motion. The district court held a
hearing on the motion, at which it allowe d Amro and SLPG to submit additional
evidentiary materials. The district court held a second hearing on the motion in December

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2019 after the case was reassigned to a different judge. The district court filed a one-page
order denying the motion to vacate the default judgment.
Amro and SLPG appe al. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to appellants
collectively as Amro.
DECISION
Amro argues that the distri ct court erred in two ways: first, by granting the city’s
motion for default judgment and, second, by denying his motion to vacate the default
judgment. In response, the city argues that the district court did not err in either respect.
In addition, the city argues that the appeal is moot because the city has abated the nuisance.
We will begin by considering the city’s mootness argument.
I. Mootness
As stated above, the city argues that th e appeal is moot because the nuisance has
been abated, which was the object of its lawsuit.
“An appeal is moot when ‘a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an
award of effective relief is no longer possible.’” State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d
393, 401 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015)).
If an event occurs after the district court ha s made a decision or entered judgment that
makes “a decision on the merits unnecessary or an award of effective relief impossible, the
appeal will be dismissed as moot.” In re Inspection of Minnes ota Auto Specialties, Inc. ,
346 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn. 1984); see also Housing & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City
of Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 2002).

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We take as given the city’s representati on that the object of its lawsuit has been
achieved. But the relevant question is whether Amro may obtain any relief on his appeal.
In his reply brief, Amro argues that the appe al is not moot because the default judgment
allows the city to assess his property taxes in an amount equal to th e costs of the city’s
abatement work. Amro is correct that the default judgment allows the city to impose such
an assessment. The record reflects that Sh oreview incurred expenses of approximately
$15,000 on the abatement that it performed in late July 2019. If Amro were successful on
either of his arguments for reversal of the district court’s orders, relief may be available to
him with respect to the $15,000 assessment on his property taxes. Thus, the appeal is not
moot.
II. Motion for Default Judgment
Amro argues that, for two reasons, the dist rict court erred by granting the city’s
motion for default judgment.
A. Sufficiency of the Answer
Amro first contends that the district court erred by finding him to be in default. A
district court may enter default judgment agai nst a defendant who “has failed to plead or
otherwise defend within the time allowed therefor.” Mi nn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. The
appropriate responsive pleading in a civil action is “an answer.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 7.01.
The form of pleadings is governed by rule 10 of the rules of civil procedure, and the content
of an answer is governed by rule 8. Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.02-.06, 10.01-.04. In addition,
every pleading “shall be signed by the party” if “the party is self-represented.” Minn. R.
Civ. P. 11.01. This court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s

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interpretation of the rules of civil procedure. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc. , 875
N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 2016).
At the July 2019 hearing, th e district court stated that, even if the one-page document
were liberally construed, it would not constitute a “proper response to the complaint.” In
its subsequent order, the district court stated, “Defendants have failed to serve an Answer
to the Complaint and are wholly in default.” Amro contends that the district court erred in
making this determination, asserting that pro se pleadings should be liberally construed
and that “there was sufficient indicia of appella nts’ intent to contest the charges.” Amro
acknowledges that, “[a]lthough some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants,”
they “are generally held to th e same standards as attorneys and must comply with court
rules.” See Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001).
Amro’s contention does not confront the re quirement in rule 11 that every pleading
be signed, either by an attorney or by a self-represented party.1 It cannot be disputed that
there is no signature on the one-page document that Amro faxed to th e city’s attorney.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by determining that Amro was in default because
he did not serve a signed answer.
B. Notice of Default
Amro contends, in the alternative, that he was not given notice of the defect in his
purported answer. He bases this contenti on on rule 11, which states, “An unsigned

1We note the city’s argument that the one-page document also was defective with
respect to SLPG because a company may not appear pro se. See Save Our Creeks v. City
of Brooklyn Park, 699 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. 2005). We need not consider that argument
in light of our resolution of other issues and our ultimate decision to affirm.

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document shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after
being called to the attenti on of the attorney or party .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.01 (emphasis
added). He relies on the italicized text in co ntending that the city had a duty to call his
attention to the defect in his answer. He further contends that, if the defect had been called
to his attention, he could have sought to cure it. See DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 267-69; Save
Our Creeks, 699 N.W.2d at 310-11. In response, th e city contends that rule 11 does not
require a plaintiff to give notice to a defendant of a defective answer and that, even if such
a duty exists, the city fulfilled the duty by sending Amro its motion papers via U.S. Mail.
Amro does not cite any caselaw for the proposition that rule 11 imposes a duty on a
plaintiff to give a defendant notice of a deficient answer, and we are not aware of any such
authority. The rule itself does not expressly state that a plaintiff must do so; the rule merely
specifies a consequence in the event that a defendant is alerted to an unsigned answer and
thereafter corrects it. The rule governing default judgments does not require that notice of
a default be given in all cases; it requires a plaintiff to serve a default-judgment motion on
a defendant only if the defendant previously has appeared. Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01(b).
In any event, we need not decide whet her rule 11 imposes a duty on a plaintiff to
give notice to a defendant of a defective answer. Even if th ere is such a duty, the city
satisfied the duty when it sent its default-judgment motion to Amro by U.S. Mail. The city
submitted two affidavits stating that it did so, and the district court found that the city did
so, and Amro has not challenged that finding on appeal. Notice of the default-judgment
motion effectively called Amro’s attention to the lack of a signature on the document that
he now claims was an answer.

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Thus, the district court did not err by gran ting the city’s motion for default judgment.
III. Motion to Vacate Default Judgment
Amro also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to vacate the
default judgment.
“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from
a final judgment . . . and may order a new trial or grant such other relief as may be just” for
any one of six reasons, including “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, 60.02(a). In Finden v. Klass, 128 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1964), the
district court entered a default judgment afte r the defendant’s attorney neglected to serve
and file an answer. Id. at 749-50. The defendant moved to vacate the default judgment
pursuant to rule 60.02, and the district court denied the motion. Id. at 750. On appeal, the
supreme court stated that a district court sh ould grant relief under rule 60.02(a) if the
defendant “(a) is possessed of a reasonable defense on the merits, (b) has a reasonable
excuse for his failure or neglect to answer, (c) has acted with due diligence . . . after notice
of the entry of judgment, and (d) [shows] that no substantial prejudice will result to the
other party.” Id. (quotations and footnote omitted); see also Buck Blacktop, Inc. v. Gary
Contracting & Trucking Co. , 929 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Minn. App. 2019). This court applies
an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s denial of a motion for relief
under rule 60.02(a). See, e.g., Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 619 (Minn. 2016).
In this case, the district court filed a one-page order without an accompanying
memorandum. The district court’s order did not discuss the four requirements of the
Finden test. On appeal, Amro contends that he satisfied each of the four requirements. In

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response, the city contends that Amro satisfied none of them. We will consider the parties’
arguments with respect to each of the four re quirements, assuming that the district court
made an implicit finding against Amro on each requirement.
A. Reasonable Defense
Amro first contends that he has a reasonable defense on the merits. A reasonable
defense on the merits must be supported by “more than conclusory statements.” In re
Welfare of Children of Coats, 633 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). The
party seeking relief must “in good faith, make a showing of facts, which if established will
constitute a good defense.” Frontier Lumber & Hardware, Inc. v. Dickey , 183 N.W.2d
788, 790 (Minn. 1971) (quotation omitted). Th e requisite showing must be more than an
“unverified statement.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Amro contends that he has a reasonable defense on the merits because there was no
nuisance on his property. But Amro’s brie f does not explain why the condition of the
property was not in violation of city ordi nances, and his oral argument was lacking in
specifics. On the other hand, the city submitted numerous photographs showing the refuse,
construction materials, inoperable vehicles, and other debris on the property. The city also
submitted correspondence from the c ity to Amro describing spec ific code violations that
created a nuisance. Amro’s general denials do not establish a reasonable defense on the
merits. Accordingly, the dist rict court did not abuse its di scretion by making an implicit
finding that Amro did not satisfy the first requirement of the Finden test.

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B. Reasonable Excuse
Amro next contends that he has a reasonable excuse for not properly responding to
the complaint: the city did not give him notice that his one-page fax was unsigned. As
explained above in part II.B., th e city sent its default-judgme nt motion to Amro by U.S.
Mail. After the city did so, Amro did not se ek to cure the defec tive answer and did not
attend the hearing on the motion for default judgment. Accordingly, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by making an implicit finding that Amro did not satisfy the second
requirement of the Finden test.
C. Due Diligence
Amro next contends that he acted promptly after receiving notice of the default
judgment. Specifically, he asserts that he retained an attorney and filed a rule 60.02 motion
within 16 days. But, more importantly in the circumstances of this case, Amro did not take
any action between the date on which he received notice of the default judgment and the
date on which the city was authorized to enter the property and abate the nuisance. To be
sure, that period of time was short. The dist rict court reasonably c ould have found that
Amro did not lack due diligence by not taking any immediate action. But the district court
also could reasonably find that Amro should have taken immediate action after learning of
the order and judgment in light of the likelihood that the c ity would promptly enter his
property and make physical changes to it. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by making an implicit finding that Amro did not satisfy the third requirement of
the Finden test.

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D. Prejudice
Amro last contends that the city would not have been substantially prejudiced if the
district court had granted his rule 60.02 moti on. He asserts that all witnesses are still
available. In response, the city asserts that it relied in good faith on the default judgment
by entering the property and abating the nuisance. As a consequence, the physical evidence
of the alleged nuisance is no longer available. If the city were required to prove that a
nuisance existed in early 2019, it would need to rely solely on its documentation of the
prior condition of the property, which likely would limit its ability to prepare for a trial on
the merits. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by making an implicit
finding that Amro did not satisfy the fourth requirement of the Finden test.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that Amro
did not satisfy any of the four requirements of the Finden test. Thus, the district court did
not err by denying Amro’s motion to vacate the default judgment.
Affirmed.