State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0526

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Casey Jo Eggum,
Appellant.

Filed January 11, 2021
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-19-407

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David J. Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Abigail H. Lambert, Assistant County
Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Casey Jo Eggum challenges th e 57-month prison sentence imposed by
the district court after he pleaded guilty to first-degree arson of a dwelling. He argues that
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional
departure and imposing a sentence within the presumptive range. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines esta blish presumptive sentences for criminal
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (201 8). A district court may depart from the
presumptive sentence only when there exist “identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2018). “Substantial
and compelling circumstances are those that make a case atypical.” State v. Walker, 913
N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). “When factors that may justify departing from the
presumptive sentence are present, a court must exercise its discretion and consider the
factors.” State v. Kier , 678 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
June 15, 2004).
District courts have great discretion when imposing sentences, and appellate courts
reverse sentencing decisions only when the district court abuses its discretion. State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 3 07-08 (Minn. 2014). We will not reverse the district court’s
refusal to depart “as long as the record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the

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testimony and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Pegel, 795
N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
When considering a dispositional departure, the district court focuses “more on the
defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him
and for society.” State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Mi nn. 1983). A defendant’s
particular amenability to probation is a proper gro und to justify a dispositional departure
from a presumptive sentence. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308. The requirement of particular
amenability ensures that “the defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes the
defendant from most others and truly pr esents the substantial and compelling
circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Id. at 309 (quotation omitted).
Relevant factors for determining whether th e defendant is particularly amenable to
probation include the defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude
in court, and support of friends and family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure because he is particularly amenable to probation.
He points to his minimal prior criminal hist ory, remorse, willingness to comply with the
conditions of probation, and willingness to participate in chemical-dependency treatment.
Some of those factors were present. The sentencing worksheet reported that appellant had
a criminal-history score of zero. Appellant claimed that his criminal behavior was driven
by drug addiction, and he underwent progra mming at the detention center while the case
was pending to address that addiction. An d the drug and alcohol counselor who treated
appellant at the detention cent er opined that there was a hi gh probability that appellant

4
would not reoffend if he completed the treatment program, followed its recommendations,
and remained sober. Nevertheless, even when there is evidence that the defendant would
be particularly amenable to probation, a district court is not required to impose a downward
dispositional departure. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009).
Moreover, other factors demonstrated that appellant was not particularly amenable
to probation. Appellant had completed tr eatment programs in the past and had short
periods of sobriety, but he eventually relapsed. Also, although appellant completed
probation for misdemeanor and gross-misdemeanor convictions for offenses he committed
in 2015, he violated that probation three times for failure to report and for failure to obtain
a chemical-dependency evaluation.
The district court considered those fact s when it denied appellant’s motion for a
downward dispositional departure. It reasoned:
Your performance on probation in other cases, as has
been pointed out, isn’t as stellar as simply saying, “I succeeded
on probation”; right? Maybe you did succeed on probation in
those other cases, but it wasn ’t without many bumps, and it
wasn’t a perfect score; it was really: you endured it until it
ended, and you succeeded that way.
Furthermore, the district court correctly obser ved that, even if appellant had the potential
to succeed in a treatment program, a dispositional departure required him to be particularly
amenable to probation, not just amenable to probation. The record shows that the district
court carefully evaluated the evidence when making its deci sion. There is therefore no
basis for us to reverse the district court’s exercise of its discretion.

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Additionally, appellant argues that the di strict court imprope rly relied on the
severity of the offense and its effect on the victims when denying his motion. He maintains
that the district court should focus primarily on the defendant as an individual, rather than
the nature of the offense, when determining whether to grant a dispositional departure. The
district court did take into account the serious ness of appellant’s offense. It stated that
appellant’s case was not “encour aging” and was “far beyond the kind of case we would
normally see,” due to the danger that appellant put himself and others in, his “callousness,”
and his “total disregard” for the effect of his actions. Even though the district court
considered offense-related factors, it also took into account of fender-related factors,
including appellant’s multiple violations of proba tion in previous cases. The offender-
related factors adequately demonstrated that appellant was not particularly amenable to
probation. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence
within the presumptive range.
Affirmed.