State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0533

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mayson Kellon Lueck,
Appellant.

Filed April 19, 2021
Reversed
Bryan, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-19-1766

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joe Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Pakou Moua, Assistant County Attorney, Milaca,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgmen t of conviction for f ourth-degree criminal
damage to property, appellant argues that th is court must reverse his conviction because
respondent failed to prove bey ond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to

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damage property. Because the circumstance s proved provide for a reasonable inference
other than guilt, we reverse appellant’s conviction.
FACTS
On August 19, 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Mayson
Kellon Lueck with fourth-degre e criminal damage to propert y in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.595, subdivision 3 (2016). The co mplaint alleged that Lueck
intentionally broke the door window of his jail cell. The case proceeded to trial and the
state called two witnesses and introduced two exhibits. Lueck did not testify. The evidence
presented established the following facts.
On February 18, 2017, a corrections officer was working at the medium-maximum
security male housing unit in th e Mille Lacs County jail. On e part of that housing unit,
referred to as “M-Block,” contains two single -person cells and is secured remotely such
that only correctional officers have access. One inmate was locked in cell M-1 and Lueck
was alone in cell M-2, which has two clear glass windows on the cell door. After serving
the inmates dinner, the officer returned to his desk a nd heard “some banging, maybe
kicking” coming from M-Block. The officer testified that these are frequent noises that he
is used to hearing and that inmates sometimes use these sounds to communicate with each
other. He testified that in this case the noi se was “very brief.” The officer went to
investigate. Upon returning to M-Block, th e officer “could see there was something off
about” the M-2 cell-door window. The officer radioed for another officer to come to M-
Block. This officer also testified at trial. One of the two windows on the cell door for cell
M-2 cell was broken, and there was glass on the inside and outside of the cell. Lueck was

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still inside cell M-2 and standing “roughly in the middle of the cell.” One of the officers
opened the cell door and ordered Lueck to sit on the bed. Lueck complied, and the officers
noticed the rectangular dinner tray on the ground with a towel wrapped around one of the
short ends. Lueck was not injured, did not ha ve shards of glass in his skin, and was not
bleeding. While the officers cleaned up, Lueck appeared upset but sat quietly on the bed,
was cooperative, and did not create any issues.
At some point, there was video footage of the incident, but it does not exist anymore
due to a change in camera systems. One officer testified that he had watched the video at
some point, but that “it wasn’t all that intere sting.” The footage was of the outside of the
cell and all the officer could see was an empty room with glass falling. The window was
eventually replaced for $318.64. The jury found Lueck guilty and the district court
sentenced Lueck to 90 days in jail and ordered $318.64 in restitution. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Lueck argues that the eviden ce is insufficient to support his conviction of fourth-
degree criminal damage to property. Beca use the circumstances proved provide for a
reasonable inference other than guilt, we reverse Lueck’s conviction.
To convict Lueck of fourth -degree criminal damage to property, the state was
required to prove that Lueck “intentionally caus e[d] damage to another person’s physical
property without the other pe rson’s consent, reducing the property’s value by less than
$500.” Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subds. 2, 3 (2016). “‘Inten tionally’ means that the actor
either has a purpose to do th e thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act
performed by the actor, if succe ssful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd.

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9(3) (2016). Generally, the state proves in tent by introducing circumstantial evidence.
State v. Mattson, 359 N.W.2d 616, 617 (Minn. 1984); see also State v. Johnson , 616
N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000) (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by
inference from words and acts of the acto r both before and after the incident.”).
Circumstantial evidence is “ev idence from which the [fact-finder] can infer whether the
facts in dispute existe d or did not exist.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted).
When the state relies solely on circumstan tial evidence to prove the element of
intent, we apply the circumstantial -evidence standard of review. State v. Griffin , 887
N.W.2d 257, 264 (Minn. 2016). The circumstantial-evidence standard requires a “review
[of] the sufficiency of the evidence using a two-step analysis.” State v. Barshaw , 879
N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 2016). The first step is to “identify the circumstances proved,
deferring to the fact-finder’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection
of evidence in the record that conflicted w ith the circumstances proved by the State.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Under the second step of the circum stantial-evidence test, the
reviewing court must “independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that
might be drawn from the circumstances prove d to determine whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsiste nt with any rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial ev idence must form a complete chain
that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to
exclude beyond a reasonabl e doubt any reasonable infe rence other than guilt.”
State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). In this second step, no deference is

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given to the jury’s verdict. Loving v. State , 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). “If a
reasonable inference other than guilt exists, then we will reverse the conviction.” Id.
In this case, the state proved th e following circumstances at trial: (1) the window
was not broken before the officer served Lueck dinner; (2) the officer heard a “very brief”
noise coming from M-Block after serving dinner; (3) the officer returned to M-Block and
observed that the M-2 cell-door window was broken; (4) Lueck was the only person in the
M-2 cell; (5) the inmate in M-1 could not ha ve broken the window; (6) no one else had
access to cell M-2; (7) inside cell M-2, the officer observed broken glass and a dinner tray
on the ground with a towel wrapped around the end of it; (8) Lueck was compliant and
remained quiet while the officers cleaned up ; (9) Lueck was not injured; and (10) the
window cost $318.64 to repair.
Lueck argues that a reasonable inference from the circumstances proved is that he
accidently broke the window. We agree that the jury c ould have reasonably inferred that
Lueck accidentally boke the cell door window. The state argues that the tray wrapped in a
towel is inconsistent with brea king the window by accident. According to the state, the
position of the towel indicates that Lueck sought to protect himself from glass shards when
he deliberately broke the window. Relying on Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at 726, and Barnslater
v. State , 805 N.W.2d 910, 914-15 (Minn. App. 2011), the state argues that Lueck
intentionally broke the window because he ba nged the window with the tray or threw the
tray at the window and because the natural and probable cons equence of doing either act
is damage to the window.

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The circumstances proved, however, do not rule out the possibility of damaging the
window by accident. There is no evidence that Lueck used the tray to bang on the window
or that he threw the tray at the window. There is no evidence regarding how the window
broke, the type of glass used in the window, or the degree of force necessary to break the
glass on the window. While the jury could have concluded th at Lueck used the tray to
deliberately break the window, the circumstan ces proved also support another reasonable
conclusion: that Lueck accidentally broke the window. The circumstances proved do not
“exclude beyond a reasonable doubt” the inference that the window was broken by
accident. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 206. Because the circumstances proved do not exclude
this inference, we reverse the conviction.
Reversed.