State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0543

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Edward Earl Williams,
Appellant.

Filed April 26, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-1171

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Je ffrey A. Wald, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Wo rke, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Dissatisfied with how his case was be ing handled, appellant Edward Williams
discharged his public defender. Williams th en requested and was appointed advisory
counsel by the district court. When doing so, the court warned W illiams that advisory

2
counsel was for the limited purpose of offe ring Williams advice upon request, not to
represent him at trial. But on the day of trial, Williams asked the district court to “upgrade”
his advisory counsel so that she could take over representation. The district court refused.
Williams now argues that the district court’s denial of his request was an abuse of discretion
and structural error. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Williams’s request, and because there is no constitutional right to advisory counsel, we
affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Edward Willia ms with third-degree criminal sexual
conduct.1 Williams requested and was appointed a public defender by the district court.
Williams subsequently entered a plea of not guilty and dema nded a speedy trial. But on
the week that trial was set to begin, due to delays in receiving DNA test results, the district
court granted the state’s request for a continuance. In response, Williams asked that he be
conditionally released, citing his demand for a speedy trial and his mid-range
risk-assessment score. The district court deni ed Williams’s request, but indicated that if
the state was not prepared for trial on May 28, 2019, the court w ould grant conditional
release.
When the parties appeared for trial on May 28, 2019, Williams’s public defender
requested a continuance for additional time to review the DNA test results. At the same
time, Williams renewed his request for conditional release. The district court granted the

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(d) (2018).

3
continuance, but denied the request for conditional release because it was Williams, not the
state, now delaying proceedings.
Williams then declared that he wanted to discharge his public defender. In response,
the district court expressed concerns over Williams’s ability to successfully proceed pro se,
explaining that “although you have a right to represent yourself at this trial, I don’t think
that you have the ability to fully and ably pr otect your interests in this case.” After
discussing the consequences of proceeding pro se with the court, Williams chose to retain
his public defender.
Yet at the next hearing, Williams changed his mind. As before, the district court
strongly discouraged Williams from dischargin g his lawyer and scheduled a hearing for
the following week to further discuss the issue. When th e parties returned, Williams
insisted on discharging his public defender, despite the district court’s concerns. Williams
asserted that any gaps in his knowledge could be filled by advi sory counsel. This led to
the following exchange between Williams and the district court:
THE COURT: And so you understa nd that what is going to
happen here, is there will be times where you
will lack the sufficient training and ability to
competently represent yourself. Right?
WILLIAMS: I believe there could be possible times where
I would have to ask questions for the
[advisory] counsel.
THE COURT: Well, you understand that I am under no
obligation to appoint [advisory] counsel to
represent you?
WILLIAMS: Correct, and that would be your choice.

4
THE COURT: Right. And [adv isory] counsel is under no
obligation in advance of the trial to prepare
anywhere—to anywhere close to the level that
your trial counsel . . . would be prepared and
does not carry the re sponsibility to fully
represent you in a trial, right?
WILLIAMS: Correct.
THE COURT: They are there mere ly to offer advice if you
request it, and if and only if you request it. So
first of all, I am not obligated—I may or may
not appoint advisory counsel to assist you, but
even if I do, they are there merely to respond
to your questions not to direct the strategy in
the case and not to inform you to step in and
say if they think you are making a bad
decision or executing some strategy in a poor
manner, right?
WILLIAMS: Correct.
THE COURT: And they will not be making arguments and
appear in front of the jury, right; that will be
up to you.
WILLIAMS: I am aware.

(Emphasis added.) Despite these warnings, Williams formally disc harged his public
defender. Upon Williams’s request, the district court appointed advisory counsel.
When the bench trial bega n, Williams appeared pro se with advisory counsel
present. But before opening arguments, W illiams moved to dismiss for violation of his
right to a speedy trial. When the district court denied the motion, Williams asked if he
could “upgrade” his advisory counsel to fully re present him at trial. The district court
denied the request, reminding Williams:
We had a pretty extensive di scussion on the record; in
fact, on more than one occasion . And my concern is that

5
[advisory counsel] has understood that her role so far has been
merely advisory. She hasn’t engaged in anything like the
preparation that your full-blow n defense counsel would do.
She is here to simply advise you. She is not fully prepared, and
you should understand that to act in the role of your lawyer in
the way your lawyer would be.

. . . .

. . . The reason I am not allo wing [advisory counsel] to
assume representation of you is because under this set of
circumstances I don’t believe she nor do I believe any attorney
could step in at this point a nd represent you in an adequate
fashion. Right.

It is not the role that she understood [she] would be
playing. And it is not the role the court requested that she
assume.

Williams then requested a continuance to gi ve advisory counsel time to prepare for
representation at trial, but the district court denied the request and the bench trial continued
as scheduled.
The district court found Williams guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
with a victim who was physically helpless. At sentencing, the district court granted a
downward durational departure and sentenced Williams to 36 months’ incarceration, with
credit for 331 days served.
2
Williams appeals.

2 The presumptive sentence was 41 to 57 months’ incarceration with a ten-year conditional
release period. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2018); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B (2018).

6
DECISION
Williams argues that the district court ab used its discretion by refusing his request
to have advisory counsel assume represen tation at trial and, in so doing, committed
structural error. In supplemental pro se briefing, Williams also claims that the district court
abused its discretion by denyi ng motions he made during th e proceedings—in particular,
his requests for pretrial release—and asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated.
We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying Williams’s request to
appoint advisory counsel as representation at trial.

Williams claims that the di strict court abused its disc retion by denying his request
to have advisory counsel repres ent him at trial. He argues that the denial constitutes an
abuse of discretion for two reasons: (1) the request was not intended to delay or disrupt the
proceedings; and (2) the district court failed to determine whether a dvisory counsel was,
in fact, unprepared to represent him at trial.
As Williams acknowledges, the decision to appoint advisory counsel lies within the
district court’s discretion, and we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of that discretion.
See State v. Clark , 722 N.W.2d 460, 466-68 (Minn. 2006) (recognizing discretion is
afforded to the district court). This standard also applies where, as here, a defendant seeks
to have their advisory counse l assume full representation. State v. Richards,
552 N.W.2d 197, 206-07 (Minn. 1996).
To review the district court’s exercise of that discretion, we begin with an
explanation of the two kinds of advisory couns el a court can appoint. The district court

7
will appoint the first type of advisory counsel when the court is concerned about the
fairness of the process. Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 2(1). Generally, this type of advisory
counsel is not expected to take over representation during the proceedings and the district
court will establish at the outset the scope of advisory counsel’s duties. Id., cmt. The court
will appoint the second type of advisory counsel when it is c oncerned about delays,
potential disruption by the defendant, or the complexity of the trial. Id., subd. 2(2). In
those circumstances, advisory counsel will assume full repr esentation if the defendant
becomes disruptive or requests counsel to take over representation. Id. Here, the parties
agree that the district court assigned the first type of advisory counsel.
Where a defendant has been appointed th e first type of advisory counsel, but
subsequently requests that advisory counsel ta ke on full representati on, the district court
should not grant the request unless it is “timely and reasona ble and reflects extraordinary
circumstances.”3 Richards, 552 N.W.2d at 206 (quotati on omitted). We turn now to
whether the district court appropriately considered these factors when it denied Williams’s
request.
Timeliness
Williams argues that the district court ab used its discretion by denying his request
because it was timely. Williams made the request before trial began, so he contends that

3 Williams identifies other factors that distri ct courts should co nsider, including the
progress of trial, the readiness of advisory counsel to assume representation, and the
potential for disruption of the proceedings in granting the request. But these factors are
inherent in the elements of timeliness, reas onableness, and extraordinary circumstances.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, cmt; Richards, 552 N.W.2d at 206-07.

8
there was no threat of disruption or delay of trial by allowing advisory counsel to prepare
for representation. And even if his request would have re quired further delay, Williams
asserts that the district court simply could have rescheduled the bench trial for the following
trial block.
At trial, the district court expressed concern about the time liness of Williams’s
request. Not only had trial al ready been delayed twice, W illiams had also consistently
reaffirmed his demand for a speedy trial and had just moved to dismiss for violation of his
right to a speedy trial. The district court determined that granting the request would likely
result in further delay because advisory counsel was not prepared to take over
representation and compound the speedy-trial issue. The district court carefully considered
the timeliness of Williams’s request and, given the history of continuances and speedy-trial
demands in this case, acted within its discretion to deny the request.
Reasonableness
Williams does not expressly address the re asonableness of his request, but argues
that the request was timely and was neither intended to cause, nor would have resulted in,
additional delay. Williams also disputes the district court’ s determination that advisory
counsel was not ready to take on full representation, arguing that the court could not have
made that determination without actually asking advisory counsel whether she was
prepared. Denying his request on these gr ounds, Williams claims, was an abuse of
discretion.
The district court’s prim ary concern about Williams’s request was that advisory
counsel was not prepared to re present Williams at trial. Although the court did not ask

9
counsel whether she was prepared for trial, the court had appointed her only 22 days before
trial began in a case involving DNA evidence, video recordings, and multiple witnesses.
The court also reiterated that advisory counsel—and Williams—had been told that
counsel’s role would be “merely advisory” and would not include “appear[ing] in front of
the jury.” And despite Williams’s claim that advisory counsel was adequately prepared,
he concedes in pro se briefing that on the day of trial advisory counsel told him “she would
need a little time to prepare” before representing him.
When Williams then asked for a continua nce to allow advisory counsel more time
to prepare, the district court reminded him th at trial had already be en delayed twice and
that any additional delay woul d violate Williams’s demand for a speedy trial. Delaying
trial, the district court also noted, presented “a hardship for the victim to continually have
to have this process be delayed so she can’t move on and gain closure.” Furthermore, the
court reminded Williams that there had been a “pretty extensive discussion” about
Williams’s choice to discharge his public de fender and proceed pro se with advisory
counsel.
The district court, by addressing adviso ry counsel’s preparedness, the potential for
further delay, the impact on the victim, and the repeated warnings Williams had been given,
seriously considered the reasonableness of W illiams’s request. As such, the court acted
within its broad discretion to deny Williams’s request.
Extraordinary Circumstances
Williams does not identify an y extraordinary circumstances to support his assertion
that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request. And our review of the

10
record reveals that there were no extraordinary circumstance s for the court to consider.
The circumstances were unchanged from when Williams discharged his public defender
and was appointed advisory counsel to when he made his request. No new evidence came
to light. No new witnesses we re called. No additional fact s were introduced. Nor could
Williams have been surprised by the scope of advisory counsel’s role at trial. The district
court repeatedly explained that advisory counsel had been appointed for the limited
purpose of advisement, not representation. Based on these unchanged circumstances, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Williams’s request.
In sum, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court
thoroughly considered the three relevant factors of timeliness, reasonableness, and
extraordinary circumstances when it denied Williams’s reque st. In doing so, the district
court acted within its broad discretion.
II. The district court did not commit st ructural error by denying Williams’s
request to have advisory counsel represent him at trial.

Williams also argues that the district court’ s denial of his request to have advisory
counsel take over representation at trial was structural error. In doing so, Williams asserts
the court deprived him of his constitutional right to representation, and as a result, he is
entitled to automatic reversal.
In reviewing a claim of structural erro r, we consider whether the alleged error
fundamentally affected the nature of the tria l so as to call into question its fairness and
reliability. State v. Dalbec , 800 N.W.2d 624, 627 (Minn. 2011). Minnesota appellate
courts have identified a “very limited class” of errors that are considered structural. Id.

11
(quotation omitted). The denial of a defendant’s constitutiona l right to representation,
which Williams contends occurred here, is such an error. State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238,
252 (Minn. 2005). But the constitutional right to representation does not include
representation by advisory counsel. State v. Chavez-Nelson , 882 N.W.2d 579, 587
(Minn. 2016) (“Simply put, there is no constitutional right to advisory counsel.”). As such,
the denial of advisory counsel is not a structural error requiring automatic reversal. Clark,
722 N.W.2d at 467 (concluding that the district court’s failure to appoint advisory counsel
“did not affect the structural integrity” of the trial becaus e the defendant did not have a
constitutional right to advisory counsel).
But Williams nonetheless urges us not to apply Chavez-Nelson because the facts in
this case are distinguishable. Williams claims that becau se, unlike the defendant in
Chavez-Nelson, he was never represented at trial, his right to representation was violated.
882 N.W.2d at 587. We disagree. In reac hing its decision, the supreme court explicitly
stated that because the defendant was unrepre sented during the in itial stages of trial by
choice, his constitutional right to repr esentation was not violated. Id. The same is true
here. Williams knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel when he dismissed
his public defender. His lack of representation was due to his own desire to discharge his
attorney, not due to an error committed by the district court. The district court’s denial of
Williams’s request was not structural error.

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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s request
for conditional release and Williams’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

Finally, Williams asserts additional claims in pro se briefing, but because not all are
adequately briefed, we focus on his arguments that the distri ct court abused its discretion
by denying him conditional release and vi olated his right to a speedy trial. 4 We review a
district court’s denial of pretrial release fo r an abuse of discreti on and review whether a
defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated de novo. State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620,
627 (Minn. 2017) (explaining that the denial of a speedy tr ial is a constitutional question
subject to de novo review); State v. Martin, 743 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2008) (stating
that the standard of review for pretrial release is for an abuse of discretion).
Conditional Release
While a case against a defendant is pendi ng, the district court must release the
defendant unless it finds that doing so would either endang er the public or would not
guarantee the defendant’s appearance at subse quent hearings. Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02,
subd. 1. Here, the district court did not re lease Williams, but instead adhered to its initial
decision that he should remain incarcerated with bail set at $20,000. Williams does not
explain—nor do we discern any evidence of—how the district court’s denial amounted to
an abuse of discretion. In fact, the district court had been prepared to release Williams on

4 Williams further asserts that the district co urt abused its discreti on by denying “all the
motions that [he] requested, but grant[ing] numerous motions by the prosecution.” But
Williams does not specify how the district court abused its discretion, or why the district
court should have granted any of his motions. Because these arguments are not adequately
briefed and we discern no obvious prejudicial error on mere inspection, we do not address
these arguments. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135
(Minn. 1971).

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May 28, 2019, if the state was not ready to pr oceed to trial. The district court denied
Williams’s request for conditional release that day because it was Williams who delayed
the trial, not the state. And as the district court explained, the delay caused by Williams
was not a substantial change in circumstances warranting conditional release. In sum, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Willia ms’s request for conditional
release.
Speedy Trial
Upon a defendant’s demand for a speedy tria l, the district court must begin trial
within 60 days, unless there is good cause for delay. Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). In
reviewing de novo the question of whether an appellant’s right to a speedy trial was
violated, four factors guide our analysis: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for delay;
(3) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay
resulted in prejudice. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627; State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315
(Minn. 1999). Williams’s trial did not begin until 100 days after he made his speedy-trial
demand. Because the trial began after the 60-day period, the dela y is presumptively
prejudicial and we look to the remaining factors to determine whether Williams’s right was
violated. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16.
The second factor—the reason fo r delay—weighs against Williams. Id. After
demanding a speedy trial, Willia ms’s trial was delayed twice. The first continuance was
requested by the state for a dditional time to obtain DNA test results. Although the delay
is attributable to the state, we have determined that a continuance to allow for DNA testing
may be for good cause. State v. Stroud, 459 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Minn. App. 1990). And

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the second delay was caused by Williams, whose public defender requested a continuance
to allow more time to review the DNA test results. Where a defendant causes the delay,
“there is no speedy trial violation.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2015). Thus,
this factor does not weigh in Williams’s favor. But the third factor—whether the defendant
asserted the right to a speedy trial—weighs in Williams’s favor because he explicitly
demanded a speedy trial. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 317.
Finally, we consider whether delaying W illiams’s trial resulted in prejudice. Id.
at 318. There are three interests protected by the right to a speedy trial: (1) prevention of
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) reductio n of the accused’s anxiety and concern; and
(3) impairment of the accused’s defense. Id. Williams’s claim focuses on the length of the
delay, rather than the anxiety he may have experienced or the potential impairment of his
defense.
While incarceration beyond the 60-day period presumptively prejudices the
defendant, this factor weighs against the defendant when the defendant is the cause of the
delay. State v. Johnson , 498 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1993 ). Here, part of the delay
experienced by Williams was a result of his own request for a continuance. When Williams
appeared on May 28, 2019, the state was prepar ed to go to trial. But Williams’s public
defender told the district court that he was not prepared for trial and requested a
continuance, suggesting the district court reschedule trial for its next available trial block.
The district court granted th e request, and accordingly scheduled trial for the week of
July 22, 2019. Williams’s trial began on July 25, 2019, during the period requested by his

15
public defender and scheduled by the district court. Therefore, any prejudice Williams
may have experienced was due in part to his requested continuance.
When considered as a whole, these four factors do not weigh in Williams’s favor.
Although Williams expressly dema nded a speedy trial, the re sulting delay was, in part,
caused by Williams and did not result in undue prejudice. For these reasons, we conclude
that Williams’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
In sum, we are not persuaded by Williams ’s arguments. Despite being incarcerated
beyond the 60-day period, his right to a speedy trial was not violated. And the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s requests for conditional release prior to
trial. Finally, the district court’s denial of Williams’s request to have advisory counsel take
over representation at trial was neither structural error nor an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.