State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0549

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gary Michael Stillwell,
Appellant.

Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-19-4

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Tyler J. Kenefick, Assistant County Attorney,
Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Pres iding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this sentencing appeal, appellant Ga ry Michael Stillwell challenges restitution
ordered after he was convicted and sentenced for receiving stolen property. Stillwell
argues that the district court abused its disc retion by awarding repair costs for a stolen

2
trailer to the victim, a person who was not the trailer’s titled owner. Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the restitution, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2018, police officers executin g a search warrant in Stillwell’s house
found a number of tools labeled with J.C.’s name. While the officers searched the house,
Stillwell left. Neighbors then saw Stillwell crawling through the snow towards the back of
his property, entering a partially concealed trailer, and leaving with items from the trailer.
The trailer was partly obscured by a canopy, tarps, and sheets, and it had been spray painted
with white paint but was visibly red. The officers learned that J.C., the victim in this case,
had reported a red trailer stolen several da ys prior, and J.C. notified the police that it
contained numerous tools, electronics, fishi ng equipment, an electronic fireplace, end
tables, pictures, and memorabilia. Police soon obtained a seco nd search warrant and
searched the spray-painted trailer on Stillwell’ s property, where they found a wallet with
J.C.’s name, along with many of the other items that belonged to J.C.
The state charged Stillwell with receiving st olen property in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.53, subd. 1 (2018), and, following a jury trial, Stillwell was found guilty and
convicted of that offense. J.C. submitted an affidavit requesting $2,433 in restitution. At
Stillwell’s sentencing hearing, the district ordered him to pay th e $2,433 in full and
imposed a 26-month prison sentence. Within 30 days of the sentencing hearing, Stillwell
filed a pro se affidavit objecting to the amount of ordered restitution. Separately, he filed
a notice of appeal from the judgment of convic tion. This court later affirmed Stillwell’s

3
conviction but reversed his sentence and remanded for recalculation of his criminal history
score. State v. Stillwell, No. A19-1366, 2020 WL 3957279 (Minn. App. July 13, 2020).1
In December 2019, the district court held a restitution hearing. J.C. testified at the
hearing that the following items were never returned to him: an ice auger that he purchased
new two years prior for $350, but currently valued at $300; four custom-made steel ice
fishing spears valued together at $500; and a 75-year-old handmade quilt, valued as a
priceless family heirloom. He testified th at a portable ice house listed in his original
affidavit had been returned to hi m. J.C. also testified that a rifle listed in the affidavit,
which belonged to his girlfriend, had not been returned. But the state agreed at the hearing
that the girlfriend would need to file a separate affidavit requesting restitution for the rifle,
because the rifle did not belong to J.C. and J.C. cannot legally possess firearms.
J.C. also testified about the requested re stitution for damage to the trailer. He
requested a total of $339 to replace a damage d door lock, tongue jack, fender, and lights,
and $500 to remove the white spray paint. He explained that he purchased the trailer over
five years prior from a close friend, but that the title remained in th e friend’s name. J.C.
and the friend had agreed not to change over the title becaus e the friend had purchased a

1 Stillwell could not have bro ught this challenge to the amended restitution order in his
initial appeal because the restitution hearing was held, and the amended order was issued,
after the deadline for direct appeal had passed. When a district court issues an order
amending restitution, a party can appeal that decision from the ame nded sentence within
90 days of the order’s entry. State v. Borg , 834 N.W.2d 194, 195 (Minn. 2013). We
accordingly construe this appeal as properly taken from the amended restitution portion of
Stillwell’s sentence.

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lifetime registration for the trailer. But J.C. testified that he had a bill of sale for the trailer
and that he, not the friend, currently owned it.
The district court heard arguments fo llowing the testimony. Stillwell asserted,
among other things, that J.C. sh ould not be allowed to recove r for damage to the trailer
because he is not its titled owner.
In January 2020, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
an order reducing the restitution amount from $2,433 to $1,639. According to the district
court, the amended restitution amount reflects the cost of the ice auger ($300), fishing
spears ($500), and trailer damage ($839), and de ducts the price of th e returned icehouse
and the rifle belonging to J.C.’s girlfriend from the original res titution order. As to
ownership of the trailer, the district court re asoned that the registration issue raised by
Stillwell was “more aligned with the tax authorities and the Department of motor vehicles,”
and that, for the purpose of restitution, the r ecord sufficiently established J.C. as the
trailer’s owner.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
“A district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and the district court’s
order will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Andersen , 871
N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). The district court “abuses its discretion when its decision
is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”
Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (M inn. 2012) (quotation om itted). Factual findings
supporting a restitution order are reviewed for clear error. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 913.

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But “[w]hether a particular claim for restituti on fits within the stat utory definition is a
question of law, which this court reviews de novo.” In re Welfare of M.R.H., 716 N.W.2d
349, 351 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).
Minnesota law allows a crime victim “to receive restitution as part of the disposition
of a criminal charge . . . against the offende r if the offender is co nvicted.” Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.04, subd. 1 (2018). A victim includes “a natural person who incurs loss or harm
as a result of a crime.” Minn. Stat. § 611A. 01(b) (2018). To request restitution, a victim
must provide the court with information describing their lo ss, including the total dollar
amounts for all claims. Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1. “A request for restitution may
include, but is not limited to, any out-of-poc ket losses resulting from the crime . . . .” Id.
An offender may challenge res titution by filing a written request for a hearing within 30
days of receiving written notic e of the restitution requested , or within 30 days of
sentencing, whichever is later. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2018).
In determining whether to order restituti on and the amount of the restitution, the
district court must consider: “(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as
a result of the offense; and (2 ) the income, resources, and ob ligations of the defendant.”
Id., subd. 1(a) (2018). The main purpose of re stitution is “to restore crime victims to the
same financial position they were in before the crime.” State v. Palubicki , 727 N.W.2d
662, 666 (Minn. 2007). The restitution statute accordingly has “broad language [that] gives
the district court significant discretion” to compensate a victim for their losses. Id. The
state has the burden of establishing the prop er restitution amount and the appropriateness
of restitution. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a); State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 282

6
(Minn. 1996). “A dispute as to the proper am ount or type of restitution must be resolved
by the [district] court by the preponderance of the evidence .” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 3(a).
Stillwell argues that the district court erre d by awarding restitu tion to J.C. for the
trailer damage because J.C. is not the tr ailer’s titled owner. By failing to rely on
Minnesota’s statutory scheme regulating vehicle ownership, Stillwell contends, the district
court allowed an unlawful user of a vehicle to recover restitution when only the vehicle’s
legal owner should be permitted to do so.
The state responds that ev en though a vehicle’s title holder is the vehicle’s
presumptive owner under Minnesota law, that presumption should not control the result in
the context of restitution in criminal cases. The state contends that the presumption created
by titling is intended to give notice as to the vehicle’s ownership to all interested parties in
a commercial setting. See Bank v. Soule, 420 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Minn. 1988) (explaining
that the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. ch. 168A in 1971 for the specific purpose of giving
parties to a commercial transaction the right to rely on a vehicle’s title as establishing
ownership). The state alternatively argues that, even if the district court erred by
determining J.C. is the trailer’s owner, J.C. is still the victim of the crime and entitled to
restitution for the repairs.
Stillwell’s reliance on the titled ownership of the trailer does not persuade us that
the district court erred. Th e restitution statutes do not refe rence ownership, either in
defining “victim” or in delineating th e scope of permissible recovery. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 611A.01(b), .04, subd. 1. A victim is si mply a person who “incurs loss or harm as a

7
result of a crime.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.01(b). To recover for loss or harm, the victim must
request recovery in compliance with Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1. That statutory
subdivision contains no requirement that th e victim demonstrate t itled ownership of the
affected property. To the contrary, the restitution statute contains broad language because
restitution is intended to restore victims to their pre-offense financial position. Palubicki,
727 N.W.2d at 666.
Although J.C. was not the title holder, the record supports the district court’s
conclusion that J.C. owned the trailer, a nd was therefore a victim for the purpose of
restitution. J.C. testified that he had purcha sed the trailer by executing a bill of sale over
five years prior. J.C. and his friend, the title holder, agreed that J.C. would own the trailer,
but that the title would remain in the friend’s na me. In addition to J.C.’s testimony at the
restitution hearing, the circumstances surrou nding Stillwell’s offense indicated that J.C.
owned the trailer. When the police found the trailer at Stillwell’s house, it was full of J.C.’s
property. And it was J.C. who re ported the trailer as stolen to the police. The totality of
these facts supports the district court’s c onclusion that it was J.C.—not his friend—who
owned the trailer, and therefore J.C. was entitle d to be restored to the position he was in
before Stillwell’s offense. See Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 666. We accordingly hold that
the district court did not abus e its discretion by awarding res titution to J.C. for the repair
costs of the trailer.
Affirmed.