Candy Michelle Ostlund, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0557

Candy Michelle Ostlund, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-09-2026

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief, appellant argues that the
district court revoked her probation based on clearly erroneous factual findings and that the

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postconviction court erred in summarily denying her petition without addressing her
arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2008, appellant Candy Michelle Ostlund purchased medications containing
pseudoephedrine from pharmacies in Minnesota to produce methamphetamine in another
state. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ostlund with conspiring to manufacture
methamphetamine in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subds. 2a(a), 3(a), .096, subd. 1
(2006). Ostlund pleaded guilty as charged. The district court imposed a 132 -month
sentence, stayed execution of the sentence for 30 years, and placed Ostlund on supervised
probation. The stay of execution constituted a downward dispositional departure from the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
On January 18, 2018 , Ostlund was arrested on suspicion of firearm theft and first -
degree burglary. A subsequent probation-violation report contained allegations that
Ostlund violated the terms of her probation by (1) failing to remain law -abiding,
(2) possessing a firearm, (3) using methamphetamine, and (4) failing to maintain contact
with her probation o fficer. The probation-violation report attached the January 18, 2018
criminal complaint, which contained allegations that officers found a rifle and a shotgun in
the vehicle driven by Ostlund and her associate to the burglary scene and that the rifle was
later identified as belonging to the burglarized residence. Ostlund ultimately pleaded guilty
to second-degree burglary in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2 (2016) , and the
state dismissed the firearm charge. The probation -violation report furt her contained
allegations that, at the time of her arrest for burglary, a test indicated methamphetamine in

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Ostlund’s system and Ostlund admitted to ingesting methamphetamine two days before the
arrest. Probation reported that Ostlund generally “ha[d] not been doing well” over the past
year, had difficulty reporting to probation even when given ample time, and “still
appear[ed] to not take responsibility.”
The district court held an admit/deny hearing regarding the probation violations .
Ostlund admitted to using methamphetamine and made a qualified admission that she
failed to maintain contact with her probation officer. She further admitted that she violated
the terms of her probation by committing the new felony offense of second-degree
burglary. She denied that she possessed a firearm and maintained that it was her associate
who took the firearms during the burglary.
The district court later held a disposition hearing. In its argument, the state
emphasized the presence of firearms in the burglary; argued that the record showed Ostlund
was under the influence of methamphetamine while driving the vehicle on January 18,
2018; and underscored the seriousness of her underlying conviction s. Ostlund again
admitted to using methamphetamine but maintained that she consumed the
methamphetamine two days before the burglary, was not driving the night of the burglary,
and had no involvement in her associate’s theft or possession of firearms.
The district court found that execution of Ostlund’s sentence was ne cessary to
protect public safety and to deter Ostlund from committing further crimes , specifically
stating that the second -degree burglary conviction alone supported the revocation of her
probation. The district court further discussed Ostlund’s history of substance use; inferred
that Ostlund was under the influence of methamphetamine on the date of the offense,

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including while driving the vehicle; and noted that firearms were involved in the
January 18, 2018 incident although not part of Ostlund’s convict ion. T he district court
revoked Ostlund’s probation and ordered execution of her sentence.
Ostlund later filed a petition for postconviction relief ,1 contending that the district
court abused its discretion in revoking her probation because the record did not support a
conclusion that Ostlund had any involvement with a firearm or that she drove under the
influence of methamphetamine. The postconviction court summarily denied Ostlund’s
petition, finding no error. Ostlund now appeals the denial of her petition for postconviction
relief.
D E C I S I O N
Ostlund confirmed at oral argument that she challenges the substance of the
postconviction court’s decision to uphold her probation revocation, not the failure of the
postconviction court to hold an evi dentiary hearing.2 Specifically, Ostlund contends that
her probation revocation was based on clearly erroneous factual findings that (1) she drove
under the influence of methamphetamine and (2) she was involved with the firearms found
in the vehicle.

1 Ostlund first filed a direct appeal, but we dismissed the appeal as untimely . State v.
Ostlund, No. A18-1590 (Minn. App. Nov. 20, 2018) (order).

2 Upon receiving a petition for postconviction relief, a postconviction court must ordinarily
hold an evidentiary hearing unless the petition, files, and records of the proceeding
“conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1
(2018). The record shows that Ostlund did not request such a hearing even when prompted
by the postconviction court, and it is not clear what evidence Ostlund would have presented
at such a hearing.

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Generally, we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a petition for
postconviction relief, Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017), or a probation-
revocation decision, State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 249 -50 (Minn. 1980). Ostlund
argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion, while the state argues we should
either deem Ostlund’s arguments forfeited or review for plain error. Because we conclude
that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion, we assume without deciding that
abuse of discretion is the applicable standard of review.
“A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark , 927
N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). We review any fact ual findings for
clear error. State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 870 (Minn. 2008). Such findings must not
be disturbed unless we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.” Id.
The record shows the district court specifically revoked Ostlund’s probation
because of the new offense , finding “that the [January 18, 2018] offense alone [wa]s
sufficient to support revocation” and “not[ing] that second degree burglary alone is a very
significant offense.” Although the district court commented about unproven and disputed
driving conduct when discussing whether confinement was necessary to protect the public,
the record shows that these comments were not the basis for th e findings and conclusions
of the district court. Further, the district court also concluded that failure to revoke
probation would “ unduly depreciate the seriousness of the underlying crime and offense
and its status as a probation violation, ” and in so doing made no reference to any of the

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contested factual findings. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01. On appeal, Ostlund does not
challenge this additional basis for probation revocation, which the district court attributed
solely to the singular new felony conviction and corresponding probation violation.
Even so, the additional statements by the district court about the circumstances
surrounding the new offense do not demonstrate clear erro r. The district court noted
Ostlund’s “long history of drug use and drug involvement.” And, although the district
court acknowledged that Ostlund was not convicted of any driving -related conduct or
possession of firearms, the court expressed “concerns” where firearms are “involved in any
offense” and “especially when a person is using methamphetamine.” These statements
find support in the record. At the admit/deny hearing, Ostlund’s counsel specifically stated
that “there was a firearm involved” in the new offense. The district court simply referenced
the fact that firearms were involved and did not make any finding that Ostlund herself
possessed a firearm. Also during the admit/deny hearing, Ostlund specifically admitted to
using methamphetamine in January 2018, which was the time period in which the new
burglary offense occurred. The probation-violation report further states that Ostlund tested
positive for methamphetamine on the date of the new offense, although confirmation of the
test results was not available at the time of the admit/deny hearing.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Ostlund’s
probation. The facts in the record show that Ostlund failed to remain law-abiding, relapsed
on methamphetamine, admitted to using methamphetamine before the burglary offense,
and associated with a person who illegally possessed firearms. Logic and the facts in the
record support the conclusion by the district court that probation was no longer sufficient

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to protect public safety and to deter Ostlund from committing further crimes and that
continued probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the new felony offense for
which she was convicted.3 The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.

3 Ostlund also argues that the postconviction court failed to adequately consider and
address her arguments when denying her petition. Given our analysis herein, we see no
abuse of discretion in the order of the postconviction court.