In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0579

In re the Marriage of:

Nicole Marie Knewtson, n/k/a Nicole Marie Campbell,
Appellant,

vs.

Adam Christopher Knewtson,
Respondent.

Filed February 22, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Faribault County District Court
File No. 22-FA-16-476

Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Daniel J. Bellig, Farrish Johnson Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Pr esiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this marital-dissolution appeal from the district court’s judgment and decree
following a trial on property issues, appellant/cross-respondent Nicole Marie Campbell and
respondent/cross-appellant Adam Christ opher Knewtson each make a number of

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challenges. Together, the parties’ challenge s raise eight issues—specifically, that the
district court (1) should have awarded Campbell a larger nonmarital interest in the marital
homestead, (2) should have awarded Campbell a larger nonmarital interest in the parties’
farm property, (3) misidentified debt incurre d by Campbell to her father as a nonmarital
debt, (4) misclassified as marital debt ce rtain cash advances that Campbell borrowed
against her nonmarital interests in two life- insurance policies, (5) should have allowed
Knewtson additional discovery, (6) erred in valuing Knewtson’s business and related
assets, (7) abused its discretion regarding the award of attorney fees , (8) and erred in the
classification and allocation of rent on the farm property. We affirm the district court on
all issues except the issue of re nt from the farm property. As to that item, we reverse and
remand to the district court.
FACTS
Campbell and Knewtson were married in 199 6, and remained married for 22 years.
The parties have two children; one was 17 years old at the time of trial, and the other was
emancipated. The parties separated in May 2016, and Campbell petitioned for dissolution
of marriage in August 2016. After the parties resolved many issues in the dissolution, the
district court held a bench trial in June 20 19 on property issues, in cluding the division of
the parties’ homestead, their farm property and its rent, marital debts, and Knewtson’s
business. The district court, by its initial order and its amended orders following posttrial
motions, determined and awarded nonmarital property, divided the parties’ marital
property and debt, and directed Knewtson to pay Campbell an equalization payment of
$75,729.48.

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The homestead
In 1994, Campbell’s father, S.C., signed a deed transferring the homestead to
Campbell. In 1996, four days before Cam pbell married Knewtson, Campbell executed a
$60,000 demand note in favor of Campbell’s mother and S.C. for the homestead. The note
required Campbell to pay both principal and interest payments.
On January 14, 1997, Campbell’s mother and S.C. forgave $15,000 of the demand
note in writing. That same day, S.C. crea ted a document titled, “Plan for Nicole House
Loan.” The document showed a $60,000 total, the $15,000 gift, and the remaining $45,000
at 6.5% interest. It also included projected annual gifts over the following years and a
comment that the note would be paid in fu ll on January 1, 2000. Bu t the document also
contains handwritten changes to the listed amounts.
Almost a year later, “Plan for Nicole House Loan” was replaced by “Nicole House
Loan (revised 1/1/98).” The revised house lo an plan identified th e $60,000 loan, the
$15,000 gift, and the ba lance due of $45,000. It listed a $10,000 principal payment to be
made on January 1, 1998 (the same date as the revised plan) and three additional $10,000
principal payments and one $5,000 payment to be paid over the succeeding four years. All
of the scheduled payment dates were during Campbell and Knewtson’s marriage. Campbell
testified that she did not make any principal payments to S.C., and Knewtson testified that
he did not make any principal payments to S. C. Yet the revised loan plan contains one
handwritten note stating, “Pd. Ch 1-13-98,” and a second handwritten note stating, “Pd In
full 1-13-98.” In addition, a satisfaction of mortgage was executed on February 20, 2002
and filed with the county recorder.

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At trial, S.C. testified that he intended to gift the homestead to Campbell. He stated
that “Plan for Nicole House Loan” included gift language, which showed his intent to gift
Campbell the maximum amount allowed under gi ft-tax laws. He also stated that the
“Nicole House Loan (revised 1/1/98)” was still a part of his gifting plan even if there was
no gift language included in it other than the $15,000 gift. S.C. did not produce any gift
documentation for the rest of the payments listed on the revised ho use loan plan. The
district court found S.C.’s testimony that he had gifted the homestead not credible.
K.T., a home appraiser engaged by Campbell, te stified at trial. In her report, K.T.
valued the homestead at $1 39,000. She listed several im provements, including a new
picture window in the living room, new windows, a gas water heater, a dishwasher, a new
faucet, a remodeled kitchen, new hardwood flooring, and a refinished basement with new
dry-walling and flooring. All of the listed improvements were completed during the
marriage. During her trial testim ony, K.T. stated that some of the improvements that she
listed under the improvements category in her re port would more properly be considered
“general maintenance.” The district court determined that the installation of a new picture
window, the kitchen remodel, and the inst allation of new hardwood flooring were
significant projects and properly categorized as improvements. The district court also
identified the construction of a gazebo as an improvement, although the gazebo was built
by S.C. before he transferred the homestead to Campbell. The district court adopted the
appraiser’s valuation of $139,000.
The district court concluded that Campbell had a $15,000 nonmarital interest in the
homestead based on the documented $15,000 gift . The district court also determined that

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the increase in the home’s value was all mar ital property because it could not determine
how much of the increase in va lue was due to market forces rather than improvements
during the marriage.
The farm property and rent
Campbell and Knewtson bought a 40-acre parcel of farmland in 1998 for $68,000.
Campbell used $20,000 of her nonmarital funds for th e initial down payment. On
November 6, 2017, the farm property’s value was appraised at $315,000.
When the parties bought the farm property, it had poor drainage, so Knewtson
installed drainage tile. Knewtson then rented the farm property to his father, W.K., from
2013 to 2018 for roughly $10,000 per year. Knewtson rented the farm property in 2019 to
another third party, J.M., for $9,600.
In its initial order, the district court awarded the farm to Knewtson, at its appraised
value of $315,000 less $20,00 0 for Campbell’s nonmarital in terest. The district court
treated all of the increase in the farm’s value as marita l property because Campbell had
failed to establish how much of the increase in value was due to market forces rather than
tiling. The district court’s initial order also di rected that the farm-p roperty rent would be
“imputed to [Knewtson] as income and used to set the child support obligations.”
Following posttrial motions, the district court amended its findings to award both
parties an equal share of the marital portion of the farm and an equal share of the rent. The
amended equalization chart reflects a $20,000 award on each party’s side for their share of
the farm-property rent.

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Apportionment of debt relating to life insurance policies
During the marriage, Campbell borrowed against two life insurance policies to pay
for marital expenses. One policy (Sun Life policy) was a whol e life insurance policy that
was established by her parent s before her marriage, for which Campbell was a joint
beneficiary and trustee. The other life insurance policy (Northwestern Mutual policy), also
established before her marriage, insured Campbell’s life and named her children as
beneficiaries. Campbell borrowed against the Sun Life policy over ei ght years and owes
$69,000 to restore the policy. Campbell borrowed against the Northwestern Mutual policy
over five years and owes $40,335.59 to restore that policy.
At trial, Campbell could not detail how the money was spent but said that she
imagined that she spent it on family expens es. The district court found her testimony
credible and concluded that the repayment amounts under the policies were marital debts
because Campbell spent the mone y on family expenses. The district court assigned the
marital debt of $109,335.59 to Campbell.
Campbell loan
In 2015, Campbell signed a promissory no te (Campbell loan) to S.C. for $6,000.
Campbell testified that she used $2,500 from the Campbell loan to pay off a personal IRA
obligation. The district court determined that, because Campbell used part of the Campbell
loan to pay for a nonmarital asset, only $3,500 of the Campbell loan is marital debt. The
district court assigned the Campbell loan debt to Campbell.

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Advantage Seed LLC
Advantage Seed LLC is a genetic licensing company formed by Knewtson in 2006.
Knewtson is the owner and sole employee. S.D., a business appraiser engaged by Campbell
for purposes of this action, performed a va luation of Advantage S eed. In his report and
testimony, S.D. valued Advantage Seed at $15,000.
To arrive at this value, S.D. used the discounted cash flow method. He projected
Advantage Seed’s future cash flow by averaging relevant financial numbers over time, 1
including officer compensa tion. He then added the value of any excess assets 2 that
Advantage Seed owned and subtracted from the total any debts Advantage Seed had
incurred.
As to Advantage Seed’s officer compensation, S.D. stated that he could not identify
any documentation that Knewtson received compensation every year. He found that officer
compensation was paid in varying amount s in 2013, 2014, and 2015 and that no
compensation was paid in 2016 . He therefore averaged all four years’ compensation to
arrive at a normalized annual compensation of $13,682.
The district court found S.D.’s appraisal to be credible and awarded Advantage Seed
to Knewtson at the appraised value of $15,000. It also awarded Knewtson a truck scale, a

1 One appraisal method is to average the fi nancial numbers produced by a small business
to determine a “normalized entry.” This method is used for small businesses because those
businesses are highly likely to have more substantial “peaks and valleys” in their financial
statements.

2 An excess asset is any asset that is not used to generate the company’s cash flow but is
still owned by the company.

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seed cleaner, and a 2014 Chevy Ta hoe truck. The district court found that the truck scale
was not an excess asset of Advantage Seed, that the seed cleaner’s value was questionable
because of the cost to remove it from Advantage Seed’s building, and that the 2014 truck
was included in Advantage Seed’s value and that Campbell’s nonmar ital interest in the
2014 truck was accounted for elsewhere in the property division.
Discovery requests and attorney fees
The district court found that both partie s contributed to the length of the litigation
and that both parties delayed discovery, no ting that both parties had brought several
motions to compel discovery. The district c ourt ordered no need-based or conduct-based
attorney fees, but it did mandate that Knew tson pay Campbell $1,684.50 in attorney fees
for her successful motion to compel discovery and that Campbell pay Knewtson $3,083 in
attorney fees for his successful motions to compel discovery.
Campbell appeals, and Knewtson cross-appeals.
DECISION
With three exceptions, we address separa tely each issue raised by each party,
beginning with issues raised by Campbell on her appeal and then turning to issues raised
by Knewtson on his cross-appeal. The three ex ceptions concern the district court’s
determinations regarding Advantage Seed’s valuation, attorney fees, and rent from the farm
property. Because both parties raise challe nges on these three topics, we address the
parties’ arguments on these three topics together.

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I. Homestead
Campbell argues that the district court e rred by rejecting her claim of a greater
nonmarital interest in the homestead, be yond the $15,000 gift from her parents.
Specifically, she contends that the district c ourt erred by (1) finding that Campbell failed
to prove that S.C. gifted her the full $60,000 of the homestead’s mortgage, and
(2) determining that all of the appreciation of the homestead’s value is marital property.
In reviewing a district court’s determinations regarding whether property is marital
or nonmarital, appellate courts defer to the district court’s underlying findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous but review de no vo the legal question of whether property is
marital or nonmarital. Olsen v. Olsen , 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Mi nn. 1997). A finding of
fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
All property obtained by eith er spouse during the marriage, regardless of the form
of ownership, is presumed to be marital property. Kerr v. Kerr , 770 N.W.2d 567, 569
(Minn. App. 2009). To overcome this presumption, the party asserting a nonmarital claim
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is nonmarital. Id.
Nonmarital property includes property acquired by a spouse during the marriage as a gift
from a third party to one spouse only. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(a) (2018).
Property can have “both mari tal and nonmarital aspects.” Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309
N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1981). “When nonmarital and marital property are commingled,
the nonmarital investment may lose that character unless it can be readily traced.” Wiegers

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v. Wiegers, 467 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Mi nn. App. 1991). “Whether a nonmarital interest has
been traced is also a question of fact.” Kerr, 770 N.W.2d at 571.
A. The $60,000 homestead loan
Campbell argues that the district court clearly erred by not finding that the
homestead was, in its entirety, a gift to her from S.C. Because the other elements of a gift
are not at issue here, whethe r this homestead was a gift to Campbell depends on S.C.’s
donative intent. See Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800 (addressing requirements for a valid inter
vivos gift). S.C.’s donative intent may be inferred from the circum stances, including the
form of the transfer. Id. Question of intent are fact questi ons, and we defer to the district
court’s findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Id.
The district court found that S.C.’s test imony was “not sufficiently credible to
establish that the remaining $45,000 of the $60,000 satisfaction of the mortgage was gifted
to [Campbell] from her parents as a non-marital gift.” Generally, appellate courts defer to
the district court credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988). Moreover, this finding is supported by the record. S. C. provided documentation
establishing that he forgave $15,000 of th e $60,000 mortgage as a nonmarital gift to
Campbell. But the district cour t found not credible S.C.’s testimony that the remaining
$45,000 interest was also a gift to Campbell. S.C. only made vague assertions that he gifted
money to Campbell and that she paid the mortga ge back with that gifted money. S.C. did
not provide any documents to support this claim.
But Campbell asserts that tr ial testimony established that there were no principal
payments made on the $60,000 mortgage and thus no marital equity was created during the

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marriage by the parties paying down the mortgage . We again defer to the district court’s
underlying findings of fact. Id. The district court found that “[t]here were princip[al]
payments made on the mortgage in at least 1998 and the mortgage was paid in full during
the marriage.” This finding is supported by the record. “Nicole Ho use Loan (Revised
1/1/98)” sets forth the repayment plan for th e $60,000 promissory note. The plan lists
specific “principal payments” to be paid fro m 1998 through 2002 and makes no mention
of “gifts.” The plan reflects that the first principal payment in the amount of $10,000 was
paid in 1998, and the last principal payment in the amount of $5,000 was to be paid in
2002. Handwritten notes on the pl an reflect that the loan wa s paid, and a satisfaction of
mortgage was executed. Although Campbell said she did not make principal payments and
Knewtson said that he did not make them, this testimony c onflicts with the documentary
evidence presented to the court. Given th e conflicting testimonial and documentary
evidence, the district court did not clearly err by determining that principal payments were,
in fact, made.
Because the parties paid down the mortgage during the marriag e, those payments
created marital equity in the homestead. See Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Minn.
2002) (concluding that marital equity was created in property from use of marital funds to
pay down the mortgage during the marriage). The parties were married in 1996, the
principal payments began in 1998, and the mortgage was paid in full in 2002. Because the
payments were made during th e marriage, the presumption is that they were made with
marital funds. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2018). It was incu mbent upon Campbell,
as the party claiming a nonmarital interest, to show that the mortgage was paid down with

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nonmarital funds. See Wopata v. Wopata , 498 N.W.2d 478, 484 (M inn. App. 1993). The
district court did not err by finding that she failed to meet that burden. Given the vague
and, as the district court found, not credible testimony of S.C., the district court did not err
by determining that Campbell fa iled to show that the principal payments were readily
traceable to nonmarital funds. See id.
B. Appreciation in value of the homestead
Campbell argues the district court erre d by not finding that she had a nonmarital
interest in the appreciation in value of the homestead. She claims that all of the appreciation
is her nonmarital property because the full $60,000 paid for the homestead was a gift, but
we have rejected that contention above. In the alternative, she argues that the district court
erred by not determining her proportional nonmarital interest in the increase in value of the
homestead. We address that argument.
Increases in the value of nonmarital property attributable to inflation or to market
forces retain their nonmarital character. Baker v. Baker , 753 N.W.2d 644, 650 (Minn.
2008). District courts use the Schmitz formula to determine marital and nonmarital interests
in the appreciation of proper ties acquired before marriage. Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100
(citing Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981)). Under that formula,
[t]he present value of a nonmarital asset used in the acquisition
of marital property is the proportion the net equity or
contribution at the time of acqui sition bore to the value of the
property at the time of purchase multiplied by the value of the
property at the time of separa tion. The remainder of equity
increase is characterized as marital property . . . .

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Id. at 102 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 316 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1982)). “However, the
Schmitz formula applies only to the appreciati on of property not attributable to
improvements made by the parties. Improvements made by the parties are presumed to be
marital property.” Dorweiler v. Dorweiler , 413 N.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Minn. App. 1987)
(citation omitted).
The district court found that the parties made improvements to the property through
their joint efforts, an d that Campbell failed to establis h how much of the homestead’s
increase in value was due to market forces rather than the marital improvements. The
district court therefore treated all of the increase in the home’s value as marital.
Campbell argues that the district cour t clearly erred by finding that the
improvements were marital. She maintains that the trial testim ony proved that any
improvements to the homestead were either not attributable to joint efforts or should
otherwise be considered rou tine maintenance not responsibl e for appreciation. And, she
argues, even if some projects are improvements, the district court clearly erred by including
improvements that were made before the marriage, and which, therefore were her
nonmarital property.
We conclude that the district court’s findings are supported by the record.
Improvements to property constitute marital property if they are attributable to the parties’
efforts. Faus v. Faus , 319 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn. 1982). The ev idence supports the
determination that Campbell’s efforts are properl y considered marital e fforts, even if her
father also contributed to the improvements, because the efforts are attributable to her.

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In addition, the record supports the de termination that the improvements were not
mere maintenance that had no effect on the increase in value of the homestead. The district
court found that the installation of a new picture window, a kitchen remodel, and the
installation of new hardwood flooring were improvements. Trial testimony supported the
determination that those improvements w ould positively affect value. Moreover, the
district court did not base its determination on things that the appraiser considered “general
maintenance,” like a new gas water heater.
Campbell asserts that the district court incorrectly considered the gazebo a joint-
efforts improvement to the property becaus e the gazebo was constructed before the
marriage. But, even if, on a ppeal, a complaining party show s that the district court
committed an error, this court will not reverse unless the error is prejudicial. See Minn. R.
Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d
279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (citing this as pect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 61); Kallio v. Ford Motor
Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987) (“Althou gh error may exist, unless the error is
prejudicial, no grounds exist for reversal.”). Campbell may indeed be correct that the
gazebo was built before the marri age. But Campbell failed to show any prejudice arising
from the error because she did not provide any evidence regarding what, if any, increase in
the value of the home is attri butable to the installation of the gazebo; thus, she failed to
show that she was prejudiced by the error.
Moreover, the district court determ ined that it could not perform a Schmitz
calculation because Campbell failed to provi de the necessary financial information on
which to base the calculations, including nonmarital equity at the time of the marriage. See

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Senske v. Senske , 644 N.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Minn. App. 2002) (concluding that Schmitz
calculation does not apply where there is no identifiable portion of equity that can be traced
to a nonmarital source). The district court foun d that it “only received credible evidence
regarding a ‘mortgage deed’ and promissory not e for $60,000 executed just days before
the marriage” but “no evid ence as to [Campbell’s] non-mar ital equity in the home at the
time of marriage, which is necessary for the Schmitz calculation.” On this record, the
district court did not err by not performing a Schmitz calculation.
In sum, the district court did not err by determining that Campbell had a $15,000
nonmarital interest in the hom estead and the remaining inte rests in the homestead were
marital.
II. Farm Property
Campbell also contends that the di strict court erred by not applying the Schmitz
formula to her $20,000 nonmarital down payment on the farm property. She contends that,
because her nonmarital down payment constituted around 29% of the purchase price of the
farm property, she was entitled to approximatel y 29% of the farm property’s increase in
value at the time of separation. See Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d at 750. An increase in value of
nonmarital property due to passive appreciation from market forces retains its nonmarital
character, while active appreciation through marital efforts does not. Gottsacker v.
Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Minn. 2003).
The district court determined that it could not apply the Schmitz calculation to
Campbell’s interest in the farm property be cause Campbell had not offered any evidence
of the impact of the installation of drain tile on the appreciation in value of the farm. The

16
district court explained that the increase in the farm property’s value is attributable to both
passive appreciation—market forces—and active appreciation—the drain tile installation.
It concluded that, by not providing sufficient evidence distinguishing how much value can
be attributed to each type of appreciation, Campbell failed to meet her burden to trace her
nonmarital interest in the farm property. See Wopata, 498 N.W.2d at 484.
The district court’s determination is supp orted by the record. At trial, the farm-
property appraiser testified that he did not investigate the specific reasons for the difference
between the purchase price and the current appraised value of the farm property. He stated
that the increase in its value could be from a variety of factors, including the drain tile as
well as market forces such as an increase in land value or grain prices. But neither the
appraiser’s testimony nor his repo rt established the amount of the farm property’s value
that resulted from the drain tile or from market forces. The district court did not clearly err
by declining to perform a Schmitz calculation because it did not have enough financial
information to do so. Because Campbell failed to meet her burden, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by awarding Campbell only her initial $20,000 down payment for the
farm property as nonmarital property.
III. Campbell Loan
Campbell asserts that the district court erred by concluding that $3,500 of the $6,000
Campbell loan constituted marital debt and th e remaining $2,500 was nonmarital debt to
be paid solely by Campbell. As to the $2,500, the district court determined that Campbell
used that money to pay income taxes genera ted by a nonmarital asset. This finding is not
clearly erroneous. Campbell testified that sh e withdrew $2,500 from her nonmarital IRA

17
account and then used $2,500 from the Campbe ll loan to replenish the $2,500 taken from
her nonmarital IRA. The district court did not abuse its discreti on by concluding that
$2,500 of the Campbell loan is nonmarital debt, allocated to Campbell.
We now turn our attention to Knewtson’s cross-appeal.
IV. Cash-Value Insurance Advances
On cross-appeal, Knewtson challenges the district court’s finding of $109,335.59 in
marital debt based on funds that Campbell borrowed against two nonmarital life insurance
policies and spent on marital expenses. He argues that (1) as a matter of law, the advances
were not loans from the insura nce companies to Campbell, an d (2) in any event, it is
inequitable to hold him accountable for the secret actions that Campbell took in borrowing
against the policies. Alterna tively, Knewtson argues that if Campbell’s insurance policy
withdrawals are marital debts, the district court clearly erred by finding that the
Northwestern Mutual policy debt was $40,335.59 rather than $30,030.
As to the first argument—whether the a dvances were loans—the issue is not
whether the advances from Campbell’s nonmar ital assets were loan s from the insurance
company to Campbell; rather, the issue is whether the advances were loans from Campbell
of her nonmarital assets to the marital estate. Whether th e advances were loans from
Campbell to the marital estate (and thus marital debts) turns on Campbell’s donative intent.
See Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800. If she intended the advances as gifts to the marital estate,
then the marital estate is not liable for the debts. See id. If she intended the advances as
loans to the marital estate , then the marital estate is liable for the debts. See id. As to the
advances from both policies, Knewtson failed to address whether the district court clearly

18
erred by finding that the advances were loans from Campbell to the marital estate, rather
than gifts. Because the burden to show erro r on appeal is on Knew tson regarding this
question, and because he failed in that burd en, we affirm the district court’s order.
Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n, 804 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. App. 2011)
(citing Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975)).
As to Knewtson’s second argument, that th e treatment of the advances as marital
debts is, in any event, inequitable, we conclude that the district court acted within its broad
discretion in dividing the marital debts. It is uncontested that Campbell used the cash
advances from the life insurance policies to pay family expenses. The district may consider
“all relevant factors” in the exercise of its discretion in dividing marital property. Minn.
Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2018); Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100.
As to Knewtson’s final argument, we find it unpersuasive. The district court found
Campbell’s testimony that she borrowed $30,030 against her Northwestern Mutual policy
both credible and corroborated by Northweste rn Mutual loan stat ements. The record
supports the district court’s determination of what is owing. It reflects that Campbell
withdrew three advances totaling $30,030. A nd it also reflects th at, as with loans,
Campbell’s advances accrued interest and that the full repayment amounts to $40,335.59.
In sum, the marital estate benefite d from the money borrowed from both life
insurance policies and is therefore liable for the total am ount owed. The district court’s
treatment of the $109,335.59 in marital debt based on the cash advances was not an abuse
of discretion.

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V. Discovery
Knewtson asserts that the district court erred by denyi ng discovery on how
Campbell’s insurance policy withdrawals were spent. The district court has wide discretion
in granting or denying discovery requests, and we will not disturb the district court’s order
absent a clear abuse of discretion. See In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 711
(Minn. 2007). In reviewing th e district court’s order, we are limited to “determining
whether the district court made findings un supported by the evidence or [improperly
applied] the law.” See id. Minnesota favors liberal discovery in civil proceedings; therefore,
courts construe the discovery rules broadly. Id. Generally, “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Minn.
R. Civ. P. 26.02(b).
The district court summarily denied Knewtson’s discovery requests, stating, “[I]t is
highly unlikely that there would remain a physical record of every purchase made with the
money from the loans.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow
further discovery. It was not unreasonable fo r the district court to conclude that
documentation of mundane family expenses paid via the loans over eight years is unlikely.
Moreover, the district court found Campbell’ s testimony that she spent it on family
expenses is credible. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
further discovery was unnecessary.
Next, we address the three areas in which Campbell’s appeal and Knewtson’s cross-
appeal overlap: Advantage Seed and its asso ciated assets, attorney fees, and the farm-
property rent.

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VI. Advantage Seed
Both parties challenge the district court’s determinations related to Advantage Seed
and associated assets.
A district court’s valuation of an item of property is a finding of fact, and it will not
be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous on the record as a whole. Maurer v. Maurer, 623
N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). “That the reco rd might support findings other than those
made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.”
Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000). To successfully
challenge a district court’s findings of fact, “the party challenging the findings must show
that despite viewing that evid ence in the light most favorable to the [district] court’s
findings . . . the record still re quires the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made.” Id. Even so, “valuation is necessarily an approximation in many cases, and it is
only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures.” Hertz v.
Hertz, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1975). Thus, we will not reverse the fact-finder’s
valuation if it falls within a range of credible estimates made by competent witnesses. Id.
A. Knewtson’s cross-appeal
The district court adopted the appraiser’s valuation of the business at $15,000.
Knewtson argues that the district court imprope rly inflated the value of business in three
ways: by removing officer compensation from Advantage Seed’s expenses, by failing to
establish the existence of a market for the business, and by failing to apply a key-person
discount.

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1. Officer compensation
Knewtson argues that the appraisal adopted by the district court “eliminated
deductions for historical officer compensation,” thus inflating the value of the company by
making its net income appear to be higher. He contends that the appraiser was “[g]aming
officer compensation.” But S.D.’s testimony and report reflects that he did not eliminate
historical officer compensation. Instead, he averaged Knewtson’s compensation over the
four-year period from 2013 to 2016, finding an average annual compensation of $13,682.
He then normalized the historical income statement by making a credit or a debit in each
year to arrive at an officer-compensation amount of $13,682 for each of the four years. The
district court found that S.D.’s method of valuing Advantage Seed, which included
normalized annual officer compensation, was credible, and that finding is supported by the
record.
2. Establishing the existence of a market
Knewtson also claims that S. D. failed to establish a market for Advantage Seed’s
business and that, without a market, the compan y has no value. The district court stated
during trial that “[S.D.’s] purpose was not to look for a market . . . [but] to give a
valuation.” Knewtson has cited no authority hol ding that an appraiser needs to establish
the existence of a market for an income-method valuation. He therefore has not shown that
the district court’s finding crediting the appraisal was clearly erroneous. See Horodenski,
804 N.W.2d at 372 (“But error is not presumed on appeal, and the burden of showing error
rests on the party asserting it.”).

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3. Key-person discount
Lastly, Knewtson asserts that the district court erred by failing to apply a key-person
discount to Advantage Seed’s value. He argues that he is key to the business because he is
the sole owner and employee of the business and the business enjoyed financial advantages
from its relationship with Knewtson’s father that it would not receive with another owner.
Thus, he contends, the value of the business must be discounted to account for his role.
The valuation of a business must account for the owner’s importance to the business.
Rogers v. Rogers, 296 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. 1980). Typically, a key person “performs
highly personal or unique services from whic h the entire business income is derived.”
Nemitz v. Nemitz, 376 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Dec. 30,
1985).
In Nelson v. Nelson, we rejected the district court’s 30% key-person discount as too
low where the owner was the only fee-generating professional in the company and was the
only certified test balancing engineer in Mi nnesota. 411 N.W.2d 868, 875 (Minn. App.
1987). In Nemitz, we affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the appellant, who was a
partner in a business that provided management and instructional services to colleges, was
not a key person. 376 N.W.2d at 245, 247. In that case, “[t]he college system would be
saleable as a business even without appellant in his role, according to his own experts. The
business could be sold and appellant could remain an active employee or consultant or he
could change careers.” Id. at 247.
This case is more like Nemitz than like Nelson. Here, like in Nemitz, Knewtson’s
services are not unique. The record includes evidence that, although Knewtson is the sole

23
employee of Advantage Seed, the services he provides to the business are not so specialized
and it would not be difficult to find another ow ner familiar with licensing genetic traits
who could find growers and sell the seed to producers. As to the argument of reduced
expenses because of the relationship between Advantage Seed and Knewtson’s father, the
district court found lacking the evidence regarding the fair value of those expenses or how
they might change the business’s value. The record supports the district court’s finding that
a key-person discount was not required.
B. Campbell’s appeal
Campbell argues the district court erred by awarding the truck scale, the seed
cleaner, and the 2014 truck to Knewtson as pa rt of the business rather than adding those
items into Advantage Seed’s value as excess assets.
1. Truck scale
Campbell maintains that the truck scale was only used for 15% of Advantage Seed’s
business, and so $6,457 should be added into Advantage Seed’s value. The district court’s
valuation of the truck scale is a finding of fact, and we do not disturb findings of fact unless
the findings are “manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence as a whole.” In re S.G.,
828 N.W.2d 118, 127 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
The district court’s finding that the truck scale is not an excess asset is supported by
the record. S.D. testified that he found nothing that suggested that the truck scale was used
for any other purpose than the business. Cam pbell does not point to any support in the
record that the truck scale was used only 15% for Advantage Seed. We thus conclude that

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Campbell has failed to meet he r burden of showing error. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn , 13
N.W.2d 461, 464 (Minn. 1944) (stating that error is never presumed on appeal).
2. Seed cleaner
Campbell next contends that the seed clea ner was never used so its entire value,
$18,000, should be added into Advantage Seed’s value as an excess asset. The district court
awarded the seed cleaner to Knewtson as part of the business and assigned no value to it.
The district court’s valuation of the seed cleaner is a finding of fact that we will not overturn
provided that it falls with a range of credible estimates made by competent witnesses. See
Hertz, 229 N.W.2d at 44 (“[A] va luation is necessarily an approximation in many cases,
and it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures.”).
Here, the district court’s valuation is not clearly erroneous. At trial, the appraiser
first testified that the seed cl eaner’s value is $18,000. But th e appraiser then testified that
the seed cleaner’s market va lue was questionable because it is attached to Advantage
Seed’s floor and would require extensive manpower to dismantle it and move it. Therefore,
the cost to dismantle and move the seed cleaner may exceed any $18,000 proceeds from a
sale. Campbell does not challenge the credibility of the equipment appraiser’s testimony;
rather she argues that the district should ha ve relied on the highest value the equipment
appraiser testified to. A valuation is an appr oximation, and the district court only needed
to arrive at a value within a reasonable range of figures. See id. Because Campbell does
not argue that $0 is unreasonabl e, not credible, or not made by a competent witness, she
has not established that the district court cl early erred in its determination of the seed
cleaner’s value.

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3. 2014 truck
Campbell finally maintains that the 2014 truck should be considered an excess asset
and its value should be added to Advantage Se ed’s $15,000 value. But the record reflects
that the truck was considered an excess asset. In S.D.’s repor t, the 2014 truck is included
as an excess asset. It was thus accounted for in S.D.’s $15, 000 valuation of the business.
The district court also found that Campbell had a nonmarital interest in the 2014 truck
because she had used her life insurance cash advances to pay for the truck’s down payment,
and observed that it considered that nonmarita l interest when alloca ting the marital debt
from those advances. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
VII. Attorney Fees
Campbell argues in her appeal that the district court erred by awarding what she
asserts were conduct-based atto rney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2018), to
Knewtson. In his cross-appeal, Knewtson assert s that the district court erred by declining
to award him certain other conduct-based attorney fees.
A. Campbell’s appeal
Campbell argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding $1,583 in
conduct-based attorney fees against her under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. She contends
that the district court acted inconsistently with its own determination that “both parties have
contributed to the length of this case” and that “neither side shall be awarded conduct based
attorney fees.”
But, contrary to Campbell’s assertion, the district court did not award conduct-based
attorney fees against Campbell pursuant to section 518.14. Rather, it awarded attorney fees

26
against her under Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01 to compensate Knewtson for his expenses in
bringing a successful motion to compel discovery. Rule 37.01(d) provides that the district
court may require the losing party on a moti on to compel discovery to pay the moving
party’s reasonable expenses in making the mo tion, including attorney fees. Appellate
courts review the award of attorney fees under rule 37 for an abuse of discretion. Bowman
v. Bowman, 493 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Minn. App. 1992).
Knewtson moved to compel production of the report of Campbell’s expert witness
S.D., the appraiser of Seed Ad vantage. The district court granted that motion. Campbell
maintains that her late response to Knewts on’s discovery request was due to S.D.’s
untimeliness and that she should not be pena lized for S.D.’s error. We are unpersuaded.
The record reflects that the district court extended the discovery deadline by two months
to accommodate Campbell and that she still fa iled to produce the requested discovery
within that extension. The district court di d not abuse its discretion by holding Campbell
accountable for the actions of her retained expert.
B. Knewtson’s cross-appeal
Knewtson contends that the district court abused its discretion by not awarding him
conduct-based attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. He asserts that Campbell
delayed proceedings and increased the expense of litigation.
This court has interpreted section 518.14 to provide a basis for an award of conduct-
based attorney fees. See, e.g., Szarzynski v. Szarzynski , 732 N.W.2d 285, 295-96 (Minn.

27
App. 2007).3 Whether to award conduct-based atto rney fees generally depends on “the
impact a party’s behavior has had on the costs of the litigation.” Dabrowski v. Dabrowski,
477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App. 1991); see Gales v. Gales, 553 N.W.2d 416, 423 (Minn.
1996) (citing this aspect of Dabrowski). We review such awards for an abuse of discretion.
Haefele v. Haefele , 621 N.W.2d 758, 767 (M inn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 21, 2001).
The district court determined that both pa rties contributed to the length of this
litigation. This finding is supported by the record. The record reflects that both parties were
slow to provide documents and respond to requests. Both parties brought successful
motions to compel discovery. Thus, both partie s caused some delay. On this record, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award Knewtson conduct-based
attorney fees under section 518.14.
VIII. Farm Property’s Rent
Both Campbell and Knewtson challenge the district court’s allocation of the farm
property’s rent. Campbell argues that the district court erred by placing $20,000 of the farm
property rent on her side of the equalization chart because, she contends, the district court
effectively attributed rent to her that she never received. Knewtson , on the other hand,
maintains that the district court erred by a llocating any post-valuation-date farm-property
rent to Campbell because that rent is statutorily his nonmarital property.

3 Neither party has questioned whether secti on 518.14 provides a substantive basis for an
award of conduct-based attorney fees. For pur poses of this appeal, we assume without
deciding that the statute does so. Cf. Anderson v. Anderson, No. A16-2006 (Minn. Aug. 6,
2018) (order). See also Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 702 (Minn. App. 2019).

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The district court determined that $40,000 in rent fo r the years 2016 through 2019
constituted marital property and, on its equa lization chart, awarde d each party $20,000.
The valuation date in this action, however, was in 2017—roughly halfway into the four-
year period. Thus, half the farm rent that th e district court treated as marital property was
received after the valuation date.
We agree with Campbell that the half of the farm rent received before the valuation
date is marital property. Property acquired before the valuation date is presumptively
marital property. Minn. Stat. §§ 518.003, subd. 3b, .58, subd. 1a (2018). But we disagree
with Campbell that she did not receive, and therefore should be awarded, the pre-valuation-
date farm rent. The district court made no finding, and th e parties do not argue, that
Knewtson transferred, encumb ered, or concealed the pre-valuation rent. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58, subd. 1a. Thus, the pre-valuation- date farm rent was accounted for in the
remaining allocation of marital property. Be cause the rent was already accounted for, we
conclude that the district court erred by including the pre-valuation-date rent as a separate
item in the equalization chart. Accordingly, each party’s award for farm rent on the
equalization chart should be reduced by $10,000 to account for this error.
But we agree with Knewtson that the farm re nt received after the valuation date is
nonmarital property. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(d ) (2018) (stating that property
acquired after the valuation date is nonmarital property). While the district court has broad
discretion to equitably divide marital property, it may not divide nonmarital property absent
findings under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (2018). Here, there were no findings, and the
parties do not argue, that findings under se ction 518.58 subdivision 2 are appropriate.

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Because the equalization chart lists and distributes only marital property, the district court
clearly erred by including the remaining $20,000 of nonmarita l rent divided between the
parties in the chart.
We disagree, however, with Knewtson’s argume nt that he is entitl ed to all of the
nonmarital rent. In its amended order, the dist rict court equally divided the farm property
between the two parties. As a result, Campbe ll has a one-half nonmarital interest in the
post-valuation-date farm rent. Yet nothing in the record shows that Campbell received her
$10,000 in nonmarital rent. We therefore conclude that the district court erred not only by
including $20,000 in nonmarital post-valuation-date rent in the equalization chart, but also
by failing to order Knewtson to pay Campbell her $10,000 in nonmarital post-valuation-
date rent.
We reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. The district court may reopen the record at its discretion.4
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

4 Knewtson argues that the district court erred by not considering the impact of the district
court’s treatment of farm rent on his child-support obligation. His claim to entitlement to a
retroactive adjustment of child support should be directed to the district court.