State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0595

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Benjamin Stuckey,
Appellant.

Filed March 22, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-29029

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Melissa Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Two victims called 911 afte r appellant pistol -whipped them. The state charged
appellant with unlawful possession of a firearm, second -degree assault with a dangerous

2
weapon, and misdemeanor domestic assault. Before appellant’s jury trial, the district court
admitted the victims’ 911 calls into evidence as nontestimonial excited utterances. In this
appeal, appellant challenges the admission of the 911 calls on the ground that it violated
the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2018, Hennepin County 911 received two emergency phone calls
about an incident at a Brooklyn Park apartment complex. The first caller, later identified
as J.S., immediately asked the 911 dispatcher (the dispatcher) to send police to her
apartment unit. In response to the dispatcher’s questioning, J.S. explained that she and her
daughter had just been “pistol whipped” by appellant Joseph Benjamin Stuckey.1 When
the dispatcher asked J.S. where appellant was, J.S. stated that he was “running now,” with
guns. And while J.S. did not know where appellant was headed, she explained that officers
could apprehend appellant in a “brown Trailblazer.” The dispatcher then assured J.S. that
officers were on their way and asked if she was injured and needed an ambulance. J.S. told
the dispatcher that her head was bleeding but declined an ambulance. The dispatcher again
assured J.S. that officers were on their way and asked for a description of appellant’s
clothing. J.S. stated that appellant was “in a white shirt with grey jogging pants” and then
the call ended.
The second caller, J.P., is J.S.’s daughter. After answering J.P.’s call, the dispatcher
immediately confirmed J.P.’s address and then asked her what happened. J.P. told the

1 Pistol whipping is the act of using a handgun as a blunt weapon.

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dispatcher that appellant had just hit her on her head and then asked the dispatcher, “Can
you send police?” The dispatcher told J.P. to “[s]low down a second” and again asked J.P.
what happened. In response to the dispatcher’s questions, J.P. stated that “[appellant] just
assaulted [her] with a gun” and that it happened in her apartment. The dispatcher then
asked J.P. if appellant was still in the apartment, and J.P. told the dispatcher that she
believed appellant went to an apartment nearby. J.P. asked the dispatcher to send help for
the second time and the dispatcher confirmed J.P.’s apartment unit number. The dispatcher
then asked J.P. if appellant hit her and she responded, “He hit my mama in the head with a
gun. She bleeding out her head.” But when the dispatcher asked J.P. if J.S. needed medical
attention, J.P. stated that J.S. said she did not. The dispatcher then put J.P. on hold and the
call ended.
Officers responded to the calls and located appellant hiding underneath bedsheets
in the bedroom of an apartment unit located near J.S.’s apartment. L.S., the resident of the
apartment where appellant hid, was inside the apartment when officers arrived. L.S.
consented to a search of her apartment and officers located a firearm in the water reservoir
tank of the toilet. Officers placed appellant under arrest and transported him to jail.
Respondent State of Min nesota charged appellant with unlawful possession of a
firearm, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018); second-degree assault with a dangerous
weapon, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2018); and misdemeanor domestic assault, Minn.
Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2) (2018). Before trial, respondent moved to admit the statements
J.S. and J.P. made during their respective 911 calls. Appellant objected , arguing that the
statements, if admitted, would violate the confrontation c lause of the Sixth Amendment

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because neither J.P. nor J.S. would testify. The district court disagreed and found the 911
calls were nontestimonial and excited utterances , and admitted the portions of the calls
relevant and intended to meet an ongoing emergency.
At appellant’s jury trial, the state called seven witnesses: a public safety answering
point manager, two law enforcement officers, a paramedic, L.S., a DNA analyst, and a
firearms examiner. Appellant neither testified on his own behalf nor called any witnesses.
The jury found appell ant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and second -degree
assault with a dangerous weapon , and not guilty of misdemeanor domestic assault. The
district court sentenced appellant to 60 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant argu es that we must reverse his conviction s because the district court
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers by admitting the 911 calls into
evidence. We generally will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of
discretion. State v. Caulfield , 722 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Minn. 2006). But whether the
admission of evidence violates a defendant’s rights under the confrontation c lause is a
question of law we review de novo. Id.
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that every criminal defendant “shall enjoy the rig ht . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This clause prohibits the “admission
of testimonial statements of a witness” when the witness does not testify at trial unless they
were unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior chance to cross-examine them.
Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 3 6, 53 -54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365 (2004). The

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confrontation clause, however, does not bar the admission of nontestimonial statements.
Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. 813, 840, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2284 (2006). Whether a
statement is testimonial depends on its “primary purpose.” Id. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.
Statements are testimonial “when the circumstances objectively indicate that there
is no [] ongoing emergency, and [] the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potential ly relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 822, 126
S. Ct. at 2273-74. On the other hand, “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”
Id. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273. In Davis, the Supreme Court noted that a 911 cal l “is
ordinarily not designed primarily to establish or prove some past fact, but to describe
current circumstances requiring police assistance.” Id. at 827, 126 S. Ct. at 2276 (quotation
omitted). The Court held that four objective factors showed that the victim made the
statements during a 911 call to meet an ongoing emergency including: (1) the v ictim
described events as they happened, rather than past events; (2) any reasonable listener
would have recognized that the victim faced an ongoing emergency; (3) the questions and
answers given were necessary to resolve a present emergency; and (4) the victim’s answers
were not provided in a tranquil environment. Id. at 827, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77; see also
State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Minn. 2007) (applying the Davis factors).
Appellant argues that the first and third Davis factors are not satisfied here and thus
the 911 calls were testimonial. We disagree. The objective circumstances surrounding the

6
911 calls show that J.S. and J.P. made the statements to enable police to meet an ongoing
emergency, and the questions asked were necessary for this purpose.
The first Davis factor is satisfied when victims describe events as they happen.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S. Ct. at 2276 -77. Here, after appellant pistol -whipped J.S.
and J.P. and fled their apartment, they called 911. Appellant’s assault of J.S. and J.P. was
thus a past event. The Davis factors, however, require us to analyze the totality of the
circumstances and determine whether the primary purpose of the statements during a 911
call was to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. And the confrontation clause
does not automatically bar a statement during a 911 call simply because it describes some
past events. State v. Wright , 726 N.W.2d 464, 474 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that
statements made after an assault were nontestimonial). J.S. and J.P., moreover, did
describe some events while they happened. J.S. told the dispatcher that appellant was
“running now,” armed, wearing a white shirt and grey jogging pants, and that police could
apprehend him in a “brown Trailblazer.” J.P. si milarly told the dispatcher that appellant
was headed to a nearby apartment unit and that J.S. was “bleeding out [of] her head.” The
primary purpose of the statements by both J.S. and J.P. was to enable police to meet an
ongoing emergency.
The third Davis factor examines whether the declarants made the statements to
resolve a present emergency. Appellant argues that because both J.S. and J.P. “said no one
needed medical assistance . . . any emergency had passed.” Respondent cites Wright, and
argues that an emergency was still underway when J.S. and J.P. called 911. Our review of

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Wright supports the determination that J.S. and J.P. made their statements during an
ongoing emergency.
In Wright, the defendant pulled a gun on his girlfriend and her sister in the apartment
that the girlfriend and the defendant shared and then fled. 726 N.W.2d at 467-68. After
the defendant fled, the girlfriend called 911 and told the dispatcher that the defendant had
pulled a gun on her and her sister and that she was scared . Id. In response to the
dispatcher’s questioning, the girlfriend told the dispatcher the defendant’s name, described
his actions and physical appearance, and answered the dispatcher’s questions regarding
how officers could gain entrance to the building o nce they arrived. Id. at 468. After the
dispatcher informed the victim that the police had arrived on the scene, the victim put her
sister on the phone. Id. The dispatcher comforted the girlfriend’s sister and informed her
that police had the defendant in custody. Id. At trial, the district court admitted the 911
call into evidence and the defendant appealed. Id. at 471.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statements that the girlfriend
and her sister made to the dispatcher were nontestimonial under the Davis factors because
it could not “be said that the primary purpose of any part of the 911 call was to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 475. Instead,
the primary purpose was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id.
at 474 (quotation omitted).
The facts in Wright are analogous to the facts here. After appellant assaulted J.S.
and J.P. with a gun, he fled J.S.’s apartment but remained in the general area. Both J.S.
and J.P. called 911 after appellant assaulted them. In response to the dispatcher’s

8
questions, J.S. told the di spatcher appellant’s name, described his actions and physical
appearance, and told the dispatcher where she believed appellant was currently located.
J.P. similarly described appellant’s actions, and told the dispatcher where she believed
appellant was cu rrently located in response to the dispatcher’s questions. Both victims
explicitly asked the dispatcher to send help.
Because the circumstances surrounding the 911 calls objectively show that the
primary purpose of the statements was to describe the circu mstances requiring police
assistance, the statements were nontestimonial. We thus conclude that the district court
did not violate appellant’s rights under the confrontation clause by admitting the 911 calls
into evidence.
Affirmed.