State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0600

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Julie Lynn Bigelow,
Appellant.

Filed February 16, 2021
Affirmed in part and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File Nos. 55-CR-18-3441, 55-CR-18-3711

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Je nnifer D. Plante, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Pres iding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Julie Lynn Bigelow appeals from her convictions of first-degree sale of
methamphetamine and second-d egree possession of methamphetamine, arguing that the
district court improperly participated in plea negotiations requiring reversal of her

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convictions. Alternatively, she argues that the district court incorrectly calculated her jail
credit. We affirm Bigelow’s convictions but remand for the district court to correct her jail
credit.
FACTS
In December 2017, Bigelow sold 28 grams of methamphetamine to a police
informant. Consequently, the state charged Bigelow with firs t-degree sale of 17 or more
grams of methamphetamine, Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2016), and second-degree
possession of 25 or more grams of methamphetamine, Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1)
(2016).
Approximately five months after the enco unter with the informant, police arrested
Bigelow on a warrant. During a pat search, a deputy discovered a plastic bag containing
over 25 grams of methamphetamine concealed under Bigelow’s clothing. The state filed
a second complaint charging Bigelow with firs t-degree sale of 17 or more grams of
methamphetamine, Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1), and second-degree possession of 25
or more grams of methamphetamine, Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1). Following her
arrest, Bigelow posted bail. She remained out of custody while both cases were pending.
Bigelow eventually entered into a plea agre ement with the state. The terms of that
agreement were placed on the re cord at an April 2019 plea hearing. In exchange for
Bigelow’s guilty pleas to one count of first-degree sale for selling methamphetamine to the
informant and one count of second-degree possession fo r the methamphetamine found
upon her arrest, the state agreed to dismiss all the remaining charges, which included two
other unrelated cases. The state also agreed to recommend a sentence within the middle of

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the presumptive duration prescr ibed by the Minnesota Senten cing Guidelines. Bigelow
faced a substantial prison sentence under the agreement, even if the district court accepted
the state’s sentencing recommendation. The presumptive sentence was between 98 and
138 months for the first-degree offense a nd between 92 and 129 months for the second-
degree offense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C (2016). The parties agreed that all other
sentencing terms would be “open to argument ” at the sentencing hearing, which would
occur on a later date after Bigelow participated in a presentence investigation (PSI).
After the agreement was placed on the reco rd, Bigelow waived her trial rights and
admitted her guilt. The district court accepted the pleas and adjudicated her guilty of both
charges.
In scheduling the sentencing hearing, Bigelow’s attorney made a special request of
the district court. Rather than scheduling sentencing within the standard six weeks of the
plea hearing, the attorney asked to delay sent encing for 90 days so that Bigelow could
participate in a family event and get her affairs in order be fore going to prison. The state
did not object to the request. Although the district court ag reed to delay the sentencing
hearing, the district court imposed a condition on Bigelow’s continued release. The district
court ordered Bigelow to immediately report for a drug test, cautioning Bigelow that if the
test was positive, Bigelow woul d be taken into custody. A dditionally, the district court
instructed Bigelow to cooperate with the PSI interview and to appear for sentencing.
Following the guilty plea hearing, Bigelow did not submit to a drug test. The next
day, the district court issued a warrant for Bigelow’s arrest. Bigelow ultimately failed to
appear for her PSI interview and for the scheduled sentencing hearing.

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About eight months later, Bigelow was arre sted on the district court’s warrant. At
Bigelow’s rescheduled sentencing hearing, the state recommended a 98-month sentence,
the lowest available sentence within the presumptive sentencing range. Bigelow’s attorney
similarly pressed the district court for a 98-month sentence for the most serious charge and
a 92-month sentence for the lesser charge; counsel also advised the court that Bigelow was
entitled to 56 days of custody credit.
Before pronouncing sentence, the district court referenced Bigelow’s failure to
obtain a drug test, failure to participate in th e PSI, and failure to appear at her scheduled
sentencing hearing. The district court al so noted that Bigelow’s offenses were not
victimless crimes, observing that selling methamphetamine harms other people. Then, the
district court sentenced Bigelow to 133 m onths in prison for the first-degree sale
conviction—a sentence near th e top of the presumptive ra nge—and a concurrent prison
term of 106 months for the second-degree possession conviction.
Bigelow appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not interfere in the parties’ plea negotiations.
Bigelow first argues that the district court improperly intervened in the plea-
bargaining process. A district court “must not participate in plea negotiations.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(1); Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 564-65 (Minn. 2018). When
a judge becomes involved in the plea-bargaining process, there is an inherent risk that the
defendant will feel pressured to plead guilty, potentially leading to an involuntary plea.
See Wheeler, 909 N.W.2d at 567-68. Th us, the district court can approve or reject a plea

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but cannot effectively become a party to negotiations. Id. at 564-65. The district court
may, however, inquire about the status of negotiations, share general sentencing practices,
and provide “nonbinding plea and sentencing information at the joint request of the parties”
without becoming improperly entangled in the plea-bargaining process. Id. at 565.
Whether a district court judge impermissibl y intervened in plea negotiations is a
question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Id. at 568. If there was improper
judicial participation, a reviewing court must examine the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the resulting guilty plea was voluntary. Id. at 567-68. The voluntariness
of a plea presents a factual question, which is reviewed for clear error. Id.
We now turn to Bigelow’s claims. Bigelo w argues that the district court injected
itself into the plea negotiations by requiring her to take a drug test, and then penalizing her
for failing to comply with this condition by imposing a lengthier sentence than
recommended under the agreement. Accordin g to Bigelow, the district court “self-
designated itself as a party to the case” a nd effectively “creat[ed] its own sub-plea
agreement.” We disagree for several reasons.
First, there is no evidence in the record that the distri ct court participated in the
parties’ plea negotiations. The record sh ows that the state and Bigelow reached an
agreement that was presented to the district court. Under th e terms of the agreement, the
state agreed to dismis s multiple charges and to recomme nd a particular sentence to the
district court. In taking Bigelow’s pleas, the district court’s role was limited to accepting
the guilty pleas and entering convictions.

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Second, the district court’s order requiring Bigelow to report for a drug test was not
a term of the plea agreement, but instead wa s a condition of Bigelo w’s continued release
pending sentencing. The distri ct court imposed the condition after Bigelow had entered
the guilty pleas. And the dist rict court only added the co ndition in addressing Bigelow’s
post-plea request to delay the sentencing hearing. The discussion about the condition was
as follows:
THE COURT: I will allow that, Ms. Bigelow. But you’re
currently under conditions that you are not to be using, correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: What I’m going to do is we’ll get a date 90
days out. I’m going to ask that after you stop down with
[community corrections] to get the Pre-sentence Investigation
started, as part of that I’m goi ng to order that you take a drug
test today. If it’s clean, you can remain at li berty and we’ll
have the sentencing date that we’re going to ge t sometime in
June. If you are not clean, I’m going to order that you be taken
into custody and be held pe nding sentencing. Do you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Because Bigelow had pleaded guilty and was convicted, the district court had authority to
impose conditions of continued release, wholly apart from any plea agreement that Bigelow
had with the state. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.01 (“After conviction but before sentencing,
the court may continue or alter the terms of release, or the court may confine the
defendant.”). Indeed, the court could have simply denied Bigelow’s request and taken her
into custody until the sentencing hearing. Bigelow was facing a significant prison sentence,
and the district court was willing to allow Bi gelow to spend three m onths out of custody
before commencing the prison term. But the district court was also concerned about
Bigelow’s propensity to use c ontrolled substances. Ordering Bigelow to take a drug test

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to confirm her abstinence from drugs was a reasonable condition to ensure public safety.
See id. (stating that a district court should co nsider factors set forth in rule 6.02 in
determining appropriate post-adjudication conditions of release); Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02,
subd. 2 (stating that a district court should consider “the na ture and circumstances of the
offense charged” and “the community’s safe ty,” among other fact ors, in determining
conditions of release).
Finally, the district court di d not abuse its discretion in deviating from the state’s
sentencing recommendation and imposing a sentence at the higher end of the presumptive
range. District courts are generally afforded “great discretion” in sentencing and will not
be reversed absent an a buse of that discretion. State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08
(Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). The distri ct court imposed a sentence within the
presumptive guidelines range—a sentence that is presumed appropriate in most cases. See
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.13 (2016); see also State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn.
App. 2010) (noting that appellate courts w ill typically not review a district court’s
discretionary imposition of a sentence w ithin the presumptive guidelines range), review
denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). Although the state recommended the lowest sentence within
the presumptive range, the district court was not bound by the state’s sentencing
recommendation. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the state merely agreed to make
a sentencing recommendation and the district court made no promises regarding the
sentence it would impose. See State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 522 n.3 (Minn. 2003)
(recognizing that “some plea agreements c ontemplate recommendations by the parties
without binding the court to a specific sentence”).

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Bigelow argues that the district court’ s sentence represented a punishment for
violating the court’s condition to obtain a drug test, evincing a personal bias. She notes
that our supreme court has cautioned that “‘[j]udges should avoi d the appearance of
impropriety and should act to assure that par ties have no reason to think their case is not
being fairly judged.’” State v. Dorsey , 701 N.W.2d 238, 249 (Minn. 2005) (quoting
Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 164-65 (Minn. 2002)).
But the record here does not reveal that the district court’s sentence was the result
of personal bias or any other improper cons iderations. In determining whether a judge
should be disqualified for bias under the Code of Judicial Conduct, “the question is whether
an objective examination of the facts a nd circumstances would cause a reasonable
examiner to question the judge’s impartiality.” State v. Burrell , 743 N.W.2d 596, 601
(Minn. 2008); see also Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 2. Although the district court
referenced Bigelow’s failure to obtain the ordered drug test, it is not reasonable to question
a district court’s impartiality for remarking on a defendant’s viola tion of a condition of
release. See Burrell, 743 N.W.2d at 601-02 (“The mere fact that a party declares a judge
partial does not in itself generate a reasonable question as to the judge ’s impartiality.”).
And in any event, the district court was also concerned about Bigelow’s other conduct after
the guilty-plea hearing, observing that Bigelow failed to participate in the PSI and failed to
appear at her sentencing hearing. Additionally, the district court pointed out that Bigelow’s
actions in selling methamphetamine harmed ot her people. Contrary to Bigelow’s claim
that the district court’s sentence was th e product of personal bias, each of these
circumstances was relevant and appropriate for the district court to consider in determining

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an appropriate sentence for Bigelow within the bounds of her plea agreement. We discern
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentence.
In sum, we conclude that the district court’s actions did not amount to improper
participation in the plea-bargaining proce ss. Accordingly, we affirm Bigelow’s
convictions.
II. Bigelow is entitled to one additional day of jail credit.
Bigelow next argues that the district court erred in awarding her 55 days of jail credit
when she has served 56 days in connection with her cases. The state concedes that Bigelow
is entitled to an additional day of jail credit.
“The district court does not have discre tion on whether to award custody credit.”
State v. Roy, 928 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 2019). Rather, a defendant is entitled to credit
for each day spent in custo dy in connection with the o ffense being sentenced. Id. at 345
(citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B)). The burden lies with the defendant to show
that she is entitled to custody credit. Id. at 344.
The record establishes that Bigelow is en titled to 56 days of custody credit. We
therefore remand to the district court to m odify Bigelow’s custody credit from 55 days to
56 days.
Affirmed in part and remanded.