Richard T. Jellinger, et al., Appellants,

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This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0620

Richard T. Jellinger, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

City of Anoka,
Respondent,
Jefferson L. Weaver, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-18-5955

Richard T. Jellinger, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for appellants)

Scott C. Baumgartner, Hawkins & Baumgartner, PA, Anoka, Mi nnesota (for respondent
City of Anoka)

Kurt B. Glaser, Smith & Glaser, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

William K. Goodrich, Randall and Goodrich , PLC, Anoka , Minnesota (for respondents
Weavers)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s entry of summary judgment for
respondents, arguing that respondents-neighbors’ (1) fence violates a city ordinance
regulating fence height; (2) trash- and recycling-container storage violates a city ordinance
regulating container placement ; and (3) dog sign violates a city ordinance regulating the
display of signs. Respondents request attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
FACTS
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows: appellants Richard T. and Margaret
K. Jellinger (the Jellingers) and respondents Jefferson L. and Robin A. Weaver (the
Weavers) are neighbors, living on two of three lots between Rice Street and the Mississippi
River in Anoka, Minnesota . The Weavers’ lot lies between the Mississippi River to the
south and the Jellingers’ lot to the north. The Weavers’ lot is a riparian lot. A private drive
crosses the Jellingers’ lot and serves both the Jellingers’ and the Weavers’ lots because
neither lot directly fronts on Rice Street. Figure 1 below is an aerial photograph of the lots.
The Weavers obtained a permit from the City of Anoka (the city) to construct a six-
foot-high, fifty-six-foot-long fence along the lot boundary shared with the Jellingers. The
Jellingers complained about the fence height, arguing that it violated the four-foot height
limit in the city’s fence ordinance for fences in front of houses. The city concluded that
the fence location and construction did not violate the fence ordinance because the fence is
located on the rear lot line.

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The Jellingers also complained to the city about the Weavers leaving their trash and
recycling containers on the private drive for collection . The city concluded that the city’s
trash ordinance, which requires people who place their containers on the street or curb to
Private Drive
Jellingers’
Residence
Weavers’ Fence
(approximate length)
Weavers’ Main
Entrance
Figure 1. This aerial photograph is taken from the summary-judgment record.
We added labels, north arrow, and a depiction of the private drive to clarify
the layout.
N
Rice Street

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return the containers to storage within 12 hours, did not apply to the Weavers because they
“reside on a riparian lot not abutting a public street.”
The Weavers also display a yellow, diamond -shaped plaque stating “Golden
Retriever Crossing” and containing a silhouette of a dog (dog sign) on their fence between
their lot and the Jellingers’ lot. The Jellingers complained about the dog sign to the city.
The city concluded that the dog sign is not a sign for purposes of the city’s sign ordinance
because it is “a decorative plaque not directed at the public.”
The Jellingers sought a declaratory judgment that the Weavers’ fence, trash - and
recycling-container storage, and dog sign violated various city ordinances. The Jellingers
moved for summary judgment on all three issues. In response, the Weavers and the city
(collectively, respondents) each requested that the district court grant summary judgment
in their favor. The district court denied the Jellingers’ motion and granted summary
judgment for respondents. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. We review summary judgment interpreting unambiguous city ordinances de
novo.

In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we review de novo
“whether there are any issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its
application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn.
2017). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary
judgment was granted. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 1982).

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“[T]he interpretation of an existing ordinance is a question of law for the court.”
Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville , 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980) .
“Ordinances are construed according to the recognized principles of statutory
construction.” Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’ n v. City of Chanhassen , 342 N.W.2d
335, 339, n.3 (Minn. 1984) . We first determine whether the ordinance is ambiguous.
Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Dept. , 783 N.W.2d 182, 193 (Minn. App. 2010) . An
ordinance is ambiguous only when it is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations. Id.
at 193. If the ordinance is unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of its
terms. Frank’s Nursery , 295 N.W .2d at 608 ; State ex rel. Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc. , 552
N.W.2d 695, 701 (Minn. 1996).
As an initial matter, respondents arg ue that we should defer to the city’s
interpretation of its own ordinances. But the interpretation of ordi nances is a question of
law, which we review de novo . RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington , 861 N.W.2d 71, 75
(Minn. 2015) (citing Frank’s Nursery, 295 N.W.2d at 608 ); cf. St. Otto’s Home v. Minn.
Dept. of Human Serv s., 437 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1989) ( “No deference is given to the
agency interpretation if the language of the regulation is clear and capable of
understanding.”).
Respondents cite several cases for the proposition of judicial deference to municipal
decisionmaking. White Bear Docking and Storage, Inc. v. City of White Bear Lake , 324
N.W.2d 174, 175 (Minn. 1982) ; Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 125 N.W.2d
846, 850 n.5 (Minn. 1964) ; Eagle Lake v. Becker County , 738 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Minn.
App. 2007) ; Berndt v. County of Crow Wing , Nos. A05 -1381, A05 -1409, 2006 WL

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1073196 (Minn. App. April 25, 2016 ). But those cases involved challenges to quasi -
judicial decisions by local government bodies. It is true that courts defer to the quasi-
judicial decisions, such as whether to grant permits or variances, of such entities . In this
case, the city issued a permit for the Weavers’ fence; however, the Jellingers did not
challenge the permit. Instead, they filed this declaratory judgment action in which
resolution of all issues turns on the interpretation of the city’s ordinances. And because we
review interpretation of ordinances d e novo, we owe the city ’s interpretation of its
ordinances no deference.
II. Because the plain language of the city ordinance prohibiting fences exceeding
four feet in height “in front of the front line of a residential structure ” applies
to the Weavers’ fence, the district court erred by entering summary judgment
in favor of respondents.

The Jellingers argue that the Weavers’ six -foot fence violates the city’s fence
ordinance height restriction. We agree.
The fence ordinance states that “[i]n single- and two-family residential districts, no
fence may exceed four feet in height above the ground level, in front of the front line of the
residential structure , along any street or highway right -of-way, or in the front yard.”
Anoka, Minn., Code of Ordinances (ACO), § 78-562(e) (2020)
https://library.municode.com/mn/anoka/codes/code_of_ordinances (emphasis added) .1
Because the fence ordinance is written in the disjunctive, a fence that exceeds four feet in

1 The city revised its city code in August and September of 2020. The revisions do not
change the substance of any applicable sections, except for renumbering. We therefore
cite the most recent version of the city c ode. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty. Bd.
of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts
apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case”).

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height in any one of the three locations violates the ordinance. See Amaral v. Saint Cloud
Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 385 (Minn. 1999) (noting that “or” is generally disjunctive).
All parties agree that the only issue is whether the fence is “in front of the front line
of the residential structure.” Because the fence ordinance is unambiguous, we look to the
plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. The city code does not define “front line” or “front
line of the residential structure.” “Front line” is modified by the adjectival prepositional
phrase, “of the residential structure,” signifying the specific “front line” to which the phrase
refers. “Residential structure” in this context plainly refers to the house. “Front,” with
reference to a structure like a house , generally means the side with the m ain entrance.
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 503 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “front” as “a side
of a building, especially the side that contains the principal entrance”) ; cf. Oxford
Dictionary of English 702 (3d ed. 2010) (defining “front” as “the side or part of an
object that . . . is normally seen or used first”). We conclude that the plain meaning of “the
front line of the residential structure” is a line that runs along the side of the home with the
principal or main entrance. Fences may not exceed four feet in height in front of this line.
ACO, § 78-562(e).
Respondents argue that the Weavers’ lot should be treated differently because it is
a riparian lot. See Girvan v. County of Le Sueur , 232 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1975) (noting
the “peculiar circumstances relating to lakeshore property in Minnesota”). They argue that
“the front line of the residential structure” either is, or is on the same side as, the “front lot
line” of a lot, and that because the Weavers’ lot is a riparian lot with the f ront lot line
abutting the river to the south, the front line of the residential structure must also be to the

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south. Because the fence is on the north lot line, they contend that the fence is not “in front
of the front line of the residential structure.” We are not persuaded . Respondents’
argument confuses the front line of the property with the front line of the residential
structure. We agree that the front lot line of a riparian lot abuts the water and that a riparian
lot’s front yard is therefore o n the side of the lot facing the water. (See Fig. 2). We also
agree that the Weavers’ fence is in their rear yard. But none of that changes that the front
line of the house is on the north side of the structure, which contains the main entrance and
is the part of the house a person approaches first. (See Fig. 2).
Here, the Weavers’ fence is “in front of the front li ne of the residential structure ”
because, like the main entrance, the fence is on the north side of the house. Because the
fence exceeds the height limitation for this are a, it violates the fence ordinance. We
therefore reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment for respondents as to the
fence, and remand to the district court for entry of summary judgment for the Jellingers on
this issue.

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Private Drive
Jellingers’
Residence
Weavers’
Front Yard
Weavers’ Fence
(approximate length)
Front line of
Weavers’
residence
N
Figure 2. This is the same aerial photograph as used in Figure 1. We again
added labels, north arrow, and a depiction of the private drive to clarify the
layout and legal conclusions.
Rice Street

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III. Because the plain language of the city ordinance regulating trash and recycling
collection does not apply to the Weavers, the district court did not err by
granting summary judgment to respondents.

The Jellingers argue that the Weavers violated the city code’s requirement that trash
and recycling containers be returned to their place of storage within 12 hours of collection.
We disagree.
In relevant part, the city’s trash ordinance provides that “[c]ontainers may be placed
next to the street or curb on the days scheduled for collection but shall be returned to the
place of storage w ithin 12 hours after collection .” ACO, § 70-81(c) (2020). The plain
language of the trash ordinance applies specifically to those who place their containers next
to the street or curb for collection. Here, the Weavers place their containers on the private
drive near their home such that the collectors must travel the private drive in order to collect
the Weavers’ trash and recycling. Because the Weavers do not place their containers next
to the street or curb , the portion of the trash ordinance requiring residents to return
containers to storage within 12 hours of collection does not apply to the Weavers.
The Jellingers argue that the intent of the trash ordinance is to provide a “complete
system for collection ” and to safeguard hea lth and sanitary conditions for city residents,
and that failing to apply the trash ordinance to the Weavers undermines these goals. But
the intent of the ordinance cannot override the plain language. See Cannon, 783 N.W.2d at
193. Moreover, the Jellingers have not alleged any particular way in which the Weavers’
container storage is unhealthy or unsanitary, or renders the collection system incomplete.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for
respondents as to the trash and recycling containers.

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IV. Because the plain language of the city ordinance defining and regulating signs
does not apply to the Weavers’ dog sign , t he district court did not err by
granting summary judgment to respondents.

The Jellingers argue that the Weavers’ dog sign, which they contend resembles an
animal-crossing sign, is a sign regulated under the city’s sign ordinance. We disagree.
The sign ordinance defines a sign as “a name, identification, description, display,
illustration or device which is affixed to or represented directly or indirectly upon a
building, structure or land in view of the general public and which directs attention to a
product, place, activity, person, institution, or business.” ACO, § 78-512 (2020). The
parties dispute whether the dog sign is “in view of the general public.” We again look to
the plain meaning of the terms in the definition. “General public” is not defined in the city
code, but a dictionary definition provides that “p ublic” means “the people as a whole, ” a
meaning which “general” simply reinforces. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
520, 1005 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “general” as “involving, relating to, or affecting the
whole”).
Here, the dog sign is not in view of the general public. The dog sign is on a private
drive, 386 feet from the nearest public street. Only those entering the private drive can see
the dog sign. The Jellingers argue that , because deliver y drivers, garbage collectors,
visitors, and neighbors will see the dog sign when they enter the private drive, it is in view
of the general public. But these are not the “people as a whole ,” which is what the term
“general public” entails. Further, by statute, a private drive is a privately owned road used
by the owner “and those having express or implied permission from the owner, but not by
other persons.” Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subd. 57 (2018). In contrast, streets are “open to the

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use of the public.” Id. § 169.011, subd. 81 (2018). Because the dog sign is visible to non-
neighbors only from the private drive, and because only those with express or implied
permission to use the private drive may do so, it is not in view of the general public. As a
result, the dog sign is not a sign for purposes of the sign ordinance.
The Jellingers nevertheless argue that the dog sign is an informational-directional
sign. An informational -directional sign is “any sign giving information to employees,
visitors or delivery vehicles, but containing no advertising; such sign may include name or
business, but must predominantly represent a directional or informational message.” ACO,
§ 78-512. The Jellingers ar gue that the dog sign is informational in nature and targets
visitors and delivery drivers, fitting within this definition. We are not persuaded. In order
to be an informational -directional sign, a display must first meet the definition of “sign.”
But as stated above, the dog sign is not in view of the general public because it is located
on a private drive 386 feet from the nearest public street , and is therefore not a sign in the
first place. Further, informational-directional signs target a broader subset of the general
public than the few delivery drivers, neighbors, and guests who will use t he private drive
and see the dog sign . The dog sign is not an informational -directional sign, and w e
therefore conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to
respondents as to the dog sign.
V. We decline to reach the Weavers’ request for attorney fees.
In their appellate brief, the Weavers request attorney fees as compensation for
frivolous and vindictive litigation. We decline to reach this issue.

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Under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.05, subd. 1, “a party seeking attorney [] fees on
appeal shall submit such a request by motion under Rule 127. ” See Minn. Stat. § 645.44,
subd. 15 (2018) (providing that “shall” is mandatory). Rules 139.03 and 139.05 impose a
14-day limitation for submitting this request to the court of appeals . Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 139.05, subd. 1 (providing that, “all motions for fees must be submitted no later than
within the time for taxation of costs ”); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.03, subd. 1 (providing
that, “[a] prevailing party seeking taxation of costs and disbursements shall file and serve
a notice of taxation of costs and disbursements within 14 days of the filing of the court ’s
order or decision”). If a party has appropriately made a request, we may award a ttorney
fees on appeal when a statute enables it or a contract authorizes it, see Barr/Nelson, Inc. v.
Tonto’s, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Minn. 1983) , or as a sanction, Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
139.05 1998 comm. cmt. Because the Weavers have not followed the procedure
established by the appellate rules, we decline to reach their request for attorney fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.