Anthony Keith Meister, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0627

Anthony Keith Meister, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CR-16-7168, 73-CR-16-7169, 73-CR-16-10623, 73-CR-16-11744

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Mi chael J. Lieberg, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Coch ran, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from denial of postc onviction relief, appella nt challenges his
agreement to plead guilty as involuntary a nd requests resentencing according to his
understanding of the plea agreement. Because appellant received a sentence consistent

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with the terms of the plea agreement as appellant reas onably understood them, his
agreement to plead guilty was voluntary. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In June 2017, appe llant Anthony Keith Meister pl eaded guilty in Stearns County
District Court to two counts of second-degree controlled-substance possession, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016), 1 and two counts of check forgery, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.31, subd. 3 (2016). The plea agreement included three
provisions: (1) the state would dismiss charges in an unrelated case; (2) the state would not
file charges relating to a pending investiga tion; and (3) appellant would receive an
85-month prison sentence. Following the plea hearing, appellant was released pending
sentencing. However, appellant was arrested for a new controlled substance offense and a
hearing was held in July 2 017 to review his release and bail conditions pending his
scheduled September sentencing hearing.
During the July 2017 hearing, the prosecutor stated that he continued to agree to the
85-month prison term despite the new controlle d-substance possession charge, though he
now sought an interim prison commitment. The prosecutor additionally agreed to dismiss
the controlled-substance possession charges rela ted to appellant’s most recent arrest.
Appellant agreed to the interim prison commitment, which the court ordered.

1At the hearing, the state agreed to ame nd these charges to second-degree controlled-
substance possession from the initial charges of first-degree sale of a controlled substance,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021 subd. 1. (2016).

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At appellant’s September 2017 sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced
appellant to 85 months’ imprisonment on one of the counts of second-degree controlled-
substance possession, to run concurrently with the sentences for the three other
convictions.2
In December 2017, appellant was indicted in federal court for conspiracy to commit
bank fraud. That same month, appellant plea ded guilty to that charge and was sentenced
to 61 months’ federal imprisonment. This caus ed a federal detainer to be placed with the
department of corrections (DOC), which subsequently prevented appellant from qualifying
for early prison release programming.
Beginning in May 2019, appellant wrote three letters to the district court asking that
his sentences be vacated or modified to allow him to serve his federal sentence. The district
court did not consider the first letter and the following two letters were summarily denied
without explanation. Upon the urging of the county attorney, the district court considered
appellant’s letters as a petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied
appellant’s petition. This appeal follows.3

2Appellant was sentenced to 68 months’ imprisonment on the first second-degree
possession charge and 21 months’ imprisonment on each of the two check forgery charges.
Appellant does not contest these sentences.
3Appellant’s pro se supplemental brief claims to recite error, but is unsupported by legal
authority and inadequately briefed. As such, these arguments are forfeited. State v.
German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 476-77 (M inn. App. 2019) (holding pro se litigants to same
standard as attorneys and conclusory arguments citing no applicable law are forfeited).

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DECISION
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, permits a court to correct an illegal sentence at
any time. And a court may modify a lawful sentence at any time during a stay of imposition
or stay of execution. See State v. Hockensmith, 417 N.W.2d 630, 630 (Minn. 1988). But
a district court does not have inherent authority to modify a legally imposed sentence after
the sentence has been executed. See Reesman v. State , 449 N.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Minn.
App. 1989). Appellant is not arguing that his sentence is unlawful. Rather, he argues that
he has lost the benefit of early-rele ase programming due to his federal
conviction. Appellant’s request to have his sentence vacated is not relief available to him,
as the postconviction court did not have the authority to grant him his requested relief.
However, we evaluate appella nt’s appeal based upon wh ether his guilty plea was
voluntary. Though appellant’s pro se letters did not formally identify a voluntariness issue,
the district court made findings suggesti ng that appellant’s plea was voluntary.
Additionally, both parties have fully brie fed the constitutional voluntariness issue.
Therefore, in the interests of justice and ju dicial efficiency, we review on appeal the
voluntariness of appellant’s plea. See State v. Thompson, 937 N.W.2d 418, 421 n.2 (Minn.
2020) (considering parties’ argument that was not briefed before the district court when
doing so was in the interests of justice, wo uld not work unfair surprise, and all parties
briefed issue).
“ To be constitutionally valid, a guilty pl ea must be accurat e, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Appellant bears the burden
of proving his plea was invalid. Id. The validity of a plea agreement is a question of law

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we review de novo. See id. Likewise subject to de novo review are issues of interpretation
and the enforcement of plea agreements. See James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn.
2005). To determine if a plea agreement is voluntary, Minnesota courts will consider what
the parties “reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.” See Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d. at 96. Inducing a guilty plea “by promises that cannot be fulfilled invalidates
the plea.” State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000). If this court finds that
appellant’s plea agreement has been breached we may “order specific performance, or alter
the sentence if appropriate.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
Appellant argues that his guilty plea was in voluntary because he understood that his
guilty plea would result in his early release and because he was therefore induced by the
prosecutor’s unfulfilled assurances that appe llant could participat e in early-release
programming.
Appellant’s claim is based on the followi ng exchanges between the prosecutor and
the district court, and appellant and his trial counsel during the July 2017 hearing. First,
the prosecutor stated: “for [appellant] it’s -- would be an ability for him to get in and start
programming. I know he’s looking at trying to get -- avail hi mself of some treatment and
programming in prison, which would potentially lead to -- maybe an earlier release date.”
Additionally, the following exchange occurred between appellant and his attorney:
THE DEFENDANT: On the 85 months, am I correct,
[prosecutor], that this is a 36- month treatment program that I
will be in?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You’re eligible for release at 36
months if you complete your in patient treatment at prison.
That’s the program, yes. You need to request that when you
get there, like I told you.

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Neither the prosecutor’s statement regarding potential treatment nor appellant’s questions
indicate an agreement for early release. The argument that there was an agreement for early
release or that appellant understood it to be in the plea agreement is contrary to the record,
which clearly identified three terms to th e plea agreement and supports appellant’s
understanding of those terms.
During the June 2017 plea hearing, appellant’s trial counsel communicated the
imprisonment portion of the agreement to the district court that, in exchange for his guilty
plea, appellant would: “receiv e a sentence of 85 months commit to the Commissioner of
Corrections.” Appellant’s trial counsel then asked appellant questions to support the guilty
plea as follows:
Q: Has anybody promised you anything outside of what we’ve
talked about here today --
A: No
Q: -- and what’s contained in this document?
A: Nothing.
Q: Okay. And then I’m just goi ng to show you, this is a
document entitled Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty in a Felony
or a Gross Misdemeanor Case Pursuant to Rule 15. Did we fill
this out together?
A: Yes.
Q: And is this your signature on page two of two?
A: It is.
Q: Did you place it here be cause you’re waiving the rights
contained in this document and you want to take advantage of
the plea offer?
A: Yes.
. . . .
THE COURT: Do you fully understand the agreement here?
A: Yeah.

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There is nothing in the record or plea agreement to show that the state told appellant that
he would be eligible for early-release programmi ng such that his guilty plea was induced by
any such promise. Appellant reasonably understood the terms of the plea agreement, and
received a sentence in accordance with that agreement. Appellant’s guilty plea was
voluntary.
Affirmed.