James Michael Soderbeck, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0632

James Michael Soderbeck, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-3123

James Michael Soderbeck, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Je ffrey A. Wald, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant James Michael Soderbeck cha llenges an order summarily denying his
second petition for postconviction relief following direct appeal. Soderbeck argues that
(1) the district court abused its discretion by concluding that his claims for postconviction
relief were procedurally barred because, he contends, he had not previously raised those
claims and (2) the district court judge who i ssued the order was biased against him. We
affirm.
FACTS
The facts and procedural hist ory underlying this case are discussed in detail in
previous opinions of this court.1 In brief, respondent State of Minnesota charged Soderbeck
with one count of first-degree and one coun t of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Soderbeck I, 2017 WL 3863833, at *1. The complaint alleged that, during a female friend’s
visit to his home, he became se xually aggressive toward her a nd inserted his fingers into
her vagina without her consent. Soderbeck II, 2019 WL 5304187, at *1. Soderbeck pleaded
guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. The district court accepted the plea and
sentenced Soderbeck to a 15-year prison term. Soderbeck I, 2017 WL 3863833, at *1.
On direct appeal, Soderbeck argued that his guilty plea was invalid on the ground
that it was not accurate because the record did not contain the facts necessary to establish

1 See Soderbeck v. State , No. A19-0238, 2019 WL 5304187 (Minn. Ap p. Oct. 21, 2019)
(Soderbeck II ) (affirming denial of Soderbec k’s first postconviction petition); State v.
Soderbeck, No. A16-1908, 2017 WL 3863833 (Minn. App. Sept. 5, 2017), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 28, 2017) (Soderbeck I) (affirming Soderbeck’s conviction on direct appeal).

3
the element of coercion. Id. at *2-3. This court rejected his argument and affirmed his
conviction. Id. at *3.
Soderbeck then filed a petition for post conviction relief in which he again
challenged the validity of his guilty plea. Soderbeck II, 2019 WL 5304 187, at *1. The
district court construed his petition to have made the following three claims: (1) the guilty
plea was not accurate, (2) he di d not intelligently en ter into the guilty plea, and (3) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not provide him with the
complaint or with the evidence against him befo re he entered his plea. The district court
denied the petition. It determined that both of Soderbeck’s claims challenging the validity
of his guilty plea were procedurally barred—the first because it was raised on direct appeal,
and the second because it could have been raised on direct appeal but was not. Id. The
district court also determined that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was
procedurally barred because it could have been raised on di rect appeal but was not, and
that, in any event, the claim failed on its merits because Soderbeck’s petition failed to allege
facts showing prejudice.
On appeal, this court affirmed the order denying postconviction relief. Id. We agreed
with the district court that Soderbeck’s challenges to th e validity of his plea were
procedurally barred, and we decided that we need not address the ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim because Soderbeck did not ch allenge the district court’s disposition of
that claim on appeal. Id. at *2.
We now arrive at the subject of this ap peal: the district court’s order denying
Soderbeck’s second petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, Soderbeck purported

4
to challenge the procedural bar to his plea-withdrawal claims and to assert an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim based on discover y disclosures, includi ng the absence of a
victim’s statement, made before his guilty plea. The district court denied Soderbeck’s
petition because it determined that Soderbeck’ s claims were all procedurally barred and
that Soderbeck “[did] not raise any claim, argument, or evidence in his Second Petition that
was not fully addressed” in the first postconviction order.
Soderbeck appeals.
DECISION
Soderbeck challenges the district court’s determination that his plea-withdrawal
claims and his ineffective-assistance-of -counsel claim are procedurally barred. In addition,
raising the argument for the first time on appeal , Soderbeck contends that the chief judge
of the district court should have decided the merits of his second petition for postconviction
relief because the district court judge was biased against him.
We review a district court’s summary deni al of a petition for postconviction relief
for an abuse of discretion. Andersen v. State , 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). “A
postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view
of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 895
N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017)). See also Zornes v. State , 903 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Minn.
2017) (applying this same standard).

5
I. Soderbeck’s plea-withdra wal and ineffective-assistan ce-of-counsel claims are
procedurally barred.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “when a petition for postconviction
relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, a ll claims raised in the direct appeal and all
claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal
are procedurally barred.” Davis v. State , 880 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. 2016) (quoting
Buckingham v. State, 799 N.W.2d 229, 231 (Minn. 2011)); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 1 (2018) (“A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been
completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the
conviction or sentence.”). This rule is known as the Knaffla bar. See State v. Knaffla, 243
N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). The Knaffla bar also applies to issues that were raised or
could have been raised in a previous postconviction petition. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d
590, 597 (Minn. 2017). Persons seeking postconviction relief bear the burden of
establishing by a prepondera nce of the evidence that their claims merit relief. Hannon v.
State, 889 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 2017).
Soderbeck contends that his first petition for postconviction relief did not raise plea-
withdrawal claims or an ineffective-assistan ce-of-counsel claim and that the claims are
therefore not procedurally barred. But, in Soderbeck II, we held that Soderbeck’s plea-
withdrawal claims in his first petition for postconviction relief were procedurally barred
because they were either raised on direct appeal or could have been raised on direct appeal.
Soderbeck II, 2019 WL 5304187, at *2. Moreover, as we also observed, Soderbeck brought
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his first petition for postconviction relief and

6
did not challenge the district court’ s rejection of that claim on appeal. Id. Thus, under
Soderbeck II, Soderbeck’s plea-withdrawal and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in
his second petition for postconviction relief are procedurally barred.
Soderbeck contends that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is not barred
because the district court erroneously co nstrued his first petiti on as including an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Not only did Soderbeck forfeit the ability to make
that argument because he did not pursue the issue on appeal in Soderbeck II, but it would
not make a difference here. The Knaffla bar precludes ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims that were not, but could ha ve been, raised on direct appeal. Vance v. State , 752
N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. 2008) (holding that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims were
Knaffla barred because they were based on facts that the appellant kne w or should have
known about at the time of his direct appeal). Soderbeck claims that his counsel was
ineffective for allegedly not obtaining a victim’s statement and disclosing it to him. Those
are facts that Soderbeck either knew or should have known at the time of his direct appeal.
Thus, the claim is procedurally barred.
II. Soderbeck’s argument of judicial bias fails.

Soderbeck maintains that the district c ourt chief judge should have decided the
merits of his second petition for postconviction relief because the district court judge was
biased against him. But Soderbeck did not raise the issue of judicial bias in the district court
or seek to disqualify the judge for cause. We do not consider issues that were not raised to
and considered by the district court. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996)

7
(stating appellate courts generall y do not address issues or theo ries not raised in district
court). This argument is therefore forfeited.
Even if this argument were not forfeited, it nevertheless fails. Soderbeck complains
that the district court judge is biased agai nst him because she has denied his petition for
postconviction relief twice. But Soderbeck did not articulate any facts to support his claim
of bias. See Hooper v. State, 680 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Minn. 2004) (“[A] petitioner’s subjective
belief that the judge is biased does not nece ssarily warrant [disqualification].”). The fact
that the same judge previously denied his first petition does not compel the determination
that she was biased against him regard ing the denial of his second petition. See State v.
Kramer, 441 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Minn. App. 1989) (“A judge’s prior adverse ruling in a
case is not sufficient to show prejudice which would disqualify the judge.”), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 9, 1989). It is common practice for the same judge to preside over both a trial
or plea hearing and the pos tconviction proceedings. See Rossberg v. State , 874 N.W.2d
786, 790 (Minn. 2016). As th e supreme court has held, “[ t]his practice does not—by
itself—present an adequate ground for disqualification.” Id. Thus, Soderbeck’s general
dissatisfaction with the district court’s ruli ngs on his first and second postconviction
petitions is not sufficient to conclude that the district court judge was biased against him.
Affirmed.