State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0644

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Lamar Mutcherson,
Appellant.

Filed June 1, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-19-2037

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tr acy M., Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judgments of conviction of first-degree
controlled-substance crime, unlawful possession of a firearm, and threats of violence,
appellant Robert Lamar Mutche rson argues that the district court committed reversible
2
error by denying his motion for a mistrial after a police officer impermissibly testified that
he knew Mutcherson from another investigation. Mutcherson also raises several additional
issues in his pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were established at the ju ry trial in this case . A.M. lived in an
apartment in St. Cloud with two other people. She first met Mutcherson in 2018, and the
two became romantically involved. Around February 2019, Mutcherson, who at the time
was homeless and unemployed, began staying with A.M. and keeping personal belongings
at her apartment.
One morning in March 2019, Mutcherson and A.M. argued by te xt message after
A.M. became suspicious that he was seeing another woman. Mutcherson swore at A.M.,
called her names, and threatened that his sist er was going to beat her up. A.M. became
scared. She told Mutcherson that she wanted him to get his belongings and get out of her
apartment.
A.M. told her roommate that she was afraid of Mutcherson and asked the roommate
to meet Mutcherson when he arrived at the apartment to get his belongings. When
Mutcherson arrived that day, A.M. hid in another roommate’s bedroom. Mutcherson did
not return his key to A.M.’s roommate. Mutcherson went to A.M.’s bedroom, where he
texted A.M. pictures of her wallet and passpor t and threatened to burn them. A.M. texted
a friend, who was not in the apartment, about what was happening.
A.M. then went into her bedroom and confronted Mutcherson, who was lying down.
A.M. told him that a friend was coming over to help her move out and that Mutcherson
3
needed to remove his belongings. Mutcherson pulled back the bedshe ets to reveal a gun
and told her, “If you keep pushing me, I will shoot you and the people that are coming.”
A.M. was afraid.
A.M. went into the living room and co mmunicated with her friend by phone and
text, telling her friend that Mutcherson had a gun. The friend called the police. Meanwhile,
Mutcherson went to the living room where A.M. was. He had the gun in his waistband and
was carrying a plastic Armor All wipes container, which he set on the coffee table in front
of him.
The police arrived, and A.M. gave them permission to enter the apartment. As
officers entered the apartmen t, Mutcherson removed the gun from his waistband and
pushed it into the couch. Officers told Mutcherson to put his hands up. As he was standing
up, the couch cushion lifted and the officers sa w the gun slide to th e back of the couch
behind where Mutcherson was sitting. A.M. later testified that this was the same gun that
Mutcherson threatened her with in her room. The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA)
also confirmed that, while there was a mixture of DNA on the gun, there was a major male
profile that matched Mutcherson’s DNA on the gun.
Officers handcuffed Mutcherson. When the officers began searching him,
Mutcherson pulled something out of his pants pocket and tried to conceal it in his
waistband. When officers grabbed his hand to seize the object, Mutcherson began to
struggle. Once able to subdue Mutcherson an d force his hand open, officers discovered a
clear plastic bag containing a white powder. O fficers later confirmed the powder was 9.5
grams of cocaine. Mutcherson testified at tria l that he possessed the cocaine for personal
4
use. Officers transported Mutcherson to the Stearns County jail, where it was noted that he
had two cell phones—one smart phone and one flip phone.
After Mutcherson’s arrest, A.M. and her ro ommates consented to a search of the
apartment. A.M. brought officers over to the couch area, where the Armor All wipes
container was. She told officers that she ha d seen Mutcherson with the container the day
before and that he often stored things in it. She showed officers how to open it. Inside the
container, officers found a plastic bag containing a larger amount of what turned out to be
cocaine weighing 24.3 grams. A.M., her room mates, and a friend present denied using
cocaine and denied that the cocaine or the container belonged to them.
A.M. also directed officers to the places in her bedr oom where Mutcherson stored
his belongings. There, officers discovered a clear plastic bag containing an unidentified
white powder that tested negative for cocaine and a black bag containing $7,680 in cash.
Mutcherson later testified that the money wa s his, but he denied it was from drug sales. 1
Finally, A.M.’s roommate told officers that Mutcherson had visitors to the apartment but
that they would only stay for ten minutes or less.
The state charged Mutcherson with first-degree possession of cocaine with intent to
sell in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2018), possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018), and felony threats
of violence in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd . 1 (2018). Th e jury found

1 Mutcherson’s ex-girlfriend testified at trial that she gave him $4,200 in cash shortly before
the incident.

5
Mutcherson guilty of all counts, 2 and the judge sentenced Mutcherson to 126 months in
prison for the drug conviction and concurrent prison sentences on the other counts.
Mutcherson appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mutcherson’s motion
for a mistrial.

Mutcherson’s motion for a mistrial arose af ter the state’s expert witness made an
impermissible comment during cross-examination. The distri ct court sustained defense
counsel’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the re mark. It denied the defense
request for a mistrial.
To decide whether to grant a mistrial, a district court must determine whether there
is a reasonable probability that the trial’s outcome would be different if the event prompting
the motion had not occurred. State v. Manthey , 711 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 2006). A
“district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event
occurring during the trial.” State v. Bahtuoh , 840 N.W.2d 804, 819 (Minn. 2013). We
therefore review the denial of a motion fo r a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See State
v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2016). A district court ab uses its discretion if its
“decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or against logic and facts in the record.”
Andersen v. State, 940 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).

2 The jury also found Mutcherson guilty of fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.05, subd. 2(1) (2018). Because it was a lesser
included controlled-substance offense, the district court did not enter a conviction for this
offense.
6
A. The Mistrial Motion and the District Court’s Ruling
Before trial in this case, the state proffe red expert testimony from an investigator
with the Central Minnesota Violent Offender Task Force regarding dr ug trafficking. The
state sought to introduce the investigator’s testimony concer ning “the quantity of drugs
typically found in sales as opposed to personal use” in order to prove that Mutcherson
intended to sell the cocaine in his possession. The district court ruled that the investigator
could testify as an expert on the quantities and characteristics of controlled substances that
are indicative of sales rather than possession but could not vouch for other witnesses or
testify about the ultimate issue of Mutcherson’s intent.
On the morning of trial, Mutcherson’s coun sel informed the dist rict court that the
investigator and the task force were invol ved in another matter involving Mutcherson,
“which potentially raises issues of bias.” The prosecutor acknowledged that in August 2019
the Violent Offender Task Force had conduct ed surveillance of Mutcherson during a
controlled buy, which resulted in a charge agai nst him. But the prosec utor explained that
the investigator would not be “testifying to anything that happened then.” The district court
reaffirmed that the investigator could testify as an expert witness regarding drug trafficking
and observed that defense coun sel could cross-examine the investigator concerning any
potential bias.
At trial, the investigator on direct ex amination provided his expert testimony
regarding the typical amount a personal us er of cocaine would purchase and other
background information about cocaine sales. On cross-examination, Mutcherson’s counsel
began by asking the investigator, “So you don’t know mister—if Mr. Mutcherson is a user,
7
do you?” The investigator resp onded, “I don’t personally kn ow Mr. Mutcherson, but our
task force has investigated Mr. Mutcherson.” Mutcherson’s counsel immediately objected
to the answer. The district court sustained th e objection, telling the ju ry to “disregard the
last part of that answer.” After a bench co nference, defense counsel asked just two more
questions of the investigator—regarding the street value of cocaine—and the prosecution
conducted no redirect examination.
Once the district court ex cused the jury for the da y, Mutcherson moved for a
mistrial, arguing that the investigator’s test imony was “highly prejudi cial.” The district
court denied the motion, stating, in part:
I will state that [defense counsel] is correct in the sense
that the witness’s an swer probably was mo re than the direct
question asked by [defense counsel]. But I also say that it was
beyond the scope of direct. . . .

. . . .

. . . I do agree, [the investigator’s statement] is, one,
beyond the scope; but, two, inap propriate in this particular
case. As a passing reference, I’m certainly willing to give a
cautionary instruction. I do not interpret that to be intentional.
I understand that [defense counse l] may feel differently, but I
did not interpret that evidence, that statement, to be malicious,
willful, intent of the officer to purposely disregard any
instructions given to him and th en intentionally tried to bring
in otherwise inadmissible evidence. So I am not going to grant
the mistrial.

I will certainly be happy to give a cautionary instruction,
and I’ll leave it to [defense co u n s e l ] t o c o m e u p w i t h a n y
instructions you would like me to give about that, if you want
me to highlight the issue. I th ink it was very short in passing
and I immediately told the jury to disregard it. But if you want
me to give additional instructions to the jury, I’ ll be happy to
consider whatever language you would like.
8

B. The district court did not apply the wrong legal standard.
Mutcherson first argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying a
mistrial because it failed to a pply the proper le gal standard. He contends that the district
court’s failure to explicitly state whether there was a reasonable probability that the
challenged testimony would change the outcome of the trial shows that the district court
applied an incorrect legal standard.
In evaluating whether a reasonable probab ility exists, courts have considered
whether challenged testimony was of a passing nature, whether an objection was sustained,
and whether the jury received a curative instruction. See, e.g., State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d
675, 689 (Minn. 2007); State v. Haglund, 267 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. 1978). The district
court here discussed the brevity of the testimo ny, the direction to the jury to disregard it,
and the availability of an ad ditional curative instruction. Given its discu ssion of these
factors, we cannot conclude that the district court failed to apply the proper legal standard.
Mutcherson argues, however, that the district court’s “focus on whether or not [the
investigator] intended to prejudice Mutcherson” demonstrates its legal error. We disagree.
In moving for a mistrial, defense counsel argued that the investigator’s testimony “was an
intentional attempt to prejudice the jury.” The district court responded to that assertion,
rejecting it. The fact that the district court responded to defense counsel’s complaint does
not mean that the district di d not understand or apply the proper legal standard for a
mistrial.
9
We observe that, “even if a district cour t applies the wrong legal standard, if the
ruling was warranted under the proper standard and no prejud ice results, reversal is not
required.” State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 474 n.5 (Minn. 2019). We turn to the question
of whether the ruling was an abuse of discretion under the applicable legal standard.
C. The denial of a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a mistrial, we analyze whether the
appellant has satisfied the burden “to establish a reasonable probability that the jury would
have reached a different verdict” absent the wrongf ul testimony. Id. at 472. For several
reasons, we conclude that Mutcherson has not satisfied his burden.
First, the challenged testimony was isolated and brief. See Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d at
819 (affirming the denial of a mistrial when “the disputed reference was isolated and
brief”). The investigator’s statement was, as the district court described it, “a passing
reference” to the other investigation, and the district court immediately directed the jury to
disregard the statement. The improper statement was one sentence of testimony in a three-
day trial, and there was no other reference to it in the trial. See Jaros, 932 N.W.2d at 475
(considering that erroneously admitted test imony was not relied on by the state or
referenced in closing argument).
Mutcherson argues that the passing reference alone is enough to warrant a mistrial
because “Minnesota courts have long recognize d that a mistrial is a necessary remedy
where a police officer testifies to inadmissibl e material prejudicing the defendant.” He
relies on State v. Gegen, where the supreme court reversed the denial of a mistrial based
on improper police testimony. 147 N.W.2d 925, 925 (Minn. 1967). In Gegen, though, the
10
supreme court focused on the fact that the pr osecutor deliberately elicited the improper
testimony regarding the defendant’s prior convi ction, stating that “i[f] prosecutors and
police officers persist in trying to inject into a trial indirectly matters which they know they
cannot introduce directly the only solution is to let them try the case over.” Id. at 926. Here,
it was defense counsel’s question that led to the improper testimony, and the district court
found that the investigator had no “malicious, willful intent . . . to purposely disregard any
instructions given to him.” Mutcherson contends that the state was still at fault for failing
to prepare the witness. But, gi ven the nature of the question posed to the investigator and
the content and brevity of hi s response, we are not persua ded that the investigator’s
statement demonstrates a failure of the state not to prepare the witness.
Second, the evidence against Mutcherson was strong. For the possession-with-
intent-to-sell charge, A.M. testified that Mutcherson possessed the Armor All container
holding cocaine and that the container was within Mutcherson’s reach when officers
entered the apartment. The container he ld a bag of a “white-ish substance
that . . . appear[ed] to be the same color and consistency and packaging” as the cocaine that
Mutcherson admitted was his. All the other occupants of the apartment denied possessing
the container. The total amount of cocaine recovered from the apartment was valued at
around $3,300 and was enough for 132 doses. Officers also discovered $7,680 in cash and
a suspected cutting agent among Mutcherson’s belongings in A.M.’s bedroom. Mutcherson
did not dispute that he owned these items, ev en though he was unemployed at the time of
his arrest. Mutcherson also often had visitors at the apartment who stayed for no more than
a few minutes at a time. Finally, officers found two cell phones belonging to Mutcherson—
11
a flip phone and a smart phone. Thus, the state presented a strong case against Mutcherson
for the possession-with-intent-to-sell charge.
As to the firearm-possession and threats-o f-violence charges, A.M. testified that
Mutcherson displayed his gun while they we re arguing and threatened to shoot her and
anyone else who came into the apartment. A.M. also saw Mu tcherson bring the gun into
the living room. Several police officers observed Mutcherson holding the gun while sitting
on the couch, and police recovered the gun from a crease in the couch behind where
Mutcherson was sitting. Finally, upon examination of the gun, a major male profile found
on the gun matched Mutcherson ’s DNA. Thus, the state pres ented a strong case against
Mutcherson on the firearm-possession and threats-of-violence charges.
Finally, the district court provided a curative instruction. See Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d
at 689 (affirming denial of mi strial based in part on curative instruction). Mutcherson
argues that the district court’s instruction to the jury was insuffi cient to mitigate any
prejudice because the testimony came from a police officer. He relies on State v.
Huffstutler, where the supreme court reversed a conviction, despite a curative instruction,
because a police officer gave inadmissible testimony. 130 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Minn. 1964).
But, since Huffstutler, the supreme court has taken into account a curative instruction in
concluding that a police officer’s inadmissi ble statement did not warrant a mistrial. See
Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 689. And this court has recognized that “doubts about instructions
have not held sway in Minnesota courts, which in the years since Huffstutler have adopted
a presumption that jurors follow instructions.” State v. McCurry, 770 N.W.2d 553, 558-59
(Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009).
12
The district court’s denial of Mutcherson’s motion for a mistrial was not an abuse
of discretion. We turn to the issues raised in Mutcherson’s pro se supplemental brief.
II. The arguments in Mutcherson’s supplemental brief lack merit.
A. The evidence is sufficient to find Mutcherson guilty of all three counts.

Mutcherson argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt on each of the three charges. We disagree.
1. First-Degree Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Sell
To convict Mutcherson of first-degree possession of cocaine with the intent to sell,
the state had to prove that he unlawfully sold 17 grams or mo re of a mixture or mixtures
containing cocaine within a 90-day period. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1). The
statute defines “sell,” in part, as the possession of the controlled substance with the intent
to sell. Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(3) ( 2018). Mutcherson admitted that he possessed
the 9.5 grams of cocaine found on his person, but he claims that the evidence is insufficient
to prove that he possessed the Armor All c ontainer containing the other 24.3 grams of
cocaine. He also argues that th e evidence is insufficient to prove that he sold or intended
to sell the cocaine.
The state used direct evidence to prove Mutcherson’s possession of the cocaine. We
review a challenge to the sufficiency of direct evidence by determining whether the
evidence—when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction—allows the fact-
finder to reach a guilty verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We will
not disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
13
and the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could have reasonably concluded
that the defendant was guilty. State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988).
The state proves actual possession when it shows that the defendant has “direct
physical control” of the contraband. State v. Barker , 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App.
2016) (quotation omitted). A.M. testified that she saw Mutcherson with the container both
the day of his arrest and the day before. A re sponding officer testified that the container
was within Mutcherson’s reach when they entered the apar tment. That same officer
testified that within the Armor All container found at the scene near Mutcherson there was
a bag of a “white-ish substance that would appear to be the same color and consistency and
packaging” as the cocaine found on Mutchers on’s person. Finally, A.M., her roommates,
and her friend present at the apartment the day of the incident denied possessing the Armor
All container or any of the cocaine within it. This is sufficient direct evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mutcherson actually possessed the Armor All container
containing the 24.3 grams of cocaine.
As to Mutcherson’s intent to sell, the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove
that element. When analyzing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-
step analysis. See State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify
the circumstances proved at trial, considering only those circumstances consistent with the
jury’s verdict. See id. at 598-99. Second, we determine “whether the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt,”
giving no deference to the jury’s c hoice between any re asonable inferences. Id. at 599
(quotations omitted). If there is any rational hypothesis pointing to innocence, then the
14
evidence is insufficient and the conviction must be overturned. See State v. Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010).
The circumstances proved at trial are: (1) the police seized 33 total grams of cocaine,
when combining the amount of cocaine Mutcherson admits to possessing with the cocaine
within the Armor All container; (2) this am ount of cocaine is 132 doses, which is more
than nine times the amount that a recreational user would purchase at a time;
(3) Mutcherson owned a gun and two cell phone s—one a smartphone and the other a flip
phone; (4) Mutcherson possesse d a bag with $7,680 even th ough he testified he was
unemployed; (5) the police found a bag of a wh ite powder consistent with a cutting agent
near Mutcherson’s belongings in the bedroom; and (6) Mutcherson had visitors over to the
apartment who never stayed more than a few minutes.
Based on these circumstances, there is no other reasonable hyp othesis than that
Mutcherson intended to sell th e cocaine in his possession. Considering that Mutcherson
possessed more than nine times the amount of cocaine a regular user would purchase and
a significant amount of money, there is no ot her reasonable hypothesis other than that
Mutcherson had the requisite inte nt to support his conviction. See State v. Collard , 414
N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Jan 15, 1988) (concluding the
amount of cocaine and money seized, the a ddress book, packaging of the cocaine, and
expert testimony provided sufficient evidence to support a finding of intent to sell).3

3 Mutcherson presents many arguments against this conclusion. He contends that (1) the
BCA contaminated or planted evidence pointing towards his guilt; (2) the state withheld
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194,
1196-97 (1963); and (3) the state did not allow him to adequately testify in his defense. He
15
2. Possession of a Firearm as an Ineligible Person
Because Mutcherson stipulated to his ineligibility to possess a firearm, the state only
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mutcherson knowingly possessed a gun to
prove his illegal-possession-of-a-firearm charge. See State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601
(Minn. 2017). A.M. and several police officers testified to seeing Mutcherson holding the
gun before he dropped it onto the couch, where police recovered it. And, while the gun
contained a mixture of DNA, the BCA determined that there was a major male profile that
matched Mutcherson’s DNA. This direct evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mutcherson knowingly possessed a gun.
3. Felony Threats of Violence
To convict Mutcherson of felony threats of violence, the state had to prove that he
“threaten[ed], directly or indirectly, to co mmit any crime of violence with purpose to
terrorize another” or did so “in a reckless disr egard of the risk of causing such terror or
inconvenience.” Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1. A.M. testified that Mutcherson showed her
his gun and said, “If you keep pushing me, I will shoot you and the people that are coming.”
A.M. later testified that she felt afraid when Mutcherson did this. This evidence is sufficient
to prove Mutcherson directly threatened A.M. with his gun.

also makes several references to prosecutorial or judicial misconduc t, perjury by several
witnesses, coercion, bias, and entrapment. We reject these arguments because they either
lack merit based on the record or are forfeited by Mutcherson’s failure to raise them to the
district court. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (holding that an issue
not raised to the district court is forfeited on appeal).
16
B. Mutcherson did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Mutcherson next argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact which are reviewed
de novo. Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 2004). Mutcherson claims his trial
counsel was ineffective because trial counsel did not file a moti on to suppress evidence
based on the Fourth Amendment or request a competency evaluation under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20. Whether to move to suppress evidence is a question of strategy, which we will not
review. See Carridine v. State, 867 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Minn. 2015). As for not requesting
a rule 20 evaluation, Mutcherson’s argument is not supported by citations to legal
authorities or to supporting evid ence in the record and is instead based on conclusory
statements. Therefore, we do not consider it. See State v. Bartylla , 755 N.W.2d 8, 22-23
(Minn. 2008) (declining to consider pro se arguments on appeal that are not supported by
argument or citation to legal authority).
C. Mutcherson was not denied a jury of his peers.
Mutcherson also asserts in passing that he was denied his right to a jury of his peers.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions entitle a defendant to a jury pool reflective
of a cross-section of the community. Andersen, 940 N.W.2d at 181. To prevail on his claim
that this right was violated, Mutcherson must present a prima facie showing that the venire
(1) excluded “a distinctive group in the community,” (2 ) the group was not “fairly
represented in the venire,” and (3) that the underrepresentation stemmed from “systematic
exclusion of the group in question” over a “significant period of time.” Id. at 181-82
17
(quotations omitted). Because Mutcherson presented no factual basis to meet any of these
three requirements, his claim fails.
D. Mutcherson’s remaining arguments fail.
Mutcherson makes several additional argum ents, including concerning the search
of the apartment, jury selecti on, his criminal-history score, alleged witness perjury, and
various evidentiary matters. These arguments are forfeited either because Mutcherson had
to but did not raise them in the district court, see Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357, or because he
has failed to provide adequate legal argument on appeal and no error is apparent based on
our review, see Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d at 23 (concluding that issues are forfeited when they
lack supportive arguments or legal authority and “no prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection” (quotation omitted)).
Affirmed.