State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0652

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Clinton Angwenyi Omuya,
Appellant.

Filed April 26, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-22419

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Clinton Angwenyi Omuya gave a handgun to a 17-yea r-old boy and encouraged
him to use it to confront another person. The boy used the handgun to shoot and kill the
other person. Omuya pleaded guilty to aiding and abetti ng second-degree unintentional

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murder. The district court imposed a t op-of-the-box sentence of 180 months of
imprisonment. On appeal, Omuya argues that the district court e rred by not imposing a
middle-of-the-box sentence of 150 months. We affirm.
FACTS
In the early morning hours of January 7, 2018, Omuya attended a house party in
southeast Minneapolis with his brother and a 17-year-old friend, A.K. At the party, Omuya
saw D.D., whom he held responsible for his be ing robbed and shot in a prior incident.
Omuya retrieved a handgun from his parked vehi cle and returned to the party. Shortly
thereafter, Omuya, his brother, and A.K. decided to leave the party in Omuya’s vehicle,
with Omuya driving. But the group later decided to return to the party. When they arrived,
Omuya asked A.K. to rejoin the party, confront D.D., and show him the handgun. Omuya
also told A.K. that if the situation escalated, he should use the handgun to pistol-whip D.D.
A.K. went back to the party, confronted D.D., and shot and killed him. In a prior appeal in
a different case, this court affirmed a district court decision to certify A.K. for prosecution
as an adult. In re Welfare of A.D.K., No. A18-2053, 2019 WL 3000766, at *4 (Minn App.
July 8, 2019), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2019).
The state charged Omuya with aiding and abetting second-degree intentional
murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016), and aiding an offender as
an accomplice after the fact, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 3 (2016). In
February 2019, Omuya pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree unintentional
murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19 , subd. 2(1). Because Omuya’s criminal-
history score was zero, the presumptive sentence was a range of between 128 months and

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180 months of imprisonment, with a mid-point of 150 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines
4.A. (2016). In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Omuya would receive a sentence
of between 150 and 180 months, unless Omuya assi sted in the successful recovery of the
handgun that A.K. used to kill D.D., in which event he woul d be entitled to a sentence of
150 months. The handgun was not recovered. In February 2020, the district court
sentenced Omuya to 180 months of imprisonment. Omuya appeals.
DECISION
Omuya argues that the district court e rred by imposing a 180-month prison sentence
instead of a 150-month prison sentence.
The Minnesota Sentencing Gu idelines prescribe presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent. Guidelin es 2.C (2016). For any particular offense, the prescribed
sentence is “presumed to be ap propriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and
offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent . Guidelines 1.B.13 (2 016). The applicable
cell in the applicable grid t ypically states a “presumptive range,” which spans durations
that are “15 percent lower and 20 percent higher than the fixed duration displayed in each
cell.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.13.c (20 16). A district court may depart from the
presumptive range only if “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2016).
An appellate court “generally will not inte rfere with a sentencing court’s decision
to impose a term within the presumptive sentence range.” State v. Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d
10, 14 (Minn. 2015). Furthermore, “any se ntence within the presumptive range . . .
constitutes a presumptive sentence.” State v. Delk , 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App.

4
2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). Accordin gly, this court “will not generally
review a district court’s exercise of its discretion to sentence a defendant when the sentence
imposed is within the presumptive guidelines range.” Id. We may modify a presumptive
sentence but only in “rare” ca ses and only if modification is supported by “compelling
circumstances.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Omuya contends that there are circumstances that should compel this court to vacate
his sentence and remand for resentencing. Sp ecifically, he refers to “his remorse, his
cooperation with the State agai nst the principal and attempt to locate the gun used in the
offense, his culpability compared to the principal, and his potential for rehabilitation post
incarceration.” Similarly, in a pro se supplemental brief, Omuya argues that a shorter
sentence is justified by his remorse, his c ooperation with the state, his strong support
system, and his lack of a prior criminal record.
Omuya expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing, but the district court was not
favorably impressed. The district court stated to Omuya that he should have expected a
violent altercation when he brought his handgun to the party, that he made a bad decision
by encouraging a j uvenile to use the handgun in a confrontation, an d that he would need
“to suffer the consequences.” The district court also noted that Omuya did not recover the
handgun. The district court’s statements at the sentencing hearing are inconsistent with
Omuya’s claims of remorse and lack of culpability. We will not interfere with the district
court’s discretionary decision to discount Omuya’s claims of remorse and lack of
culpability. We see no other compelling reasons in the record to disturb the district court’s
exercise of discretion to impos e the longest sentence within the presumptive range. This

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simply is not the rare case in which an offender is en titled to a shorter presumptive
sentence. See Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428.
Thus, the district court did not err by imposing a sentence of 180 months of
imprisonment instead of a sentence of 150 months.
Affirmed.