Ronald Regino Altamirano, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0661

Ronald Regino Altamirano,
Respondent,

vs.

Katherine Peterson,
Appellant.

Filed February 8, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CV-20-454

Ronald Regino Altamirano, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

James R. Martin, Martin Law Office, Faribault, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Katherine Peterson, who wa s witnessed egging respondent Ronald
Altamirano’s car, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence under lying the harassment
restraining order granted to Altamirano and against her. Peterson further asserts the district
court erred by not holding a full hearing and issuing an incorrect oath. Because testimonial

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evidence supports Altami rano’s claims, the district court did conduct a full hearing, and
the retroactive oath was not improper, we affirm.
FACTS
After four days of eggs a nd tomato sauce thrown at his car, respondent Ronald
Regino Altamirano hid in a ne ighboring vehicle one early Ja nuary morning to catch the
culprit. He witnessed appellant Katherine Peterson and an unknown male throw eggs and
tomato sauce on his car, but was too afraid to confront them in person. Instead, Altamirano
called the police. In response, Peterson reported Altamirano for driving without a driver’s
license. Altamirano responded by filing a petition for a harassment restraining order
(HRO).
At a harassment hearing, Peterson, A ltamirano, and a witness for Altamirano
testified. The hearing requir ed the use of an in terpreter. In addition to the egging and
police call, Altamirano testified that Peterson left messages for him at his work place,
including a message left on his car in an enve lope labeled “bruho,” which the interpreter
said meant “sorcerer” in Spanis h. While he never witnesse d Peterson at his workplace,
Altamirano’s coworkers reported seeing her there multiple times. Altamirano testified that
these actions by Peterson made him fearful.
After this testimony, the district court judge realized he forgot to swear in
Altamirano. He issued a correcting oath that “everything [he] said is the truth, and
everything [he’s] about to say is the truth.” The judge ad ministered oaths to the two
remaining witnesses before they testified.

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Peterson denied egging any car. 1 She admitted to leaving a message on
Altamirano’s car at his place of business, but claimed the note was meant for her
ex-boyfriend, who was nicknamed “Bruho.” A ltamirano’s witness testified that Peterson
came to her house and accused the witness of harboring a rapist, and named Altamirano
and Peterson’s ex-boyfriend as men who lived there. The witness explained that no men
live in her house, and that sh e makes a living selling meals out of her home, including to
Altamirano.
After the testimony of every witness, the district court asked Peterson if she had
questions for the witnesses. The judge explained that Peterson had “an opportunity to ask
questions right now” but also gave her the option to wait until she testified. If she had
questions, the court stated “tell me what you think the question is and then I can phrase it
the way I want to phrase it.” Peterson declined to ask questions.2 Following her testimony,
the judge asked again if there was anything else she wanted to say or ask, but Peterson
declined this offer as well.
The district court identified several ba ses for the HRO: (1 ) the honesty of
Altamirano and the lack of credibility of Pe terson; (2) Altamarino witnessing the fifth
egging incident; (3) the repeated efforts to falsely declare Altamarino a rapist; and
(4) Altamirano’s expression of fear. Peterson appeals.3

1 Peterson later stated in her letter brief to this court that she had egged Altamirano’s car
once.
2 Only one of these opportunities to ask questions was before the retroactive oath.
3 Altamirano did not file a brief in this appeal and this court ordered that the appeal proceed
under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

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DECISION
I. Sufficient facts support the issuance of the HRO.

First, Peterson argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion in granting the
HRO because there was insufficient evidence to find that Peterson harassed Altamirano.
A district court may grant an HRO if, amon g other things, it “finds at the hearing
that there are reasonable grounds to beli eve that the respondent has engaged in
harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2018). Harassment includes “repeated
incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse
effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy
of another.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2018). We review the issuance of an HRO for an abuse of
discretion. Kush v. Mathison , 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App. 2004). We will not
overturn the district court’s de cision to grant a restraining or der unless that decision is
based on an “erroneous view of the law” or is unsupported by the facts in the record.
State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019).
With this statutory framework in mind, we turn to the HRO before us. Here,
Altamirano reported five incidents of eggs a nd tomato sauce being thrown at his car, and
witnessed Peterson committing the final one. Peterson argues this only accounts as one
incident, as “[t]here is no evidence given suggesting that Peterson was the one who put
eggs and tomato sauce on Altamirano’s car the fi rst four times.” We are not persuaded.
The likelihood that Peterson ha ppened to be only the fifth perpetrator in a pattern of
dumping eggs and tomato sauce on a car that she also adm itted to leaving messages on is
minimal. Based on this testimony, the distri ct court could objectively infer that Peterson

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was behind more than on e of the five eggings. 4 Because the repeated eggings and
Peterson’s admission to leaving a note on Alta mirano’s vehicle are sufficient repeated
incidents of intrusive or unwanted behavi or, and given Altamirano’s credibility, this
testimony supports the issuance of the HRO.5
In sum, because there were sufficient facts in the record to support issuance of the
HRO, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in granting it.
II. The district court allowed for a full hearing and a retroactive oath did not deny
Peterson due process.

Second, Peterson contends that she was denied her rights to a “full hearing,”6 which
we interpret as Peterson asserting the lack of an adequate hearing under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.748 (2018), which we address below, in addition to her claim that the district
court’s failure to give Altamirano an oath before testifying was improper.

4 Additionally, the district court found te stimony regarding Pete rson falsely claiming
Altamirano was a rapist to satisfy an additional justification to support the HRO. Because
we conclude that Peterson’s other behavior is enough to support the issuance of an HRO,
we do not need to address the false rapist allegations.
5 Although it was not a basis for the distri ct court’s decision, Peterson being spotted
multiple times at Altamirano’s workplace, and her own testimony confirming that she
placed a message on his car at his workplace, would support an additional factor for
upholding the issuance of an HRO. See Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987)
(stating that the district court will not be reversed if it reached the right result for the wrong
reason).
6 Peterson did not specify where she got the “full hearing” language from. However, she
cites to Anderson v. Lake, in which this court observed that the Minnesota Domestic Abuse
Act and the statute governing the issuance of HROs are “sufficiently similar so that we
may recognize caselaw construing the former as applicable to the latter.” 536 N.W.2d 909,
911 (Minn. App. 1995). The statute at issue in Anderson has not contained the “full
hearing” language for years. See 1995 Minn. Laws ch 142, § 5, at 404; 2002 Minn. Laws
ch. 304 § 10, at 442; see also Oberg v. Bradley , 868 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn. App. 2015)
(explaining the history of the phrase “full heari ng” in this statute). But, the distinction
between “hearing” and “full hearing” does not change the results of this matter.

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Right to a Hearing
First, we look at whether Peterson was denied the right to a hearing when the court
issued the HRO. We review the issuance of an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Kush,
683 N.W.2d at 843.
The district court may issue an HRO if:
(1) the petitioner has filed a petition under subdivision
3;
(2) a peace officer has serv ed respondent with a copy
of the temporary restraining order obtained under
subdivision 4, and with notice of the right to
request a hearing . . . ; and
(3) the court finds at the hearing that there are
reasonable grounds to belie ve that the respondent
has engaged in harassment.

Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5( b). This court has explained that a hearing includes “the
right to present and cross-examine witnesses, to produce documents, and to have the case
decided on the merits.” El Nashaar v. El Nashaar, 529 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn. App. 1995);
see also Anderson, 536 N.W.2d at 911.
Those requirements were met here. The district court held a hearing, heard
testimony from multiple witnesses, accepted exhibits into evidence, and gave the
opportunity to question other witnesses to both parties. Peterson was given several
opportunities to raise questions and chose not to. Th is case is a far cry from El Nashaar,
where a hearing was held but no evidence was accepted, 529 N.W.2d at 14, and Anderson,
where no witness was ever given an oath and the parties were barred from cross-
examination, 536 N.W.2d at 910-11.

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Still, Peterson argues that the judge’s statement that “if you have any questions tell
me what you think the question is and then I can phrase it the way I want to phrase it” was
improper and shows that her right to cross-ex amine witnesses was vi olated. While this
language in a vacuum may ra ise questions, the hearing here involved speakers who were
not fluent in English and required a translator. Our view of this particular record leads us
to conclude that the judge was acting as an intermediary, not trying to quash Peterson’s
questioning.
Because a hearing was held and Pete rson was given the opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an HRO.
Procedural Due Process
Next we turn to Peterson’s argument that a retroactive oath violated her due-process
rights. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportun ity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Brooks v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
584 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 24,
1998). We review the questio n of whether a person’s du e-process rights have been
violated de novo. Zellman ex rel. M.Z. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2758, 594 N.W.2d 216, 220
(Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999).
Procedural due process includes “reasona ble notice, a timely opportunity for a
hearing, the right to be represented by couns el, an opportunity to present evidence and
argument, the right to an impartial decisionm aker, and the right to a reasonable decision
based solely on the record.” Humenansky v. Minn. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 525 N.W.2d 559,
565 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995).

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Here, there is no reason to believe that a curative, retroactive oath was not sufficient
as a matter of procedural due process. Not on ly does Peterson fail to point to caselaw to
say that a curative oath is improper or ineffec tive, this approach generally comports with
other ways that the court allows for swearing of statements. See generally Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 15 (requiring that a “signature is affi xed immediately below a declaration” in an
affidavit instead of before a declaration).
For these reasons, the district court’s actions do not amount to a deprivation of
Peterson’s statutory right to a hearing, nor a violation of her procedural due-process rights.
Affirmed.