Carlos Heard, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0672

Carlos Heard, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-10-34107

Carlos Heard, Rush City, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant, a self -represented litigant, challenges the summary denial of his fourth
postconviction petition . He argues that the convicting court lacked subject -matter
jurisdiction. We affirm.
FACTS
Following the fatal shooting of two people, appellant Carlos Heard 1 was indicted
and charged with multiple counts of murder. State v. Heard, No. A11 -1628, 2012 WL
3263775, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 13, 2012), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2012). The
case was tried to a jury, and Heard was convicted of second- and third-degree murder. Id.
Heard appealed to this court, we affirmed the convictions, and the supreme court denied
review. Id. at *1, *3-6.
In 2014, Heard petitioned for postconviction relief. The postconviction court
summarily denied the petition, concluding that the claims were Knaffla barred. See State
v. Knaffla , 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (“[W]here direct appeal has once been
taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered
upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief .”). This court affirmed the
postconviction court’s denial of relief. Heard v. State, No. A14-1578, 2015 WL 1758005,
at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 2015).

1 Heard is also known as Carlos Clark.

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In 2016, Heard filed his second postconviction petition. The postconviction court
summarily denied the petition, concluding that the claims were Knaffla barred.
In 2018, Heard filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal and subject -matter
jurisdiction. The district court treated the motion as a petition for postconviction relief.
The court summarily denied relief, concluding that the claims were Knaffla barred.
In November 2019, Heard filed his fourth postconviction petition. The
postconviction court summarily denied the petition. The court concluded that Heard’s
challenge to the convicting court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was Knaffla barred and
without merit. Heard appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Heard seeks reversal of his convictions and a remand to the district court “to put the
[s]tate to its burden to p rove that it had jurisdiction.” He contends that the state lacked a
valid warrant and argues that “a warrant has the sole function of giving the [courts]
jurisdiction over the accused person.”
Minnesota’s postconviction statute authorizes “a person convicted of a crime” to
seek postconviction relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction “violated the
person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state. ” Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2018). Upon the filing of a postconviction petition, an
evidentiary hearing must be held “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the
proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief .” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2018).

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We review a denial of a postconviction petition and request for an evidentiary
hearing for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). A
postconviction court abuses its discretion when it makes clearly erroneous factual findings,
bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or exercises discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). We review legal
issues de novo. Id.
“In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required, a postconviction court
considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State , 913 N.W.2d 417, 424 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). “But a court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner
alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief.”
Jackson v. State , 929 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). A petitioner
bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that facts exist that warrant
postconviction relief. Tscheu v. State, 829 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Minn. 2013).
Under Knaffla, a postconviction court generally does not consider claims that were
raised, or that could have been raised, on direct appeal or in a p revious postconviction
petition. Hooper v. State , 838 N.W.2d 775, 787 (Minn. 2013) . Heard’s challenge to
jurisdiction could have been raised in his direct appeal or prior postconviction petitions. In
fact, Heard challenged subject-matter jurisdiction in a previous postconviction proceeding.
Thus, Heard’s current postconviction claim is Knaffla barred.
A court may consider Knaffla-barred claims if the defendant presents a nove l legal
issue or if the interests of justice so require. Id. The postconviction court determined that

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Heard failed to satisfy either of those two exceptions. Indeed, Heard did not raise either
exception to the postconviction court. In Ashby v. State, the supreme court concluded that
the postconviction court did not err by failing to apply Knaffla exceptions when the
petitioner failed to raise them. 752 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn. 2008).
Heard suggests that his jurisdictional challenge is not barred because “there is no
discretion to ignore [a] lack of subject -matter jurisdiction .” See Pearson v. State , 946
N.W.2d 877, 884 (Minn. 2020) (acknowledging possibility that challenges to subject -
matter jurisdiction are never untimely). For support, Heard cites Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), Johnson v. State , 916 N.W.2d 674 (Minn. 2018), and
Fagin v. State , 933 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. 2019) .2 Those cases regard the unconstitutional
application of Minnesota’s chemical -test-refusal statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2
(2018). Heard relies on those cases for the proposition that “a court is without jurisdiction
to convict a defendant of conduct that is not criminal.” Johnson, 916 N.W.2d at 680. But
Heard does not explain why the conduct underlying his murder convictions is not criminal,
such that his jurisdiction challenge is valid.

2 In Birchfield, the Supreme Court held that although a warrantless breath test was
permissible as a search incident to arrest, a blo od test did not fall within that warrant
exception and that, t herefore, a suspected drunk driver’s refusal to give a blood sample
could only be criminalized if the police had a valid warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement applied. 136 S. Ct. at 2185-86; see also Fagin, 933 N.W.2d at 778 (discussing
Birchfield). In Johnson, the supreme court concluded that the rule announced in Birchfield
is essentially a challenge to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the convicting court and that
a guilty plea therefore did not bar an as-applied Fourth Amendment challenge to
convictions in chemical -test-refusal cases. 916 N.W.2d at 680 -81; see also Fagin , 933
N.W.2d at 778 (discussing Johnson). In Fagin, the supreme court concluded that “ the
burden of proof in a Birchfield/Johnson postconviction proceeding is on the petitioner.”
933 N.W.2d at 780.

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In sum, we conclude that t he postconviction court did not err by denying relief on
procedural grounds under Knaffla.
Even if Heard’s claim w as not procedurally barred, it would fail on the merits.
Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to hear the type of dispute at issue
and to grant the type of relief sought. State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 257 (Minn. 2014).
The question of whether subject -matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law that this
court reviews de novo. Id. at 257 -58. A district court has original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases. Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3; see also Johnson, 916 N.W.2d at 680 (“A district
court has subject-matter jurisdiction to convict a defendant of all crimes cognizable under
the laws of the State of Minnesota.”).
Heard argues that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking because the state failed to
obtain a valid warrant. But he fails to identify the type of warrant to which he refers or to
explain why the lack of a warrant deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction
in his criminal case . We discern no basis to conclude that t he convicting court lack ed
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Heard also argues that he was not timely brought before the district court following
his arrest. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide timelines for bringing a
suspect before the district court following an arrest. See, e.g., Minn. R. Crim. P. 4.02, subd.
5. Heard does not cite authority indicating that compliance with those timelines is a
jurisdictional requirement, and caselaw refutes that proposition . See Reed v. State , 793
N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. 2010) (discussing the difference between rules governing subject-
matter jurisdiction and inflexible claim -processing rules). We fail to discern how a

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violation of those timelines deprived the district court of jurisdiction. See United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1251 (1980) (“An illegal arrest, without more,
has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid
conviction.”).
In sum, like the postconviction court, we conclude that Heard’s petition fails on the
merits.
Affirmed.