State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0673

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Linden Gene McKinney,
Appellant.

Filed April 26, 2021
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-3335

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant
County Attorneys, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first -degree criminal sexual conduct,
assigning error to the district court’s admission of relationship evidence under Minn. Stat.

2
§ 634.20 (2018), allowance of expert testimony, and exclusion of evidence supporting his
theory of the case. He also argues that the jury pool did not reflect a fair cross -section of
the community. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Linden McKinney with one count
of first -degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of third -degree criminal sexual
conduct. The complaint alleged that after C.L. ended her six-year relationship with
McKinney, McKinney sexually assaulted her when he came to her home to pick up his
belongings.
The state presented evidence at trial that C.L. began dating McKinney in 2012 . In
February 2018, the c ouple had a child together. C.L. testified that the relationship was
“rocky,” that McKinney was verbally and physically abusive, and that the abuse increased
over time. She described several incidents in which McKinney punched, strangled, kicked,
and stomped on her. C.L. also testified McKinney pushed her through a window in April
2019.
C.L. testified that she broke up with McKinney in April 2019, but she told him that
“he could basically stay [with her] to watch the baby and get on his feet.” On May 4, 2019,
C.L. and McKinney argued and then engaged in consensual sex ual activity . The next
morning, the two argued again. According to C.L., McKinney chok ed her until she “felt
[her] body just go limp.”
C.L. claimed that the fighting woke up the baby, prompting McKinney to “allow[]”
her to change the baby and make the baby breakfast. According to C.L., McKinney told

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her that he was “going to hold [her] hostage all day” and make her take three ecstasy pills.
C.L. testified that as she was making the baby breakfast, McKinney spit on her “two to
three times . . . in the face,” and tried to break her cell phone.
C.L. testified that after she changed and fed the baby, she called her sister “to get
her to the house because I knew if I could get her to the house, I could let her know that
something was going on and get us out.” C.L. also testified that, after she called her sister,
McKinney “basically lets me know that we’re about to have sex a nd asks if I’m going to
cooperate or if he needs to drug me.” Accordin g to C.L., McKinney then straddled her,
put his penis in her mouth, and eventually ejaculate d in her mouth. C.L. stated that
McKinney then had vaginal sex with her and, after she started crying, he put a pillow over
her head and threatened to drug her. C.L. further testified that she did not want to have sex
with McKinney and that “[h]e knew that.” C.L. denied consensually engaging in rough
sexual activity with McKinney.
After McKinney finished , he put a Taser on the bed between them so that C.L.
would not leave. When McKinney fell asleep, C.L. took the baby and ran down the street
towards her mother’s house. C.L. called her sister on the way and told her that she needed
to be picked up before McKinney caught her and killed her. A round this time, C.L.’s
mother called C.L. , and C.L. told her mother that McKinney “raped me and tried to kill
me.”
C.L.’s sister found C.L. and the baby and drove them to their parents’ house. C.L.
then called 911 and reported that McKinney had raped and strangled her. Officer Ilya
Tereshko responded to the call. C.L. told the officer that she and McKinney had an

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argument that culminated in McKinney choking her, threatening to drug her, and then
making her have oral and vaginal sex with him. As C.L. spoke with Officer Tereshko,
McKinney sent C.L. a message stating: “Dam U got away.”
Police went to C.L.’s residence, where they found McKinney hiding under the bed.
McKinney was arrested and, as he was transported to jail, he told Officer Tereshko that he
had argued with C.L. the night before and that he choked C.L. while having “rough” make-
up sex that morning. McKinney told the officer that it was “not unusual” for them to have
“rough sexual intercourse” and that C.L. “frequently” requests to be choked during sex.
During an interview with investigators the next day, McKinney reasserted that he and C.L.
had consensual “rough make-up sex” on May 5.
C.L. was examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE). The SANE testified
that during the examination, C.L. described prior incidents of domestic abuse that
culminated with the events that occurred on May 5. The SANE further testified that C.L.
described the events on May 5, which include McKinney strangling C.L. and later forcing
her to engage in oral and vaginal sex.
The state presented evidence that, after McKinney was charged with criminal sexual
conduct, the district court issued a no-contact order prohibiting him from contacting C.L.
The state also introduced evidence that, despite the existence of the no -contact order,
McKinney repeatedly called and exchanged electronic messages with C.L. During th ose
exchanges, McKinney admitted that he “made a mistake” and stated that he was “probably
going to get hung.” He begged for C.L.’s forgiveness, asked C.L. to change her story, and
threatened C.L. if she were to testify ag ainst him. Moreover, in one of the phone calls,

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McKinney told C.L.: “I am asking you to straight flat out lie, let’s be honest because what
I did was straight out rape. What I did, abuse. What I did was disrespect ful and so many
other things.” In another call with C.L., McKinney stated: “Linden Gene McKinney raped
you,” and “I raped [C.L.] in front of our son.” During the same call, McKinney stated:
“I’m going to say it again out loud . . . so I can help incriminate myself. Linden Gene
McKinney . . . raped [C.L.] on May 5, 2019, which is, and he spit on her, he did all the
things that those two investigators, he did everything that they said he did.”
McKinney testified that he had a “rocky” relationship with C.L. and acknowledged
being “physical” with C.L. in the past, but he denied that he had ever abused her.
McKinney also testified that he and C.L. engaged in consensual, rough sex that involved
hair pulling, biting, and choking. He claimed that C.L. would pretend to be his “sex slave.”
McKinney denied ever choking C.L. “outside of a sexual encounter.”
McKinney testified that on the night of May 4, he and C.L. engaged in consensual
sex that was “on the rougher end” and that the two engaged in sex again the next morning.
According to McKinney, C.L. later “flip[ped] out” after he told her that he had received a
“blow job at work” from a coworker. McKinney testified that he told C.L. that he was
joking and that the two had consensual, rough “make -up sex,” which included both oral
and vaginal sex. McKinney stated that when they were done, he fell asleep, and woke up
to find C.L. gone.
McKinney denied spitting on C.L., threatening to drug her, or putting a Taser on the
bed. But he admitted that he lied to police about sending the message: “Dam U got away.”
He claimed that the message was an “insider joke” referencing their “role -playing.”

6
McKinney also admitted that he tried to persuade and frighten C.L. into retracting what he
claimed were f alse allegations of sexual assault. Evidence was presented that C.L. told
McKinney that she would do what she could to help him avoid going to prison.
The jury found McKinney guilty as charged. The district court sentenced McKinney
to 208 months in pri son and ten years of conditional release for the first-degree criminal-
sexual-conduct offense. McKinney appeals.
DECISION
I.
McKinney contends that the district court erred by admitting, under Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20, evidence regarding McKinney and C.L.’s six-year relationship. A district court’s
evidentiary ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902,
906-07 (Minn. 1997).
Prior to trial, the state moved to introduce evidence “regarding the history of the
relationship” between C.L. and McKinney to provide “context” regarding why the charged
incident occurred. The district c ourt, over McKinney’s objection , rule d that the
relationship evidence was admissible under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, because it was “relevant
to provide a context of their relationship.” The district court repeatedly instructed the jury
regarding the proper use of the relationship evidence. The court provided those instructions
three times during C.L.’s testimony, prior to her testimony describing specific incidents of
abuse, and again before closing arguments.
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 is a rule of evidence that allows for the admission of evidence
of domestic conduct by the defendant against the victim or other family or household

7
members. State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015). The statute provides that
“[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or
against other family or household members, is admissible unless the probative value i s
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .” Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
“Domestic conduct” includes, among other things, “evidence of domestic abuse.” Id.
“Domestic abuse” includes “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” if committed against
a family or household member. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018); see also Minn.
Stat. § 634.20 (incorporating that definition of domestic abuse).
McKinney argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence
regarding his prior abuse of C.L. because the probative value of that evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Specifically, he argues that the
relationship evidence “had little probative value because the stat e did not need the
evidence.” McKinney also argues that the evidence had little probative value because the
“only disputed issue of consequence . . . was whether [C.L.] consented to having rough sex
with McKinney” on the date of the alleged sexual assault , and the “extensive testimony
detailing their six -year relationship” does not make it more like ly that a sexual assault
occurred.
“[T]he rationale for admitting relationship evidence under section 634.20 is to
illuminate the relationship between the def endant and the alleged victim and to put the
alleged crime in the context of that relationship.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637
(Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). Relationship evidence “is
relevant because it illuminates the history of the relationship between the victim and

8
defendant and may also help prove motive or assist the jury in assessing witness
credibility.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Relationship evidence under sectio n 634.20 involving a family or household member has
a high probative value because it demonstrates how the defendant interacts with people
close to him. State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 729-30 (Minn. App. 2014).
In this case, the relationship evidence provided context for the alleged offense. That
context was relevant because the jury heard that even though C.L. had broken up with
McKinney, she had consensual sex with him the night before the charged offense. The
jury also heard that even though C.L. had accused McKinney of sexual assault, she
continued to communicate with him. As McKinney acknowledges, this was a he-said-she-
said case. Evidence regarding the nature of the parties’ relationship helped explain C.L.’s
conduct before and after the sexual a ssault, which was relevant to an assessment of her
credibility. Although McKinney asserts that the “state did not need the evidence” because
its case against McKinney was strong, the relationship evidence was highly probative
because it assisted the jury in evaluating the parties’ credibility.
McKinney argues that, in light of the “sheer quantity of relationship evidence,” any
probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. But “unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging
evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving
one party an unfair advantage.” Id. at 729 (quotation omitted). And the danger of unfair
prejudice is low when the district court provides a limiting instruction to the jury. Id. at
730.

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We acknowledge that the relationship evidence was prejudicial to McKinney’s case;
all damaging evidence is. But McKinney fails to establish that the evidence persuaded by
illegitimate means or gave the state an unfair advantage. Moreover, the district court
repeatedly instructed the jury regarding the limited use of the relationship evidence, which
mitigated the danger of unfair prejudice. See id . Given the probative value of the
relationship evidence and the district court’s provision of limiting instruction s regarding
the proper use of that evidence, we conclude that the relationship evidence did not persuade
by illegitimate means. In sum, the district co urt did not abuse its discretion by admitting
the relationship evidence.
II.
McKinney contends that the district court erred by allowing the SANE to provide
expert testimony about “the cycle of domestic abuse, the correlation between domestic
abuse and sexual assault, and the ‘Power and Control Wheel.’” A district court’s decision
to admit expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Garland , 942
N.W.2d 732, 742 (Minn. 2020). A defendant challenging the admission of evidence must
show that the district court abused its discretion and that he was prejudiced as a result.
Nunn, 561 N.W.2d at 907.
Prior to trial, the state noticed its intent to elicit testimony from the SANE describing
the cycle of domestic abuse, the correlation between domestic abuse and sexual assault,
and the “Power and Control Wheel.” The district court, over McKinney’s objections, ruled
that the SANE’s testimony was admissible, with some limitations.

10
The SANE testified that domestic abuse involves a recurring cycle of violence that
can overlap with sexual assault. She also testified about the “Power and Control Wheel”
that therapists use to educate domestic -assault victims about how abusers use iso lation,
money, abuse, children, and guilt to control their victims. And the SANE described how
the brain works when a person experiences a traumatic event.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony.
Under that rule, “expert testimony is admissible if: (1) the witness is qualified as an expert;
(2) the expert’s opinion has foundational reliability; (3) the expert testimony is helpful to
the jury; and (4) if the testimony involves a novel scientific theory, it satisfies the Frye-
Mack standard.” Garland, 942 N.W.2d at 741-42 (quotation omitted).
McKinney argues that the state failed to show that the first three prongs are satisfied.
He also contends that he was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of this evidence. We
address each argument in turn.
The SANE’s Qualifications as an Expert
An expert witness is one who is qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training
or education” to testify about and provide an opinion regarding “scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge.” Minn. R. Evid. 702 . An expert’ s qualifications are not
required to stem solely from formal training, but the expert’s qualifications must be based
on some “knowledge, skill, or experience that would provide the background necessary for
a meaningful opinion on the subject.” Minn. R. Evid. 702 1977 comm. cmt. We afford
district courts broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude expert
testimony. State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980).

11
McKinney acknowledges that the SANE’s “education and experience qualify her to
testify about nursing and proper forensic interviewing techniques.” (Emphasis omitted.)
But McKinney argues that, because she is not a doctor, psychologist, or psychology
professor, the SANE’s testimony improperly “delved into social science theories about
domestic abuse and domestic abusers, correlations between domestic abuse and sexual
assault, and the workings of the brain.”1
Although the SANE was not a doctor or psychologis t, McKinney ci tes no case
indicating that only doctors and psychologists are qualified to testify about the
psychological aspects of domestic abuse. Indeed, the SANE testified that she received
specialized training to become a SANE; that the training incl udes “trauma training,”
involving how the trauma affects the brain; that the training is “ongoing”; and that she has
performed over 400 sexual -assault examinations. The SANE also described how the
trauma training applies to her work. Thus, the record sup ports the district court’s
determination that the SANE was qualified to testify about the psychological aspects of
domestic abuse.

1 The state asserts that McKinney forfeited this argument by generally objecting to the
SANE’s qualifications prior to trial and then failing to make specific challenges to the
SANE’s qualifications at trial. See State v. Tovar , 605 N.W.2d 717, 726 (Minn. 2 000)
(stating that, in general, only “clear and specific objections raised before the district court”
will preserve the issue of admissibility of evidence for appeal ). Before trial, McKinney
specifically challenged the SANE’s qualifications to testify about the psychological aspects
of domestic abuse, arguing that the SANE was not a psychologist and did not have training
in that area. At trial, McKinney repeatedly objected to the SANE’s testimony related to
the psychological aspects of domestic abuse. We are satisfied that McKinney preserved
the issue for appellate review.

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Foundational Reliability
“When determining whether an opinion is foundationally reliable under Rule 702,
the district court must analyze the proffered testimony in light of the purpose for which it
is being offered and consider the underlying reliability, consistency , and accuracy of the
subject about which the expert is testifying.” Garland, 942 N.W.2d at 742 (quotation
omitted). The standard for foundational reliability “goes beyond a mere helpfulness
standard.” Id. (quotation omitted). Rather, foundational reliability “is a concept that looks
to the theories and methodologies used by an expert.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the SANE testified that domestic abuse involves a recurring cycle of violence
that can overlap with sexual assault. She also testified that sexual-assault victims describe
their assaults inconstantly and in sensory terms because of the way the brain works when
a person is experiencing trauma.
McKinney argues that this testimony lacked foundatio nal reliability because the
state presented no evidence from which the district court could independently asses s the
reliability of the SANE’s assertions. 2 We agree. The SANE did not cite support for her
testimony that domestic abusers sexually assault their victims, and the state presented no
evidence to support that theory. The SANE also did not cite scientific data to support her
opinion related to the effects of domestic abuse on domestic-abuse victims’ brains. Given

2 The state again asserts that such arguments are forfeited because McKinney’s objections
at trial were not specific. But the record reflects that prior to trial, McKinney specifically
challenged the foundational reliability of the SANE’s testimony as it pertained to the
percentage of domestic abusers w ho sexually assault their victims. And McKinney
repeatedly objected to the SANE’s testimony at trial on the basis of foundation. Once
again, we are satisfied that McKinney preserved the issue for appellate review.

13
the lack of evidence regarding the theories and methodologies on which the SANE relied,
the SANE’s test imony that domestic abuse overlaps with sexual assault lacked
foundational reliability.
Helpfulness of the SANE’s Testimony
“Expert testimony is not helpful if the expert opinion is within the knowledge and
experience of a lay jury and the testimony of the expert will not add precision or depth to
the jury’s ability to reach conclusions.” Id. at 746 (quotation omitted). Stated differently,
“if the jury can reach an informed concl usion just as e asily as the expert, the expert’ s
testimony is not helpful to the jury.” Id.
McKinney argues that the SANE’s testimony about the “Power and Control Wheel,”
the recurring “cycle of abuse,” and the correlation between domestic abuse and sexu al
assault, was not helpful because it focuses on the characteristics of a domestic abuser and
how domestic abusers behave. McKinney argues that this evidence is akin to improper
character evidence because it suggests that domestic abusers are the type of people who
are likely to commit sexual assault.
To support his position, McKinney relies on State v. Williams , 525 N.W.2d 538
(Minn. 1994). In that case, police officers testified regarding the typical behavior of drug
couriers, including the manne r in which they purchase tickets for travel, the cities from
which they depart, and other typical travel behaviors. Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 548. The
supreme court compared this profile evidence to evidence of typical characteristics of child
abusers. Id. The supreme court observed that such evidence is similar to character
evidence because it invites the jury to infer that, if the defendant’s conduct fits the profile,

14
then it is probative evidence that he is a drug courier. Id. at 547-48. Thus, the suprem e
court concluded that police testimony regarding the typical behavior of “most drug
couriers” was “clearly and plainly inadmissible.” Id. at 548.
Here, the SANE’s testimony about the correlation between domestic abuse and
sexual assault is akin to the improper character evidence discussed in Williams. The SANE
testified that “most often when it’s someone who is a victim of . . . domestic violence ”
there may “be an overlap of sexual assault as well.” Th at testimony effectively profile d
domestic abusers as perpetrators of sexual assault and invite d the jury to infer that, if
McKinney fit the profile of a domestic abuser, he likely committed the sexual assault.
Under Williams, such testimony constitutes improper character evidence.
However, the SANE’s testimony about the “Power and Control Wheel” and the
reoccurring cycle of abuse was not character evidence. Instead, it focuse d on the
characteristics of abusive rel ationships and help ed explain C.L.’s conduct to the jury.
Specifically, the SANE’s testimony about the “Power and Control Wheel” and the
recurring cycle of abuse helped explain why C.L. continued in a relationship with
McKinney despite his abuse, why she had consensual sex with McKinney the night before
the sexual assault, and why she continued to communicate with McKinney after the sexual
assault. Thus, the district court did not err by admitting the SANE’s testimony about the
“Power and Control Wheel” and the reoccurring cycle of abuse.
Prejudice
Having concluded that the district court improperly admitted the SANE’s testimony
about the correlation between domestic abuse and sexual assault, we consider the issue of

15
prejudice. McKinney argues that he is entitled to a new trial because there is a reasonable
possibility that the SANE’ s “improper testimony substantially influenced the jury to
convict.” When an alleged error does not implicate a constitutional right, the defendant
must prove “there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. 2011)
(quotations omitted). In determining whether the erroneously admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict, we consider whether the district co urt gave a limiting
instruction, whether the state dwelled on the evidence in the closing argument, and whether
the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. State v. Benton , 858 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn.
2015).
Here, although the prosecutor referenced C.L.’s testimony in closing arguments, the
evidence against McKinney was ove rwhelming. C.L. testified in detail regarding the
events of May 5, inclu ding the alleged sexual assault. Moreover, testimony from several
other witnes ses, including C.L.’s mother, sister, and responding officers, showed that
C.L.’s description of the offense never changed. Evidence was also admitted showing that
McKinney repeatedly contacted C.L., asked her to lie about the events of May 5, and
threatened her if sh e did not change her stor y. Additionally, in the recorded telephone
conversations between McKinney and C.L., McKinney never denied raping her and
repeatedly apologized for his actions. In fact, in one of the recorded phone calls, McKinney
told C.L.: “I am asking you to straight flat out lie, let’s be honest because what I did was
straight out rape . What I did, abuse. What I did was disrespectful and so many other
things.” (Emphasis added.) And in another recorded phone conversation, McKinney

16
repeatedly admitted to C.L. that he raped her. Thus, even though the district court erred by
allowing some of the SANE’s testimony, McKinney fails to establish that the wrongfully
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict. He therefore is not entitled to a new
trial based on the district court’s error.
III.
McKinney contends that the district court violated his constitutional right to present
a complete defense by excluding evidence that C.L. falsely accused another individual,
K.J., of sexual assault and sent messages to a d ifferent individual, J.E., stating her desire
to engage in rough oral sex. McKinney argues that because this error was prejudicial, he
is entitled to a new trial.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to “a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528,
2532 (1984) . That right encompasses, among other things, “the right to present the
defendant’s version of the facts . . . to the [fact -finder] so it may decide where the truth
lies.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967). But in presenting
a defense, the defendant “must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.”
Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973) . Evidentiary
rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d at 906-
07.

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K.J.’s Testimony
In a criminal-sexual-conduct trial, admission of evidence of a victim’s prior sexual
conduct is governed by Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412 , commonly known as the rape -
shield rule. Under this rule, “evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct shall not be
admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the presence of the jury, except
by court order” under the rule’s procedure. Minn. R. Evid. 412(1). Prior sexual conduct
includes making prior allegations of sexual abuse. State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750
(Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1991).
A defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense creates an exception
to the rape-shield rule. See State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. App. 1993),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993). As this court explained in Goldenstein, evidence of
a prior false accusation by an alleged victim of sexual abuse is admissible both to attack
the credibility of the complainant and as substantive evidence tending to prove that the
current offense did not occur. Id. Nonetheless, the admission of a prior false accusation is
predicated upon the district court’s threshold determination that “a reasonable probability
of falsity exists.” Id. The district court also must determine whether the probative va lue
of the evidence of a victim’ s sexual conduct is substantially outweighed by its
inflammatory or prejudicial nature in order to be admitted. Minn. R. Evid. 412(2)(C).
The district court allowed K.J. to tes tify that C.L. had a reputation for
untruthfulness, but the court did not allow him to testify that C.L. had falsely accused him
of rape. In doing so, the district court reasoned that McKinney failed to show a reasonable
probability that C.L. had falsely accused K.J. of sexual assault. The district court explained

18
that the proffered evidence presented a he -said-she-said situation because there was no
evidence, other than K.J.’s assertion, that C.L. falsely accused K.J. of rape.
McKinney assigns error to that reasoning, arguing that the district court’s use of a
reasonable-probability-of-falsity standard was incorrect because in State v. Caswell , the
supreme court only required a showing that the evidence “tend [ed] to establish” a
predisposition to fabricate. 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982). However, in Caswell, the
complainant admitted that she had falsely accused someone of sexual assault. Id. C.L. has
not made such an admission here. Moreover, the district court’s reasoning satisfied both
standards: McKinney did not present evidence establishing a reasonable probability that
C.L.’s sexual -assault accusation against K.J. was false or that C.L. was predisposed to
fabricate such an accusation.
The district court also reasoned that the admis sion of the evidence would prolong
the trial and confuse the jury. See Minn. R. Evid. 403 (stating that relevant evidence may
be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mi sleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence”). The district court
explained that a “mini-trial” within the trial would be necessary to determine whether C.L.
had falsely accused K. J. of sexual assault. Given the lack of evidence supporting K.J.’s
assertion that C.L. had falsely accused him of sexual assault, the district court’s reasoning
is sound. In sum, McKinney does not persuade us that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding evidence that C.L. falsely accused K.J. of sexual assault.

19
Text Messages to J.E.
McKinney also challenges the district court’s exclusion of text messages C.L. sent
to J.E., in which she described her desire to engage in fellatio with J.E. The district court
allowed McKinney to question C.L. about “the nature of th[e] communications” with J.E.,
but the court excluded the substance of the messages. The district court based its exclusion
on Minn. R. Evid. 412.
Generally, in a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, “evidence of the victim’s
previous sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be
made in the presence of the jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 412(1). But when the v ictim’s consent
is a defense, evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct “tending to establish a common
scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the case at issue”
may be admissible. Id., (1)(A)(i).
McKinney argues that rule 412 is inapplicable because he was not seeking to
introduce evidence of C.L.’s “ previous sexual conduct.” He describes the proffered text
messages as evidence of C.L.’s “desire to engage in a particular type of sexual conduct in
the future.” McKinney alternatively argues that if rule 412 applies, C.L.’s messages to J.E.
fall within the rule’s exception for evidence tending to establish a common scheme or plan.
Specifically, McKinney argues that “C.L.’s messages . . . tend to establish a ‘plan’ on he r
part to engage in the very type of sexual conduct she claimed she had not, would not, and
did not willing ly partake in with McKinney.” McKinney further argues that “[t]he
messages undermined C.L.’s credibility because they demonstrate she was being untruthful
and misleading the jury about the nature of her and McKinney’s sexual relationship and

20
her interest in rough, submissive sex” and provided “substantive support for McKinney’s
claim that C.L. willingly engaged in rough sex with him.”
We have reviewed the proffered text messages, and we are not persuaded that they
describe the type of consensual “rough, submissive sex” that McKinney described, and
C.L. denied, at trial. Although the text messages are graphic, they do not express a
willingness to eng age in the type of sexual activity that McKinney attributed to C.L .
Specifically, C.L.’s text messages did not indicate a desire to engage in hair pulling, biting,
and choking. Thus, the messages were not relevant for impeachment, and they do not fall
within rule 412’s exception for evidence tending to establish a common scheme or plan.
The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by excluding the substance of the
proffered text messages.
Moreover, even if the exclus ion were error, McKinney would not be entitled to a
new trial if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . See State v. Johnson, 915
N.W.2d 740, 745 (Minn. 2018) (stating that if an alleged error is constitutional in nature,
the state must prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). “For an error
to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the State must show that the verdict was surely
unattributable to the error.” Id. (quotations omitted). A new trial is not required if an
appellate court is “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been
admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury ( i.e., a
reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102
(Minn. 1994) (footnote omitted).

21
The state argues that the exclusion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt , based
on the “very strong” evidence of guilt. We agree. Given the evidence that McKinney
repeatedly contacted C.L. after the sexual assault and ma de several statements
acknowledging guilt—including his statement that “I am asking you to straight flat out lie,
let’s be honest because what I did was straight out rape ,”—we cannot say that the jury
would have reached a different verdict if the damaging potential of the excluded evidence
had been fully realized. (Emphasis added.)
IV.
McKinney contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury panel selected
for his trial did not reflect a fair cross-section of the community. We review that claim de
novo. See State v. Griffin , 846 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 5, 2014).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a jury pool that reflects a fair cross-section of the community. See Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S. Ct. 692, 697-98 (1975); Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 544.
To make a prima facie showing that the jury venire did not reflect a fair cross-section of
the community, a defendant must show “that the group allegedly excluded is a ‘distinctive’
group in the community, that the group in question was not fairly represented in the venire,
and that the underrepresentation was the result of a ‘systematic’ exclusion of the group in
question from the jury selection process.” Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 542 (quoting Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-67, 99 S. Ct. 664, 668-70 (1979)).

22
After the jury panel was identified, McKinney objected to the panel and request ed
a hearing to establish that “there is a systematic process within the State of Minnesota that
works to not allow a proper repre sentation of African -Americans on the jury pool .” The
district court granted McKinney’s request for a hearing and, after that hearing, denied
McKinney’s challenge to the jury panel.
Here, only two people in McKinney’s 40 -person jury panel identi fied as Black,
accounting for five percent of the pool. McKinney, who is Black, argues that this
percentage fails to represent a fair cross -section of the community because a 2010 census
shows that the overall percentage of eligible jurors in Ramsey County who are Black
represent 9.34% of the county’s population. But McKinney fails to establish a prima facie
case for relief because Williams requires a showing that “over a significant period of time—
panel after panel, month after month —the group of eligible jurors in question has been
significantly underrepresented on the panel s and that this results from . . . unfair or
inadequate selection procedures used by the state. ” Id. at 543 (describing this showing as
“key”).
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that it had previously held, in State
v. Roan, “that a jury selection system that ‘use [d] registered voters, driver’s licenses, and
registered Minnesota identification card holders’ did not systematically exclude people of
color.” Andersen v. State, 940 N.W.2d 172, 182 (Minn. 2020) (quoting State v. Roan, 532
N.W.2d 563, 569 (Mi nn. 1995)). The supreme court concluded that because the jury
selection system used in Roan was the “ same type of jury selection system” used in
Andersen, the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated. Id.; see State v. Willis, 559

23
N.W.2d 693, 700 (Minn. 1997) (concluding that “[e]ven if appellant were to show the
necessary underrepresentation, as a matter of law, he could not demonstrate that the
underrepresentation resulted from the state’s procedures because in Roan, this court upheld
the same Hennepin County selection process at issue here against a Sixth Amendment
challenge”).
At the hearing on McKinney’s challenge to the jury panel, the Ramsey County jury
coordinator testified that the Ramsey County master jury list is comprised of records from
the Department of Public Safety, which include driver’s license records and state
identification cards, as well as records from the Secretary of State, which include voter
registration records. The Minnesota General Rules of Practice require that those sources
be used when creating a master jury list for each county. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 806(b)
(stating that “voter registration and drivers’ license list[s] for the county must serve as the
[venire] source list”). The supreme court has held that the use of those sources to select a
venire panel does not systematically exclude people of color. See Andersen, 940 N.W.2d
at 182. Thus, the Ramsey County jury selection procedure complied with Minnesota law
and did not systematically exclude people of color.
McKinney also fails to establish that there was a significant underrepresentation of
Black jurors in Ramsey County over a significant period of time . As the state points out,
the county jury coordinator t estified that he only had specific data available for the time
period between October 2018 , and October 2019, and that he could not “say for sure”
whether the percentage of African Americans in the master jury list in any year met or
exceeded their proportional representation in the community. Moreover, no evidence was

24
presented showing the absence of alternative explanations for any underrepresentation,
such as voluntary “no shows” or ineligibility for jury service. See Griffin, 846 N.W.2d at
101 (stating “[s]ystematic exclusion means that the underrepresentation is attributable to
the juror-selection process and not alternative reasons such as individuals failing to show
up for jury service”). In sum , McKinney fails to establish that he was denied his
constitutional right to a jury pool that reflects a fair cross-section of the community.
Affirmed.