Eric S. Walker, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0675

Eric S. Walker,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven D. Walker, defendant,

Lynn M. Walker,
Appellant.

Filed March 15, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-CV-18-375

Dominique J. Navarro, Thomas R. Braun, Bruce K. Piotrowski, Restovich Braun &
Associates, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

John T. Giesen, Ken D. Schueler, Courtney D. Logli, Dunlap and Seeger, P.A., Rochester,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this civil action, a jury fo und that appellant entered into an oral contract to transfer
80 acres of a family farm to respondent, and the district court granted specific performance.
The jury also found that appellant entered into an oral contra ct to compensate respondent

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for his work on the farm over several years, and the district court awarded monetary
damages.
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of her posttrial motions. She argues
that the district court erred by denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding
the land contract because there was not clear a nd convincing evidence of an oral contract
and because the contract was void under the stat ute of frauds. Appellant also argues that
she is entitled to a new trial on the issue of her liability for respondent’s farm services
because the district court allowed inadmissible hearsay at the trial. We affirm.
FACTS
This case involves a dispute between fam ily members over agreements concerning
the family’s farm. Appellant Lynn Walker and defendant Steve Walker were married
during most of the relevant time frame.1 Respondent Eric Walker is Lynn and Steve’s adult
son. Lynn is the sole appellant; Steve is listed on the case caption as Lynn’s codefendant,
but he aligned with Eric at trial and did not file an appeal.
Complaint and Pretrial Motions
Eric brought a civil action against Ly nn and Steve in April 2018. The action
centered on his parents’ farm, where Eric had worked for many ye ars. The complaint
alleged that in 2004 the parties entered into an oral contract (Contract 1) in which Lynn
and Steve agreed to transfer the farm to Eric when they retired if Eric would work the farm
until their retirement and make investments in the farm such as erecting additional grain

1 Lynn and Steve initiated divorce proceedings in July 2017, before the present action was
filed, and the divorce proceedings were still pending at the time of the jury trial.

3
bins. The complaint al so alleged that, at the same time , Lynn and Steve entered into a
separate oral contract with Eric (Contract 2) to pay Eric after each farming season for his
labor and expenses, including the use of farm machinery that Eric owned. Eric agreed to
provide his parents with a bill for his labor and expenses after each season.
According to the complaint, by fall 2013, Lynn and Steve had not paid Eric for any
of his farm labor or expenses from 2004 through 2013, which to taled approximately
$370,000. The complaint further alleged that the parties entered into a third oral contract
(Contract 3) in 2013: Lynn and Steve agreed to transfer 80 acres of the farm to Eric so that
he could build a house, and Eric agreed that this transfer would constitute payment of Lynn
and Steve’s outstanding debt. Eric also promis ed to continue working on the farm. That
fall, Lynn and Steve “portioned off” an 80-acre parcel from their 252-acre farm and Eric
began building a house on the parcel. Eric c ontinued to provide fa rm services for his
parents. But, according to the complaint, Lynn and Steve never transferred the 80 acres to
Eric and they never paid Eric for any of his farm services.
Eric brought several claims against Lynn an d Steve, including br each of contract.
The complaint sought relief on all three contr acts. It sought specific performance of
Contract 3 for the 80 acres of land on which Eric had built his house and of Contract 1 for
transfer of the entire farm to Eric upon his parents’ retirement, as well as monetary damages
for his services under Contract 2 from 2014 through 2017. In her answer, Lynn denied that
the parties ever entered into any contracts. Lynn also brought several counterclaims against
Eric, including civil battery and trespass to chattels.

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Following discovery, Lynn moved for pa rtial summary judgment on several of
Eric’s claims, including the breach-of-con tract claim. She argued that there was
insufficient evidence of an oral agreement to transfer a ny portion of the farmland. The
district court granted summary judgment for Ly nn in part, dismissing Eric’s claims with
respect to Contract 1 for transfer of the entire farm upon his parents’ retirement, based on
the vagueness of the alleged contract. But the district court determined that Eric had shown
that the terms of Contract 2 for payment of Er ic’s farm services were clear and definite.
The district court also determined that Eric had presented clear evidence of Contract 3 for
the transfer of 80 acres of the farm. Add itionally, the district court concluded that
Contract 3 was removed from the statute of frauds because Eric’s evidence established that
the part-performance exception wo uld apply. Consequently, the district court denied
Lynn’s summary-judgment motion with respect to Contracts 2 and 3.
Trial Testimony
The matter proceeded to a jury trial, wh ich lasted nine days. Various witnesses
testified to the following facts.
Eric testified about the alleged contracts. He stated that his parents bought the farm
in 2003 from his grandmother and that he worked on the farm at that time while also doing
side jobs. Eric testified that, in 2004, his parents agreed to transfer the entire farm to him
when they retired if he stayed, worked the farm, and inve sted in the farm. According to
Eric, his parents also agreed to pay him for his labor and expenses, including use of his
machinery. The agreements we re not put in writing, Eric said, because he trusted his
parents.

5
Eric further testified that, in 2013, his pa rents had not yet paid him for any of his
services on the farm and that, by then, th ey owed him about $3 70,000. His parents
therefore agreed to transfer 80 acres of the farm to him in exchange for the $370,000 that
they owed. Eric agreed to this arrangement. The oral agreement occurred “[a]t the kitchen
table . . . about mid[-]year,” with just Eric and his parents present. Eric gave the following
explanation about what he and his parents discussed:
[M]y parents agreed to transf er me the 80 acres in lieu of
$350,000 that they owed me at the time because I had not been
paid for the money, my services that they owed me. They had
not paid me so they agreed to transfer 80 acres of the Walker
farm to me for the $370,000 that they owed me. . . . [T]hey had
to do the 80 acres because I wa s engaged to get married. We
were, me and my wife, were talking about moving away, and I
wanted to either go buy a ho use somewhere or build a house
on the farm.
As with the earlier agreements, Eric did not get the agreement in writing because he trusted
his parents.
Eric testified that he had worked on the farm since the parties entered into their
agreement for farm services in 2004 and that he gave his parents a bill after each farming
season from 2004 to 2018 showing the work he ha d completed. Eric further testified that
his father signed each bill after review with Er ic and Lynn. Eric introduced evidence of
these bills at trial in the form of Exhibits 3 and 4.
Exhibit 3 consists of bills showing Eric’s time and expenses for each farming season
from 2004 to 2018. Th e bills for 2004 through 2013 are handwritten on notebook paper,
and those after 2013 are handwritten on letterh ead containing Eric’s business name and
contact information. Each bill also contains Steve’s signature at the bottom, except for the

6
bill concerning the 2018 season. Exhibit 4 consists of “recreations” of the handwritten bills
from 2004 to 2013, but on Eric’s official business letterhead. The bills in Exhibit 4 contain
the same substantive information as those in Exhibit 3. Eric testified that he recreated the
2004 to 2013 bills (in Exhibit 4) on letterhead after he purchased a computer in 2014.
At trial, plaintiff’s counsel stated that the reason for admitting Exhibit 4 in addition
to Exhibit 3 was to show that Eric wanted to formalize the bills for 2004 to 2013 because
his parents had not transferred the 80 acres as promised to pay their outstanding debt for
those years. Defense counsel objected to the exhibits, arguing, among other things, that
the bills were inadmissible hearsay. The district court overruled the objections and allowed
the exhibits to be admitted.
Steve testified at trial to the family de alings, providing a similar version of the
events as Eric. He discussed Contracts 1 and 2, saying that he and Lynn told Eric that they
“would give him the farm at our retirement” if he woul d work the farm and make
investments in the farm instead of pursuing other opportunities. Steve testified that he and
Lynn also agreed to compensate Eric for his time, la bor, and expenses while working on
the farm. The parties agreed that Eric woul d present invoices to Steve and Lynn on an
annual basis, and that they intended to pay him each year. Steve further testified that Eric
presented the bills as agreed upon and that Steve signed each one af ter “sit[ting] down”
with Eric to discuss the work performed. Steve also testified that Lynn was present at the
meetings where Eric and Steve reviewed the bills and that she never voiced any objection
to the time and amounts requested.

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Steve further testified about Contract 3 for the 80-acre parcel. He initially said that
the parties discussed the matter in 2014, but then acknowledged that it must have happened
earlier, before construction of the house began. He recalled that “[he] and Eric and Lynn
sat down, and [the y] had a conversation about splitting an 80 acres off.” During the
conversation, Eric mentioned that Steve and Lynn had not paid his bills for his work on the
farm, so Steve and Lynn agreed to transfer some of the farmland to Eric. Steve said that
he heard Lynn verbally agree to that arrangement. Steve te stified that the value of the
80 acres was approximately equal to the amount that he and Lynn owed Eric for his
services. Steve also explained that the 80-acre parcel size was necessary in order for Eric
to build a house because the township required a parcel of at least 80 acres to build a new
house. And Steve clarified that if he and Lynn had wanted to build another house on their
existing parcel, they would not have had to parcel off the property because, according to
the township rules, their existing parcel was large enough to accommodate two homes.
In November 2013, Steve and Lynn split of f 80 acres from the farm. Both Steve
and Lynn signed the quitclaim deed. Rather than convey the proper ty to Eric, though,
Steve and Lynn deeded the property to themselves. St eve explained that his reason for
doing this was that they “needed to look through and find out . . . what the burden of the
taxes and the legal aspects of turning it over to Eric [were] for money reasons [because]
there could be burdens there.”
Construction of a house on the 80-acre parc el began near the e nd of 2013. Steve
and Eric both testified that it was understood that the hous e was being built for Eric and
his wife. Eric said that he and his wife funded the construction of the house and that they

8
put about $400,000 into the house. Eric acted as his own general contractor, did much of
the work himself, and hired people to help him with various parts of the construction. Eric
testified that Lynn never objected to him building the house and that she never told him to
get off the property when he was building it. The house was completed in May 2015, and
Eric moved in with his wife.
Lynn disputed Eric’s and Steve’s testimony, providing a different version of events.
She denied that she and Steve ever orally agreed to transfer the farm or the 80 acres to Eric
in exchange for him working on the farm. She also disputed the figures on Eric’s invoices
and said that she had never seen any documentation of his hours. Lynn testified that, as of
2014, she “felt that [Eric] was getting paid” and “didn’t feel we owed him anything.” Lynn
acknowledged that she had agreed to split off the 80 acres of land in fall 2013 and that she
was aware that a house was being built on the property. But she said that she had believed
that the house was being built fo r her and that she agreed to the land transfer “under the
assumption [she] was going to get the new house.”
After Eric moved into the h ouse with his wife, title to th e 80-acre parcel remained
with Lynn and Steve. Eric testified that he talked with his parents on several occasions
about transferring the property to him and that he “assumed that it was going to happen.”
By 2017, though, Lynn claimed that the hous e belonged to her. According to Eric, Steve
wanted to transfer the 80-acre parcel to him, but Lynn had refused. At the time of the trial,
Eric lived in the house with his wife and three children.

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Verdict and Posttrial Motions
The jury returned a special verdict, finding in favor of Eric on several of his claims.
It found that there was clear and convincing ev idence that the parties entered into an oral
contract to transfer 80 acres in exchange for the outstanding debt due to Eric at the time,
and that Lynn breached the contra ct. The jury also found that there was an oral contract
for Lynn and Steve to compensate Eric for his farm services and expenses, and that Lynn
and Steve breached that contract for the pe riod from 2014 through the time of trial—the
period postdating the 80-acre la nd contract. The jury furt her found that Steve and Lynn
were unjustly enriched in that Eric conferred a benefit on them and that it would be unfair
for them to retain that benefit. Additionally, the jury found in favor of Lynn on two of her
counterclaims, civil battery and trespass to chattels. The district court incorporated the jury
verdict into its findings of fact , conclusions of law, and orde r for judgment. The district
court granted Eric title to the 80 acres and aw arded him $537,535.77 in damages. It also
awarded $9,000 to Lynn on her counterclaims.
Lynn filed posttrial motions for judgment as a matter of law, to amend the court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law, or for a new trial. She argued that she was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law because, among other reasons, the alleged oral contract for
the 80 acres of land did not satisfy the statute of frauds and the evidence did not establish
that an enforceable contract was ever formed. Lynn argue d alternatively that she was
entitled to a new trial because, among other reas ons, the district court erred at trial by
admitting Eric’s exhibits showing his bills for his farm services, which Lynn asserted were
inadmissible hearsay.

10
The district court denied Lynn’s posttrial mo tions. It determined that the jury had a
“legally sufficient basis” to reach its ve rdict and therefore Lynn was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Regarding Ly nn’s new-trial argument, the district court
determined that it had properly admitted the exhibits containing Eric’s bills, reasoning that
Exhibit 3 was admissible as a prior consiste nt statement or a business record, and that
Exhibit 4 was nonhearsay. Alte rnatively, the district court concluded that it could have
properly admitted the exhibits under the residual-hearsay exception.
Lynn appeals.
DECISION
Lynn challenges the district court’s denial of her posttrial motions. Specifically, she
argues that the district court erred by denyi ng her motion for judgment as a matter of law
on Eric’s claim regarding the 80 acres. She also argues that she is entitled to a new trial
on the issue of her liability for Eric’s farm se rvices because the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted evidence of Eric’s bills, which served as the basis for the
damages awarded to Eric. Neither argument is persuasive.
I. The district court properly denied Lynn’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law.
Lynn argues that she is en titled to judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on Eric’s
claim for specific performance of Contract 3—the contract to convey the 80-acre parcel to
Eric. We review the district court’s decision on a motion for JMOL de novo.
Pouliot v. Fitzsimmons, 582 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Minn. 1998). A party is entitled to JMOL
on an issue only when “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury

11
to find” for the opposing party on that issue. Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.01(a). We take into
account all the evidence, “incl uding that favoring the verdic t,” view the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the verdict,” and “may not weigh the ev idence or judge the
credibility of the witnesses.” Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines, 933 N.W.2d 45, 55 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). We will not set aside the jury’s verdict “if it can be sustained
on any reasonable theory of the evidence.” Pouliot, 582 N.W.2d at 224.
Lynn argues that she is entitled to JMOL for two reasons: (1) there was not clear
and convincing evidence that the parties entered into an oral contract to convey the 80 acres
of farmland, and (2) even if there were an oral contract, the contract is void under the statute
of frauds, and the part-performance exception does not apply to remove the contract from
the statute of frauds. We examine each argument in turn.
A. There was clear and convincing evidence of an oral contract for the 80-acre
parcel.
Lynn maintains that Eric did not present clear and convincing evidence that there
was an oral contract for the 80 acres of farmland. Eric argues that his testimony along with
Steve’s testimony clearly and convincingly sh owed that there was an oral contract. 2 We
agree with Eric that the jury could find clear and convincing evidence of a contract based
on the evidence presented.

2 Although Eric and Steve also testified that the parties entered into Contract 1 in 2004 to
transfer the entire farm to Eric , this issue was not put before the jury because the district
court granted summary judgment for Lynn befo re trial on Contract 1. The only alleged
contract at issue here is Contract 3 for the 80 acres.

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A party seeking to establish an oral contra ct for the sale of land must prove the
existence of the contract by clear and convincing evidence. Christie v. Estate of Christie,
911 N.W.2d 833, 840 (Minn. 2018). The clea r-and-convincing standard is higher than a
preponderance of the evidence and is satisfied when “the truth of the facts asserted is
‘highly probable.’” Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Mi nn. 1978). To satisfy
the clear-and-convincing standard , the facts must be “consiste nt and not contradictory,
clear and not equivocal, convi ncing and not doubtful.” Christie, 911 N.W.2d at 840
(quoting Theisen’s, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. , 243 N.W.2d 145, 148-49 (Minn. 1976)).
The reason that oral contracts for land sa les must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence is due to the concern that “a fraudul ent claim regarding th e contract could be
enforced if the standard of proof is not high enough to ensure certainty.” Id.
To prove the formation of a contract, three elements must be met: offer, acceptance,
and consideration. Commercial Assocs., Inc. v. Work Connection, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 772,
782 (Minn. App. 2006). Consid eration is something that is bargained for and given in
return for a performance or promise of performance. Deli v. Hasselmo, 542 N.W.2d 649,
656 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 1996). Whether a contract was
formed is based on the parties’ objective co nduct rather than their subjective intent.
Thomas B. Olson & A ssocs., P.A. v. Leffert, Jay & Polglaze, P.A. , 756 N.W.2d 907, 918
(Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2009).
Here, the evidence Eric pres ented was sufficient for the jury to find all three
elements of a contract. Eric and Steve both testified that they and Lynn had a conversation
in 2013 about transferring 80 acres of farmland to Eric. According to their testimony, the

13
offer and acceptance occurred during that conversation. And there was clear evidence for
the jury to find consideration: Steve and Lynn promised to convey 80 acres of farmland to
Eric in exchange for Eric’s waiver of the debt that they owed Eric for his work on the farm
from 2004 through 2013. Lynn and Steve’s acceptance of the offer is further supported by
their act of signing the quitclaim deed in November 2013 that split off 80 acres from their
252-acre farm. This evidence is sufficient to uphold the jury’s finding that all the necessary
elements of a contract were met.
Lynn, however, argues that the evidence is not clear and convincing for several
reasons. First, she maintains that the timing of Eric’s offer was unc lear, noting that Eric
and Steve presented inconsistent testimony about when the alleged contract occurred. We
observe that Eric and Steve’s testimony was somewhat vague regarding exactly when in
2013 the conversation to ok place. Eric testified that the conversation happened “about
mid[-]year” in 2013. Steve initially testified that it occurred in 2014, and then stated that
it must have happened before construction on the house began in fall 2013. Given that the
trial was held in 2019, several years after the discussion, we do not believe that the parties’
inability to recall exactly when the discussion occurred means that the jury could not find
by clear and convincing evidence that there was a contract. More over, the evidence
presented allowed the jury to find that Steve and Lynn split off 80 acres from the farm in
fall 2013 and that Eric began co nstruction of the house on the parcel around that time.
These events are consistent with the testimon y that the parties agreed to transfer the
80 acres. Regardless of what the parties were able to recall about the exact details of the

14
conversation, the evidence of their actions in late 2013 allowed the jury to conclude that
the parties understood that a contract had been formed.
Next, Lynn argues that the evidence did not clearly show that she accepted the offer,
pointing to the fact that she never finalized th e transfer of the 80 ac res to Eric. Steve,
however, testified that Lynn did agree to the transfer. His testimony is supported by the
fact that Lynn signed the quitclaim deed splitting off the 80 acres from their farmland. The
signing of the deed is strong ev idence that Lynn understood that the 80 acres were to be
transferred. Lynn insists that , if she and Steve had intended to transfer the land to Eric,
they would have deeded it directly to him, rather than to themselves. But Steve offered an
explanation for why they transferred the property to themselves, saying that they were
concerned about the tax consequences. Steve also testified that the township required
80 acres in order to build a new house on a separate parcel. Based on the evidence, the
jury could find that Lynn did not object to Eric building the house on the property, nor did
she tell him to get off the property while he was building the house. Although Lynn
testified that she believed the house was meant to be for her, the jury was not obligated to
accept her testimony in light of contrary evidence. Under the township rules, it would not
have been necessary for Lynn and Steve to transfer the land if the house was meant for
Lynn because the parcel that they owned was large enough to build another house. We
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d
at 55, and that evidence could allow the jury to find it highly probable that Lynn accepted
the offer.

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Finally, Lynn insists that Er ic did not present clear ev idence of consideration,
arguing that the evidence did not show that the 80-acre parcel was in exchange for the debt
Steve and Lynn owed Eric for his farm services from 2004 to 2013. We disagree. In
addition to Eric and Steve’s testimony that the 80 acres served as consideration for the debt,
Eric introduced Exhibits 3 and 4. These exhibits include bills for Eric’s annual labor and
expenses on the farm.3 Exhibit 3 includes handwritten bills for 2004 through 2013.4 Each
bill was dated and signed by Steve. Exhibit 4 includes similar bills, with the only
significant difference being that the bills are printed on paper w ith Eric’s business
letterhead. In 2014, after he bought a computer, Eric “recr eated” the bills included in
Exhibit 4 so that they appeared more busin ess-like than the orig inal handwritten bills
included in Exhibit 3. Steve’s act of signing Eric’s bills, as well as Eric’s act of formalizing
them after purchasing a computer, supports th e jury’s finding that the parties treated the
bills as debts that Lynn an d Steve needed to pay. Th ere was ample evidence of
consideration to support the jury’s finding of an oral contract.
In concluding that there was clear and co nvincing evidence presented at trial to
allow the jury to find an oral contract, we are mindful of our role on appeal from a denial
of a motion for JMOL. The parties presented competing theories to the jury, and the jury
chose to accept Eric’s version over Lynn’s. We must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, without reweighing the testimony or judging the credibility

3 We address Lynn’s argument that Exhibits 3 and 4 were inadmissible hearsay in greater
detail below.
4 Exhibit 3 also includes bills from later years but those years are not relevant to this issue.

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of witnesses. Id. Applying this standard, we conclude that there was clear and convincing
evidence of an oral contract an d that the jury could find that the parties formed an oral
contract to transfer the 80-acre parcel. As such, Lynn is not entitled to JMOL on this basis.
B. The part-performance doctrine removes the oral contract from the statute
of frauds.
Lynn argues that, even if an oral cont ract existed, she is still entitled to JMOL
because the contract was void under the statute of frauds and no exception to the statute of
frauds applies. Eric maintains that the oral contract is removed from the statute of frauds
under the doctrine of part performance. We agree with Eric that the part-performance
exception removes the contract from the statute of frauds.5
Under the Minnesota statute of frauds, a cont ract for the sale of land is void unless
it “is in writing and subscribed by the party by wh om the . . . sale is to be made.” Minn.
Stat. § 513.05 (2020). One exce ption to the statute of frauds is part performance, which
allows a court of equity to compel specific performance of a contract that is otherwise void.
Minn. Stat. § 513.06 (2020). For the doctrine to apply, a part y to a contract must engage
in acts of part performance “in reliance upon a nd in pursuance of an existing contract.”
Ruble v. Ruble , 47 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Minn. 1951 ). Under one formulation of the

5 We note that the jury instructions did no t ask for the jury to make a finding on part
performance. Lynn argues in her principal brief that, because neither the district court nor
the jury made a finding on part performance, the district court erred by failing to apply the
statute of frauds. But Lynn never asked for a jury instruction on the statute of frauds or
part performance. We are satisfied that the district court implicitly made a finding of part
performance, and Lynn concedes this point in her reply brief. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 49.01(a)
(providing that, if an issue is omitted from the special-verdict form, the district court may
make a finding, or it is deemed to have made a finding consistent with the judgment on the
special verdict).

17
part-performance doctrine, speci fic performance of the contract will be required “where
[the] plaintiff shows that his acts of part performance in reliance upon the contract have so
altered his position that he will incur unjust and irreparable in jury in the event that [the]
defendant is permitted to rely on the statute of frauds.” Burke v. Fine, 51 N.W.2d 818, 820
(Minn. 1952). The supreme court has recognized that part performance applies to a
land-sale contract when a buyer has taken possession of the land and made significant
improvements on it. Bouten v. Richard Miller Homes, Inc., 321 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn.
1982); see also Kociemba v. Kociemba, 177 N.W. 927, 928 (Minn. 1920) (holding that part
performance of an oral contract for land was sufficient when a son who had allegedly
bought the land from his parents took possession of the land, made improvements, and paid
taxes on it).
Here, Eric took possession of the 80-acr e parcel and made substantial improvements
by building a house on the property. Eric and his wife paid for construction of the house.
He personally engaged in extensive projects for the house: digging a water line to the house,
pouring cement footings, putti ng rock down, and putting up the walls. When the house
was completed, Eric moved in with his wife, and he currently resides there with his family.
Eric’s actions fall within th e type of situation for whic h courts have applied the
part-performance doctrine. His actions strong ly suggest that he was acting in reliance on
the oral contract and that he would be unjus tly and irreparably harmed if the statute of
frauds were enforced and he were not given title to the property.

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For this reason, we conclude that the part-performance do ctrine removes the
oral contract from the statute of frauds. Lynn is not entitled to JMOL based on her
statute-of-frauds argument.
II. The district court properly denied Lynn’s motion for a new trial.
Lynn also argues that she is entitled to a new trial on the issue of her liability for
Eric’s farm services. She main tains that Exhibits 3 and 4, which include bills for Eric’s
farm services, constitute inadmissible hearsay and that the district court erred by admitting
the exhibits. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
the exhibits.
A district court may grant a new trial i f, among other reasons, “errors of law”
occurred at the trial and the complaining party objected to the alleged error. Minn. R. Civ.
P. 59.01(f). The admission of evidence lies within the discretion of the district court, and
we will not reverse unless there was an erroneous view of the law or an abuse of discretion.
Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997).
Hearsay is an out-of-court st atement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception
applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802. The district court determined that Exhibit 3 was admissible
either as a nonhearsay prior consistent statement or under the business-records exception,
and that Exhibit 4 was nonhearsay because it wa s not admitted for its tr uth. The district
court also concluded that both exhibits could have been admitted under the
residual-hearsay exception. We conclude that Exhibit 3 was properly admitted as a

19
business record and that Exhibit 4 was prope rly admitted as nonhearsay. Consequently,
we do not address the other hearsay grounds decided by the district court.
A. Exhibit 3 was properly admitted under the business-records exception.
The district court admitted Exhibit 3 und er the business-records exception.
Exhibit 3 consisted of informal, handwritten documents showing Eric’s time and expenses
for the farm services that he provided each year from 2004 to 2018. We agree with the
district court that the exhibit falls within the business-records exception.
The business-records exception to the hearsay rule is c ontained in Minnesota Rule
of Evidence 803(6):
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made
at or near the time by, or fro m information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice
of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, a ll as shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified w itness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used
in this paragraph includes busi ness, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calli ng of every kind, whether or
not conducted for profit. A me morandum, report, record, or
data compilation prepared for litigation is not admissible under
this exception.

The rule essentially encompasses four requ irements: (1) the document was made by a
person with personal knowledge and with “a business duty to report accurately”; (2) it was
made “at or near the time of the recorded event”; (3) it was “kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity ”; and (4) it was made as part of a regular practice of that
business activity. In re Child of Simon , 662 N.W.2d 155, 160 (M inn. App. 2003). Even

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when all these requirements are met, a do cument will not be admissible if it lacks
trustworthiness. Id.
We conclude that all the requirement s for the business-records exception are
satisfied here. Although Eric’s billing prac tice was relatively informal, we note that
rule 803(6) applies broadly to records “in a ny form” and to businesses “of every kind.”
Eric testified that he documented his work because his pare nts had agreed to pay him for
his labor on the farm and his use of the mach inery. He explained that he wrote up a bill
after each farming season, that he discussed the labor and ex penses included in each bill
with his parents, and that St eve signed the bills after review ing them. Eric had personal
knowledge of the information included in the bills because he was the one who performed
the work and wrote up the bills. His testimony shows that the bills were kept in the course
of his regularly conducted business activity, and that writing up the bills was a regular,
annual business practice. Although Eric did not specifically testify that he had a “business
duty” to report his expenses accurately, the di strict court likened Eric to an independent
contractor, with a duty to report the amount of work he completed and to charge
accordingly. The record suppor ts this characterization. Er ic’s explanation of writing up
his charges after each farming season and presenting them to his parents for signature
implies that he had a clear business duty to re port his expenses accurately. And the bills
were prepared near the time of the record ed event because the bills were an annual
summary of Eric’s labor and expenses for each farming season.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Lynn’s contention, at oral argument, that the
exhibits constituted “double hearsay” because Eric testified that he compiled the bills from

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other, undisclosed sources on which he had written more specific charges. This court has
recognized that “[b]ills and summary listi ngs may be acceptable evidence [under the
business-records exception] even without the inclusion of underlying support.” Theissen-
Nonnemacher, Inc. v. Dutt , 393 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that a
contractor’s monthly bills for labor and materials were properly admitted under the
business-records exception). We observe that many business records necessarily include
information that the person preparing the record may have obtained from multiple sources.
Here, Eric’s testimony shows that these other sources that he relied on when preparing his
annual bills were also kept as part of the same regular business practice. The fact that
Eric’s bills were a compilation of multiple sources does not render them inadmissible.
Finally, we address Lynn’s argument that the district court should not have admitted
Exhibit 3 because it lacked trustworthiness. Lynn insi sts that the method and
circumstances of Exhibit 3’s preparation demonstrate that Exhibit 3 is not trustworthy. To
support this argument, she points to Exhibi t 4, which includes the same information as
Exhibit 3. Lynn argues that the information included in both exhibits was likely “falsified”
because Exhibit 4 was recreated from Exhibit 3 and backdated. But th e record does not
support the contention that Exhibit 4 was n ecessarily created for an improper purpose.
Exhibit 4 is not a “false replica” of Exhibit 3 as claimed by Lynn; both exhibits contain the
same substantive information, with the only difference be ing as to form—one entirely
handwritten (Exhibit 3) and the other on Eric’s letterhead (Exhibit 4). Eric explained that
he created the bills included in Exhibit 4 to retain a more o fficial-looking version of the
bills, and that he did so only after he purchased a com puter. These circumstances do not

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suggest that the original documents included in Exhibit 3 lack trustworthiness or are not
reliable. Moreover, Lynn had an extensive o pportunity at the trial to cross-examine Eric
and Steve about the creation of Exhibits 3 and 4, and to argue to the jury that the bills were
not genuine. The district court and the jury both were able to consider Eric’s bills in light
of the competing evidence presented, and they rejected Lynn’s argument that the bills were
created improperly. Given the evidence before us, we cannot say as a matter of law that
the bills lack trustworthiness such that they should not have been admitted and considered
by the jury.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting Exhibit 3 under the business-records exception.
B. Exhibit 4 was properly admitted as nonhearsay.
The district court admitted Exhibit 4, determining that it was nonhearsay because it
was not offered for its truth. Exhibit 4 show s the same information as Exhibit 3 for the
years 2004 to 2013, but the bills in Exhibit 4 are on paper with Eric’s business letterhead.
As noted above, Eric testified that the bills included in Exhibit 4 are “recreations” of bills
included in Exhibit 3 and that he created the Exhibit 4 bills after purchasing a computer in
2014. The district court reasoned that Exhibit 4 was not offered for its truth and was instead
“offered to establish that [Eri c] wanted some sort of form alization of documents.” We
agree.
A statement is hearsay only if it is offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Here, the truth of the matter asserted in Exhibit 4 is that the
descriptions of Eric’s farm services and th e dollar figures contained in Eric’s bills are

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accurate representations of his time and labor. When seeking to admit the exhibit, however,
plaintiff’s attorney told the district court that he was offering the exhibit to show that Eric
“tried to formalize his invoices that he already had” because he “had concerns in 2014 with
respect to his parents transferring the 80 acres to him.” The record supports that this was
indeed the purpose of admitting th e exhibit. The bills included in Exhibit 4 list the same
charges as those shown on the bills included in Exhibit 3 and differ only in the form in
which the information is pres ented. As such, Exhibit 4 would have been needlessly
duplicative if it had been admitted for its truth. Because Exhibit 4 was not admitted for its
truth, the district court properly admitted it as nonhearsay.
Conclusion
In sum, Lynn is not entitled to JMOL beca use, viewing the ev idence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, there was clear and convincing evidence of an oral contract
for the 80-acre parcel, and that contract wa s removed from the statute of frauds under the
part-performance exception. Likewise, Lynn is not entitled to a new trial because the
district court properly admitted the exhibits showing Eric’s annual farm-services bills. The
district court did not err in denying Lynn’s posttrial motions.
Affirmed.