State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0680

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony Dale Klitzke,
Appellant.

Filed July 19, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-28231

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Melissa Sheridan, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After entering a “straight plea” for in tentional second-d egree murder and
second-degree assault for shooting and killi ng one man and injuring another at a house
party, appellant Antho ny Klitzke sought to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court,

2
finding that allowing Klitzke to withdraw his plea would un fairly prejudice the state,
denied his motion. Klitzke appeals. Because the plea was made voluntarily and
intelligently, withdrawal would cause prejudice to the state, and Klitzke’s pro se arguments
are either forfeited or unwarranted, we affirm.
FACTS
In early 2018, a man was killed at a house party in south Minneapolis. According
to the complaint, law enforcement officers responded to a call and found an adult male,
D.D., lying on the sidewalk outside the home. The officers pronounced him dead at the
scene. Witnesses told the o fficers that while they were standing outside smoking, an
individual—later identified as appellant Anthony Klitzke —approached and pointed a
handgun at the group. He fired multiple shot s and fled. Witnesses also reported that the
same shooter shot another victim, C.S., in the thigh. Following an investigation, the state
ultimately charged Klitzke with intentional second-degree murder, second-degree felony
murder (assault), and seco nd-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.19, subds. 1(1), 2(1), .221, subd. 2 (2016). Klitzke was 17 at the time of the
offense and he was charged 22 days before he turned 18. The state also identified another
individual, C.O., as Klitzke’s co-defendant, and charged him with one count of aiding and
abetting murder and one count of aiding an offender.
A week before trial, defense counsel requested a continuance because he was
“inundated with discovery on a daily basis.” According to defense counsel, because the
state was still disclosing witness statements made that week, it would be unfai r to start a
trial without allowing the defense the opportun ity to investigate the new evidence. At a

3
hearing the day before jury selection, the di strict court denied the continuance request,
stating that defense counsel had “plenty of time” to review the evidence. The district court
additionally stated that it would cause “extre me prejudice” to the state and the court to
continue the matter because a ll the judges were “inundated with trials” and it would be
difficult to schedule a new hearing. At th e same hearing, the prosecuting attorney
announced that C.O. was granted a reduction in his sentence from the presumptive 306
months’ to 180 months’ imprisonment in exch ange for his plea and testimony against
Klitzke. The state then offe red a plea deal to Klitzke: plead guilty to intentional
second-degree murder and receive a “botto m of the box” sentence of 261 months’
imprisonment. The prosecuting attorney said the offer would expire when the jury was
sworn. Klitzke declined.
During jury selection, the prosecuting attorney reiterated the offer and said it would
expire the following day when the jury was sworn in. Klitzke again declined. But Klitzke
asked if he could speak with his mother prior to making a decision, which the district court
permitted.
The next morning, Klitzke made a “str aight plea” to the charged offenses—two
counts of second-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder.
1 There was no
discussion on the record about what made Klitzke change his mind or why he did not take
the state’s plea deal. Klitzke entered a Norgaard plea, claiming he was too intoxicated to
remember important details the night of the murder but that there was an adequate factual

1 A straight plea is a plea with no “agreement regarding sentencing.” State v. Sanchez-
Sanchez, 879 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Minn. 2016).

4
basis against him should he go to trial. 2 Klitzke acknowledged that he talked through the
Norgaard plea with his attorney and that he un derstood what he was doing by pleading
guilty and giving up his right to a jury trial. Klitzke explicitly agreed that he was not opting
for the state’s plea agreement and that he understood what he was doing, stating:
DEFENSE: Your head is cl ear and you understand what
you’re doing?
KLITZKE: Yes.
. . . .
DEFENSE: If the judge accepts your plea here today, we
proceed towards sentencing after presentence
investigation and everything else the court does
in between your plea and sentencing. You
understand that?
KLITZKE: Yes.
DEFENSE: And that by pl eading open, we’re not
necessarily—we don’t have any plea agreement
with the state as to how you’re going to be
sentenced. You understand that?
KLITZKE: Yes.
DEFENSE: And that we’re going to present who you are to
the judge and she’s goin g to get facts from all
sides and then she will make a decision at the
time of sentencing as to what your ultimate
sentence would be?
KLITZKE: Yes.
DEFENSE: And knowing all th at, you still wish to go
forward?
KLITZKE: Yes.
Klitzke then affirmed the following facts: he went to a party and was intoxicated after
taking ecstasy, marijuana, alcohol, and Xanax; he was there with co-defendant C.O.; C.O.
handed him a gun and asked him to intimidate or shoot D.D.; someone shot D.D. who later
died from gunshot wounds; someone also shot C.S.; and witnesses and other physical

2 See State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1961).

5
evidence associated with Klitzke —including his house keys a nd flip flops fo und next to
D.D.’s body—connected Klitzke to the scene. He additionally agreed that a jury would
likely find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that he was not claiming to be
innocent. The district cour t found that there was suffici ent evidence to support guilty
verdicts and that Klitzke entered his guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
But, in the court-ordered pr esentence investigation (PSI), Klitzke changed his story.
While he maintained that he was extremely intoxicated wh en the shooting occurred, he
said he remembered most of what happened at the party. He claimed he was with a
previously undisclosed witness in the bathroom taking ecstasy when he heard gunshots.
He ran out of the hous e and believed that C.O. might have shot and killed D.D. Klitzke
denied his guilt, stating:
I pled that there is evidence that could convict me, but I did not
admit guilt. But I pled to that a jury might find me guilty. But
I never had the gun. I did not shoot [D.D.]. The case against
me is purely circumstantial, and there is no real evidence. And
the judge told me that I am getting between 180 and 261, the
bottom of the box. She said she would not go lower than my
codefendant and would not go higher than the bottom of the
box.

The presentence investigator recommended th e presumptive sentence of 306 months for
second-degree murder and a consecutive sentence of 36 months for second-degree assault.
At the originally scheduled sentenci ng hearing, defense counsel requested a
continuance based on the statements made in the PSI, which had been released four days
earlier. The state objected, arguing that a cont inuance would be prejudicial to their case,
particularly now that the state’s main w itness, C.O., had been sentenced and had no

6
obligation to testify against Klitzke if the plea was withdrawn. The district court granted
a short continuance. In the meantime, Klitzke filed a moti on to withdraw his Norgaard
plea.
At the rescheduled sentencing hearing, K litzke argued that the district court should
allow him to withdraw his plea for three reasons: (1) he lacked the maturity to understand
the criminal justice system and the gravity of his plea because he was a juvenile when the
offenses occurred; (2) he was pressured to plead guilty because two of the state’s witnesses
had added incriminating details to their statements; and (3 ) an alibi witness that was
previously unknown to defense counsel was identified in the PSI. The state argued that the
reasons were not adequate and that withdraw al would cause “extrem e prejudice” against
it.
The district court denied the motion, ruling that Klitzke failed to provide a fair-and-
just reason to grant the motion. The distri ct court emphasized the amount of time that
Klitzke had to discuss his plea with his attorney and to contact the alibi witness, and stated
that the timing of the withdrawal motion was “suspicious,” adding that it believed Klitzke
panicked after seeing the PSI which was “not a good report for [him].” As for prejudice,
the district court stated that the testimony of the state’s witness wa s “very valuable,” and
the loss of the testimony showed extreme prejudice to the state “just on that factor alone.”
The district court then sentenced Klitzke to 367 months in pr ison for intentional
second-degree murder and a concurrent sentence of 36 months in prison for second-degree
assault.
Klitzke appeals.

7
DECISION
I. Denying Klitzke’s presente ncing motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not an
abuse of discretion.

Klitzke appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
arguing that it would be fair and just to do so because his plea was not voluntary or
intelligent, and that the state did not demonstrate prejudice.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). Guilty pleas may only be withdrawn if
one of two standards are met: (1) at any time , a plea withdrawal must be permitted if
“necessary to correct a manife st injustice”; or (2) a plea may be withdrawn before
sentencing when it is fair and just to do so. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subds. 1-2. The
constitutional validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. But we review a di strict court’s decision to deny a motion to
withdraw before sentencing for an abuse of discretion will rarely reverse that decision. Id.
at 97.
Under the less burdensome fair-and-just standard, the defendant bears the burden of
providing reasons supporting withdrawal, while the state bears the burden of showing it
would be prejudiced by withdrawal. Id. We defer to the credibility determinations made
by a district court during a plea hearing. State v. Aviles-Alvarez , 561 N.W.2d 523, 527
(Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 11, 1997). Although it is a lower burden,
the fair-and-just standard “does not allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for simply
any reason.” State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

8
Allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty pl ea “for any reason or without good reason”
would “undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.” Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263,
266 (Minn. 1989). Regardless of which standard is applied, a plea must be valid, meaning
that it must be accurate, vol untary, and intelligent. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646. Here,
Klitzke argues only that his plea was not intellig ently or voluntarily made, thus we focus
our analysis on those factors.
Intelligence
First, Klitzke contends that his plea was not intelligent. The intelligence
requirement guarantees that a defendant “under stands the charges against him, the rights
he is waiving, and the c onsequences of his plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (citing
State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983)). A defendant bears the burden of
showing his plea was invalid. Id. at 94. Counsel does not need to explain “ every
consequence” for a plea to be intelligent. Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 823
(Minn. 2016). But the defendant must know of the direct consequenc es of a plea, which
are “definite, immediate, and automatic and are punitive a nd a part of a defendant’s
sentence.” State v. Brown, 896 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted),
review denied (Minn. July 18, 2017). Direct cons equences of a guilty plea primarily
include the maximum sentence and fine. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
Here, when asked about his plea, Klitzke stated that he unde rstood what he was
doing, and that the district court would ma ke a decision and determine “the ultimate
sentence.” In his petition to enter a plea of guilty, Klitzke also acknowledged that he read
the criminal complaint, discussed it with his attorney, and understood that he could receive

9
a sentence between 306 and 416 months in prison, that his open plea could be subject to a
downward departure based on his PSI, and that he was giving up hi s right to a jury trial.
For these reasons, Klitzke’s guilty plea was intelligent.
Still, Klitzke argues that his plea was not intelligent because he was not an adult
when he committed the crime and because making an open plea instead of taking the state’s
plea deal was illogical. Neither argument is persuasive. First, while Klitzke was 17 when
he committed the crime, he was 20 years old when he pleaded guilty. He also had over
two years from the date he was charged to jury selection to consult with his lawyer and
consider the potential consequences of his situ ation. Nor is there any indication in the
record or his argument that Klitzke was unable to understand the consequences of his plea.
Second, with regard to his decision to make an open plea, Klitzke affirmatively agreed that
there was no plea agreement with the state when he pleaded guilty, and that he understood
the judge would be determini ng his sentence. This demons trates that he understood the
implication of entering a straight plea.
In sum, Klitzke did not meet his burden of showin g that his guilty plea was
unintelligent.
Voluntariness
Klitzke also argues that his plea was in voluntary. The purpose of requiring guilty
pleas to be voluntary is to ensure that th e defendant “is not pleading guilty because of
improper pressures.” Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251. Improper pressure or coercion generally
comes from an external source, such as a threat or promise made to induce a defendant to
plead guilty. Nelson v. State , 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016); State v. Brown ,

10
606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (“A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or
unfulfillable promises . . . .”). Whether a plea is voluntary is determined by considering
all relevant circumstances. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994).
Here, the record does not reflect that K litzke based his plea on any external threats
or promises. Klitzke did not no te any outside pressures to pl ead guilty, either in court or
in the PSI. His signed plea petition states that no person or entity made promises or
threatened him into a plea. And, at least according to the prosec uting attorney, Klitzke
chose a straight plea instead of a plea negotiati on with the state becaus e he felt that “the
court would be more sympathetic.” For these reasons Klitzke’s guilty plea was voluntary.
But Klitzke contends that he was under stress to plea d guilty because one witness
“changed his story to include more detailed and incriminating claims,” and another witness
gave additional incriminating details after being granted immunity. Neither the timing of
the witness disclosures nor their incriminating nature amounts to coercion. With regard to
timing, the state provided the first witness’s statements months be fore Klitzke pleaded
guilty, and the second witness’s statements were disclosed the day they were made—three
weeks before the trial was set to begin. And the possibility that the witnesses’ statements
would hurt Klitzke at trial is not an improper pressure. See State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712,
719 (Minn. 1994) (stating that an improper pressure involves “actual or threatened physical
harm, or by mental coercion ov erbearing the will of the defe ndant” (quotation omitted)).
In light of all the relevant circumstances, Klitzke did not meet hi s burden demonstrating
that his plea was involuntary.

11
In sum, because Klitzke did not meet his burden to demonstrate that his guilty plea
was either unintelligent or invol untary, he did not show that it would be fair and just to
allow a plea withdrawal.3 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Klitzke’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
II. Pro se Supplemental Brief
Finally, Klitzke raises a host of issues in his pro se supplemental brief. Included are
allegations that (1) a witness lied; (2) disc overy was sent late; (3 ) Klitzke’s attorney
misrepresented the plea; (4) the judge was biased; (5) the state lied about offering multiple
plea offers; (6) the investigators coerced witnesses; and (7) Klitzke did not understand the
plea agreement.
Here, for the bulk of the raised issues, Klitzke cites no precedential legal authority
in support of his assertions. 4 As such, the assertions are forfeited. State v. Krosch ,
642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002); see also State v. DeWalt, 757 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn.
App. 2008) (declining to addre ss pro se arguments that are fu lly addressed in the public
defender’s appellate brief).

3 Because Klitzke failed to demonstrate fair a nd just reasons for withdrawal, we need not
reach whether the state showed that a plea withdrawal would re sult in prejudice.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98. Regardless, the state demonstrated that it would be prejudiced
because the state lost their ability to compel testimony from Klitzke’s co-defendant—who
would have testified that he handed the gun to Klitzke and ordered him to shoot the victim.
The co-defendant’s sentencing went forward on the belief that Klitzke was also pleading
guilty on the same day.
4 Five of the arguments did not rise above mere assertion. Addi tionally, two of those
assertions, that the prosecution disclosed late discovery and that Klitzke did not understand
his plea, were also raised by his attorney in briefing and addressed above.

12
Klitzke cites to precedential authority in only one of the arguments, contending that
his attorney misrepresented the plea. For this ar gument, Klitzke cites to State v. Bobo ,
770 N.W.2d 129 (Minn. 2009). In Bobo, the defendant argued that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his attorney chose to cross- examine a witness, allowing
damaging grand jury testimony to be entered into the record. Id. at 136, 138. It is unclear
how Bobo is analogous to Klitzke’s case, not only because he cites it in reference to his
attorney urging him to enter a straight plea in order to get a lower sentence from the district
court, but also because the supreme court in Bobo did not find the representation to be
ineffective. Id. at 138-39. The supreme court instea d found that the attorney’s faulty
actions were based on tria l strategy, which is not subject to review. Id. at 138. Because
Klitzke does not demonstrate how his attorney misrepresented the plea or otherwise erred,
this argument is unwarranted.
Considering this appeal as a whole, because Klitzke did not demonstrate that it was
fair and just to allow a plea withdrawal, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Klitzke’s motion to wi thdraw his guilty plea. And fu rther, the issues raised in
Klitzke’s pro se supplemental brief are unreviewable for failing to cite to relevant authority
or not rising above mere assertions.
Affirmed.